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*ALCIPHRON:*  
OR, THE  
MINUTE PHILOSOPHER.  
IN  
SEVEN DIALOGUES.

*Containing an APOLOGY for the Christian Religion,  
against those who are called Free-thinkers.*

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VOLUME *the* FIRST.

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*They have forsaken me the Fountain of living waters, and hewed them  
out cisterns, broken cisterns that can hold no water. Jerem. ii. 13.*

*Sin mortuus, ut quidam minuti Philosophi censent, nihil sentiam, non  
vereor ne hunc errorem meum mortui Philosophi irrideant.*

Cicero.

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## ADVERTISEMENT.

**T**HE Author's Design being to consider the Free-thinker in the various Lights of Atheist, Libertine, Enthusiast, Scornor, Critic, Metaphysician, Fatalist, and Sceptic, it must not therefore be imagined, that every one of these Characters agrees with every individual Free-thinker, no more being implied, than that each Part agrees with some or other of the Sect. There may possibly be a Reader who shall think the Character of Atheist agrees with none: But though it hath been often said, there is no such thing as a Speculative Atheist; yet we must allow, there are several Atheists who pretend to Speculation. This the Author knows to be true; and is well assured, that one of the most noted Writers against Christianity in our Times, declared, he had found out a Demonstration against the Being of a God. And he doubts not, whoever will be at the pains

A

to

## ADVERTISEMENT.

to inform himself, by a general Conversation, as well as Books, of the Principles and Tenets of our modern Free-thinkers, will see too much Cause to be persuaded that nothing in the ensuing Characters is beyond the Life. As for the Treatise concerning VISION, why the Author annexed it to the MINUTE PHILOSOPHER, will appear upon Perusal of the Fourth Dialogue.

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THE




# THE MINUTE PHILOSOPHER.

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## The FIRST DIALOGUE.

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- I.  Flattered my self, *Theages*, that before this time I might have been able to have sent you an agreeable Account of the Success of the Affair, which brought me into this remote corner of the Country. But instead of this, I shou'd now give you the Detail of its Miscarriage,
- B if

if I did not rather choose to entertain you with some amusing Incidents, which have helped to make me easy under a Circumstance I cou'd neither obviate nor foresee. Events are not in our power; but it always is, to make a good use even of the very worst. And I must needs own, the Course and Event of this Affair gave opportunity for Reflections, that make me some amends for a great loss of Time, Pains, and Expence. A Life of Action, which takes its Issue from the Counsels, Passions, and Views of other Men, if it doth not draw a Man to imitate, will at least teach him to observe. And a Mind at liberty to reflect on its own Observations, if it produce nothing useful to the World, seldom fails of Entertainment to it self. For several Months past I have enjoy'd such Liberty and Leisure in this distant Retreat, far beyond the Verge of that great Whirlpool of Business, Faction, and Pleasure, which is called *the World*. And a Retreat in it self agreeable, after a long Scene of Trouble and Disquiet, was made much more so by the Conversation and good Qualities of my Host *Euphranor*, who unites in his own Person the Philosopher and the Farmer, two Characters not so inconsistent in nature as by Custom they seem to be. *Euphranor*, from the time he left the University, hath lived in this small Town, where he is possessed of a convenient House with a hundred Acres of Land adjoining to it; which being improved by his own Labour, yield him a plentiful Subsistence. He hath a good Collection, chiefly of old Books, left him by a Clergyman his Uncle, under whose Care he was brought up. And the Business of his Farm doth not hinder him from making good use of it. He hath read much, and thought more; his Health and Strength of Body enabling him the better to bear Fatigue of Mind. He is of opinion that he cou'd not carry on his Studies with more Advantage in the Closet than the Field, where his Mind is seldom idle while he prunes the Trees, follows the Plough, or looks after his Flocks. In the House of this honest Friend

Friend I became acquainted with *Crito*, a neighbouring Gentleman of distinguished Merit and Estate, who lives in great Friendship with *Euphranor*. Last Summer, *Crito*, whose Parish Church is in our Town, dining on a Sunday at *Euphranor*'s, I happened to inquire after his Guests, whom we had seen at Church with him the Sunday before. They are both well, said *Crito*, but, having once occasionally conformed, to see what sort of Assembly our Parish cou'd afford, they had no farther Curiosity to gratify at Church, and so chose to stay at home. How, said *Euphranor*, are they then Dissenters? No, replied *Crito*, they are Free-thinkers. *Euphranor*, who had never met with any of this Species or Sect of Men, and but little of their Writings, shew'd a great Desire to know their Principles or System. That is more, said *Crito*, than I will undertake to tell you. Their Writers are of different Opinions. Some go farther, and explain themselves more freely than others. But the current general Notions of the Sect are best learned from Conversation with those who profess themselves of it. Your Curiosity may now be satisfy'd, if you and *Dion* wou'd spend a Week at my House with these Gentlemen, who seem very ready to declare and propagate their Opinions. *Alciphron* is above Forty, and no stranger either to Men or Books. I knew him first at the Temple, which, upon an Estate's falling to him, he quitted, to travel through the polite parts of *Europe*. Since his Return he hath lived in the Amusements of the Town, which being grown stale and tasteless to his Palate, have flung him into a sort of splenetic Indolence. The young Gentleman, *Lyficles*, is a near Kinsman of mine, one of lively Parts, and a general Insight into Letters, who, after having passed the Forms of Education, and seen a little of the World, fell into an Intimacy with Men of Pleasure, and Free-thinkers, I am afraid much to the damage of his Constitution and his Fortune. But what I most regret, is the Corruption of his Mind by a Set of pernicious Prin-

ciples, which, having been observed to survive the Passions of Youth, forestal even the remote Hopes of Amendment. They are both Men of Fashion, and wou'd be agreeable enough, if they did not fancy themselves Free-thinkers. But this, to speak the Truth, has given them a certain Air and Manner, which a little too visibly declare they think themselves wiser than the rest of the World. I shou'd therefore be not at all displeased if my Guests met with their Match, where they least expected it, in a Country Farmer. I shall not, replied *Euphranor*, pretend to any more than barely to inform my self of their Principles and Opinions. For this end I propose tomorrow to set a Week's Task to my Labourers, and accept your Invitation, if *Dion* thinks good. To which I give consent. Mean while, said *Crito*, I shall prepare my Guests, and let them know that an honest Neighbour hath a mind to discourse them on the Subject of their Free-thinking. And, if I am not much mistaken, they will please themselves with the Prospect of leaving a Convert behind them, even in a Country Village. Next Morning *Euphanor* rose early, and spent the Forenoon in ordering his Affairs. After Dinner we took our Walk to *Crito's*, which lay through half a dozen pleasant Fields planted round with Plane-trees, that are very common in this part of the Country. We walked under the delicious Shade of these Trees for about an Hour before we came to *Crito's* House, which stands in the middle of a small Park, beautify'd with two fine Groves of Oak and Walnut, and a winding Stream of sweet and clear Water. We met a Servant at the Door with a small Basket of Fruit which he was carrying into a Grove, where he said his Master was with the two Strangers, we found them all three sitting under a Shade. And after the usual Forms at first meeting, *Euphranor* and I sat down by them. Our Conversation began upon the Beauty of this rural Scene, the fine Season of the Year, and some late Improvements which had been made



made in the adjacent Country by new Methods of Agriculture. Whence *Alciphron* took occasion to observe, That the most valuable Improvements came latest. I should have small Temptation, said he, to live where Men have neither polished Manners, nor improved Minds, though the Face of the Country were ever so well improved. But I have long observed, that there is a gradual Progress in humane Affairs. The first Care of Mankind is to supply the Cravings of Nature; in the next place they study the Conveniencies and Comforts of Life. But the subduing Prejudices, and acquiring true Knowledge, that *Herculean* Labour is the last, being what demands the most perfect Abilities, and to which all other Advantages are preparative. Right, said *Euphranor*, *Alciphron* hath touched our true Defect. It was always my Opinion, That as soon as we had provided Subsistence for the Body, our next Care should be to improve the Mind. But the Desire of Wealth steps between and engrosseth Mens Thoughts.

II. *ALC.* Thought is that which we are told distinguisheth Man from Beast; and Freedom of Thought makes as great a difference between Man and Man. It is to the noble Asserters of this Privilege and Perfection of humane Kind, the Free-thinkers I mean, who have sprung up and multiplied of late Years, that we are indebted for all those important Discoveries, that Ocean of Light which hath broke in and made its way, in spite of Slavery and Superstition. *Euphranor*, who is a sincere Enemy to both, testified a great Esteem for those Worthies who had preserved their Country from being ruined by them, having spread so much Light and Knowledge over the Land. He added, That he liked the Name and Character of a Free-thinker: but in his Sense of the Word, every honest Inquirer after Truth in any Age or Country was intitled to it. He therefore desired to know what this Sect was that *Alciphron* had spoken

of as newly sprung up; what were their Tenets; what were their Discoveries; and wherein they employ'd themselves, for the benefit of Mankind? Of all which, he shou'd think himself obliged, if *Alciphron* wou'd inform him. That I shall very easily, replied *Alciphron*, for I profess myself one of the number, and my most intimate Friends are some of the most considerable among them. And perceiving that *Euphranor* heard him with respect, he proceeded very fluently. You must know, said he, that the mind of Man may be fitly compared to a piece of Land. What stubbing, plowing, digging and harrowing is to the one, that thinking, reflecting, examining is to the other. Each hath its proper culture; and as Land that is suffered to lie waste and wild for a long tract of time will be overspread with brush-wood, brambles, thorns and such vegetables which have neither use nor beauty; even so there will not fail to sprout up in a neglected uncultivated mind, a great number of prejudices and absurd opinions, which owe their origin partly to the Soil it self, the passions and imperfections of the mind of Man, and partly to those Seeds which chance to be scattered in it by every wind of Doctrine, which the cunning of Statesmen, the singularity of Pedants, the superstition of Fools or the imposture of Priests shall raise. Represent to your self the mind of Man or humane Nature in general, that for so many ages had lain obnoxious to the frauds of designing and the follies of weak Men. How it must be over-run with prejudices and errors, what firm and deep Roots they must have taken, and consequently how difficult a task it must be to extirpate them? And yet this work no less difficult than glorious is the employment of the modern Free-thinkers. *Alciphron* having said this made a pause, and looked round on the Company. Truly, said I, a very laudable undertaking! We think, said *Euphranor*, that it is praise-worthy to clear and subdue the earth, to tame brute Animals, to fashion the outsides of Men, provide

vide sustenance for their Bodies, and cure their Maladies. But what is all this in comparison of that most excellent and useful undertaking to free Mankind from their errors, and to improve and adorn their minds? For things of less merit towards the world, Altars have been raised and Temples built in antient times. Too many in our days, replied *Alciphron*, are such Fools as not to know their best Benefactors from their worst Enemies. They have a blind respect for those who enslave them, and look upon their Deliverers as a dangerous sort of Men that wou'd undermine received Principles and Opinions. *EUPH.* It were a great pity such worthy ingenious Men shou'd meet with any discouragement. For my part I shou'd think, a Man who spent his time in such a painful impartial search after Truth a better friend to Mankind than the greatest Statesman or Hero, the advantage of whose Labours is confined to a little part of the world, and a short space of time, whereas a Ray of Truth may enlighten the whole world and extend to future ages. *ALC.* It will be some time I fear before the common herd think as you do. But the better sort, the Men of parts and polite Education pay a due regard to the Patrons of Light and Truth.

III. *EUPH.* The Clergy no doubt are on all occasions ready to forward and applaud your worthy endeavours. Upon hearing this *Lyficles* cou'd hardly refrain from laughing. And *Alciphron* with an air of pity told *Euphranor* that he perceived he was unacquainted with the real character of those Men. For, saith he, you must know that of all Men living they are our greatest Enemies. If it were possible they wou'd extinguish the very light of nature, turn the world into a dungeon, and keep mankind for ever in Chains and darkness. *EUPH.* I never imagined any thing like this of our Protestant Clergy, particularly those of the established Church, whom, if I may be allowed to judge by what I have seen of them and

their writings, I shou'd have thought lovers of learning and useful knowledge. *ALC.* Take my word for it, Priests of all Religions are the same, wherever there are Priests there will be Priestcraft, and wherever there is Priestcraft there will be a persecuting Spirit, which they never fail to exert to the utmost of their power against all those who have the courage to think for themselves, and will not submit to be hoodwinked and manacled by their Reverend Leaders. Those great Masters of Pedantry and Jargon have coined several Systems, which are all equally true and of equal importance to the world. The contending Sects are each alike fond of their own, and alike prone to discharge their fury upon all who dissent from them. Cruelty and Ambition being the darling vices of Priests and Churchmen all the world over, they endeavour in all Countries to get an ascendant over the rest of mankind, and the Magistrate having a joint interest with the Priest in subduing, amusing, and fearing the People, too often lends a hand to the Hierarchy, who never think their authority and possessions secure, so long as those who differ from them in opinion are allowed to partake even in the common rights belonging to their birth or species. To represent the matter in a true light, figure to your selves a monster or spectre made up of Superstition and Enthusiasm, the joint issue of Statecraft and Priestcraft, rattling chains in one hand and with the other brandishing a flaming Sword over the Land, and menacing destruction to all who shall dare to follow the dictates of Reason and common Sense. Do but consider this, and then say if there was not danger as well as difficulty in our undertaking. Yet, such is the generous ardour that Truth inspires, our Free-thinkers are neither overcome by the one nor daunted by the other. In spite of both we have already made so many Profelytes among the better sort, and their numbers increase so fast, that we hope we shall be able to carry all before us, beat down the Bulwarks of all Tyranny,

Secular

Secular or Ecclesiastical, break the Fetters and Chains of our Countrymen, and restore the original inherent Rights, Liberties, and Prerogatives of Mankind. *Euphranor* heard this discourse with his mouth open and his eyes fixed upon *Alciphron*, who, having uttered it with no small emotion, stopt to draw breath and recover himself; But finding that no body made answer he resumed the thread of his discourse, and turning to *Euphranor* spoke in a lower note what follows. The more innocent and honest a Man is, the more liable is he to be imposed on by the specious pretences of other Men. You have probably met with certain writings of our Divines that treat of grace, virtue, goodness and such matters fit to amuse and deceive a simple honest mind. But believe me when I tell you they are all at bottom (however they may gild their designs) united by one common principle in the same Interest. I will not deny there may be here and there a poor half-witted Man that means no mischief; but this I will be bold to say that all the Men of Sense among them are true at bottom to these three pursuits of ambition, avarice and revenge.

IV. While *Alciphron* was speaking, a Servant came to tell him and *Lyficles*, that some Men who were going to *London* waited to receive their orders. Whereupon they both rose up and went towards the house. They were no sooner gone, but *Euphranor* addressing himself to *Crito* said, he believed that poor Gentleman had been a great sufferer for his Free-thinking, for that he seemed to express himself with the passion and Resentment natural to Men who have received very bad usage. I believe no such thing, answered *Crito*, but have often observed those of his Sect run into two faults of conversation, declaiming and bantering, just as the tragic or the comic humour prevails. Sometimes they work themselves into high passions and are frightened at Spectres of their own raising. In those fits every Country Curate passes for

for an Inquisitor. At other times they affect a fly facetious manner, making use of hints and allusions, expressing little, insinuating much, and upon the whole seeming to divert themselves with the Subject and their Adversaries. But if you wou'd know their opinions you must make them speak out and keep close to the point. Persecution for Free-thinking is a topic they are apt to enlarge on though without any just cause, every one being at full liberty to think what he pleases, there being no such thing in *England* that I know as Persecution for opinion, sentiment, or thought. But in every Country, I suppose, some care is taken to restrain petulant Speech, and, whatever Mens inward thoughts may be, to discourage an outward contempt of what the public esteemeth Sacred. Whether this care in *England* hath of late been so excessive, as to distress the Subjects of this once free and easy Government, whether the Free-thinkers can truly complain of any hardship upon the score of conscience or opinion, you will better be able to judge, when you hear from themselves an account of the numbers, progress and notions of their Sect: which I doubt not they will communicate fully and freely, provided no body present seem shocked or offended. For in that case it is possible good manners may put them upon some reserve. Oh! said *Euphranor*, I am never angry with any Man for his opinion whether he be *Jew*, *Turk* or *Idolater*, he may speak his mind freely to me without fear of offending. I shou'd even be glad to hear what he hath to say, provided he saith it in an ingenuous candid manner. Whoever digs in the Mine of Truth I look on as my Fellow-labourer, but if, while I am taking true pains, he diverts himself with teizing me and flinging Dust in mine Eyes, I shall soon be tired of him.

V. In the meantime *Alciphron* and *Lyficles* having dispatched what they went about returned to us. *Lyficles* sat down where he had been before. But *Alciphron*

*phron* stood over-against us, with his arms folded across, and his head reclined on the left shoulder in the posture of a Man meditating. We sat silent not to disturb his thoughts; and after two or three Minutes he uttered these words, oh Truth! oh Liberty! after which he remained musing as before. Upon this *Euphranor* took the freedom to interrupt him. *Alciphron*, said he, it is not fair to spend your time in Soliloquies. The conversation of learned and knowing Men is rarely to be met with in this corner, and the opportunity you have put into my Hands I value too much, not to make the best use of it. *ALC.* Are you then in earnest a Votary of Truth, and is it possible you shou'd bear the liberty of a fair Inquiry? *EUPH.* It is what I desire of all things. *ALC.* What! upon every Subject? upon the notions you first sucked in with your Milk, and which have been ever since nursed by parents, pastors, tutors, religious assemblies, books of Devotion and such methods of pre-possessing Mens minds. *EUPH.* I love information upon all Subjects that come in my way, and especially upon those that are most important. *ALC.* If then you are in earnest hold fair and stand firm, while I probe your prejudices and extirpate your principles.

*Dum veteres avias tibi de pulmone revello.*

Having said thus, *Alciphron* knit his brows and made a short pause, after which he proceeded in the following manner. If we are at the pains to dive and penetrate into the bottom of things, and analyse Opinions into their first principles, we shall find that those Opinions which are thought of greatest consequence have the slightest original, being derived either from the casual customs of the Country where we live, or from early instruction instilled into our tender minds, before we are able to discern between right and wrong, true and false. The Vulgar (by whom I understand all those who do not make a free use

use of their Reason) are apt to take these prejudices for things sacred and unquestionable, believing them to be imprinted on the hearts of men by God himself, or convey'd by Revelation from Heaven, or to carry with them so great light and evidence as must force an assent without any inquiry or examination. Thus the shallow Vulgar have their heads furnished with sundry conceits, principles and doctrines, religious, moral and political, all which they maintain with a zeal proportionable to their want of Reason. On the other hand, those who duly employ their faculties in the search of Truth, take especial care to weed out of their minds and extirpate all such notions or prejudices as were planted in them before they arrived at the free and intire use of Reason. This difficult task hath been successfully performed by our modern Free-thinkers, who have not only dissected with great Sagacity the received Systems, and traced every established prejudice to the fountain-head, the true and genuine motives of assent : But also, having been able to embrace in one comprehensive view the several parts and ages of the World, they observed a wonderful variety of Customs and Rites, of Institutions Religious and Civil, of Notions and Opinions very unlike and even contrary one to another : A certain sign they cannot all be true. And yet they are all maintained by their several Partisans with the same positive air and warm zeal, and if examined will be found to bottom on one and the same Foundation, the strength of prejudice. By the help of these Remarks and Discoveries, they have broke through the bands of popular Custom, and having freed themselves from Imposture do now generously lend a hand to their Fellow Subjects, to lead them into the same paths of Light and Liberty. Thus, Gentlemen, I have given you a summary account of the views and endeavours of those Men who are called Free-thinkers. If in the course of what I have said or shall say hereafter, there be some things contrary to your pre-conceived Opinions,



nions, and therefore shocking and disagreeable, you will pardon the freedom and plainness of a Philosopher, and consider that, whatever displeasure I give you of that kind, I do it in strict regard to Truth and Obedience to your own commands. I am very sensible, that Eyes long kept in the dark cannot bear a sudden view of noon day light, but must be brought to it by degrees. It is for this Reason, the ingenious Gentlemen of our Profession are accustomed to proceed gradually, beginning with those prejudices to which Men have the least Attachment, and thence proceeding to undermine the rest by slow and insensible degrees, till they have demolished the whole Fabric of Human Folly and Superstition. But the little time I can propose to spend here obligeth me to take a shorter course, and be more direct and plain than possibly may be thought to suit with Prudence and good Manners. Upon this, we assured him he was at full liberty to speak his mind of Things, Persons and Opinions without the least reserve. It is a liberty, replied *Alciphron*, that we Free-thinkers are equally willing to give and take. We love to call things by their right Names, and cannot endure that Truth shou'd suffer through Complaisance. Let us therefore lay it down for a Preliminary, that no offence be taken at any thing whatsoever shall be said on either side. To which we all agreed.

VI. In order then, said *Alciphron*, to find out the Truth, we will suppose that I am bred up, for instance in the Church of *England*. When I come to maturity of Judgment and reflect on the particular Worship and Opinions of this Church, I do not remember when or by what means they first took possession of my mind, but there I find them from time immemorial. Then casting an Eye on the Education of Children, from whence I can make a judgment of my own, I observe they are instructed in religious matters before they can reason about them, and consequently

frequently that all such instruction is nothing else but filling the tender mind of a Child with prejudices. I do therefore reject all those religious notions, which I consider as the other Follies of my Childhood. I am confirmed in this way of thinking, when I look abroad into the World, where I observe Papists and several Sects of Dissenters which do all agree in a general profession of Belief in Christ, but differ vastly one from another in the particulars of Faith and Worship. I then enlarge my View so as to take in *Jews* and *Mahometans*, between whom and the Christians I perceive indeed some small agreement in the Belief of one God; but then they have each their distinct Laws and Revelations, for which they express the same regard. But extending my view still further to Heathenish and Idolatrous Nations I discover an endless variety, not only in particular Opinions and Modes of Worship, but even in the very notion of a Deity, wherein they widely differ one from another, and from all the forementioned Sects. Upon the whole, instead of Truth simple and uniform I perceive nothing but Discord, Opposition and wild Pretensions, all springing from the same source to wit the prejudice of Education. From such reasonings and reflections as these, thinking Men have concluded that all Religions are alike false and fabulous. One is a Christian, another a Jew, a third a Mahometan, a fourth an Idolatrous Gentile, but all from one and the same reason, because they happen to be bred up each in his respective Sect. In the same manner, therefore, as each of these contending Parties condemns the rest, so an unprejudiced stander-by will condemn and reject them all together, observing that they all draw their origin from the same fallacious Principle, and are carried on by the same Artifice to answer the same ends of the Priest and the Magistrate.

VII. *EUPH.* You hold then that the Magistrate concurs with the Priest in imposing on the People.

ple. *ALC.* I do, and so must every one who considers things in a true light. For you must know, the Magistrates principal aim is to keep the People under him in awe. Now the public Eye restrains Men from open Offences against the Laws and Government. But to prevent secret Transgressions a Magistrate finds it expedient, that Men shou'd believe there is an Eye of Providence watching over their private Actions and Designs. And, to intimidate those who might otherwise be drawn into Crimes by the prospect of Pleasure and Profit, he gives them to understand, that whoever escapes Punishment in this Life will be sure to find it in the next, and that so heavy and lasting as infinitely to over-balance the Pleasure and Profit accruing from his Crimes. Hence the Belief of a God, the Immortality of the Soul, and a future state of Rewards and Punishments have been esteemed useful Engines of Government. And to the end that these notional airy Doctrines might make a sensible impression, and be retained on the minds of Men, skilful Rulers have in the several civilized Nations of the Earth devised Temples, Sacrifices, Churches, Rites, Ceremonies, Habits, Music, Prayer, Preaching, and the like spiritual trumpery, whereby the Priest maketh temporal gains, and the Magistrate findeth his account in frightening and subduing the People. This is the original of the Combination between Church and State, of Religion by Law established, of rights, immunities and incomes of Priests all over the World: There being no Government but wou'd have you fear God that you may honour the King or civil Power. And you will ever observe that politic Princes keep up a good understanding with their Clergy, to the end that they in return, by inculcating Religion and Loyalty into the minds of the People, may render them tame, timorous and slavish. *Crito* and I heard this Discourse of *Alciphron* with the utmost attention, though without any appearance of surprize, there being indeed nothing

in it to us new or unexpected. But *Euphranor*, who had never before been present at such Conversation, cou'd not help shewing some Astonishment, which *Lyficles* observing, asked him with a lively Air, how he liked *Alciphron's* Lecture. It is, said he, the first I believe that you ever heard of the kind, and requireth a strong Stomach to digest it. *EUPH.* I will own to you that my Digestion is none of the quickest; but it hath sometimes, by degrees, been able to master things which at first appeared indigestible. At present I admire the free Spirit and Eloquence of *Alciphron*, but, to speak the Truth, I am rather astonished, than convinced of the Truth of his Opinions. How (said he turning to *Alciphron*) is it then possible you shou'd not believe the Being of a God? *ALC.* To be plain with you, I do not.

VIII. But this is what I foresaw, a Flood of Light let in at once upon the Mind being apt to dazzle and disorder, rather than enlighten it. Was I not pinched in Time, the regular way would be to have begun with the Circumstantials of Religion, next to have attacked the Mysteries of Christianity, after that proceeded to the practical Doctrines, and in the last place to have extirpated that which of all other religious Prejudices, being the first taught, and Basis of the rest, hath taken the deepest root in our Minds, I mean the Belief of a God. I do not wonder it sticks with you, having known several very ingenious Men who found it difficult to free themselves from this Prejudice. *EUPH.* All Men have not the same Alacrity and Vigour in thinking: for my own part, I find it a hard matter to keep pace with you. *ALC.* To help you, I will go a little way back, and resume the Thread of my Reasoning. First I must acquaint you, That having applied my Mind to contemplate the Idea of Truth, I discovered it to be of a stable, permanent, and uniform nature; not various and changeable, like Modes or Fashions, and things de-  
pending

pending on Fancy. In the next place, having observed several Sects and Subdivisions of Sects espousing very different and contrary Opinions, and yet all professing Christianity, I rejected those Points wherein they differed, retaining only that which was agreed to by all, and so became a *Latitudinarian*. Having afterwards, upon a more enlarged View of things, perceived that Christians, Jews, and Mahometans had each their different Systems of Faith, agreeing only in the Belief of one God, I became a *Deist*. Lastly, extending my View to all the other various Nations which inhabit this Globe, and finding they agreed in no one Point of Faith, but differed one from another, as well as from the forementioned Sects, even in the Notion of a God, in which there is as great Diversity as in the Methods of Worship, I thereupon became an *Atheist*: it being my Opinion that a Man of Courage and Sense shou'd follow his Argument wherever it leads him, and that nothing is more ridiculous than to be a Free-thinker by halves. I approve the Man who makes thorough Work, and not content with lopping off the Branches, extirpates the very Root from which they sprung.

IX. Atheism therefore, that Bugbear of Women and Fools, is the very Top and Perfection of Free-thinking. It is the grand *Arcanum* to which a true Genius naturally riseth, by a certain Climax or Gradation of Thought, and without which he can never possess his Soul in absolute Liberty and Repose. For your thorough Conviction in this main Article, do but examine the Notion of a God with the same Freedom that you would other Prejudices. Trace it to the fountain-head, and you shall not find that you had it by any of your Senses, the only true means of discovering what is real and substantial in Nature: You will find it lying amongst other old Lumber in some obscure corner of the Imagination, the proper Receptacle of Visions, Fancies, and Prejudices of all

kinds; and if you are more attached to this than the rest, it is only because it is the oldest. This is all, take my Word for it, and not mine only, but that of many more the most ingenious Men of the Age, who, I can assure you, think as I do on the Subject of a Deity. Though some of them hold it proper, to proceed with more Reserve in declaring to the World their Opinion in this Particular, than in most others. And it must be owned, there are still too many in *England* who retain a foolish Prejudice against the Name of Atheist. But it lessens every Day among the better sort: and when it is quite worn out, our Free-thinkers may then, (and not till then) be said to have given the finishing Stroke to Religion; it being evident that so long as the Existence of God is believed, Religion must subsist in some Shape or other. But the Root being once plucked up, the Scions which shot from it will of course wither and decay. Such are all those whimsical Notions of Conscience, Duty, Principle, and the like, which fill a Man's Head with Scruples, awe him with Fears, and make him a more thorough Slave than the Horse he rides. A Man had better a thousand times be hunted by Bailiffs or Messengers than haunted by these Spectres, which embarrass and embitter all his Pleasures, creating the most real and sore Servitude upon Earth. But the Free-thinker, with a vigorous flight of Thought breaks through those airy Springs, and asserts his original Independency. Others indeed may talk, and write, and fight about Liberty, and make an outward Pretence to it, but the Free-thinker alone is truly free. *Alciphron* having ended this Discourse with an Air of Triumph, *Euphranor* spoke to him in the following Manner. You make clear Work. The Gentlemen of your Profession are, it seems, admirable Weeders. You have rooted up a world of Notions, I shou'd be glad to see what fine things you have planted in their stead. *ALC.* Have Patience, good *Euphranor*. I will shew you in the first place, That whatever was  
found

found and good we leave untouched, and encourage it to grow in the Mind of Man. And secondly, I will shew you what excellent things we have planted in it. You must know then, that pursuing our close and severe Scrutiny, we do at last arrive at something solid and real, in which all Mankind agree, to wit, the Appetites, Passions, and Senses: These are founded in Nature, are real, have real Objects, and are attended with real and substantial Pleasures; Food, Drink, Sleep, and the like animal Enjoyments being what all Men like and love. And if we extend our view to the other kinds of Animals, we shall find them all agree in this, that they have certain natural Appetites and Senses, in the gratifying and satisfying of which they are constantly employ'd. Now these real natural good things which include nothing of Notion or Fancy, we are so far from destroying, that we do all we can to cherish and improve them. According to us, every wise Man looks upon himself, or his own bodily Existence in this present World, as the Center and ultimate End of all his Actions and Regards. He considers his Appetites as natural Guides directing to his proper Good, his Passions and Senses as the natural true Means of enjoying this Good. Hence he endeavours to keep his Appetites in high Relish, his Passions and Senses strong and lively, and to provide the greatest Quantity and Variety of real Objects suited to them, which he studieth to enjoy by all possible means, and in the highest Perfection imaginable. And the Man who can do this without Restraint, Remorse, or Fear, is as happy as any other Animal whatsoever, or as his Nature is capable of being. Thus I have given you a succinct View of the Principles, Discoveries, and Tenets of the select Spirits of this enlightned Age.

X. *Crito* remarked, that *Alciphron* had spoke his Mind with great Clearness. Yes, replied *Euphranor*, we are obliged to the Gentleman for letting us at once

into the Tenets of his Sect. But, if I may be allowed to speak my Mind, *Alciphron*, though in compliance with my own Request, hath given me no small Uneasiness. You need, said *Alciphron*, make no Apology for speaking freely what you think to one who professeth himself a Free-thinker. I shou'd be sorry to make one, whom I meant to oblige, uneasy. Pray let me know wherein I have offended. I am half ashamed, replied *Euphranor*, to own that I who am no great Genius have a Weakness incidental to little ones. I wou'd say that I have favourite Opinions, which you represent to be Errors and Prejudices. For Instance, the Immortality of the Soul is a Notion I am fond of, as what supports the Mind with a very pleasing Prospect. And if it be an Error, I shou'd perhaps be of *Tully's* Mind, who in that Case protested he shou'd be sorry to know the Truth, acknowledging no sort of Obligation to certain Philosophers in his Days, who taught the Soul of Man was mortal. They were, it seems, Predecessors to those who are now called Free-thinkers; which Name being too general and indefinite, inasmuch as it comprehends all those who think for themselves, whether they agree in Opinion with these Gentlemen or no, it shou'd not seem amiss to assign them a specific Appellation or peculiar Name, whereby to distinguish them from other Philosophers, at least in our present Conference. For I cannot bear to argue against Free-thinking and Free-thinkers. *ALC.* In the Eyes of a wise Man Words are of small moment. We do not think Truth attached to a Name. *EUPH.* If you please then, to avoid Confusion, let us call your Sect by the same Name that *Tully* (who understood the force of Language) bestow'd upon them. *ALC.* With all my heart. Pray what may that Name be? *EUPH.* Why, he calls them *Minute Philosophers*. Right, said *Crito*, the modern Free-thinkers are the very same with those *Cicero* called Minute Philosophers; which Name admirably suits them, they being a sort of



of Sect which diminish all the most valuable things, the thoughts, views, and hopes of Men ; all the Knowledge, Notions, and Theories of the Mind they reduce to Sense ; Humane Nature they contract and degrade to the narrow low Standard of Animal Life, and assign us only a small pittance of Time instead of Immortality. *Alciphron* very gravely remark'd, That the Gentlemen of his Sect had done no injury to Man, and that if he be a little, short-lived, contemptible Animal, it was not their saying it made him so : And they were no more to blame for whatever defects they discover, than a faithful Glass for making the wrinkles which it only shews. As to what you observe, said he, of those we now call Free-thinkers having been anciently termed *Minute Philosophers*, it is my opinion this Appellation might be derived from their considering things minutely, and not swallowing them in the gross, as other Men are used to do. Besides, we all know the best Eyes are necessary to discern the minutest Objects : It seems therefore, that Minute Philosophers might have been so called from their distinguished perspicacity. *EUPH.* O *Alciphron* ! these Minute Philosophers (since that is their true Name) are a sort of Pirates who plunder all that come in their way. I consider my self as a Man left stript and desolate on a bleak Beach.

XI. But who are these profound and learned Men that of late Years have demolished the whole Fabric which Law-givers, Philosophers and Divines had been erecting for so many Ages ? *Lyficles* hearing these words, smiled, and said he believed *Euphranor* had figured to himself Philosophers in square caps and long gowns : but, thanks to these happy Times, the Reign of Pedantry was over. Our Philosophers, said he, are of a very different kind from those awkward Students, who think to come at Knowledge by poring on dead Languages, and old Authors, or

by sequestering themselves from the Cares of the World to meditate in Solitude and Retirement. They are the best bred Men of the Age, Men who know the World, Men of pleasure, Men of fashion, and fine Gentlemen. *EUPH.* I have some small notion of the People you mention, but shou'd never have taken them for Philolophers. *CRI.* Nor wou'd any one else till of late. The World it seems was long under a mistake about the way to Knowledge, thinking it lay through a tedious course of Academical Education and Study. But among the Discoveries of the present Age, one of the principal is the finding out that such a Method doth rather retard and obstruct, than promote Knowledge. *ALC.* Academical Study may be comprised in two points, Reading and Meditation. Their Reading is chiefly employ'd on ancient Authors in dead Languages: so that a great part of their Time is spent in learning Words; which, when they have mastered with infinite pains, what do they get by it but old and obsolete Notions, that are now quite exploded and out of use? Then, as to their Meditations, what can they possibly be good for? He that wants the proper Materials of Thought, may think and meditate for ever to no purpose: Those Cobwebs spun by Scholars out of their own Brains being alike unserviceable, either for Use or Ornament. Proper Ideas or Materials are only to be got by frequenting good Company. I know several Gentlemen, who, since their Appearance in the World, have spent as much time in rubbing off the rust and pedantry of a College Education, as they had done before in acquiring it. *LYS.* I'll undertake, a Lad of fourteen, bred in the modern way, shall make a better Figure, and be more considered in any Drawing-Room or Assembly of polite People, than one of four and twenty, who hath lain by a long time at School and College. He shall say better things, in a better manner, and be more liked by good Judges. *EUPH.* Where doth he pick up all this Improvement?

ment? *CRI*. Where our grave Ancestors wou'd never have look'd for it, in a Drawing-Room, a Coffee-House, a Chocolate-House, at the Tavern, or Groom-Porter's. In these and the like fashionable Places of Resort, it is the Custom for polite Persons to speak freely on all Subjects, religious, moral, or political. So that a young Gentleman who frequents them is in the way of hearing many instructive Lectures, seasoned with Wit and Raillery, and uttered with Spirit. Three or four Sentences from a Man of quality spoke with a good Air, make more Impression, and convey more Knowledge, than a dozen Dissertations in a dry Academical way. *EUPH*. There is then no Method or Course of Studies in those Places. *LIS*. None but an easy free Conversation, which takes in every thing that offers, without any Rule or Design. *EUPH*. I always thought that some Order was necessary to attain any useful degree of Knowledge, that Haste and Confusion begat a conceited Ignorance, that to make our Advances sure, they shou'd be gradual, and those Points first learned which might cast a light on what was to follow. *ALC*. So long as Learning was to be obtained only by that slow formal course of Study, few of the better sort knew much of it; but now it is grown an Amusement, our young Gentry and Nobility imbibe it insensibly amidst their Diversions, and make a considerable Progress. *EUPH*. Hence probably the great number of Minute Philosophers. *CRI*. It is to this that Sect is owing for so many ingenious Proficients of both Sexes. You may now commonly see (what no former Age ever saw) a young Lady, or a *Petit Maitre* nonplus a Divine or an old-fashioned Gentleman, who hath read many a *Greek* and *Latin* Author, and spent much Time in hard methodical Study. *EUPH*. It shou'd seem then that Method, Exactness, and Industry are a Disadvantage. Here *Alciphron*, turning to *Lyficles*, said he cou'd make the point very clear, if *Euphranor* had any notion of

Painting. *EUPH.* I never saw a first-rate Picture in my Life, but have a tolerable Collection of Prints, and have seen some good Drawings. *ALC.* You know then the difference between the *Dutch* and the *Italian* manner. *EUPH.* I have some notion of it. *ALC.* Suppose now a Drawing finished by the nice and laborious Touches of a *Dutch* Pencil, and another off-hand scratched out in the free manner of a great *Italian* Master. The *Dutch* Piece, which hath cost so much pains and time will be exact indeed, but without that Force, Spirit, or Grace, which appear in the other, and are the Effects of an easy free Pencil. Do but apply this, and the Point will be clear. *EUPH.* Pray inform me, did those great *Italian* Masters begin and proceed in their Art without any choice of Method or Subject, and always draw with the same ease and freedom? Or did they observe some Method, beginning with simple and elementary parts, an Eye, a Nose, a Finger, which they drew with great pains and care, often drawing the same thing, in order to draw it correctly, and so proceeding with Patience and Industry, till after a considerable length of Time they arrived at the free masterly manner you speak of. If this were the Case, I leave you to make the Application. *ALC.* You may dispute the Matter if you please. But a Man of parts is one thing, and a Pedant another. Pains and Method may do for some sort of People. A Man must be a long time kindling wet Straw into a vile smothering Flame, but Spirits blaze out at once. *EUPH.* The Minute Philosophers have, it seems, better Parts than other Men, which qualifies them for a different Education. *ALC.* Tell me, *Euphranor*, what is it that gives one Man a better Mien than another; more Politeness in Dress, Speech, and Motion? Nothing but frequenting good Company. By the same means Men get insensibly a delicate Taste, a refined Judgment, a certain Politeness in thinking and expressing one's self. No wonder if you Countrymen are strangers to the

Advantage of polite Conversation, which constantly keeps the Mind awake and active, exercising its Faculties, and calling forth all its Strength and Spirit on a thousand different Occasions and Subjects, that never came in the way of a Book-worm in a College, no more than of a Ploughman. *CRI.* Hence those lively Faculties, that quickness of Apprehension, that swiftness of Ridicule, that egregious Talent of Wit and Humour which distinguish the Gentlemen of your Profession. *EUPH.* It shou'd seem then that your Sect is made up of what you call fine Gentlemen. *LYS.* Not altogether, for we have among us some contemplative Spirits of a coarser Education, who, from observing the Behaviour and Proceedings of Apprentices, Watermen, Porters, and the Assemblies of Rabble in the Streets, have arrived at a profound Knowledge of Humane Nature, and made great Discoveries about the Principles, Springs, and Motives of moral Actions. These have demolished the received Systems, and done a world of good in the City. *ALC.* I tell you we have Men of all Sorts and Professions, plodding Citizens, thriving Stockjobbers, skilful Men in Business, polite Courtiers, gallant Men of the Army; but our chief Strength and Flower of the Flock are those promising young Men who have the Advantage of a modern Education. These are the growing Hopes of our Sect, by whose Credit and Influence in a few Years we expect to see those great things accomplished that we have in view. *EUPH.* I cou'd never have imagined your Sect so considerable. *ALC.* There are in *England* many honest Folk as much in the dark about these matters as your selves.

XII. To judge of the prevailing Opinion among People of fashion, by what a Senator saith in the House, a Judge upon the Bench, or a Priest in the Pulpit, who all speak according to Law, that is, to the reverend prejudices of our Fore-fathers, wou'd  
be

be wrong. You should go into good Company, and mind what Men of parts and breeding say, those who are best heard and most admired as well in public places of resort, as in private visits. He only who hath these opportunities, can know our real strength, our numbers and the figure that we make. *EUPH.* By your account there must be many Minute Philosophers among the Men of Rank and Fortune. *ALC.* Take my word for it, not a few, and they do much contribute to the spreading our notions. For he who knows the World must observe, that fashions constantly descend. It is therefore the right way to propagate an Opinion from the upper end. Not to say that the Patronage of such Men is an encouragement to our Authors. *EUPH.* It seems then you have Authors among you. *LYS.* That we have several, and those very great Men who have obliged the World with many useful and profound discoveries. *CRI.* *Moschon* for instance hath proved that Man and Beast are really of the same nature: That consequently a Man need only indulge his Senses and Appetites to be as happy as a Brute. *Gorgias* hath gone further, demonstrating Man to be a piece of Clockwork or Machine: and that Thought or Reason are the same thing as the impulse of one Ball against another. *Cimon* hath made noble use of these discoveries, proving as clearly as any proposition in Mathematics, that conscience is a whim and morality a prejudice: and that a Man is no more accountable for his actions than a Clock is for striking. *Tryphon* hath written irrefragably on the usefulness of vice. *Thrasenor* hath confuted the foolish prejudice Men had against Atheism, shewing that a republick of Atheists might live very happily together. *Demylus* hath made a jest of Loyalty, and convinced the World there is nothing in it: To him and another Philosopher of the same stamp this age is indebted for discovering, that public Spirit is an idle Enthusiasm which seizeth only on weak minds. It wou'd be endless to  
recount

recount the Discoveries made by writers of this Sect-*LYS*. But the Master-piece and finishing Stroke is a learned Anecdote of our great *Diagoras*, containing a demonstration against the Being of God; which it is convinced the public is not yet ripe for. But I am assured by some judicious Friends who have seen it, that it is as clear as Day-light, and will do a world of good, at one blow demolishing the whole System of Religion. These discoveries are published by our Philosophers, sometimes in just Volumes, but often in Phamphlets and loose Papers for their readier conveyance through the Kingdom. And to them must be ascribed that absolute and independent freedom, which groweth so fast to the terrour of all Bigots. Even the dull and ignorant begin to open their Eyes, and be influenced by the example and authority of so many ingenious Men. *EUPH*. It shou'd seem by this account that your Sect extend their discoveries beyond Religion; and that Loyalty to his Prince or Reverence for the Laws are but mean things in the Eye of a Minute Philosopher. *LYS*. Very mean, we are too wise to think there is any thing Sacred either in King or Constitution, or indeed in any thing else. A Man of Sense may perhaps seem to pay an occasional regard to his Prince, but this is no more at bottom than what he pays to God when he kneels at the Sacrament to qualify himself himself for an Office. Fear God, and honour the King, are a pair of slavish maxims, which had for a long time cramp't Human Nature, and awed not only weak minds but even Men of good Understanding, till their Eyes, as I observed before, were opened by our Philosophers. *EUPH*. Methinks I can easily comprehend that, when the fear of God is quite extinguished, the mind must be very easy with respect to other Duties, which become outward pretences and formalities, from the moment that they quit their hold upon the Conscience, and Conscience always supposeth the Being of a God. But I still  
thought

thought that *Englishmen* of all denominations (how widely soever they differ as to some particular points) agreed in the Belief of a God, and of so much at least, as is called natural Religion. *ALC.* I have already told you my own Opinion of those matters, and what I know to be the Opinion of many more. *CR I.* Probably, *Euphranor*, by the title of *Deists*, which is sometimes given to Minute Philosophers, you have been mis-led to imagine they believe and worship a God according to the light of Nature: but by living among them, you may soon be convinced of the contrary. They have neither time nor place, nor form of Divine worship; they offer neither Prayers nor Praises to God in public; and in their private practice shew a contempt or dislike even of the Duties of natural Religion. For instance, the saying Grace before and after meals is a plain point of natural worship, and was once universally practised, but in proportion as this Sect prevailed it hath been laid aside, not only by the Minute Philosophers themselves, who wou'd be infinitely ashamed of such a weakness as to beg God's blessing, or give God thanks for their daily Food; but also by others who are afraid of being thought Fools by the Minute Philosophers. *EUPH.* Is it possible that Men, who really believe a God, shou'd yet decline paying so easy and reasonable a Duty for fear of incurring the contempt of Atheists? *CR I.* I tell you there are many, who believing in their Hearts the truth of Religion, are yet afraid or ashamed to own it, lest they shou'd forfeit their Reputation with those who have the good luck to pals for great wits and Men of genius. *ALC.* O *Euphranor*, we must make allowance for *Crito's* prejudice: he is a worthy Gentleman and means well. But doth it not look like prejudice to ascribe the respect that is paid our ingenious Free-thinkers rather to good luck than to merit? *EUPH.* I acknowledge their merit to be very wonderful, and that those Authors must needs be great Men



Men who are able to prove such Paradoxes : for example, That so knowing a Man as a Minute Philosopher shou'd be a meer Machine, or at best no better than a Brute. *ALC.* It is a true maxim, that a Man shou'd think with the Learned and speak with the Vulgar. I shou'd be loth to place a Gentleman of merit in such a light, before prejudiced and ignorant Men. The tenets of our Philosophy have this in common with many other Truths, in Metaphysics, Geometry, Astronomy and natural Philosophy, that vulgar ears cannot bear them. All our discoveries and notions are in themselves true and certain ; but they are at present known only to the better sort, and wou'd sound strange and odd among the Vulgar. But this, it is to be hoped, will wear off with time. *EUPH.* I do not wonder that vulgar minds shou'd be startled at the notions of your Philosophy. *CR.* Truly a very curious sort of Philosophy, and much to be admired !

XIII. The profound Thinkers of this way have taken a direct contrary course to all the great Philosophers of former ages, who made it their Endeavour to raise and refine Humane Kind, and remove it as far as possible from the Brute ; to moderate and subdue Mens Appetites ; to remind them of the dignity of their nature ; to awaken and improve their superior Faculties and direct them to the noblest Objects ; to possess Mens minds with a high Sense of the Divinity, of the supreme Good, and the Immortality of the Soul. They took great pains to strengthen the Obligations to Virtue, and upon all those Subjects have wrought out noble Theories, and treated with singular force of Reason. But it seems our Minute Philosophers act the reverse of all other wise and thinking Men ; it being their end and aim to erase the Principles of all that is great and good from the mind of Man, to unhinge all order of civil Life, to undermine the foundations of morality, and, in-

stead

stead of improving and ennobling our natures, to bring us down to the maxims and way of thinking of the most uneducated and barbarous nations, and even to degrade Humane Kind to a level with Brute Beasts. And all the while they wou'd pass upon the World for Men of deep Knowledge. But in effect what is all this negative Knowledge better than downright savage Ignorance? That there is no Providence, no Spirit, no future State, no moral Duty: truly a fine System for an honest Man to own, or an ingenious Man to value himself upon! *Alciphron* who heard this discourse with some uneasiness very gravely replied. Disputes are not to be decided by the weight of Authority, but by the force of Reason. You may pass, indeed, general reflexions on our notions and call them brutal and barbarous if you please: But it is such brutality and such barbarism as few cou'd have attained to if Men of the greatest Genius had not broke the Ice, there being nothing more difficult than to get the better of Education, and conquer old prejudices. To remove and cast off a heap of Rubbish that has been gathering upon the Soul from our very infancy, requires great courage and great strength of Faculties. Our Philosophers therefore, do well deserve the name of *Esprits forts*, *Men of strong heads*, *Free-thinkers* and such like Appellations betokening great force and liberty of mind. It is very possible, the Heroic Labours of these Men may be represented (for what is not capable of misrepresentation?) as a piratical plundering and stripping the mind of its wealth and ornaments, when it is in truth the divesting it only of its prejudices, and reducing it to its untainted original State of Nature. Oh Nature! the genuine Beauty of pure Nature! *EUPH.* You seem very much taken with the Beauty of Nature. Be pleased to tell me, *Alciphron*, what those things are which you esteem natural, or by what mark I may know them.

XIV. *ALC.* For a thing to be natural, for instance to the mind of Man, it must appear originally therein, it must be universally in all Men, it must be invariably the same in all Nations and Ages. These limitations of original, universal and invariable exclude all those notions found in the Humane Mind, which are the effect of Custom and Education. The case is the same with respect to all other Species of Beings. A Cat, for example, hath a natural inclination to pursue a Mouse, because it agrees with the forementioned marks. But if a Cat be taught to play tricks, you will not say those tricks are natural. For the same reason if upon a Plumbtree, Peaches and Apricots are engrafted, no body will say they are the natural growth of the Plumbtree. *EUPH.* But to return to *Man*: It seems you allow those things alone to be natural to him, which shew themselves upon his first entrance into the World; to wit the Senses and such Passions and Appetites as are discovered upon the first application of their respective objects. *ALC.* That is my opinion. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, if from a young Apple-tree after a certain period of time there shou'd shoot forth Leaves, Blossoms and Apples; wou'd you deny these things to be natural, because they did not discover and display themselves in the tender bud? *ALC.* I wou'd not. *EUPH.* And suppose that in a Man after a certain season, the Appetite of Lust or the Faculty of Reason shall shoot forth, open and display themselves as Leaves and Blossoms do in a Tree; wou'd you therefore deny them to be natural to him, because they did not appear in his original infancy? *ALC.* I acknowledge I wou'd not. *EUPH.* It seems therefore, that the first mark of a thing's being natural to the mind was not warily laid down by you; to wit, that it shou'd appear originally in it. *ALC.* It seems so. *EUPH.* Again, inform me, *Alciphron*, whether you do not think it natural for an Orange-plant to produce Oranges? *ALC.* I do. *EUPH.* But plant it in the  
North

North end of *Great Britain*, and it shall with care produce, perhaps, a good Sallad; in the Southern parts of the same Island, it may with much pains and culture thrive and produce indifferent Fruit; but in *Portugal* or *Naples* it will produce much better with little or no pains. Is this true or not? *ALC.* It is true. *EUPH.* The Plant being the same in all places doth not produce the same Fruit, Sun, Soil, and Cultivation making a difference. *ALC.* I grant it. *EUPH.* And since the case is, you say the same with respect to all Species; why may we not conclude by a parity of reason that things may be natural to Human Kind, and yet neither found in all Men, nor invariably the same where they are found? *ALC.* Hold, *Euphranor*, you must explain your self further. I shall not be over hasty in my concessions. *LRS.* You are in the right, *Alciphron*, to stand upon your guard. I do not like these ensnaring Questions. *EUPH.* I desire you to make no concessions in complaisance to me, but only to tell me your opinion upon each particular, that we may understand one another, know wherein we agree, and proceed jointly in finding out the Truth. But (added *Euphranor* turning to *Crito* and me) if the Gentlemen are against a free and fair inquiry, I shall give them no further trouble. *ALC.* Our Opinions will stand the test. We fear no trial, proceed as you please. *EUPH.* It seems then that from what you have granted it shou'd follow, Things may be natural to Men, although they do not actually shew themselves in all Men, nor in equal perfection; there being as great difference of culture and every other advantage with respect to Humane Nature, as is to be found with respect to the vegetable nature of Plants, to use your own similitude, Is it so or not? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* Answer me, *Alciphron*, do not Men in all times and places when they arrive at a certain Age express their Thoughts by Speech? *ALC.* They do. *EUPH.* Shou'd it not seem then that Language is natural?

*ALC.*

*ALC.* It shou'd. *EUPH.* And yet there is a great variety of Languages. *ALC.* I acknowledge there is. *EUPH.* From all this will it not follow a thing may be natural and yet admit of variety? *ALC.* I grant it will. *EUPH.* Shou'd it not seem therefore to follow, that a thing may be natural to Mankind, though it have not those marks or conditions assigned; though it be not original, universal and invariable? *ALC.* It shou'd. *EUPH.* And that consequently religious Worship and civil Government may be natural to Man, notwithstanding they admit of sundry forms and different degrees of Perfection? *ALC.* It seems so. *EUPH.* You have granted already that Reason is natural to Mankind. *ALC.* I have. *EUPH.* Whatever therefore is agreeable to Reason is agreeable to the nature of Man. *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* Will it not follow from hence that Truth and Virtue are natural to Man? *ALC.* Whatever is reasonable I admit to be natural. *EUPH.* And as those Fruits which grow from the most generous and mature stock, in the choicest soil, and with the best culture, are most esteemed; even so ought we not to think, those sublime Truths which are the Fruits of mature Thought, and have been rationally deduced by Men of the best and most improved understandings, to be the choicest productions of the rational nature of Man? And if so, being in fact reasonable, natural and true, they ought not to be esteemed unnatural whims, errors of education and groundless prejudices, because they are raised and forwarded by manuring and cultivating our tender minds, because they take early root and sprout forth betimes by the care and diligence of our Instructors. *ALC.* Agreed, provided still they may be rationally deduced: But to take this for granted, of what Men vulgarly call the Truths of Morality and Religion wou'd be begging the question. *EUPH.* You are in the right, I do not, therefore, take for granted

ted that they are rationally deduced. I only suppose that, if they are; they must be allowed natural to Man, or in other words agreeable to, and growing from, the most excellent and peculiar part of Humane Nature. *ALC.* I have nothing to object to this. *EUPH.* What shall we think then of your former Assertions? That nothing is natural to Man but what may be found in all Men, in all Nations and Ages of the World: That to obtain a genuine view of Humane Nature, we must extirpate all the effects of Education and Instruction, and regard only the Senses, Appetites and Passions which are to be found originally in all Mankind: That, therefore, the notion of a God can have no foundation in nature, as not being originally in the mind, nor the same in all Men; Be pleased to reconcile these things with your late concessions, which the force of Truth seems to have extorted from you.

XV. *ALC.* Tell me, *Euphranor*, whether Truth be not one and the same uniform invariable thing, and, if so, whether the many different and inconsistent notions which Men entertain of God and Duty be not a plain proof there is no Truth in them. *EUPH.* That Truth is constant and uniform I freely own, and that consequently Opinions repugnant to each other cannot be true; but I think it will not hence follow they are all alike false. It among various Opinions about the same thing, one be grounded on clear and evident Reasons, that is to be thought true, and others only so far as they consist with it. Reason is the same, and rightly applied will lead to the same conclusions in all times and places. *Socrates* two thousand years ago seems to have reasoned himself into the same notion of a God, which is entertained by the Philosophers of our days, if you will allow that name to any who are not Atheists. And the remark of *Confucius*, That a Man shou'd guard in his youth against Lust,

Lust, in manhood against Faction, and in old age against Covetousness is as current morality in *Europe* as in *China*. *ALC.* But still it wou'd be a satisfaction, if all Men thought the same way, difference of Opinions implying uncertainty. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, what you take to be the cause of a Lunar Eclipse. *ALC.* The shadow of the Earth interposing between the Sun and Moon. *EUPH.* Are you assured of this? *ALC.* Undoubtedly. *EUPH.* Are all Mankind agreed in this Truth? *ALC.* By no means. Ignorant and barbarous People assign different ridiculous causes of this appearance. *EUPH.* It seems then there are different Opinions about the nature of an Eclipse. *ALC.* There are. *EUPH.* And nevertheless one of these Opinions is true. *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* Diversity therefore of Opinions about a thing doth not hinder, but that the thing may be, and one of the Opinions concerning it may be true. *ALC.* I acknowledge it. *EUPH.* It shou'd seem, therefore, that your Argument against the Belief of a God from the variety of Opinions about his nature is not conclusive. Nor do I see how you can conclude against the truth of any moral or religious tenet, from the various Opinions of Men upon the same Subject; might not a Man as well argue, that no historical account of a matter of fact can be true, when different relations are given of it? Or may we not as well inter, that because the several Sects of Philosophy maintain different opinions, none of them can be in the right, not even the *Minute Philosophers* themselves? During this conversation *Lyficles* seemed uneasy, like one that wished in his heart there was no God. *Alciphron*, said he, me-thinks you sit by very tamely, while *Euphranor* saps the foundation of our Tenets. Be of good courage, replied *Alciphron*, a skilful gamester has been known to ruin his adversary by yielding him some advantage at first. I am glad, said he turning to *Euphranor*, that you are drawn in

to argue and make your appeals to Reason. For my part, wherever Reason leads I shall not be afraid to follow. Know then, *Euphranor*, that I freely give up what you now contend for. I do not value the success of a few crude notions thrown out in a loose discourse, any more than the *Turks* do the loss of that vile infantry they place in the front of their armies, for no other end but to waste the powder and blunt the swords of their enemies. Be assured I have in reserve a body of other-guess arguments, which I am ready to produce. I will undertake to prove -----  
*EUPH.* O *Alciphron*! I do not doubt your faculty of proving. But before I put you to the trouble of any farther proofs, I shou'd be glad to know whether the notions of your Minute Philosophy are worth proving. I mean, whether they are of use and service to Mankind?

XV. *ALC.* As to that, give me leave to tell you, a thing may be useful to one Man's Views, and not to another's : but Truth is Truth whether useful or not, and must not be measured by the Convenience of this or that Man, or Party of Men. *EUPH.* But is not the general Good of Mankind to be regarded as a rule and measure of moral Truths, of all such Truths as direct or influence the moral Actions of Men? *ALC.* That Point is not clear to me. I know, indeed, that Legislators, and Divines, and Politicians have always alledged, That it is necessary to the well-being of Mankind, that they shou'd be kept in awe by the slavish Notions of Religion and Morality. But granting all this, how will it prove these Notions to be true? Convenience is one thing, and Truth is another. A genuine Philosopher, therefore, will overlook all Advantages and consider only Truth it self as such. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, is your genuine Philosopher a wise Man, or a Fool? *ALC.* Without question, the wisest of Men. *EUPH.* Which is to be thought the wise Man, he who acts with design,  
 or



or he who acts at random? *ALC.* He who acts with design. *EUPH.* Whoever acts with design, acts for some end. Doth he not? *ALC.* He doth. *EUPH.* And a wise Man for a good end? *ALC.* True. *EUPH.* And he sheweth his Wisdom in making choice of fit means to obtain his end. *ALC.* I acknowledge it. *EUPH.* By how much therefore the end proposed is more excellent, and by how much fitter the means employ'd are to obtain it, so much the wiser is the Agent to be esteemed. *ALC.* This seems to be true. *EUPH.* Can a rational Agent propose a more excellent end than Happiness? *ALC.* He cannot. *EUPH.* Of good things, the greater Good is most excellent. *ALC.* Doubtless. *EUPH.* Is not the general happiness of Mankind a greater Good, than the private happiness of one Man, or of some certain Men? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* Is it not therefore the most excellent end? *ALC.* It seems so. *EUPH.* Are not then those who pursue this end by the properest methods to be thought the wisest Men? *ALC.* I grant they are. *EUPH.* Which is a wise Man govern'd by, wise or foolish Notions? *ALC.* By wise, doubtless. *EUPH.* It seems then to follow, that he who promotes the general well-being of Mankind by the proper necessary means, is truly wise, and acts upon wise grounds. *ALC.* It shou'd seem so. *EUPH.* And is not Folly of an opposite nature to Wisdom? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* Might it not therefore be inferred, that those Men are foolish who go about to unhinge such Principles as have a necessary connexion with the general good of Mankind? *ALC.* Perhaps this might be granted: but at the same time I must observe, that it is in my power to deny it. *EUPH.* How! you will not surely deny the Conclusion, when you admit the Premises. *ALC.* I wou'd fain know upon what terms we argue; whether in this progress of Question and Answer, if a Man makes a slip it be utterly irretrievable? For if you are on the catch to lay hold

of every advantage, without allowing for surprize or inattention, I must tell you this is not the way to convince my Judgment. *EUPH.* O *Alciphron*! I aim not at Triumph, but at Truth. You are therefore at full liberty to unravel all that hath been said, and to recover or correct any slip you have made. But then you must distinctly point it out: otherwise it will be impossible ever to arrive at any conclusion. *ALC.* I agree with you upon these terms jointly to proceed in search of Truth, for to that I am sincerely devoted. In the progress of our present Inquiry I was, it seems, guilty of an oversight, in acknowledging the general happiness of Mankind to be a greater Good than the particular happiness of one Man. For in fact, the individual happiness of every Man alone, constitutes his own entire Good. The happiness of other Men making no part of mine, is not with respect to me a Good: I mean a true natural Good. It cannot therefore be a reasonable end to be proposed by me in Truth and Nature, (for I do not speak of political pretences) since no wise Man will pursue an end which doth not concern him. This is the voice of Nature. Oh Nature! thou art the fountain, original, and pattern of all that is good and wise. *EUPH.* You wou'd like then to follow Nature, and propose her as a guide and pattern for your imitation. *ALC.* Of all things. *EUPH.* Whence do you gather this respect for Nature? *ALC.* From the excellency of her Productions. *EUPH.* In a Vegetable, for instance, you say there is use and excellency, because the several parts of it are so connected and fitted to each other, as to protect and nourish the whole, make the individual grow, and propagate the kind, and because in its fruits or qualities it is adapted to please the Sense, or contribute to the benefit of Man. *ALC.* Even so. *EUPH.* In like manner, do you not infer the excellency of Animal Bodies from observing the frame and fitness of their several parts; by which they mutually conspire to the well-being of each other

ther as well as of the whole? Do you not also observe a natural union and consent between Animals of the same kind, and that even different kinds of Animals have certain qualities and instincts whereby they contribute to the exercise, nourishment, and delight of each other? Even the inanimate unorganized Elements seem to have an excellency relative to each other. Where was the excellency of Water if it did not cause Herbs and Vegetables to spring from the Earth, and put forth flowers and fruits? And what wou'd become of the beauty of the Earth, if it was not warmed by the Sun, moistened by Water, and fanned by Air? Throughout the whole System of the visible and natural World, do you not perceive a mutual connexion and correspondence of parts? And is it not from hence that you frame an Idea of the perfection, and order, and beauty of Nature?

*ALC.* All this I grant. *EUPH.* And have not the Stoics heretofore said (who were no more Bigots than you are) and did you not your self say, this pattern of Order was worthy the imitation of rational Agents? *ALC.* I do not deny this to be true.

*EUPH.* Ought we not therefore to infer the same Union, Order, and Regularity in the moral World that we perceive to be in the natural? *ALC.* We ought.

*EUPH.* Shou'd it not therefore seem to follow that reasonable Creatures were, as the philosophical Emperor † observes, made one for another; and consequently that *Man* ought not to consider himself as an independent Individual, whose happiness is not connected with that of other Men? but rather as the part of a whole, to the common good of which he ought to conspire, and order his Ways and Actions suitably, if he wou'd live according to Nature. *ALC.* Supposing this to be true, what then? *EUPH.* Will it not follow that a wise Man

† M. Antonin. l. 4.

shou'd consider and pursue his private Good, with regard to, and in conjunction with, that of other Men? in granting of which, you thought your self guilty of an oversight. Though, indeed, the sympathy of pain and pleasure, and the mutual affections by which Mankind are knit together, have been always allowed a plain proof of this point: And though it was the constant Doctrine of those, who were esteemed the wisest and most thinking Men among the Ancients, as the Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics; to say nothing of Christians, whom you pronounce to be an unthinking prejudiced sort of people. *ALC.* I shall not dispute this point with you. *EUPH.* Since therefore we are so far agreed, shou'd it not seem to follow from the Premises; That the belief of a God, of a future State, and of moral Duties, are the only wise, right, and genuine Principles of Humane Conduct, in case they have a necessary connection with the well-being of Mankind? This Conclusion you have been led to by your own concessions and by the analogy of Nature. *ALC.* I have been drawn into it step by step through several Preliminaries, which I cannot well call to mind; but one thing I observe, that you build on the necessary connection those Principles have with the well-being of Mankind, which is a point neither proved nor granted. *LYS.* This I take to be a grand fundamental Prejudice, as I doubt not, if I had time I cou'd make appear. But it is now late, and we will, if you think fit, defer this Subject till to-morrow. Upon which Motion of *Lysicles* we put an end to our conversation for that Evening.

The



## The SECOND DIALOGUE.

- I. *Vulgar error, that Vice is hurtful.* II. *The benefit of Drunkenness, Gaming, and Whoring.* III. *Prejudice against Vice wearing off.* IV. *Its usefulness illustrated in the instances of Callicles and Telefilla.* V. *The reasoning of Lyficles in behalf of Vice examined.* VI. *Wrong to punish Actions when the Doctrines whence they flow are tolerated.* VII. *Hazardous experiment of the Minute Philosophers.* VIII. *Their Doctrine of Circulation and Revolution.* IX. *Their sense of a Reformation.* X. *Riches alone not the public weal.* XI. *Authority of Minute Philosophers: their Prejudice against Religion.* XII. *Effects of Luxury: Virtue whether notional?* XIII. *Pleasure of Sense.* XIV. *What sort of pleasure most natural to Man.* XV. *Dignity of Humane Nature.* XVI. *Pleasure mistaken.* XVII. *Amusements, Misery, and Cowardice of Minute Philosophers.* XVIII. *Rakes cannot reckon.* XIX. *Abilities and Success of Minute Philosophers.* XX. *Happy effects of the Minute Philosophy in particular instances.* XXI. *Their free notions about Government.* XXII. *England the proper soil for Minute Philosophy.* XXIII. *The policy and address of its Professors.* XXIV. *Merit of Minute Philosophers towards the Public.* XXV. *Their Notions and Character.* XXVI. *Their tendency towards Popery and Slavery.*

**N**EXT Morning, *Alciphron* and *Lyficles* said the Weather was so fine they had a mind to spend the Day abroad, and take a cold Dinner under a Shade in some pleasant part of the Country. Whereupon, after Breakfast, we went down to a Beach about

bout half a mile off; where we walked on the smooth sand, with the Ocean on one hand, and on the other wild broken Rocks, intermixed with shady Trees and Springs of Water, till the Sun began to be uneasy. We then withdrew into a hollow Glade, between two Rocks, where we had no sooner seated our selves but *Lyficles* addressing himself to *Euphranor*, said: I am now ready to perform what I undertook last Evening, which was to shew, there is nothing in that necessary Connection which some Men imagine between those Principles you contend for, and the public Good. I freely own, that if this Question was to be decided by the authority of Legislators or Philosophers, it must go against us. For those Men generally take it for granted, that Vice is pernicious to the Public; and that Men cannot be kept from Vice but by the fear of God, and the sense of a future State; whence they are induced to think the belief of such things necessary to the well-being of humane Kind. This false notion hath prevailed for many ages in the World, and done an infinite deal of mischief, being in truth the cause of religious Establishments, and gaining the protection and encouragement of Laws and Magistrates to the Clergy and their Superstitions. Even some of the wisest among the Ancients, who agreed with our Sect in denying a Providence and the Immortality of the Soul, had nevertheless the weakness to lie under the common prejudice that Vice was hurtful to Societies of Men. But *England* hath of late produced great Philosophers who have undeceived the world, and proved to a demonstration that private Vices are public Benefits. This Discovery was reserved to our times, and our Sect hath the glory of it. *CRI.* It is possible some Men of fine Understanding might in former ages have had a glimpse of this important Truth; but it may be presumed they lived in ignorant times and bigotted countries, which were not ripe for such a discovery. *LYS.* Men of narrow capacities and short sight being able  
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to see no further than one link in a chain of Consequences, are shocked at small evils which attend upon Vice. But those who can enlarge their view, and look through a long series of events, may behold Happiness resulting from Vice, and Good springing out of Evil in a thousand instances. To prove my point I shall not trouble you with Authorities or far-fetched Arguments, but bring you to plain Matter of Fact. Do but take a view of each particular Vice, and trace it through its Effects and Consequences, and then you will clearly perceive the advantage it brings to the Public.

II. Drunkenness, for instance, is by your sober Moralists thought a pernicious Vice; but it is for want of considering the good effects that flow from it. For in the first place it increases the Malt-Tax, a principal branch of his Majesty's Revenue, and thereby promotes the safety, strength, and glory of the Nation. Secondly, it employs a great number of hands, the Brewer, the Malster, the Ploughman, the dealer in Hops, the Smith, the Carpenter, the Brasier, the Joiner, with all other artificers necessary to supply those enumerated, with their respective instruments and utensils. All which advantages are procured from Drunkenness in the vulgar way, by strong Beer. This point is so clear it will admit of no dispute. But while you are forced to allow thus much, I foresee you are ready to object against Drunkenness occasion'd by Wine and Spirits, as exporting wealth into foreign countries. But you do not reflect on the number of hands which even this sets on work at home: The Distillers, the Vintners, the Merchants, the Sailors, the Shipwrights, with all those who are employ'd towards victualling and fitting out Ships, which upon a nice computation will be found to include an incredible variety of Trades and Callings. Then for freighting our Ships to answer these foreign importations, all our manufactures  
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throughout the Kingdom are employ'd, the Spinners, the Weavers, the Dyers, the Wool-combers, the the Carriers, the Packers. And the same may be said of many other manufactures, as well as the wool-len. And if it be further considered, how many Men are enriched by all the forementioned ways of trade and business, and the expences of these Men, and their families, in all the several articles of convenient and fashionable living, whereby all sorts of trades and callings, not only at home, but throughout all parts wherever our commerce reaches, are kept in employment, you will be amazed at the wonderfully extended scene of benefits which arise from the single vice of Drunkenness, so much run down and declaimed against by all grave Reformers. With as much judgment your half-witted folk are accustomed to censure Gaming. And indeed (such is the ignorance and folly of Mankind) a Gamester and a Drunkard are thought no better than public nuisances, when in truth, they do each in their way greatly conduce to the public benefit. If you look only on the surface and first appearance of things, you will no doubt think playing at Cards a very idle and fruitless occupation. But dive deeper, and you shall perceive this idle amusement employs the Card-maker, and he sets the Paper-mills at work, by which the poor Rag-man is supported; not to mention the Builders and Workers in wood and iron that are employ'd in erecting and furnishing those Mills. Look still deeper, and you shall find that Candles and Chair-hire employ the industrious and the poor, who by these means come to be relieved by Sharpers and Gentlemen, who wou'd not give one penny in charity. But you will say that many Gentlemen and Ladies are ruined by play, without considering that what one Man loses another gets, and that consequently as many are made as ruined; money changeth hands, and in this circulation the life of business and commerce consists. When money is spent, it is all one to the Public who spends



spends it. Suppose a fool of quality becomes the dupe of a Man of mean birth and circumstance, who has more wit. In this case what harm doth the Public sustain? Poverty is relieved, Ingenuity is rewarded, the Money stays at home, and has a lively circulation, the ingenious Sharper being enabled to set up an equipage and spend handsomely, which cannot be done without employing a world of people. But you will perhaps object, that a Man reduced by play may be put upon desperate courses hurtful to the Public. Suppose the worst, and that he turns Highwayman, such Men have a short life and a merry. While he lives, he spends, and for one that he robs makes twenty the better for his expence. And when his time is come, a poor Family may be relieved by fifty or a hundred Pounds set upon his Head. A vulgar eye looks on many a Man as an idle or mischievous fellow, whom a true Philosopher viewing in another light, considers as a Man of pleasant occupation who diverts himself, and benefits the Public: And that with so much ease, that he employs a multitude of Men, and sets an infinite Machine in motion, without knowing the good he does, or even intending to do any; which is peculiar to that Gentleman-like way of doing good by Vice. I was considering Play, and that insensibly led me to the advantages, which attend robbing on the high-way. Oh the beautiful and never enough admired connection of Vices! It wou'd take too much time to shew how they all hang together, and what an infinite deal of good takes its rise from every one of them. One word for a favourite Vice, and I shall leave you to make out the rest your self, by applying the same way of reasoning to all other vices. A poor Girl, who might not have the spending of half a Crown a week in what you call an honest way, no sooner hath the good fortune to be a kept Mistress, but she employs Milliners, Laundresses, Tire-women, Mercers, and a number of other trades to the benefit of her Country. It wou'd be endless

to trace and pursue every particular Vice through its consequences and effects, and shew the vast advantage they all are of to the Public. The true Springs that actuate the great Machine of Commerce, and make a flourishing State have been hitherto little understood. Your Moralists and Divines have for so many ages been corrupting the genuine Sense of mankind, and filling their heads with such absurd principles, that it is in the power of few Men to contemplate real life with an unprejudiced Eye. And fewer still have sufficient Parts and Sagacity to pursue a long train of consequences, relations and dependences, which must be done in order to form a just and entire notion of the public weal. But, as I said before, our Sect hath produced Men capable of these discoveries, who have displayed them in a full light, and made them public for the benefit of their Country.

III. Oh! Said *Euphranor*, who heard this discourse with great attention, you *Lyficles* are the very Man I wanted, eloquent and ingenious, knowing in the principles of your Sect, and willing to impart them. Pray tell me, do these principles find an easy admission in the World? *LYS.* They do among ingenious Men and People of fashion, though you will sometimes meet with strong prejudices against them in the middle sort, an effect of ordinary Talents and mean Breeding. *EUPH.* I shou'd wonder if Men were not shocked at notions of such a surprising nature, so contrary to all Laws, Education, and Religion. *LYS.* They wou'd be shocked much more if it had not been for the skilful address of our Philosophers, who, considering that most Men are influenced by names rather than things, have introduced a certain polite way of speaking, which lessens much of the abhorrence and prejudice towards Vice. *EUPH.* Explain me this. *LYS.* Thus in our Dialect a vicious Man is a Man of pleasure, a Sharper is one that plays the whole game, a Lady is said to have

an affair, a Gentleman to be a gallant, a Rogue in business to be one that knows the World. By this means we have no such things as Sots, Debauchees, Whores, Rogues, or the like in the *beau monde*, who may enjoy their vices without incurring disagreeable Appellations. *EUPH.* Vice then is, it seems, a fine thing with an ugly name. *LYS.* Be assured it is. *EUPH.* It shou'd seem then, that *Plato's* fearing lest youth might be corrupted, by those Fables which represented the Gods vicious, was an effect of his weakness and ignorance. *LYS.* It was, take my word for it. *EUPH.* And yet *Plato* had kept good Company and lived in a Court. And *Cicero* who knew the World well had a profound esteem for him. *CRI.* I tell you, *Euphranor*, that *Plato* and *Tully* might perhaps make a figure in *Athens* or *Rome*: But were they to revive in our days, they wou'd pass but for underbred Pedants, there being at most Coffee-houses in *London*, several able Men who cou'd convince them they knew nothing in, what they are valued so much for, Morals and Politics. *LYS.* How many long-headed Men do I know both in the Court-end and the City with five times *Plato's* Sense, who care not one straw what notions their Sons have of God or Virtue.

IV. *CRI.* I can illustrate this Doctrine of *Lyficles* by examples that will make you perceive its force. *Cleophon*, a Minute Philosopher, took strict care of his Son's Education and entered him betimes in the principles of his Sect. *Callicles* (that was his Son's name) being a Youth of parts made a notable progress; in so much that before he became of age he killed his old covetous Father with vexation, and ruined the Estate he left behind him; or, in other words, made a present of it to the Public, spreading the Dung-hill collected by his Ancestors over the face of the Nation, and making out of one overgrown Estate several pretty fortunes for ingenious Men, who live by the vices

vices of the Great. *Telefilla*, though a Woman of Quality and Spirit, made no figure in the World, till she was instructed by her Husband in the tenets of the Minute Philosophy, which he wisely thought wou'd prevent her giving any thing in Charity. From that time she took a turn towards expensive Diversions, particularly deep Play, by which means she soon transferred a considerable share of his fortune to several acute Men skilled in that Mystery, who wanted it more, and circulate it quicker than her Husband wou'd have done, who in return hath got an Heir to his Estate, having never had a Child before. That same *Telefilla*, who was good for nothing as long as she believed her Catechism, now shines in all public places, is a Lady of gallantry and fashion, and has by her extravagant parade in Lace and fine Clothes raised a Spirit of expence in other Ladies, very much to the public benefit, though it must be owned to the mortification of many frugal Husbands. While *Crito* related these facts with a grave face, I cou'd not forbear smiling, which *Lyficles* observing, superficial minds, said he, may perhaps find something to ridicule in these accounts; but all who are Masters of a just way of thinking must needs see that those maxims, the benefit whereof is universal, and the damage only particular to private Persons or Families, ought to be encouraged in a wise Commonwealth. For my part, said *Euphranor*, I confess my self to be rather dazzled and confounded than convinced by your reasoning; which, as you observed your self, taking in the connection of many distant points requires great extent of thought to comprehend it. I must therefore intreat you to bear with my defects, suffer me to take to pieces what is too big to be received at once; and where I cannot keep pace with you, permit me to follow you step by step, as fast as I can. *LYS.* There is reason in what you say. Every one cannot suddenly take a long concatenation of Arguments.

V. *EUPH.* Your several Arguments seem to center in this, that vice circulates money and promotes industry, which causeth a People to flourish: Is it not so? *LYS.* It is. *EUPH.* And the reason that vice produceth this effect is; because it causeth an extravagant consumption which is the most beneficial to the Manufactures, their encouragement consisting in a quick demand and high price. *LYS.* True. *EUPH.* Hence you think a Drunkard most beneficial to the Brewer and the Vintner, as causing a quick consumption of Liquor, inasmuch as he drinks more than other Men. *LYS.* Without doubt. *EUPH.* Says, *Lyficles*, who drinks most a sick Man or a healthy? *LYS.* A healthy. *EUPH.* And which is healthiest a sober Man or a Drunkard? *LYS.* A Sober Man. *EUPH.* A Sober Man therefore in health may drink more than a Drunkard when he is sick. *LYS.* He may. *EUPH.* What think you, will a Man consume more Meat and Drink in a long life or a short one? *LYS.* In a long. *EUPH.* A Sober healthy Man, therefore, in a long life may circulate more Money by eating and drinking, than a Glutton or Drunkard in a short one. *LYS.* What then? *EUPH.* Why then it shou'd seem, that he may be more beneficial to the Public even in this way of eating and drinking. *LYS.* I shall never own that temperance is the way to promote drinking. *EUPH.* But you will own that sickness lessens, and death puts an end to all drinking. The same Argument will hold, for ought I can see, with respect to all other vices that impair Mens health and shorten their lives. And if we admit this, it will not be so clear a point that vice hath merit towards the public. *LYS.* But admitting that some Artificers or Traders might be as well encouraged by the sober Men as the vicious; what shall we say of those who subsist altogether by Vice and Vanity? *EUPH.* If such there are, may they not be otherwise employ'd with-

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out loss to the Public? Tell me, *Lyficles*, is there any thing in the nature of Vice, as such that renders it a public blessing, or is it only the consumption it occasions? *LYS.* I have already shewn how it benefits the nation by the consumption of its Manufactures. *EUPH.* And you have granted that a long and healthy life consumes more than a short and sickly one; and you will not deny that many consume more than one. Upon the whole then compute and say, which is most likely to promote the industry of his Countrymen, a virtuous married Man with a healthy numerous Offspring, and who feeds and cloaths the Orphans in his Neighbourhood, or a fashionable Rake about Town. I wou'd fain know whether Money spent innocently, doth not circulate as well as that spent upon Vice. And if so, whether by your own rule it doth not benefit the Publick as much? *LYS.* What I have proved, I proved plainly, and there is no need of more words about it. *EUPH.* You seem to me, to have proved nothing, unless you can make it out that it is impossible to spend a fortune innocently. I shou'd think the publick weal of a Nation consists in the number and good condition of its Inhabitants; have you any thing to object to this? *LYS.* I think not. *EUPH.* To this end which would most conduce, the employing Men in open air and manly exercise, or in sedentary business within doors? *LYS.* The former I suppose. *EUPH.* Shou'd it not seem therefore, that building, gardening, and agriculture would employ Men more usefully to the Public, than if Tailors, Barbers, Perfumers, Distillers and such arts were multiplied. *LYS.* All this I grant; but it makes against you. For what moves Men to build and plant but vanity, and what is vanity but vice? *EUPH.* But if a Man shou'd do those things for his convenience or pleasure, and in proportion to his fortune, without a foolish ostentation or over-rating them beyond their due value, they would not then be the effect of vice; and how do you know but this may be the case? *CR.* One thing

I know that the readiest way to quicken that sort of industry, and employ Carpenters, Masons, Smiths, and all such trades wou'd be to put in practice the happy hint of a celebrated Minute Philosopher, who by profound thinking has discovered, that burning the City of *London* wou'd be no such bad action, as silly prejudiced People might possibly imagine; inasmuch as it wou'd produce a quick circulation of property, transferring it from the rich to the poor, and employing a great number of Artificers of all kinds. This at least cannot be denied that it hath opened a new way of thinking to our Incendiaries, of which the Public hath of late begun to reap the benefit. *EUPH.* I cannot sufficiently admire this ingenious thought.

VI. But methinks it wou'd be dangerous to make it public. *CRI.* Dangerous to whom? *EUPH.* In the first place to the publisher. *CRI.* That is a mistake; for the notion hath been published and met with due applause, in this most wise and happy age of Free-thinking, Free-speaking, Free-writing, and Free-acting. *EUPH.* How! may a Man then publish and practise such things with impunity? *CRI.* To speak the truth, I am not so clear as to the practice part. An unlucky accident now and then befalls an ingenious Man. The Minute Philosopher *Magirus*, being desirous to benefit the Public, by circulating an Estate possessed by a near Relation who had not the heart to spend it, soon convinced himself upon these principles, that it wou'd be a very worthy action to dispatch out of the way such a useless fellow, to whom he was next heir. But for this laudable attempt, he had the misfortune to be hanged by an under-bred Judge and Jury. Could any thing be more unjust? *EUPH.* Why unjust? *CRI.* Is it not unjust to punish actions, when the principles from which they directly follow are tolerated and applauded by the Public? Can any thing be more in-

consistent than to condemn in practice what is approved in speculation. Truth is one and the same, it being impossible a thing should be practically wrong and speculatively right. Thus much is certain, *Magirus* was perfect Master of all this Theory, and argued most acutely about it with a Friend of mine, a little before he did the fact for which he died. *LYS.* The best on't is the World every day grows wiser. *CRI.* You mistake, *Euphranor*, if you think the Minute Philosophers idle Theorists; They are Men of practical views. *EUPH.* As much as I love Liberty, I shou'd be afraid to live among such People; it would be, as *Seneca* somewhere expresseth it, *in libertate bellis ac tyrannis seviore*. *LYS.* What do you mean by quoting *Plato* and *Seneca*? Can you imagine a Free-thinker is to be influenced by the Authority of such old fashioned Writers? *EUPH.* You, *Lysicles*, and your Friend have often quoted to me ingenious Moderns, profound fine Gentlemen, with new names of Authors in the Minute Philosophy, to whose merits I am a perfect stranger. Suffer me in my turn to cite such Authorities as I know, and have passed for many ages upon the World.

VII. But, Authority apart, what do you say to Experience? My Observation can reach as far as a private Family; and some wise Men have thought, a Family may be considered as a small Kingdom, or a Kingdom as a great Family. Do you admit this to be true? *LYS.* If I say *yes*, you'll make an inference, and if I say *no*, you'll demand a reason. The best way is to say nothing at all. There is, I see, no end of answering. *EUPH.* If you give up the point you undertook to prove, there is an end at once: But if you hope to convince me you must answer my questions, and allow me the liberty to argue and inter. *LYS.* Well, suppose I admit that a Kingdom may be considered as a great Family. *EUPH.* I shall ask you then, whether ever you knew private Families



lies thrive by those vices, you think so beneficial to the Public? *LYS.* Suppose I have not. *EUPH.* Might not a Man therefore by a parity of reason suspect their being of that benefit to the Public? *LYS.* Fear not; the next age will thrive and flourish. *EUPH.* Pray tell me, *Lyficles*; suppose you saw a fruit of a new untried kind; would you recommend it to your own Family to make a full meal of? *LYS.* I would not. *EUPH.* Why then would you try upon your own Country these maxims which were never admitted in any other? *LYS.* The experiment must begin somewhere; and we are resolved our own Country shall have the honour and advantage of it. *EUPH.* O *Lyficles*, hath not old *England* subsisted for many ages without the help of your notions? *LYS.* She has. *EUPH.* And made some figure? *LYS.* I grant it. *EUPH.* Why then shou'd you make her run the risque of a new experiment, when it is certain she may do without it? *LYS.* But we would make her do better. We wou'd produce a change in her that never was seen in any Nation. *EUPH.* *Sallust* observes, that a little before the downfall of the *Roman* Empire, avarice (the effect of Luxury) had erased the good old principles of probity and justice, had produced a contempt for Religion, and made every thing venal, while ambition bred dissimulation, and caused Men to unite in clubs, and parties, not from honourable motives, but narrow and interested views. The same Historian observes of that great Free-thinker *Catiline*, that he made it his business to insinuate himself into the acquaintance of young Men, whose minds unimproved by years and experience were more easily seduced. I know not how it happens, but these passages have occurred to my Thoughts more than once during this Conversation. *LYS.* *Sallust* was a sententious Pedant. *EUPH.* But consult any Historian, look into any Writer. See, for instance, what *Xenophon* and *Livy* say of *Sparta* and *Rome*, and then tell me if

Vice be not the likeliest way to ruin and enslave a People. *LRS.* When a point is clear by its own evidence, I never think it worth while to consult old Authors about it. *CR I.* It requires much thought and delicate observation to go to the bottom of things. But one who hath come at Truth with difficulty can impart it with ease. I will therefore, *Euphranor*, explain to you in three words (what none of your old Writers ever dreamt of) the true cause of ruin to those States. You must know that Vice and Virtue, being opposite and contradictory Principles, both working at once in a state, will produce contrary effects, which intestine discord must needs tend to the dissolution and ruin of the whole. But it is the design of our Minute Philosophers, by making Men wicked upon principle, a thing unknown to the Ancients, so to weaken and destroy the force of virtue, that its effects shall not be felt in the Public. In which case Vice being uncontrolled without let or impediment of principle, pure and genuine without allay of virtue, the Nation must doubtless be very flourishing and triumphant. *EUPH.* Truly, a noble Scheme! *CR I.* And in a fair way to take effect. For our young proficients in the Minute Philosophy, having, by a rare felicity of Education, no tincture of bigotry or prejudice, do far outgo the old standers and professors of the Sect; who, though Men of admirable parts, yet, having had the misfortune to be imbued in their Childhood with some religious Notions, cou'd never after get intirely rid of them; but still retain some small grains of conscience and superstition, which are a check upon the noblest Genius. In proof of this, I remember that the famous Minute Philosopher old *Demodocus* came one day, from conversation upon business with *Timander*, a young Gentleman of the same Sect, full of astonishment. I am surpris'd, said he, to see so young, and withal so compleat a Villain, and, such was the force of prejudice, spoke of *Timander* with abhorrence, not considering  
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that he was only the more egregious and profound Philosopher of the two.

VIII. *EUPH.* Though much may be hoped from the unprejudiced education of young Gentlemen, yet it seems we are not to expect a settled and intire Happiness, before Vice reigns pure and unmixed: till then, much is to be feared from the dangerous struggle between Vice and Virtue, which may perchance overturn and dissolve this Government, as it hath done others. *LVS.* No matter for that, if a better comes in its place. We have cleared the land of all Prejudices towards Government or Constitution, and made them fly like other Phantasms before the light of Reason and good Sense. Men who think deeply cannot see any reason, why Power shou'd not change hands as well as Property; or why the fashion of a Government shou'd not be changed as easy as that of a Garment. The perpetual circulating and revolving of Wealth and Power, no matter through what or whose hands, is that which keeps up Life and Spirit in a State. Those who are even slightly read in our Philosophy, know that of all Prejudices the silliest is an attachment to forms. *CRI.* To say no more upon so clear a point, the overturning a Government may be justified upon the same Principles as the burning a Town, wou'd produce parallel effects, and equally contribute to the public good. In both cases, the natural springs of Action are forcibly exerted: and in this general Industry what one loses another gets, a quick circulation of Wealth and Power making the Sum Total to flourish. *EUPH.* And do the Minute Philosophers publish these things to the World? *LVS.* It must be confessed our Writers proceed in Politics with greater caution than they think necessary with regard to Religion. *CRI.* But those things plainly follow from their Principles, and are to be admitted for the genuine Doctrine of the Sect, expressed perhaps with more freedom and per-

spicuity, than might be thought prudent by those who wou'd manage the Public, or not offend weak brethren. *EUPH.* And pray, is there not need of caution, a Rebel, or Incendiary being Characters that many Men have a prejudice against? *LTS.* Weak People of all ranks have a world of absurd Prejudices. *EUPH.* But the better sort, such as Statesmen and Legislators; do you think they have not the same Indisposition towards admitting your Principles? *LTS.* Perhaps they may; but the reason is plain. *CRI.* This puts me in mind of that ingenious Philosopher, the Gamester *Glaucus*, who used to say, that Statesmen and Lawgivers may keep a stir about right and wrong, just and unjust, but that, in truth, Property of every kind had too often passed from the right owners by fraud and violence, that it was now to be considered as lying on the common, and with equal right belonged to every one that cou'd seize it. *EUPH.* What are we to think then of Laws and Regulations relating to Right and Wrong, Crimes and Duties? *LTS.* They serve to bind weak minds, and keep the Vulgar in awe: But no sooner doth a true Genius arise, but he breaks his way to Greatness through all the trammels of Duty, Conscience, Religion, Law; to all which he sheweth himself infinitely superior.

IX. *EUPH.* You are, it seems, for bringing about a thorough Reformation. *LTS.* As to what is commonly called the Reformation, I cou'd never see how or wherein the World was the better for it. It is much the same as Popery, with this difference, that it is the more prude-like and disagreeable thing of the two. A noted Writer of ours makes it too great a compliment, when he computes the benefit of Hooped-petticoats to be nearly equal to that of the Reformation. Thorough Reformation is thorough Liberty. Leave Nature at full freedom to work her own way, and all will be well. This is  
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what we aim at, and nothing short of this can come up to our Principles. *Crito*, who is a zealous Protestant, hearing these words, cou'd not refrain. The worst effect of the Reformation, said he, was the rescuing wicked Men from a darkness which kept them in awe. This, as it hath proved, was holding out Light to Robbers and Murderers. Light in it self is good, and the same Light which shews a Man the folly of Superstition, might shew him the truth of Religion, and the madness of Atheism. But to make use of Light, only to see the Evils on one side, and never to see, but to run blindly upon the worse extreme, this is to make the best of things produce Evil, in the same sense that you prove the worst of things to produce Good, to wit, accidentally or indirectly: and by the same method of arguing, you may prove that even Diseases are useful: but whatever benefit seems to accrue to the Public, either from disease of Mind or Body, is not their genuine offspring, and may be obtained without them. *Lyficles* was a little disconcerted by the affirmative air of *Crito*; but after a short pause replied briskly, That to contemplate the public good was not every one's talent. True, said *Euphranor*, I question whether every one can frame a notion of the public good, much less judge of the means to promote it.

X. But you, *Lyficles*, who are master of this subject, will be pleased to inform me, whether the public good of a Nation doth not imply the particular good of its Individuals? *LYS.* It doth. *EUPH.* And doth not the good or happiness of a Man consist, in having both Soul and Body sound and in good condition, enjoying those things which their respective Natures require, and free from those things which are odious or hurtful to them. *LYS.* I do not deny all this to be true. *EUPH.* Now it shou'd seem worth while to consider, whether the regular decent life of a virtuous Man may not  
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as much conduce to this end, as the mad fallies of Intemperance and Debauchery. *LYS.* I will acknowledge that a Nation may meerly subsist, or be kept alive, but it is impossible it shou'd flourish without the aid of Vice. To produce a quick circulation of traffick and wealth in a State, there must be exorbitant and irregular motions in the Appetites and Passions. *EUPH.* The more people a Nation contains, and the happier those people are, the more that Nation may be said to flourish. I think we are agreed in this point. *LYS.* We are. *EUPH.* You allow then that Riches are not an ultimate end, but shou'd only be considered as the means to procure Happiness. *LYS.* I do. *EUPH.* It seems, that means cannot be of use without our knowing the end, and how to apply them to it. *LYS.* It seems so. *EUPH.* Will it not follow, that in order to make a Nation flourish, it is not sufficient to make it wealthy, without knowing the true end and happiness of Mankind, and how to apply wealth towards attaining that end? In proportion as these points are known and practised, I think the Nation shou'd be likely to flourish. But for a people who neither know nor practise them, to gain riches, seems to me the same advantage that it wou'd be for a sick Man to come at plenty of meat and drink, which he cou'd not use but to his hurt. *LYS.* This is meer sophistry; it is arguing without persuading. Look into common Life; examine the pursuits of Men; have a due respect for the consent of the World; and you will soon be convinced, that Riches alone are sufficient to make a Nation flourishing and happy. Give them Riches and they will make themselves happy, without that political Invention, that Trick of Statesmen and Philosophers, called Virtue.

XI. *EUPH.* Virtue then, in your account, is a Trick of Statesmen. *LYS.* It is. *EUPH.* Why

Why then do your sagacious Sect betray and divulge that Trick or Secret of State, which wise Men have judged necessary for the good Government of the World? *Lyficles* hesitating, *Crito* made answer, That he presumed it was because their Sect, being wiser than all other wise Men, disdained to see the World governed by wrong Maxims, and wou'd set all things on a right bottom. *EUPH.* Thus much is certain, If we look into all institutions of Government, and the political Writings of such as have heretofore passed for wise Men, we shall find a great regard for Virtue. *LYS.* You shall find a strong tincture of Prejudice: But, as I said before, consult the Multitude if you wou'd find Nature and Truth. *EUPH.* But among Country Gentlemen, and Farmers, and the better sort of Tradesmen, is not Virtue a reputable thing? *LYS.* You pick up Authorities among Men of low life and vile education. *EUPH.* Perhaps we ought to pay a decent respect to the Authority of Minute Philosophers. *LYS.* And I wou'd fain know whose Authority shou'd be more considered, than that of those Gentlemen who are alone above Prejudice, and think for themselves. *EUPH.* How doth it appear that you are the only unprejudiced part of Mankind? May not a Minute Philosopher, as well as another Man, be prejudiced in favour of the leaders of his Sect? May not an atheistical Education prejudice towards Atheism? What shou'd hinder a Man's being prejudiced against Religion, as well as for it? Or can you assign any reason why an attachment to Pleasure, Interest, Vice, or Vanity, may not be supposed to prejudice Men against Virtue? *LYS.* This is pleasant? What! Suppose those very Men influenced by Prejudice, who are always disputing against it, whose constant aim it is to detect and demolish Prejudices of all kinds! Except their own, replied *Crito*, for you must pardon me, if I cannot help

help thinking they have some small Prejudice, though not in favour of Virtue.

XII. I observe, *Lyficles*, that you allowed to *Euphranor*, the greater number of happy People are in a State, the more that State may be said to flourish; it follows therefore, That such methods as multiply Inhabitants are good, and such as diminish them are bad for the Public. And one wou'd think nobody need be told, that the strength of a State consists more in the number and sort of People, than in any thing else. But in proportion as Vice and Luxury, those public blessings encouraged by this Minute Philosophy, prevail among us, fewer are disposed to marry, too many being diverted by Pleasure, disabled by Disease, or frightened by Expence. Nor doth Vice only thin a Nation, but also debaseth it by a puny degenerate Race. I might add, that it is ruinous to our Manufactures, both as it makes labour dear, and thereby enables our more frugal Neighbours to undersel us; and also as it diverts the lower sort of People from honest Callings to wicked Projects. If these and such considerations were taken into the account, I believe it wou'd be evident to any Man in his senses, that the imaginary benefits of Vice bear no proportion to the solid real woes that attend it. *Lyficles*, upon this, shook his head, and smiled at *Crito*, without vouchsafing any other answer. After which, addressing himself to *Euphranor*, There cannot, said he, be a stronger instance of Prejudice, than that a Man shou'd at this time of day preserve a reverence for that idol Virtue, a thing so effectually exposed and exploded by the most knowing Men of the age, who have shewn, that a Man is a meer engine, play'd upon and driven about by sensible objects; and that moral Virtue is only a Name, a Notion, a Chimæra, an Enthusiasm, or at best a Fashion, uncertain and changeable, like all other Fashions. *EUPH.* What do you think, *Lyficles*,  
of



of Health; doth it depend on Fancy and Caprice, or is it something real in the bodily composition of a Man? *LYS.* Health is something real, which results from the right Constitution and Temperature of the Organs and the Fluids circulating through them. *EUPH.* This you say is health of Body. *LYS.* It is. *EUPH.* And may we not suppose an healthy constitution of Soul, when the Notions are right, the Judgments true, the Will regular, the Passions and Appetites directed to their proper objects, and confined within due bounds? This, in regard to the Soul, seems what Health is to the Body. And the Man whose mind is so constituted, is he not properly called virtuous? And to produce this healthy disposition in the minds of his Countrymen, shou'd not every good Man employ his endeavours? If these things have any appearance of Truth, as to me they seem to have, it will not then be so clear a point that Virtue is a meer whim or fashion, as you are pleased to represent it: I must own something unexpectedly, after what had been discourd in last Evening's Conference, which if you wou'd call to mind, it might perhaps save both of us some trouble. *LYS.* Wou'd you know the truth, *Euphranor*? I must own I have quite forgot all your discourse about Virtue, Duty, and all such Points, which, being of an airy notional nature, are apt to vanish, and leave no trace on a mind accustomed only to receive Impression from Realities.

XIII. Having heard these words, *Euphranor* looked at *Crito* and me, and said smiling, I have mistaken my part; it was mine to learn, and his to instruct. Then addressing himself to *Lyficles*, Deal faithfully, said he, and let me know whether the public Benefit of Vice be in truth that which makes you plead for it? *LYS.* I love to speak frankly what I think. Know then, that private Interest is the first and principal consideration with Philosophers of our Sect. Now

Now of all Interests Pleasure is that which hath the strongest charms, and no Pleasures like those which are heightened and enlivened by licence. Herein consists the peculiar excellency of our Principles, that they shew People how to serve their Country by diverting themselves, causing the two streams of public Spirit and Self-love to unite and run in the same channel. I have told you already, that I admit a Nation might subsist by the rules of Virtue. But give me leave to say, it will barely subsist, in a dull joyless insipid state, whereas the sprightly excesses of Vice inspire Men with joy: And where Particulars rejoice, the Public, which is made up of Particulars, must do so too; that is, the Public must be happy. This I take to be an irrefragable argument. But to give you its full force, and make it as plain as possible, I will trace things from their original. Happiness is the end to which created beings naturally tend, but we find that all Animals, whether Men or Brutes, do naturally and principally pursue real Pleasure of Sense, which is therefore to be thought their supreme Good, their true End and Happiness. It is for this Men live, and whoever understands Life must allow that Man to enjoy the top and flower of it, who hath a quick sense of Pleasure, and withal Spirit, Skill, and Fortune sufficient to gratify every appetite and every taste. Niggards and Fools will envy or traduce such a one because they cannot equal him. Hence, all that sober trifling in disparagement of what every one wou'd be master of if he cou'd, a full freedom and unlimited scope of Pleasure. *EUPH.* Let me see whether I understand you. Pleasure of Sense, you say, is the chief Pleasure. *LYS.* I do. *EUPH.* And this wou'd be cramped and diminished by Virtue. *LYS.* It wou'd. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Lyficles*, is Pleasure then at the height when the Appetites are satisfied? *LYS.* There is then only an Indolence, the lively sense of Pleasure

Pleasure being past. *EUPH.* It shou'd seem therefore, that the appetites must be always craving to preserve Pleasure alive. *LRS.* That is our sense of the matter. *EUPH.* The *Greek* Philosopher therefore was in the right, who considered the body of a Man of pleasure as a leaky Vessel, always filling and never full. *LRS.* You may divert your self with Allegories, if you please. But all the while ours is literally the true taste of Nature. Look throughout the Universe, and you shall find Birds and Fishes, Beasts and Insects, all kinds of Animals, with which the Creation swarms, constantly engaged by instinct in the pursuit of sensible Pleasure. And shall Man alone be the grave tool who thwarts, and crosses, and subdues his appetites, while his fellow-creatures do all most joyfully and freely indulge them? *EUPH.* How! *Lyficles!* I thought that being governed by the Senses, Appetites, and Passions, was the most grievous Slavery; and that the proper business of Free-thinkers, or Philosophers, had been to set Men free from the power of Ambition, Avarice, and Sensuality. *LRS.* You mistake the point. We make Men relish the World, attentive to their Interests, lively and luxurious in their Pleasures, without fear or restraint either from God or Man. We despise those preaching Writers, who used to disturb or cramp the pleasures and amusements of Human Life. We hold, that a wise Man who meddles with business, doth it altogether for his interest, and refers his interest to his pleasure. With us it is a maxim, that a Man shou'd seize the moments as they fly. Without Love, and Wine, and Play, and late hours, we hold Life not to be worth living. I grant, indeed, that there is something gross and ill-bred in the vices of mean Men, which the genteel Philosopher abhors. *CRI.* But to cheat, whore, betray, get drunk, do all these things decently, this is true wisdom, and elegance of taste.

XIV. *EUPH.* To me, who have been us'd to another way of thinking, this new Philosophy seems difficult to digest. I must therefore beg leave to examine its Principles, with the same freedom that you do those of other Sects. *LYS.* Agreed. *EUPH.* You say, if I mistake not, that a wise Man pursues only his private interest, and that this consists in sensual pleasure, for proof whereof you appeal to Nature. Is not this what you advance? *LYS.* It is. *EUPH.* You conclude therefore, that as other Animals are guided by natural instinct, Man too ought to follow the dictates of sense and appetite. *LYS.* I do. *EUPH.* But in this, do you not argue as if Man had only sense and appetite for his guides, on which supposition there might be truth in what you say? But what if he hath intellect, reason, a higher instinct and a nobler life? If this be the case, and you being Man, live like a Brute, is it not the way to be defrauded of your true happiness? to be mortified and disappointed? Consider most sorts of Brutes; you shall perhaps find them have a greater share of sensual happiness than Man. *LYS.* To our sorrow we do. This hath made several Gentlemen of our Sect envy Brutes, and lament the lot of Humane Kind. *CRI.* It was a consideration of this sort which inspired *Erotylus*, with the laudable ambition of wishing himself a snail, upon hearing of certain particularities discovered in that animal by a modern Virtuoso. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Lyficles*, if you had an inexhaustible fund of gold and silver, shou'd you envy another for having a little more copper than you? *LYS.* I shou'd not. *EUPH.* Are not Reason, Imagination, and Sense, Faculties differing in kind, and in rank higher one than another. *LYS.* I do not deny it. *EUPH.* Their acts therefore differ in kind. *LYS.* They do. *EUPH.* Consequently the pleasures perfective of those acts are also different. *LYS.* They are. *EUPH.* You admit therefore three sorts of pleasure; pleasure of Reason,  
pleasure

pleasure of imagination, and pleasure of Sense. *LYS.* I do. *EUPH.* And, as it is reasonable to think, the operation of the highest and noblest faculty to be attended with the highest pleasure, may we not suppose the two former to be as gold or silver, and the latter only as copper? Whence it shou'd seem to follow, that Man need not envy or imitate a Brute. *LYS.* And nevertheless there are very ingenious Men who do. And surely every one may be allowed to know what he wants, and wherein his true happiness consists. *EUPH.* Is it not plain that different Animals have different pleasures? Take a Hog from his ditch or dunghil, lay him on a rich bed, treat him with sweet-meats, and music, and perfumes. All these things will be no entertainment to him. Do not a Bird, a Beast, a Fish, amuse themselves in various manners, insomuch that what is pleasing to one may be death to another? Is it ever seen that one of these Animals quits its own element or way of living, to adopt that of another? And shall Man quit his own Nature to imitate a Brute? *LYS.* But Sense is not only natural to Brutes; is it not also natural to Man? *EUPH.* It is, but with this difference, it maketh the Whole of a Brute, but is the lowest part or faculty of a Humane Soul. The nature of any thing is peculiarly that which doth distinguish it from other things, not what it hath in common with them. Do you allow this to be true? *LYS.* I do. *EUPH.* And is not Reason that which makes the principal difference between Man and other Animals? *LYS.* It is. *EUPH.* Reason therefore being the principal part of our Nature, whatever is most reasonable shou'd seem most natural to Man. Must we not therefore think rational Pleasures more agreeable to Human Kind, than those of Sense? Man and Beast having different Natures, seem to have different Faculties, different Enjoyments, and different sorts of Happiness. You can easily conceive, that the sort of Life which makes the happiness of a Mole or a

Bat, wou'd be a very wretched one for an Eagle. And may you not as well conceive that the happiness of a Brute can never constitute the true happiness of a Man? A Beast, without Reflection or Remorse, without Foresight or Appetite of Immortality, without notion of Vice or Virtue, or Order, or Reason, or Knowledge! What motive, what grounds can there be for bringing down Man, in whom are all these things, to a level with such a creature? What merit, what ambition in the Minute Philosopher to make such an Animal a guide or rule for Humane Life?

XV. *LYS.* It is strange, *Euphranor*, that one who admits freedom of thought as you do, shou'd yet be such a slave to prejudice. You still talk of order and virtue, as of real things, as if our Philosophers had never demonstrated, that they have no foundation in Nature, and are only the effects of Education. I know, said *Crito*, how the Minute Philosophers are accustomed to demonstrate this point. They consider the animal nature of Man, or Man so far forth as he is animal; and it must be owned that considered in that light, he hath no sense of Duty, no notion of Virtue. He therefore, who shou'd look for Virtue among meer animals, or Human Kind as such, wou'd look in the wrong place. But that Philosopher who is attentive only to the animal part of his Being, and raiseth his Theorys from the very dregs of our Species, might probably upon second thoughts find himself mistaken. Look you, *Crito*, said *Lyficles*, my argument is with *Euphranor* to whom addressing his discourse; I observe, said he, that you stand much upon the dignity of Humane Nature. This thing of dignity is an old worn-out notion, which depends on other notions old and stale, and worn-out, such as an immaterial Spirit, and a Ray derived from the Divinity. But in these days Men of Sense make a jest of all this Grandeur and Dignity; and many there  
are

are wou'd gladly exchange their share of it for the repose and freedom, and sensuality of a Brute. But comparisons are odious: waving therefore all inquiry concerning the respective excellencies of Man and Beast, and whether it is beneath a Man to follow or imitate Brute Animals, in judging of the chief good and conduct of Life and Manners, I shall be content to appeal to the Authority of Men themselves, for the truth of my notions. Do but look abroad into the World, and ask the common run of Men, whether pleasure of Sense be not the only true, solid, substantial good of their kind? *EUPH.* But might not the same vulgar sort of Men prefer a piece of Sign-post Painting to one of *Raphael's*, or a *Grubstreet* Ballad to an Ode of *Horace*? Is there not a real difference between good and bad Writing? *LYS.* There is. *EUPH.* And yet you will allow there must be a maturity and improvement of understanding to discern this difference, which doth not make it therefore less real. *LYS.* I will. *EUPH.* In the same manner what shou'd hinder, but there may be in nature a true difference between Vice and Virtue, although it require some degree of reflexion and judgment to observe it? In order to know whether a thing be agreeable to the rational nature of Man, it seems one shou'd rather observe and consult those who have most employ'd or improved their Reason. *LYS.* Well, I shall not insist on consulting the common herd of mankind. From the ignorant and gross Vulgar, I might myself appeal in many cases to Men of rank and fashion. *EUPH.* They are a sort of Men I have not the honour to know much of by my own Observation. But I remember a remark of *Aristotle*, who was himself a Courtier and knew them well. 'Virtue, saith he, \* and good Sense are not

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\* *Ethic. ad Nicom. l. 10, c. 6.*

‘ the property of high Birth or a great Estate. Nor  
 ‘ if they who possess these advantages, wanting a  
 ‘ taste for rational pleasures, betake themselves to  
 ‘ those of Sense ; ought we therefore to esteem them  
 ‘ eligible, any more than we shou’d the toys and pas-  
 ‘ times of Children, because they seem so to them?’  
 And indeed one may be allowed to question, whether  
 the truest estimate of things was to be expected from  
 a mind intoxicated with Luxury, and dazzled with  
 the splendor of high living.

*Cum stupet insanis acies fulgoribus, Et cum  
 Acclinis falsis animus meliora recusat.*

Hor.

*Crito* upon this observed, that he knew an *English*  
 Nobleman who in the prime of Life professeth a li-  
 beral art, and is the first Man of his profession in the  
 World ; and that he was very sure, he had more  
 pleasure from the exercise of that elegant art, than  
 from any sensual enjoyment within the power of one  
 of the largest fortunes, and most bountiful Spirits in  
*Great Britain*.

XVI. *LYS*. But why need we have recourse to  
 the judgment of other Men in so plain a case ? I ap-  
 peal to your own breast, consult that, and then say  
 if sensible pleasure be not the chief good of Man.  
*EUPH*. I, for my part, have often thought those  
 pleasures which are highest in the esteem of sensualists,  
 so far from being the chiefest good, that it seemed  
 doubtful upon the whole, whether they were any  
 good at all, any more than the meer removal of pain.  
 Are not our wants and appetites uneasy ? *LYS*. They  
 are. *EUPH*. Doth not sensual pleasure consist in  
 satisfying them ? *LYS*. It doth. *EUPH*. But  
 the cravings are tedious, the satisfaction momentary.  
 Is it not so ? *LYS*. It is, but what then ? *EUPH*.  
 Why then it shou’d seem that sensual pleasure is but  
 a short deliverance from long pain. A long avenue  
 of



of uneasiness leads to a point of pleasure, which ends in disgust or remorse. *CR I.* And he who pursues this *ignis fatuus* imagines himself a Philosopher and Free-thinker. *L Y S.* Pedants are governed by words and notions, while the wiser Men of pleasure follow Fact, Nature and Sense. *CR I.* But what if notional pleasures should in fact prove the most real and lasting? Pure pleasures of Reason and Imagination neither hurt the health, nor waste the fortune, nor gall the conscience. By them the mind is long entertained without loathing or satiety. On the other hand a notion (which with you it seems passeth for nothing) often embitters the most lively sensual pleasures, which at bottom will be found also to depend upon notion more than perhaps you imagine, it being a vulgar remark, that those things are more enjoyed by hope and foretaste of the Soul than by possession. Thus much is yielded, that the actual enjoyment is very short, and the alternative of Appetite and Disgust long as well as uneasy. So that, upon the whole, it should seem those Gentlemen, who are called Men of pleasure from their eager pursuit of it, do in reality with great expence of fortune, ease, and health purchase pain. *L Y S.* You may spin out plausible Arguments, but will after all find it a difficult matter to convince me that so many ingenious Men shou'd not be able to distinguish between things so directly opposite as pain and pleasure. How is it possible to account for this? *CR I.* I believe a reason may be assigned for it, but to Men of pleasure no truth is so palatable as a fable. *Jove* once upon a time having ordered, that pleasure and pain shou'd be mixed in equal proportions in every dose of Humane Life, upon a complaint, that some Men endeavoured to separate what he had joined, and taking more than their share of the sweet, wou'd leave all the sour for others, commanded *Mercury* to put a stop to this evil, by fixing on each Delinquent a pair of invisible Spectacles, which shou'd change the appearance of things, mak-

ing pain look like pleasure, and pleasure like pain, labour like recreation, and recreation like labour. From that time the Men of Pleasure are eternally mistaking and repenting. *LYS.* If your Doctrine takes place I wou'd fain know what can be the advantage of a great fortune, which all mankind so eagerly pursue? *CR I.* It is a common saying with *Eucrates*, That a great fortune is an edged tool, which a hundred may come at, for one who knows how to use it, so much easier is the art of getting than that of spending. What its advantage is I will not say, but I will venture to declare what it is not. I am sure that where abundance excludes want, and enjoyment prevents appetite, there is not the quickest sense of those pleasures we have been speaking of, in which the Footman hath often a greater share than his Lord, who cannot enlarge his Stomach in proportion to his Estate.

XVII. Reasonable and well-educated Men of all Ranks have, I believe, pretty much the same amusements, notwithstanding the difference of their fortunes: But those who are particularly distinguished as Men of pleasure seem to possess it in a very small degree. *EUPH.* I have heard that among Persons of that character, a game of Cards is esteemed a chief diversion, *LYS.* Without Cards there cou'd be no living for People of fashion. It is the most delightful way of passing an Evening when Gentlemen and Ladies are got together, who wou'd otherwise be at a loss what to say or do with themselves. But a pack of Cards is so engaging, that it doth not only employ them when they are met, but serves to draw them together, *Quadrille* gives them pleasure in prospect during the dull hours of the day, they reflect on it with delight, and it furnishes discourse when it is over. *CR I.* One wou'd be apt to suspect these People of condition pass their time but heavily, and are but little the better for their fortunes, whose  
chief

chief amusement is a thing in the power of every Porter or Footman, who is as well qualified to receive pleasure from Cards as a Peer. I can easily conceive that when People of a certain turn are got together, they shou'd prefer doing any thing to the *ennui* of their own conversation; but it is not easily to conceive there is any great pleasure in this. What a Card-table can afford requires neither parts nor fortune to judge of. *LRS.* Play is a serious amusement that comes to the relief of a Man of pleasure, after the more lively and affecting enjoyments of Sense. It kills time beyond any thing, and is a most admirable Anodyne to divert or prevent thought, which might otherwise prey upon the mind. *CR I.* I can easily comprehend, that no Man upon Earth ought to prize Anodynes for the Spleen, more than a Man of fashion and pleasure. An ancient Sage speaking of one of that character, saith he is made wretched by disappointments and appetites, *λυπείται ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν*. And if this was true of the *Greeks* who lived in the Sun, and had so much Spirit, I am apt to think it is still more so of our modern *English*. Something there is in our climate and complexion, that makes idleness no where so much its own punishment as in *England*, where an uneducated fine Gentleman pays for his momentary pleasures, with long and cruel intervals of Spleen; for relief of which he is driven into sensual excesses, that produce a proportionable depression of Spirits, which, as it createth a greater want of pleasures, so it lessens the ability to enjoy them. There is a cast of Thought in the Complexion of an *Englishman*, which renders him the most unsuccessful Rake in the World. He is (as *Aristotle* expresseth it) at variance with himself. He is neither Brute enough to enjoy his appetites, nor Man enough to govern them. He knows and feels that what he pursues is not his true good, his reflexion serving only to shew him that misery which his habitual sloth and indolence will not suffer him to remedy. At length being

grown odious to himself, and abhorring his own Company, he runs into every idle Assembly, not from the hopes of pleasure, but meerly to respite the pain of his own mind. Listless and uneasy at the present, he hath no delight in reflecting on what is past, or in the prospect of any thing to come. This Man of pleasure, when after a wretched Scene of vanity and woe his animal nature is worn to the Stumps, wishes and dreads Death by turns, and is sick of living, without having ever tried or known the true life of Man. *EUPH.* It is well this sort of Life, which is of so little benefit to the owner, conduceth so much to that of the Public. But pray tell me, do these Gentlemen set up for Minute Philosophers? *CRI.* That Sect you must know contains two sorts of Philosophers, the wet and the dry. Those I have been describing are of the former kind. They differ rather in Practice than in Theory. As an older, graver or duller Man from one that is younger, and more capable or fond of pleasure. The dry Philosopher passeth his time but drily. He has the honour of pimping for the Vices of more sprightly Men, who in return offer some small incense to his Vanity. Upon this encouragement, and to make his own mind easy when it is past being pleased, he employs himself in justifying those excesses he cannot partake in. But to return to your question, those miserable Folk are mighty Men for the Minute Philosophy. *EUPH.* What hinders them then from putting an end to their lives? *CRI.* Their not being persuaded of the Truth of what they profess. Some indeed in a fit of despair do now and then lay violent hands on themselves. And as the Minute Philosophy prevails, we daily see more examples of Suicide. But they bear no proportion to those who wou'd put an end to their lives if they durst. My friend *Clinias*, who had been one of them, and a Philosopher of rank, let me into the secret History of their doubts and fears and irresolute resolutions of making away with themselves, which

last

last he assures me is a frequent topic with Men of pleasure, when they have drunk themselves into a little Spirit. It was by virtue of this mechanical valour, the renowned Philosopher *Hermocrates* shot himself through the head. The same thing hath since been practised by several others to the great relief of their friends. Splenetic, worried, and frightened out of their wits, they run upon their doom, with the same courage as a Bird runs into the mouth of a Rattle Snake, not because they are bold to die, but because they are afraid to live. *Climias* endeavoured to fortify his irreligion, by the discourse and opinion of other Minute Philosophers, who were mutually strengthened in their own unbelief by his. After this manner, authority working in a circle, they endeavoured to atheize one another. But though he pretended even to a demonstration against the Being of a God, yet he cou'd not inwardly conquer his own Belief. He fell sick, and acknowledged this truth, is now a sober Man and a good Christian; owns he was never so happy as since he became such, nor so wretched as while he was a Minute Philosopher. And he who has tried both conditions may be allowed a proper judge of both. *LRS.* Truly a fine account of the brightest and bravest Men of the Age. *CRI.* Bright and brave are fine attributes. But our Curate is of opinion, that all your Free-thinking Rakes are either Fools or Cowards. Thus he argues; if such a Man doth not see his true Interest, he wants Sense, if he doth but dare not pursue it, he wants Courage. In this manner from the defect of Sense and Courage, he deduceth that whole Species of Men, who are so apt to value themselves upon both those qualities. *LRS.* As for their Courage they are at all times ready to give proof of it; and for their understanding, thanks to nature, it is of a size not to be measured by Country Parsons.

XVIII. *EUPH.* But *Socrates*, who was no Country Parson, suspected your Men of pleasure were such through ignorance. *LYS.* Ignorance of what? *EUPH.* Of the art of computing. It was his opinion that Rakes cannot reckon\*. And that for want of this skill they make wrong judgments about pleasure, on the right choice of which their happiness depends. *LYS.* I do not understand you. *EUPH.* Do you grant that Sense perceiveth only sensible things? *LYS.* I do. *EUPH.* Sense perceiveth only things present. *LYS.* This too I grant. *EUPH.* Future pleasures, therefore, and pleasures of the understanding, are not to be judged of by actual Sense. *LYS.* They are not. *EUPH.* Those therefore who judge of pleasure by Sense, may find themselves mistaken at the foot of the account.

† *Cum lapidosa chiragra*  
*Contudit articulos veteris ramalia fagi,*  
*Tum crassos transisse dies lucemque palustrem,*  
*Et sibi jam feri vitam ingemuere relictam.*

To make a right computation, thou'd you not consider all the faculties and all the kinds of Pleasure, taking into your account the future as well as the present, and rating them all according to their true value? *CRI.* The *Epicureans* themselves allowed, that Pleasure which procures a greater Pain, or hinders a greater Pleasure, thou'd be regarded as a Pain; and, that Pain which procures a greater Pleasure, or prevents a greater Pain, is to be accounted a Pleasure. In order therefore to make a true estimate of Pleasure, the great spring of action, and that from whence the conduct of Life takes its bias, we ought to compute intellectual Pleasures and future Pleasures,

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\* Plato in protag. † Persius, Sat. 5.

as well as present and sensible: We ought to make allowance in the valuation of each particular Pleasure, for all the Pains and Evils, for all the Disgust, Remorse, and Shame that attend it: We ought to regard both kind and quantity, the sincerity, the intenseness, and the duration of Pleasures. *EUPH.* And all these points duly considered, will not *Socrates* seem to have had reason of his side, when he thought ignorance made Rakes, and particularly their being ignorant of what he calls the Science of more and less, greater and smaller, equality and comparison, that is to say of the art of Computing? *LRS.* All this discourse seems notional. For real abilities of every kind it is well known we have the brightest Men of the age among us. But all those who know the World do calculate that what you call a good Christian, who hath neither a large Conscience, nor unprejudiced Mind, must be unfit for the affairs of it. Thus you see, while you compute your selves out of pleasure, others compute you out of business. What then are you good for with all your computation? *EUPH.* I have all imaginable respect for the abilities of Free-thinkers. My only fear was, their parts might be too lively for such slow talents as Forecast and Computation, the gifts of ordinary Men.

XIX. *CRI.* I cannot make them the same compliment that *Euphranor* does. For though I shall not pretend to characterize the whole Sect, yet thus much I may truly affirm, That those who have fallen in my way have been mostly raw Men of pleasure, old Sharpers in business, or a third sort of lazy Sciolists, who are neither Men of business, nor Men of speculation, but set up for judges or critics in all kinds, without having made a progress in any. These, among Men of the World pass for profound Theorists, and among speculative Men wou'd seem to know the World; a conceited race, equally useless to the affairs and studies of Mankind. Such as these, for the most part,

part, seem to be Sectaries of the Minute Philosophy. I will not deny that now and then you may meet with a Man of easy manners, that, without those faults and affectations, is carried into the party by the meer stream of Education, Fashion, or Company; all which do in this age prejudice Men against Religion, even those who mechanically rail at Prejudice. I must not forget that the Minute Philosophers have also a strong party among the Beaux and fine Ladies, and, as affectations out of character are often the strongest, there is nothing so dogmatical and invincible as one of these fine things, when it sets up for Free-thinking. But, be these professors of the Sect never so dogmatical, their authority must needs be small with Men of sense: For who would choose for his guide in the search for Truth, a Man whose Thoughts and Time are taken up with Dress, Visits, and Diversions? Or whose Education hath been behind a Counter, or in an Office? Or whose Speculations have been employed on the forms of business, who are only well read in the ways and commerce of Mankind, in stock-jobbing, purloining, supplanting, bribing? Or would any Man in his senses give a fig for Meditations and Discoveries made over a bottle? And yet it is certain, that instead of Thought, Books, and Study, most Free-thinkers are the Profelytes of a drinking Club. Their Principles are often settled, and decisions on the deepest Points made, when they are not fit to make a bargain.

*LYS.* You forget our Writers, *Crito*. They make a world of Profelytes. *CRI.* So would worse Writers in such a cause. Alas! how few read! and of these, how few are able to judge? How many wish your notions true? How many had rather be diverted than instructed? How many are convinced by a title? I may allow your reasons to be effectual, without allowing them to be good. Arguments, in themselves of small weight, have great effect, when they



they are recommended by a mistaken interest, when they are pleaded for by passion, when they are countenanced by the humour of the age; and above all, with some sort of Men, when they are against Law, Government, and established Opinions, things which, as a wise or good Man wou'd not depart from without clear evidence, a weak or a bad Man will affect to disparage on the slightest Grounds. *LYS.* And yet the arguments of our Philosophers alarm. *CR I.* The force of their reasoning is not what alarms, their contempt of Laws and Government is alarming, their application to the young and ignorant is dangerous. *EUPH.* But without disputing or disparaging their talent at Ratiocination, it seems very possible their success might not be owing to that alone. May it not in some measure be ascribed to the defects of others, as well as to their own perfections? My friend *Eucrates* used to say, that the Church wou'd thrive and flourish beyond all opposition, if some certain persons minded Piety more than Politics, Practics than Polemics, Fundamentals than Consecratories, Substance than Circumstance, Things than Notions, and Notions than Words. *LYS.* Whatever may be the cause, the effects are too plain to be denied. And when a considering Man observes that our Notions do, in this most learned and knowing age, spread and multiply, in opposition to established Laws, and every day gain ground against a body so numerous, so learned, so well supported, protected, encouraged for the service and defence of Religion: I say, when a Man observes and considers all this, he will be apt to ascribe it to the force of Truth, and the merits of our cause; which, had it been supported with the revenues and establishments of the Church and Universities, you may guess what a figure it wou'd make, by the figure that it makes without them. *EUPH.* It is much to be pitied, that the learned professors of your Sect do not meet with the encouragement they deserve. *LYS.* All in  
due

due time. People begin to open their eyes. It is not impossible but those revenues that in ignorant times were applied to a wrong use, may hereafter in a more enlightned age, be applied to a better. *CR I.* But why professors and encouragement for what needs no teaching? An acquaintance of mine has a most ingenious Footman that can neither write nor read, who learned your whole System in half an hour, he knows when and how to nod, shake his head, smile, and give a hint as well as the ablest Sceptic, and is in fact a very Minute Philosopher. *LTS.* Pardon me, it takes time to unlearn religious Prejudices, and requires a strong head. *CR I.* I do not know how it might have been once upon a time. But in the present laudable education, I know several who have been imbued with no religious notions at all; and others who have had them so very slight, that they rubbed off without the least pains.

XX. *Panope*, young and beautiful, under the care of her Aunt, an admirer of the Minute Philosophy, was kept from learning the Principles of Religion, that she might not be accustomed to believe without a reason, nor assent to what she did not comprehend. *Panope* was not indeed prejudiced with religious notions, but got a notion of Intriguing, and a notion of Play, which ruined her reputation by fourteen, and her fortune by four and twenty. I have often reflected on the different fate of two Brothers in my neighbourhood. *Cleon* the elder being designed an accomplish'd Gentleman, was sent to town, had the first part of his education in a great School: What Religion he learned there was soon unlearned in a certain celebrated Society, which, till we have a better, may pass for a nursery of Minute Philosophers. *Cleon* dressed well, cou'd cheat at cards, had a nice palate, understood the mystery of the Die, was a mighty Man in the Minute Philosophy. And having shined a few years in these accomplishments, he died before  
thirty,

thirty, childless, and rotten, expressing the utmost indignation that he cou'd not out-live that old dog his Father; who, having a great notion of polite manners, and knowledge of the World, had purchased them to his favourite Son, with much expence, but had been more frugal in the education of *Chærephon*, the younger Son, who was brought up at a Country-School, and entered a Commoner in the University, where he qualified himself for a Parsonage in his Father's gift, which he is now possessed of, together with the Estate of the Family, and a numerous Offspring. *LRS.* A pack of unpolish'd cubbs, I warrant. *CRI.* Less polished, perhaps, but more sound, more honest, and more useful than many who pass for fine Gentlemen. *Crates*, a worthy Justice of the Peace in this County, having had a Son miscarry at *London*, by the conversation of a Minute Philosopher, used to say with a great air of complaint, If a Man spoils my Corn, or hurts my Cattle, I have a remedy against him; but if he spoils my Children, I have none. *LRS.* I warrant you, he was for penal methods; he wou'd have had a Law to persecute tender Consciences. *CRI.* The tender Conscience of a Minute Philosopher! He who tutored the Son of *Crates*, soon after did justice on himself. For he taught *Lycidas*, a modest young Man, the Principles of his Sect. *Lycidas*, in return, debauched his Daughter, an only child, upon which, *Charmides* (that was the Minute Philosopher's Name) hanged himself. Old *Bubalion* in the City is carking, and starving, and cheating, that his Son may drink and game, keep Mistresses, Hounds, and Horses, and die in a Jail. *Bubalion* nevertheless thinks himself wise, and passeth for one that minds the main chance. He is a Minute Philosopher, which learning he acquired behind the counter, from the works of *Prodicus* and *Tryphon*. This same *Bubalion* was one night at supper, talking against the Immortality of the Soul, with two or three grave Citizens, one of whom the next day declared

clared himself bankrupt, with five thousand Pound of *Bubalion's* in his hands, and the night following he received a note from a Servant, who had during his lecture waited at table, demanding the sum of fifty guineas to be laid under a stone, and concluding with most terrible threats and imprecations. *LRS.* Not to repeat what hath been already demonstrated, That the Public is at bottom no sufferer by such accidents, which in truth are inconvenient only to private persons, who in their turn too may reap the benefit of them; I say, not to repeat all that hath been demonstrated on that head, I shall only ask you whether there wou'd not be Rakes and Rogues, although we did not make them? Believe me, the World always was, and always will be the same, as long as Men are Men. *CRI.* I deny that the World is always the same. Humane Nature, to use *Alciphron's* comparison, is like Land, better or worse, as it is improved, and according to the Seeds or Principles sown in it. Though no body held your Tenets, I grant there might be bad Men by the force of corrupt appetites and irregular passions: But where Men, to the force of appetite and passion, add that of opinion, and are wicked from Principle, there will be more Men wicked, and those more incurably and outrageously so. The error of a lively Rake lies in his passions, and may be reformed: But the dry Rogue who sets up for judgment, is incorrigible. It is an observation of *Aristotle's*, That there are two sorts of Debauchees, the ἀκρατής, and the λήλατος, of which the one is so against his judgment, the other with it, and that there may be hopes of the former, but none of the latter. And in fact I have always observed, that a Rake who is a Minute Philosopher, when grown old becomes a sharper in business. *LRS.* I cou'd name you several such who have grown most noted Patriots. *CRI.* Patriots! such Patriots as *Catiline* and *Marc Antony*. *LRS.* And what then? Those famous *Romans* were brave though unsuccessful. They

They wanted neither Sense nor Courage, and if their Schemes had taken effect, the brisker part of their Countrymen had been much the better for them.

XXI. The wheels of Government go on, though wound up by different hands ; it not in the same form, yet in some other, perhaps a better. There is an endless variety in nature, weak Men, indeed, are prejudiced towards Rules and Systems in Life and Government ; and think if these are gone all is gone : But a Man of a great Soul and free Spirit delights in the noble experiment of blowing up Systems and dissolving Governments, to mold them anew upon other principles and in another shape. Take my word for it ; there is a plastic nature in things that seeks its own end. Pull a State to pieces, jumble, confound, and shake together the particles of Humane Society, and then let them stand a while, and you shall soon see them settle of themselves in some convenient order, where heavy heads are lowest and Men of genius uppermost. *EUPH. Lycicles*, speaks his mind freely. *LYS.* Where was the advantage of Free-thinking if it were not attended with Free-speaking, or of Free-speaking if it did not produce Free-acting ? We are for absolute, independent, original freedom in thought, word, and deed. Inward freedom without outward, is good for nothing but to set a Man's judgment at variance with his practice. *CRI.* This free way of *Lycicles* may seem new to you ; it is not so to me. As the Minute Philosophers lay it down for a maxim, that there is nothing sacred of any kind, nothing but what may be made a jest of, exploded, and changed like the fashion of their Clothes, so nothing is more frequent than for them to utter their schemes and principles, not only in select Companies, but even in public. In a certain part of the World, where ingenious Men are wont to retail their Speculations, I remember to have seen a *Valetundinarian* in a long Wig and a Cloak sitting at the upper end of a  
G Table,

Table, with half a dozen of Disciples about him. After he had talked about Religion in a manner, and with an air that wou'd make one think, Atheism established by Law, and Religion only tolerated, he entered upon Civil Government, and observed to his Audience, that the natural World was in a perpetual circulation: Animals, said he, who draw their sustenance from the Earth, mix with that same Earth, and in their turn become Food for Vegetables, which again nourish the Animal kind: The Vapours that ascend from this Globe descend back upon it in showers: The Elements alternately prey upon each other: That which one part of nature loseth another gains, the sum total remaining always the same, being neither bigger nor lesser, better nor worse for all these intestine changes. Even so, said this learned Professor, the revolutions in the civil World are no detriment to Human Kind, one part whereof rises as the other falls, and wins by another's loss. A Man therefore who thinks deeply, and hath an eye on the whole System, is no more a Bigot to Government than to Religion. He knows how to suit himself to occasions, and make the best of every event: For the rest, he looks on all translations of power and property from one hand to another with a philosophic indifference. Our Lecturer concluded his discourse with a most ingenious Analysis of all political and moral Virtues into their first principles and causes, shewing them to be meer fashions, tricks of State, and illusions on the Vulgar. *LYS.* We have been often told of the good effects of Religion and Learning, Churches and Universities: But I dare affirm, that a dozen or two ingenious Men of our Sect have done more towards advancing real knowledge, by extemporaneous Lectures in the compass of a few years, than all the Ecclesiastics put together for as many Centuries. *EUPH.* And the Nation no doubt thrives accordingly: But, it seems, *Crito*, you have heard them discourse. *CRI.* Upon hearing this and other Lec-  
tures

tures of the same tendency, methought it was needless to establish Professors for the Minute Philosophy in either University, while there are so many spontaneous Lecturers in every corner of the Streets, ready to open Mens Eyes, and rub off their prejudices about Religion, Loyalty, and public Spirit. *L Y S.* If wishing was to any purpose, I cou'd wish for a Telescope that might draw into my view things future in time, as well as distant in place. Oh ! that I cou'd but look into the next age, and behold what it is that we are preparing to be, the glorious harvest of our Principles, the spreading of which hath produced a visible tendency, in the Nation towards something great and new. *C R I.* One thing I dare say you wou'd expect to see, be the changes and agitations of the Public what they will, that is, every Free-thinker upon his legs. You are all Sons of Nature, who chearfully follow the fortunes of the common Mass. *L Y S.* And it must be owned we have a maxim, that *each shou'd take care of one.* *C R I.* Alas, *Lyficles*, you wrong your own Character. You wou'd fain pass upon the World and upon your selves for interested cunning Men: But can any thing be more disinterested than to sacrifice all regards to the abstracted Speculation of Truth? Or can any thing be more void of all cunning than to publish your discoveries to the World, teach others to play the whole game, and arm Mankind against your selves?

XXII. If a Man may venture to suggest so mean a thought as the love of their Country, to Souls fired with the love of Truth, and the love of Liberty, and grasping the whole extent of Nature, I wou'd humbly propose it to you, Gentlemen, to observe the caution practised by all other discoverers, projectors, and makers of experiments, who never hazard all on the first trial. Wou'd it not be prudent to try the success of your principles on a small model in some remote corner? For instance set up a Colony of Athe-

ists in *Monomotapa*, and see how it prospers before you proceed any further at home: Half a dozen Ship-load of Minute Philosophers might easily be spread upon so good a design. In the mean time, you Gentlemen, who have found out that there is nothing to be hoped or feared in another Life, that Conscience is a Bugbear, that the bands of Government, and the cement of Human Society are rotten things, to be dissolved and crumbled into nothing, by the argumentation of every Minute Philosopher, be so good as to keep these sublime discoveries to yourselves: Suffer us, our Wives, our Children, our Servants and our Neighbours to continue in the Belief and way of Thinking established by the Laws of our Country. In good earnest, I wish you wou'd go try your experiments among the *Hottentots* or *Turks*. *LYS.* The *Hottentots* we think well of, believing them to be an unprejudiced People; but it is to be feared their diet and customs wou'd not agree with our Philosophers: As for the *Turks* they are Bigots who have a notion of God and a respect for Jesus Christ. I question whether it might be safe to venture among them. *CRI.* Make your experiment then in some other part of *Christendom*. *LYS.* We hold all other Christian Nations to be much under the power of prejudice; even our Neighbours the *Dutch* are too much prejudiced in favour of their Religion by Law established, for a prudent Man to attempt innovations under their Government. Upon the whole it seems, we can execute our Schemes nowhere with so much security and such prospect of success as at home. Not to say that we have already made a good progress. Oh! That we cou'd but once see a Parliament of true, staunch, libertine Free-thinkers! *CRI.* God forbid. I shou'd be sorry to have such Men for my Servants, not to say, for my Masters. *LYS.* In that we differ.



XXIII. But you will agree with me that the right way to come at this, was to begin with extirpating the prejudices of particular Persons. We have carried on this work for many years with much art and industry, and at first with secrecy, working like Moles under ground, concealing our progress from the Public, and our ultimate views from many, even of our own Profelytes, blowing the Coals between polemical Divines, laying hold on and improving every incident, which the passions and folly of Churchmen afforded, to the advantage of our Sect. As our principles obtained, we still proceeded to farther inferences; and as our numbers multiplied, we gradually disclosed our selves and our Opinions; where we are now I need not say. We have stubbed and weeded and cleared Humane Nature to that degree, that in a little time, leaving it alone without any labouring or teaching, you shall see natural and just Ideas sprout forth of themselves. *CRI.* But I have heard a man, who had lived long and observed much, remark that the worst and most unwholesom weed was this same Minute Philosophy. We have had, said he, divers epidemical distempers in the State, but this hath produced of all others the most destructive Plague. Enthusiasm had its day, its effects were violent and soon over: This infects more quietly but spreads widely: The former bred a fever in the State, this breeds a consumption and final decay. A Rebellion or an Invasion alarms and puts the Public upon its defence, but a corruption of principles works its ruin more slowly perhaps, but more surely. This may be illustrated by a Fable I somewhere met with in the writings of a *Swiss* Philosopher, setting forth the original of Brandy and Gun-powder. The Government of the North being once upon a time vacant, the Prince of the power of the air convened a Council in Hell, wherein upon competition between two Dæmons of rank, it was determined they shou'd both

make trial of their abilities, and he shou'd succeed who did most mischief. One made his appearance in the shape of Gunpowder, the other in that of Brandy: The former was a declared Enemy and roared with a terrible noise, which made folks afraid, and put them on their guard: The other passed as a Friend and a Physician through the World, disguised himself with Sweets and Perfumes and Drugs, made his way into the Ladies Cabinets, and the Apothecaries Shops, and under the notion of helping digestion, comforting the Spirits, and cheering the Heart, produced direct contrary effects; and having insensibly thrown great numbers of Humane Kind into a lingering but fatal decay, was found to people Hell and the Grave so fast as to merit the Government which he still possesses.

XXIV. *L R S.* Those who please may amuse themselves with Fables and Allegories. This is plain *Eng-lish*: Liberty is a good thing, and we are the support of Liberty. *C R I.* To me it seems that Liberty and Virtue were made for each other. If any Man wish to enslave his Country, nothing is a fitter preparative than Vice; and nothing leads to Vice so surely as Irreligion. For my part I cannot comprehend or find out, after having considered it in all lights, how this crying down Religion shou'd be the effect of honest views towards a just and legal Liberty. Some seem to propose an indulgence in Vice. Others may have in prospect the advantages which needy and ambitious Men are used to make in the ruin of a State: One may indulge a pert petulant Spirit; another hope to be esteemed among Libertines, when he wants wit to please or abilities to be useful. But, be Mens views what they will, let us examine what good your principles have done; who has been the better for the instructions of these Minute Philosophers? Let us compare what we are in respect of Learning, Loyalty, Honesty, Wealth, Power and Public Spirit with  
what

what we have been. Free-thinking (as it is called) hath wonderfully grown of late years. Let us see what hath grown up with it, or what effects it hath produced. To make a catalogue of ills is disagreeable; and the only blessing it can pretend to is Luxury: That same blessing which revenged the World upon old *Rome*: That same Luxury that makes a Nation, like a diseased pampered body, look full and fat with one foot in the Grave. *LRS.* You mistake the matter. There are no People who think and argue better about the public good of a State than our Sect; who have also invented many things tending to that end, which we cannot as yet conveniently put in practice. *CRI.* But one point there is from which it must be owned the Public hath already received some advantage, which is the effect of your principles flowing from them, and spreading as they do; I mean that old *Roman* practice of Self-murder, which at once puts an end to all distress, ridding the World and themselves of the miserable. *LRS.* You were pleased before to make some reflexions on this Custom, and laugh at the irresolution of our Free-thinkers: But I can aver for matter of fact, that they have often recommended it by their example as well as arguments, and that it is solely owing to them that a practice, so useful and magnanimous, hath been taken out of the hands of Lunatics, and restored to that credit among Men of sense, which it anciently had. In whatever light you may consider it, this is in fact a solid Benefit: But the best effect of our principles is that light and truth so visibly shed abroad in the World. From how many prejudices, errors, perplexities and contradictions have we freed the minds of our Fellow-Subjects? How many hard words and intricate absurd notions had possessed the minds of Men before our Philosophers appeared in the World? But now even Women and Children have right and sound notions of things. What say you to this, *Crito*? *CRI.* I say, with respect to

these great advantages of destroying Men and Notions, that I question whether the Public gains as much by the latter as it loseth by the former. For my own part I had rather my Wife and Children all believed what they had no notion of and daily pronounced words without a meaning, than that any one of them shou'd cut his Throat, or leap out of a Window. Errors and nonsense as such are of small concern in the eye of the Public, which consider not the metaphysical Truth of notions, so much as the tendency they have to produce good or evil. Truth it self is valued by the Public, as it hath an influence, and is felt in the course of Life. You may confute a whole shelf of Schoolmen, and discover many speculative Truths, without any great merit towards your Country. But if I am not mistaken, the Minute Philosophers are not the Men to whom we are most beholden for discoveries of that kind: This I say must be allowed supposing, what I by no means grant, your notions to be true. For, to say plainly what I think, the tendency of your opinions is so bad, that no good Man can endure them, and your arguments for them so weak that no wise Man will admit them. *LRS.* Has it not been proved as clear as the Meridian Sun, that the politer sort of Men lead much happier lives, and swim in pleasure since the spreading of our Principles? But, not to repeat or insist further on what has been so amply deduced, I shall only add that the advantages flowing from them, extend to the tenderest Age and the softer Sex: Our principles deliver Children from terrors by night, and Ladies from splenetic hours by day. Instead of these old fashioned things, Prayers and the Bible, the grateful amusements of Drums, Dice, and Billets-doux have succeeded. The fair Sex have now nothing to do but dress and paint, drink and game, adorn and divert themselves, and enter into all the sweet Society of Life. *CRI.* I thought, *Lyficles*, the argument from pleasure had been exhausted; but since you have not  
done

done with that point, let us once more by *Euphranor's* rule cast up the account of pleasure and pain, as credit and debt under distinct Articles. We will set down in the life of your fine Lady, rich clothes, dice, cordials, scandal, late hours against vapours, distaste, remorse, losses at play, and the terrible distress of ill spent age increasing every day; suppose no cruel accident of jealousy, no madness or infamy of love, yet at the foot of the account you shall find that empty, giddy, gaudy, fluttering thing, not half so happy as a butterfly, or a grasshopper on a Summer's day: And for a Rake or Man of pleasure, the reckoning will be much the same, if you place listlessness, ignorance, rottenness, loathing, craving, quarrelling, and such qualities or accomplishments over against his little circle of fleeting amusements, long woe against momentary pleasure; and if it be considered that, when Sense and Appetite go off, though he seek refuge from his Conscience in the Minute Philosophy, yet in this you will find, if you sift him to the bottom, that he affects much, believes little, knows nothing. Upon which *Lyficles* turning to me, observed, that *Crito* might dispute against fact if he pleased, but that every one must see the Nation was the merrier for their principles. True, answered *Crito*, we are a merry Nation indeed: Young Men laugh at the old; Children despise their Parents; and Subjects make a jest of the Government; happy effects of the Minute Philosophy!

XXV. *LRS.* Infer what effects you please that will not make our principles less true. *CRI.* Their truth is not what I am now considering. The point at present is the usefulness of your principles; and to decide this point we need only take a short view of them fairly proposed and laid together: That there is no God or Providence; that Man is as the Beasts that perish; that his Happiness as theirs consists in obeying animal instincts, appetites and passions;

sions; that all stings of conscience and sense of guilt are prejudices and errors of Education; that Religion is a State trick; that Vice is beneficial to the Public; that the Soul of Man is corporeal and dissolveth like a flame or vapour; that Man is a Machine actuated according to the Laws of motion; that consequently he is no agent or subject of guilt; that a wise Man will make his own particular individual interest in this present life, the rule and measure of all his actions: These and such Opinions are, it seems, the Tenets of a Minute Philosopher, who is himself according to his own principles an Organ play'd on by sensible objects, a Ball bandied about by appetites, and passions; so subtle is he as to be able to maintain all this by artful reasonings; so sharp-sighted and penetrating to the very bottom of things as to find out, that the most interested occult cunning is the only true wisdom. To compleat his Character, this curious piece of Clockwork, having no principle of Action within it self, and denying that it hath or can have any one Free Thought or Motion, sets up for the Patron of Liberty, and earnestly contends for *Free-thinking*. *Crito* had no sooner made an end, but *Lyficles* address'd himself to *Euphranor* and me; *Crito*, said he, has taken a world of pains, but convinced me only of one single point, to wit, That I must despair of Convincing him. Never did I in the whole course of my life meet with a Man so deeply immersed in Prejudice; let who will pull him out for me. But I entertain better hopes of you. I can answer, said I, for my self, that my eyes and ears are always open to Conviction: I am attentive to all that passes, and upon the whole shall form, whether right or wrong, a very impartial judgment. *Crito*, said *Euphranor*, is a more enterprising Man than I, thus to rate and lecture a Philosopher. For my part, I always find it easier to learn than to teach. I shall therefore beg your assistance to rid me of some scruples about the tendency of your Opinions; which

I find my self unable to master, though never so willing. This done, though we shou'd not tread exactly in the same steps, nor perhaps go the same road; yet we shall not run in all points diametrically opposite one to another.

XXVI. Tell me now, *Lyficles*, you who are a minute observer of things, whether a shade be more agreeable at morning or evening or noon-day. *LYS.* Doubtless at noon-day. *EUPH.* And what disposeth Men to rest? *LYS.* Exercise. *EUPH.* When do Men make the greatest fires? *LYS.* In the coldest weather. *EUPH.* And what creates a love for acid Liquors? *LYS.* Excessive heat. *EUPH.* What if you raise a Pendulum to a great height on one side? *LYS.* It will, when left to it self, ascend so much the higher on the other. *EUPH.* It shou'd seem, therefore, that Darkness ensues from Light, Rest from Motion, Heat from Cold, and in general that one Extreme is the consequence of another. *LYS.* It shou'd seem so. *EUPH.* And doth not this observation hold in the civil as well as natural World? Doth not Power produce Licence, and Licence Power? Do not Whigs make Tories, and Tories Whigs? Bigots make Atheists, and Atheists Bigots? *LYS.* Granting this to be true. *EUPH.* Will it not hence follow, that as we abhor Slavish Principles, we shou'd avoid running into Licentious ones? I am and always was a sincere lover of Liberty, Legal *English* Liberty; which I esteem a chief blessing, ornament, and comfort of Life, and the great Prerogative of an *Englishman*. But is it not to be feared, that upon the Nation's running into a Licentiousness which hath never been endured in any civilized Country, Men feeling the intolerable evils of one extreme may naturally fall into the other? You must allow, the bulk of Mankind are not Philosophers like you and *Alci-phron*. *LYS.* This I readily acknowledge. *EUPH.* I have another scruple about the tendency of your  
Opinions.

Opinions. Suppose you shou'd prevail and destroy this Protestant Church and Clergy: How cou'd you come at the Popish? I am credibly informed there is a great number of Emissaries of the Church of *Rome* disguised in *England*: who can tell what harvest a Clergy so numerous, so subtle, and so well furnished with arguments to work on vulgar and uneducated minds, may be able to make in a Country despoiled of all Religion, and feeling the want of it? Who can tell whether the Spirit of Free-thinking ending with the Opposition, and the Vanity with the Distinction, when the whole Nation are alike Infidels, who can tell, I say, whether in such a juncture the Men of Genius themselves may not affect a new Distinction, and be the first converts to Popery? *LRS.* And suppose they shou'd. Between friends it wou'd be no great matter. These are our maxims. In the first place we hold it wou'd be best to have no Religion at all. Secondly, we hold that all Religions are indifferent. If therefore upon trial we find the Country cannot do without a Religion, why not Popery as well as another? I know several ingenious Men of our Sect, who, if we had a Popish Prince on the Throne, wou'd turn Papists to-morrow. This is a Paradox, but I shall explain it. A Prince whom we compliment with our Religion, to be sure must be grateful. *EUPH.* I understand you. But what becomes of Free-thinking all the while? *LRS.* Oh! we shou'd have more than ever of that, for we shou'd keep it all to our selves. As for the amusement of retailing it, the want of this wou'd be largely compensated by solid advantages of another kind. *EUPH.* It seems then, by this account, the Tendency you observed in the Nation towards something great and New proves a Tendency towards Popery and Slavery. *LRS.* Mistake us not, good *Euphranor*. The thing first in our intention is Consummate Liberty: But if this will not do, and there must after all be such things tolerated as Religion  
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and Government, we are wisely willing to make the best of both. *CRI.* This puts me in mind of a thought I have often had, That Minute Philosophers are Dupes of the Jesuits: The two most avowed, professed, busy, propagators of Infidelity in all companies, and upon all occasions, that I ever met with were both Bigotted Papists, and being both Men of considerable estates, suffered considerably on that score; which, it is wonderful their Thinking Disciples shou'd never reflect upon. *Hegemon*, a most distinguished Writer among the Minute Philosophers, and Hero of the Sect, I am well assured, was once a Papist, and never heard that he professed any other Religion. I know that many of the Church of *Rome* abroad, are pleased with the growth of Infidelity among us, as hoping it may make way for them. The Emissaries of *Rome* are known to have personated several other Sects, which from time to time have sprung up amongst us, and why not this of the Minute Philosophers, of all others the best calculated to ruin both Church and State? I my self have known a Jesuit abroad talk among *English* Gentlemen like a Free-thinker. I am credibly informed, that Jesuits, known to be such by the Minute Philosophers at home, are admitted into their Clubs: And I have observed them to approve, and speak better of the Jesuits, than of any other Clergy whatsoever. Those who are not acquainted with the subtle Spirit, the refined Politics, and wonderful Oeconomy of that renowned Society, need only read the account given of them by the Jesuit *Inchofer*, in his Book *De Monarchia Solipsorum*; and those who are, will not be surprized they shou'd be able to make Dupes of our Minute Philosophers: Dupes, I say, for I can never think they suspect they are only tools to serve the ends of cunninger Men than themselves. They seem to me drunk and giddy with a false notion of Liberty, and spur'd on by this principle to make mad Experiments on their Country, they agree only in pulling  
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down all that stands in their way ; without any concerted Scheme, and without caring or knowing what to erect in its stead. To hear them, as I have often done, descant on the moral Virtues, resolve them into Shame, then laugh at Shame as a weakness, admire the unconfined lives of Savages, despise all order and decency of Education, one wou'd think the intention of these Philosophers was, when they had pruned and weeded the notions of their fellow-subjects, and divested them of their Prejudices, to strip them of their Clothes, and fill the country with naked Followers of Nature, enjoying all the Privileges of Brutality. Here *Crito* made a pause, and fixed his eyes on *Alciphron*, who during this whole conversation had sat thoughtful and attentive, without saying a word, and with an air, one while dissatisfied at what *Lyficles* advanced, another, serene and pleased, seeming to approve some better thought of his own. But the day being now far spent, *Alciphron* proposed to adjourn the Argument till the following ; when, said he, I shall set matters on a new Foundation, and in so full and clear a Light, as, I doubt not, will give intire Satisfaction. So we changed the discourse, and after a repast upon cold provisions, took a walk on the Strand, and in the cool of the evening returned to *Crito's*.

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## The THIRD DIALOGUE.

I. Alciphron's account of *Honour*. II. *Character and conduct of Men of Honour*. III. *Sense of moral Beauty*. IV. *The Honestum* or τὸ καλὸν of the ancients. V. *Taste for moral Beauty whether a sure guide or rule*. VI. *Minute Philosophers ravished with the abstract Beauty of Virtue*. VII. *Their Virtue alone disinterested and heroic*. VIII. *Beauty of sensible objects what and how perceived?* IX. *The idea of Beauty explained by Painting and Architecture*. X. *Beauty of the moral System wherein it consists*. XI. *It supposeth a Providence*. XII. *Influence of τὸ καλὸν and τὸ πρέπον*. XIII. *Enthusiasm of Cratylus compared with the sentiments of Aristotle*. XIV. *Compared with the Stoical principles*. XV. *Minute Philosophers, their talent for Raillery and Ridicule*. XVI. *The wisdom of those who make virtue alone its own reward*.

THE following day as we sate round the Tea-table, in a Summer-Parlour which looks into the Garden, *Alciphron* after the first dish turned down his cup, and reclining back in his Chair proceeded as follows. Above all the Sects upon earth it is the peculiar Privilege of ours, not to be tied down by any Principles. While other Philosophers profess a servile adherence to certain Tenets, ours assert a noble freedom, differing not only one from another, but very often the same Man from himself. Which method of proceeding, beside other advantages, hath this annexed to it, that we are of all Men the hardest to confute. You may, perhaps, confute a particu-  
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lar Tenet, but then this affects only him who maintains it, and so long only as he maintains it. Some of our Sect dogmatize more than others, and in some more than other points. The Doctrine of the usefulness of Vice is a point wherein we are not all agreed. Some of us are great admirers of Virtue. With others the points of Vice and Virtue are problematical. For my own part, though I think the Doctrine maintained yesterday by *Lyficles* an ingenious speculation; yet, upon the whole, there are divers Reasons which incline me to depart from it, and rather to espouse the Virtuous side of the question; with the smallest, perhaps, but the most contemplative and laudable part of our Sect. It seemeth, I say, after a nice inquiry and balancing on both sides, that we ought to prefer Virtue to Vice; and that such preference wou'd contribute both to the public Weal, and the reputation of our Philosophers. You are to know then, we have among us several that, without one grain of Religion, are Men of the nicest Honour, and therefore Men of Virtue because Men of Honour. Honour is a noble unpolluted Source of Virtue, without the least mixture of Fear, Interest or Superstition. It hath all the advantages without the evils which attend Religion. It is the mark of a great and fine soul, and is to be found among Persons of Rank and Breeding. It affects the Court, the Senate, and the Camp, and in general every Rendezvous of people of fashion. *EUPH.* You say then that honour is the Source of Virtue. *ALC.* I do. *EUPH.* Can a thing be the source of it self? *ALC.* It cannot. *EUPH.* The Source, therefore, is distinguished from that of which it is the Source. *ALC.* Doubtless *EUPH.* Honour then is one thing and Virtue another. *ALC.* I grant it. Virtuous actions are the effect, and Honour is the Source or Cause of that effect. *EUPH.* Tell me. Is Honour the Will producing those actions, or the final Cause for which they are produced,

or right Reason which is their rule and limit, or the Object about which they are conversant? Or do you by the word *Honour* understand a Faculty or Appetite? All which are supposed, in one sense or other, to be the Source of humane actions. *ALC.* Nothing of all this. *EUPH.* Be pleased then to give me some notion or definition of it. *Alciphron* having mused a while answered, that he defined Honour to be a Principle of virtuous Actions. To which *Euphranor* replied; if I understand it rightly the word Principle is variously taken. Sometimes by Principles we mean the parts of which a whole is composed, and into which it may be resolved. Thus the Elements are said to be principles of compound bodies. And thus words, syllables, and letters are the principles of Speech. Sometimes by Principle we mean a small particular seed, the growth or gradual unfolding of which doth produce an Organized Body, animal or vegetable, in its proper size and shape. Principles at other times are supposed to be certain fundamental Theorems in Arts and Sciences, in Religion and Politics. Let me know in which of these senses, or whether it be in some other sense that you understand this word, when you say, Honour is a Principle of Virtue. To this *Alciphron* replied, that for his part he meant it in none of those senses, but defined Honour to be a certain Ardour or Enthusiasm that glowed in the breast of a gallant Man. Upon this, *Euphranor* observed, it was always admitted to put the Definition in place of the thing defined. Is this allowed, said he, or not? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* May we not therefore say, that a Man of Honour is a warm Man, or an Enthusiast? *Alciphron* hearing this declared that such exactness was to no purpose; that Pedants, indeed, may dispute and define, but cou'd never reach that high sense of Honour which distinguished the fine Gentleman, and was a thing rather to be felt than explained.

II. *Crito*, perceiving that *Alciphron* cou'd not bear being pressed any farther on that article, and willing to give some satisfaction to *Euphranor*, said that of himself indeed he should not undertake to explain so nice a point, but he wou'd retail to them part of a conversation he once heard between *Nicander* a Minute Philosopher and *Menecles* a Christian, upon the same subject, which was for substance as follows. *M.* From what principle are you Gentlemen virtuous? *N.* From Honour. We are Men of Honour. *M.* May not a Man of Honour debauch another's wife, or get drunk, or sell a vote, or refuse to pay his debts, without lessening or tainting his Honour? *N.* He may have the vices and faults of a Gentleman: But is obliged to pay debts of Honour, that is, all such as are contracted by Play. *M.* Is not your Man of Honour always ready to resent Affronts and engage in Duels? *N.* He is ready to demand and give Gentleman's satisfaction upon all proper occasions. *M.* It shou'd seem by this account, that to Ruin tradesmen, Break faith to one's own wife, Corrupt another Man's, Take bribes, Cheat the Public, Cut a Man's throat for a word, are all points consistent with your principle of Honour. *N.* It cannot be denied that we are Men of gallantry, Men of fire, Men who know the world, and all that. *M.* It seems therefore that Honour among Infidels is like Honesty among Pirates: something confined to themselves, and which the Fraternity perhaps may find their account in, but every one else shou'd be constantly on his guard against. By this Dialogue, continued *Crito*, a Man, who lives out of the grand *Monde*, may be enabled to form some notion of what the world calls Honour and men of Honour. *EUPH.* I must intreat you not to put me off with *Nicander's* opinion, whom I know nothing of, but rather give me your own judgment, drawn from your own observation upon Men of Honour. *CRI.* If I must pronounce,

nounce, I can very sincerely assure you that by all I have heard or seen, I cou'd never find, that Honour, considered as a principle distinct from Conscience, Religion, Reason, and Virtue, was more than an empty name. And I do verily believe, that those who build upon that notion have less Virtue than other Men; and that what they have or seem to have is owing to Fashion, (being of the reputable kind) if not to a Conscience early imbued with religious principles, and afterwards retaining a Tincture from them without knowing it. These two principles seem to account for all that looks like Virtue in those Gentlemen. Your Men of Fashion in whom animal life abounds, a sort of Bullies in Morality, who disdain to have it thought they are afraid of Conscience; these descant much upon Honour, and affect to be called Men of Honour, rather than conscientious or honest Men. But, by all that I cou'd ever observe, this specious Character, where there is nothing of Conscience or Religion underneath, to give it life and substance, is no better than a meteor or painted cloud. *EUPH.* I had a confused notion that Honour was something nearly connected with truth, and that Men of Honour were the greatest enemies to all Hypocrisy, Fallacy, and Disguise. *CR I.* So far from that, an Infidel who sets up for the nicest Honour shall, without the least grain of Faith or Religion, pretend himself a Christian, take any test, join in any act of worship, kneel, pray, receive the Sacrament to serve an interest. The same person, without any impeachment of his Honour, shall most solemnly declare and promise in the face of God and the World, that he will love his Wife, and forsaking all others keep only to her, when at the same time it is certain, he intends never to perform one tittle of his vow; and convinceth the whole world of this as soon as he gets her in his power, and her fortune, for the sake of which this Man of untainted Honour makes no scruple to cheat and lye. *EUPH.* We have a notion here in the

Country, that it was of all things most odious, and a matter of much risque and hazard, to give the Lye to a Man of Honour. *CR I.* It is very true. He abhors to take the Lye but not to tell it.

III. *Alciphron*, having heard all this with great composure of mind and countenance, spake as follows. You are not to think, that our greatest strength lies in our greatest Number, Libertines and meer Men of Honour. No : we have among us Philosophers of a very different character, Men of curious contemplation, not governed by such gross things as Sense and Custom, but of an abstracted Virtue and sublime Morals : and the less religious the more virtuous. For Virtue of the high and disinterested kind no Man is so well qualified as an Infidel, it being a mean and selfish thing to be virtuous through fear or hope. The notion of a Providence and future State of Rewards and Punishments, may indeed tempt or scare Men of abject spirit into practices contrary to the natural bent of their Souls, but will never produce a true and genuine Virtue. To go to the bottom of things, to analyse Virtue into its first principles, and fix a scheme of Duty on its true basis, you must understand, that there is an idea of Beauty natural to the mind of Man. This all Men desire, this they are pleased and delighted with for its own sake, purely from an Instinct of Nature. A Man needs no arguments to make him discern and approve what is beautiful ; it strikes at first sight and attracts without a reason. And as this Beauty is found in the shape and form of corporeal things ; so also is there analogous to it a Beauty of another kind, an order, a symmetry, and comeliness in the moral world. And as the Eye perceiveth the one, so the Mind doth by a certain interior sense perceive the other, which sense, talent, or faculty is ever quickest and purest in the noblest Minds. Thus as by sight I discern the Beauty of a Plant or an Animal, even so the mind apprehends the  
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moral Excellence, the Beauty, and Decorum of Justice and Temperance. And as we readily pronounce a Dress becoming or an Attitude graceful, we can, with the same free untutored judgment, at once declare, whether this or that Conduct or Action be comely and beautiful. To relish this kind of Beauty, there must be a delicate and fine Taste: But where there is this natural Taste, nothing further is wanting, either as a principle to convince, or as a motive to induce Men to the love of Virtue. And more or less there is of this Taste or Sense in every creature that hath Reason. All Rational Beings are by nature social. They are drawn one towards another by natural affections: they unite and incorporate into families, clubs, parties, and commonwealths by mutual Sympathy. As by means of the sensitive Soul, our several distinct parts and members do consent towards the animal Functions, and are connected in one Whole: even so, the several parts of these Rational Systems or Bodies Politic, by virtue of this moral or interior Sense, are held together, have a fellow-feeling, do succour and protect each other, and jointly cooperate towards the same end. Hence that joy in Society, that propension towards doing good to our Kind, that gratulation and delight in beholding the virtuous deeds of other Men, or in reflecting on our own. By contemplation of the fitness and order of the parts of a moral System, regularly operating, and knit together by benevolent affections, the Mind of Man attaineth to the highest notion of Beauty, Excellence, and Perfection: Seized and rapt with this sublime idea, our Philosophers do infinitely despise and pity, whoever shall propose or accept any other motive to Virtue. Interest is a mean ungenerous thing, destroying the merit of Virtue, and Falshood of every kind is inconsistent with the genuine spirit of Philosophy. *CR I.* The Love therefore that you bear to moral Beauty, and your passion for abstracted Truth, will not suffer you to think with pa-

tience of those fraudulent Impositions upon Mankind, Providence, the Immortality of the Soul, and a future Retribution of rewards and punishments; which under the notion of promoting do, it seems, destroy all true Virtue, and at the same time contradict and disparage your noble Theories, manifestly tending to the perturbation and disquiet of Mens minds, and filling them with fruitless hopes and vain terrors. *ALC.* Mens first Thoughts and natural Notions are the best in moral matters. And there is no need, that Mankind shou'd be preached, or reasoned, or frightened into Virtue, a thing so natural and congenial to every Human Soul. Now if this be the case, as it certainly is, it follows that all the ends of Society are secured without Religion, and that an Infidel bids fair to be the most virtuous Man, in a true, sublime and heroic Sense,

IV. *EUPH.* O *Alciphron*, while you talk, I feel an affection in my soul like the trembling of one lute, upon striking the unison strings of another. Doubtless there is a Beauty of the mind, a Charm in Virtue, a Symmetry and Proportion in the moral world. This moral Beauty was known to the ancients by the name of *Honestum* or τὸ καλόν. And in order to know its force and influence, it may not be amiss to inquire, what it was understood to be, and what light it was placed in by those who first considered it, and gave it a name: τὸ καλόν according to *Aristotle* is the εὔκαινον or laudable, according to *Plato* it is the ἡδὺ or ὠφέλιμον, pleasant or profitable, which is meant with respect to a reasonable mind and its true interest. Now I wou'd fain know whether a mind, which considers an action as laudable, be not carried beyond the bare action it felt, to regard the opinion of others concerning it? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* And whether this be a sufficient ground or principle of Virtue, for a Man to act upon, when he thinks himself removed from the eye and observation of every other intelligent Being?

*ALC.*

*ALC.* It seems not. *EUPH.* Again, I ask whether a Man who doth a thing pleasant or profitable as such, might not be supposed to forbear doing it, or even to do the contrary, upon the prospect of greater pleasure or profit? *ALC.* He might. *EUPH.* Doth it not follow from hence, that the Beauty of Virtue or τὸ καλόν, in either *Aristotle's* or *Plato's* sense, is not a sufficient principle or ground, to engage sensual and worldly-minded Men in the practice of it? *ALC.* What then? *EUPH.* Why then, it will follow that Hope of reward and Fear of punishment are highly expedient, to cast the balance of pleasant and profitable on the side of virtue, and thereby very much conduce to the benefit of Human Society. *Alciphron* upon this appealed; Gentlemen, said he, you are witnesses of this unfair proceeding of *Euphranor*, who argues against us, from explications given by *Plato* and *Aristotle* of the Beauty of Virtue, which are things we have nothing to say to; the Philosophers of our Sect abstracting from all Praise, Pleasure, and Interest, when they are enamoured and transported with that sublime Idea. I beg pardon, replied *Euphranor*, for supposing the Minute Philosophers of our days think like those ancient Sages. But you must tell me, *Alciphron*, since you do not think fit, to adopt the sense of *Plato* or *Aristotle*, what sense it is in which you understand the Beauty of Virtue? Define it, explain it, make me to understand your meaning, that so we may argue about the same thing, without which we can never come to a conclusion.

V. *ALC.* Some things are better understood by definitions and descriptions, but I have always observed that those who wou'd define, explain, and dispute about this point, make the least of it. Moral Beauty is of so peculiar and abstracted a nature, something so subtle, fine, and fugacious, that it will not bear being handled and inspected, like every gross

and common subject. You will, therefore, pardon me, if I stand upon my Philosophic liberty; and choose rather to intrench my self, within the general and indefinite sense, rather than, by entering into a precise and particular explication of this Beauty, perchance lose sight of it, or give you some hold whereon to cavil, and infer, and raise doubts, queries, and difficulties about a point as clear as the Sun when no body reasons upon it. *EUPH.* How say you, *Alciphron*, is that notion clearest when it is not considered? *ALC.* I say it is rather to be felt than understood, a certain *je ne sçay quoy*. An object, not of the discursive faculty, but of a peculiar sense which is properly called the moral sense, being adapted to the preception of moral Beauty, as the Eye to colours, or the Ear to sounds. *EUPH.* That Men have certain instinctive Sensations or Passions from nature, which make them amiable and useful to each other, I am clearly convinced. Such are a Fellow-feeling with the distressed, a Tendernefs for our offspring, an Affection towards our friends, our neighbours, and our country, an Indignation against things base, cruel, or unjust. These Passions are implanted in the Human Soul, with several other fears and appetites, aversions and desires, some of which are strongest and uppermost in one mind, others in another. Shou'd it not therefore seem a very uncertain guide in morals, for a Man to follow his passion or inward feeling? and wou'd not this rule infallibly lead different Men different ways, according to the prevalency of this or that appetite or passion? *ALC.* I do not deny it, *EUPH.* And will it not follow from hence, that Duty and Virtue are in a fairer way of being practised, if Men are led by Reason and Judgment, balancing low and sensual pleasures with those of a higher kind, comparing present losses with future gains, and the uneasiness and disgust of every Vice with the delightful practice of the opposite Virtue, and the pleasing reflexions and hopes which attend it? Or can there

be a stronger motive to Virtue, than the shewing that considered in all lights it is every Man's true interest?

VI. *ALC.* I tell you, *Euphranor*, we contemn the Virtue of that Man, who computes and deliberates, and must have a reason for being virtuous. The refined Moralists of our Sect are ravished and transported with the abstract Beauty of Virtue. They disdain all forinsecal motives to it; and love Virtue only for Virtue's sake. Oh Rapture! Oh Enthusiasm! Oh the Quintessence of Beauty! Methinks I cou'd dwell for ever on this Contemplation: But rather than entertain my self, I must endeavour to convince you. Make an experiment on the first Man you meet. Propose a villanous or unjust action. Take his first sense of the matter, and you shall find he detests it. He may, indeed, be afterwards misled by Arguments or overpowered by Temptation, but his original unpremeditated and genuine thoughts are just and orthodox. How can we account for this but by a moral sense, which, left to it self, hath as quick and true a perception of the Beauty and Deformity of Human Actions, as the Eye hath of Colours? *EUPH.* May not this be sufficiently accounted for, by Conscience, Affection, Passion, Education, Reason, Custom, Religion, which principles and habits, for ought I know, may be what you metaphorically call a Moral Sense. *ALC.* What I call a moral sense is strictly, properly, and truly such, and in kind different from all those things you enumerate. It is what all men have though all may not observe it. Upon this *Euphranor* smiled and said, *Alciphron* has made discoveries where I least expected it. For, said he, in regard to every other point, I shou'd hope to learn from him, but for the knowledge of my self, or the faculties and powers of my own mind, I shou'd have looked at home. And there I might have looked long enough, without  
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finding this new talent, which even now after being tutored I cannot comprehend. For *Alciphron*, I must needs say, is too Sublime and Ænigmatical upon a point, which of all others ought to be most clearly understood. I have often heard that your deepest adepts and oldest professors in science are the obicurest. *Lyficles* is young and speaks plain. Wou'd he but favour us with his sense of this point, it might perhaps prove more upon a level with my apprehension.

VII. *Lyficles* shook his head, and in a grave and earnest manner addressed the Company. Gentlemen, said he, *Alciphron* stands upon his own legs. I have no part in these refined notions he is at present engaged to defend. If I must subdue my passions, abstract, contemplate, be enamoured of Virtue; in a word, if I must be an Enthusiast, I owe so much deference to the laws of my Country, as to choose being an Enthusiast in their way. Besides, it is better being so for some end than for none. This Doctrine hath all the solid inconveniences, without the amusing hopes and prospects of the Christian. *ALC.* I never counted on *Lyficles* for my Second in this point; which after all doth not need his assistance or explication. All subjects ought not to be treated in the same manner. The way of Definition and Division is dry and pedantic. Besides, the subject is sometimes too obscure, sometimes too simple for this method. One while we know too little of a point, another too much, to make it plainer by discourse. *CRI.* To hear *Alciphron* talk, puts me in mind of that Ingenious *Greek*, who having wrapt a man's brother up in a cloak, asked him whether he knew that person? being ready, either by keeping on, or pulling off the cloak, to confute his answer whatever it shou'd be. For my part I believe, if matters were fairly stated, that rational satisfaction, that peace of mind, that inward comfort, and conscientious

scientific joy, which a good Christian finds in good actions, wou'd not be found to fall short of all the Ecstasy, Rapture, and Enthusiasm supposed to be the effect of that high and undescribed principle. In earnest can any Ecstasy be higher, any Rapture more affecting, than that which springs from the love of God and Man, from a Conscience void of offence, and an inward discharge of Duty, with the secret delight, trust, and hope that attends it? *ALC.* O *Euphranor*, we Votaries of Truth do not envy, but pity, the groundless joys and mistaken hopes of a Christian. And, as for Conscience and rational Pleasure, how can we allow a Conscience without allowing a vindictive Providence? Or how can we suppose, the charm of Virtue consists in any pleasure, or benefit attending virtuous actions, without giving great advantages to the Christian Religion, which, it seems excites its believers to Virtue by the highest Interests and Pleasures in reversion. Alas! shou'd we grant this, there wou'd be a door opened to all those rusty Declaimers upon the necessity and usefulness of the great points of Faith, the Immortality of the Soul, a Future State, Rewards and Punishments, and the like exploded Conceits; which, according to our system and principles, may perhaps produce a low, popular, interested kind of Virtue, but must absolutely destroy and extinguish it in the sublime and heroic sense.

VIII. *EUPH.* What you now say is very intelligible: I wish I understood your main principle as well. *ALC.* And are you then in earnest at a loss? Is it possible you shou'd have no notion of Beauty, or that having it you shou'd not know it to be amiable, amiable I say, in it self, and for it self? *EUPH.* Pray tell me, *Alciphron*, are all mankind agreed in the notion of a beauteous face? *ALC.* Beauty in Human Kind seems to be of a more mixt and various nature; forasmuch as the passions, sentiments, and quali-

qualities of the Soul being seen through and blending with the features, work differently on different minds, as the sympathy is more or leis. But with regard to other things is there no steady principle of Beauty? Is there upon earth a Human mind without the idea of order, harmony, and proportion? *EUPH.* O *Alciphron*, it is my weakn<sup>ess</sup> that I am apt to be lost and bewildered in abstractions and generalities, but a particular thing is better suited to my faculties. I find it easy to consider and keep in view the objects of sense, let us therefore try to discover what their Beauty is, or wherein it consists; and so, by the help of these sensible things, as a scale or ladder, ascend to moral and intellectual Beauty. Be pleased then to inform me, what it is we call Beauty in the objects of sense? *ALC.* Every one knows Beauty is that which pleases. *EUPH.* There is then Beauty in the smell of a Rose, or the taste of an Apple. *ALC.* By no means. Beauty is, to speak properly, perceived only by the eye. *EUPH.* It cannot therefore be defined in general that which pleaseth. *ALC.* I grant it cannot. *EUPH.* How then shall we limit or define it? *Alciphron*, after a short pause, said, that Beauty consisted in a certain symmetry or proportion pleasing to the eye. *EUPH.* Is this proportion one and the same in all things, or is it different in different kinds of things? *ALC.* Different doubtless: The proportions of an Ox wou'd not be beautiful in a Horse. And we may observe also in things inanimate, that the Beauty of a Table, a Chair, a Door, consists in different proportions. *EUPH.* Doth not this proportion imply the relation of one thing to another? *ALC.* It doth. *EUPH.* And are not these relations founded in size and shape? *ALC.* They are. *EUPH.* And to make the proportions just, must not those mutual relations of size and shape in the parts be such, as shall make the whole compleat and perfect in its kind? *ALC.* I grant they must. *EUPH.* Is not a thing said to



to be perfect in its kind, when it answers the end for which it was made? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* The parts, therefore, in true proportions must be so related, and adjusted to one another, as that they may best conspire to the use and operation of the whole. *ALC.* It seems so. *EUPH.* But the comparing Parts one with another, the considering them as belonging to one Whole, and the referring this whole to its use or end, shou'd seem the work of Reason: Shou'd it not? *ALC.* It shou'd. *EUPH.* Proportions therefore are not, strictly speaking, perceived by the sense of Sight, but only by Reason through the means of Sight. *ALC.* This I grant. *EUPH.* Consequently Beauty, in your sense of it, is an object, not of the eye, but of the mind. *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* The Eye, therefore, alone cannot see that a Chair is handsom, or a Door well proportioned. *ALC.* It seems to follow; but I am not clear as to this point. *EUPH.* Let us see if there be any difficulty in it. Cou'd the Chair you sit on, think you, be reckon'd well proportioned or handsom, if it had not such a height, breadth, wideness, and was not so far reclined as to afford a convenient seat? *ALC.* It cou'd not. *EUPH.* The Beauty, therefore, or Symmetry of a Chair cannot be apprehended but by knowing its use, and comparing its figure with that use, which cannot be done by the Eye alone, but is the effect of Judgment. It is therefore, one thing to see an Object, and another to discern its Beauty. *ALC.* I admit this to be true.

IX. *EUPH.* The Architects judge a Door to be of a beautiful Proportion, when its height is double of the breadth. But if you shou'd invert a well-proportion'd Door making its breadth become the height, and its height the breadth, the figure would still be the same, but without that Beauty in one Situation, which it had in another. What can be the cause of this, but that in the forementioned Supposition, the Door  
wou'd

wou'd not yield a convenient entrance to Creatures of a Human Figure? But, if in any other part of the Universe, there shou'd be supposed rational animals of an inverted Stature, they must be supposed to invert the Rule for Proportion of Doors; and to them that wou'd appear beautiful, which to us was disagreeable. *ALC.* Against this I have no Objection. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, is there not something truly decent and beautiful in Dress? *ALC.* Doubtless there is. *EUPH.* Are any likelier to give us an Idea of this Beauty in Dress, than Painters and Sculptors, whose proper business and study it is, to aim at graceful Representations? *ALC.* I believe not. *EUPH.* Let us then examine the Draperies of the great Masters in these Arts: How, for instance, they use to clothe a Matron or a Man of Rank. Cast an eye on those Figures (said he, pointing to some Prints after *Raphael* and *Guido*, that hung upon the Wall) what appearance, do you think, an *English* Courtier or Magistrate, with his *Gothic*, succinct, plaited Garment, and his full-bottom'd Wig, or one of our Ladies in her unnatural Dress pinched, and stiffened, and enlarged with Hoops and Whale-bone and Buckram, must make, among those Figures so decently clad in Draperies that fall into such a variety of natural, easy, and ample Folds, that appear with so much dignity and simplicity, that cover the Body without encumbering it, and adorn without altering the Shape? *ALC.* Truly I think they must make a very ridiculous appearance. *EUPH.* And what do you think this proceeds from? Whence is it that the Eastern Nations, the *Greeks*, and the *Romans*, naturally ran into the most becoming Dresses, while our *Gothic* Gentry, after so many Centuries racking their Inventions, mending, and altering, and improving, and whirling, about in a perpetual rotation of Fashions, have never yet had the luck to stumble on any that was not absurd and ridiculous? Is it not from hence, that in-

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stead of consulting Use, Reason, and Convenience, they abandon themselves to irregular Fancy, the unnatural Parent of Monsters? Whereas the Ancients, considering the use and end of Dress, made it subservient to the Freedom, Ease, and Convenience of the Body, and, having no Notion of mending or changing the natural Shape, they aimed only at shewing it with decency and advantage. And, if this be so, are we not to conclude that the Beauty of Dress depends on its subserviency to certain Ends and Uses? *ALC.* This appears to be true. *EUPH.* This subordinate relative nature of Beauty, perhaps will be yet plainer, if we examine the respective Beauties of a Horse and a Pillar. *Virgil's* Description of the former is,

- - - - - *Illi ardua cervix,  
Argutumque caput, brevis alvus, obesaque terga,  
Luxuriatque toris animosum pectus.*

Now I wou'd fain know, whether the perfections and uses of a Horse may not be reduced to these three points, Courage, Strength, and Speed; and whether each of the Beauties enumerated doth not occasion, or betoken, one of these Perfections? After the same manner, if we inquire into the Parts and Proportions of a beautiful Pillar, we shall perhaps find them answer to this same Idea. Those who have considered the Theory of Architecture, tell us\*, the Proportions of the three *Grecian* Orders were taken from the Human Body, as the most beautiful and perfect Production of Nature. Hence were derived those graceful Ideas of Columns, which had a Character of Strength without clumsiness, or of Delicacy without weakness. Those beautiful Proportions were, I say, taken originally from Nature, which, in her Creatures, as hath been already observed, referreth them to some end, use, or design.

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\* See the learned Patriarch of *Aquilin's* Commentary on *Vitruius*, l. 4. c. 1.

The *Gonfiezza* also, or swelling, and the diminution of a Pillar, is it not in such proportion as to make it appear strong and light at the same time? In the same manner must not the whole Entablature, with its Projections be so proportioned, as to seem great but not heavy, light but not little, inasmuch as a Deviation into either extreme wou'd thwart that reason and use of Things, wherein their Beauty is founded, and to which it is subordinate? The Entablature and all its Parts and Ornaments, Architrave, Freeze, Cornice, Triglyphs, Metopes, Modiglions, and the rest, have each an use or appearance of use, in giving firmness and union to the Building, in protecting it from the Weather, and casting off the Rain, in representing the Ends of Beams with their intervals, the production of Ratters, and so forth. And if we consider the graceful Angles in Frontispieces, the Spaces between the Columns, or the Ornaments of their Capitels, shall we not find, that their Beauty riseth from the appearance of Use, or the imitation of natural Things, whose Beauty is originally founded on the same Principle? which is, indeed, the grand distinction between *Græcian* and *Gothic* Architecture, the latter being fantastical, and for the most part founded neither in Nature nor in Reason, in Necessity nor Use, the appearance of which accounts for all the Beauty, Grace, and Ornament of the other. C R I. What *Euphranor* has said confirms the Opinion I always entertained, that the Rules of Architecture were founded, as all other Arts which flourished among the *Greeks*, in Truth, and Nature, and good Sense. But the Ancients, who, from a thorough consideration of the Grounds and Principles of Art, formed their Idea of Beauty, did not always confine themselves strictly to the same Rules and Proportions: But, whenever the particular Distance, Position, Elevation, or Dimension of the Fabric or its Parts seemed to require it, made no scruple to depart from them, without deserting the original

original Principles of Beauty, which governed whatever Deviations they made. This latitude or licence might not, perhaps, be safely trusted with most modern Architects, who in their bold Sallies seem to act without aim or design, and to be governed by no Idea, no Reason or principle of Art, but pure Caprice, joined with a thorough contempt of that noble Simplicity of the Ancients, without which there can be no unity, gracefulness, or grandeur in their Works; which of consequence must serve only to disfigure and dishonour the Nation, being so many Monuments to future Ages of the opulence and ill taste of the present; which, it is to be feared, wou'd succeed as wretchedly, and make as mad work in other Affairs, were Men to follow, instead of rules, precepts and models, their own taste and first thoughts of Beauty. *ALC.* I shou'd now, methinks, be glad to see a little more distinctly the use and tendency of this Digression upon Architecture. *EUPH.* Was not Beauty the very thing we inquired after? *ALC.* It was. *EUPH.* What think you, *Alciphron*, can the appearance of a thing please at this time, and in this place, which pleased two thousand Years ago, and two thousand Miles off, without some real principle of Beauty? *ALC.* It cannot. *EUPH.* And is not this the case with respect to a just piece of Architecture? *ALC.* Nobody denies it. *EUPH.* Architecture, the noble Offspring of judgment and fancy, was gradually formed in the most polite and knowing Countries of *Asia*, *Egypt*, *Greece*, and *Italy*. It was cherished and esteemed by the most flourishing States, and most renowned Princes, who with vast expence improved and brought it to perfection. It seems, above all other Arts, peculiarly conversant about Order, Proportion and Symmetry. May it not therefore be supposed on all accounts, most likely to help us to some rational Notion of the *je ne sçay quoy* in Beauty? And, in effect, have we not learned from this Digression, that as there is no Beauty without

Proportion, so Proportions are to be esteem'd just and true, only as they are relative to some certain use or end, their Aptitude and Subordination to which end is, at bottom, that which makes them please and charm? *ALC.* I admit all this to be true.

X. *EUPH.* According to this Doctrine, I wou'd fain know what Beauty can be found in a moral System, formed connected and governed by Chance. Fate, or any other blind unthinking Principle; forasmuch as without thought there can be no end or design, and without an end there can be no use, and without use there is no aptitude or fitness of Proportion, from whence Beauty springs? *ALC.* May we not suppose a certain vital Principle of Beauty, Order, and Harmony diffused throughout the World, without supposing a Providence inspecting, punishing, and rewarding the moral Actions of Men? Without supposing the Immortality of the Soul, or a Life to come, in a word, without admitting any part of what is commonly called Faith, Worship, and Religion? *CRI.* Either you suppose this Principle intelligent, or not intelligent: If the latter, it is all one with Chance or Fate which was just now argued against: If the former, let me intreat *Alciphron* to explain to me, wherein consists the Beauty of a moral System, with a supreme Intelligence at the head of it, which neither protects the innocent, punishes the wicked, nor rewards the virtuous? To suppose indeed a Society of rational Agents acting under the Eye of Providence, concurring in one design to promote the common benefit of the whole, and conforming their Actions to the established Laws and Order of the Divine Parental Wisdom: Wherein each particular Agent shall not consider himself apart, but as the Member of a great City, whose Author and Founder is God: In which the Civil Laws are no other, than the Rules of Virtue, and the Duties of Religion: And where every one's  
true

true Interest is combined with his Duty : To suppose this wou'd be delightful : on this Supposition a Man need be no Stoic or Knight-errant, to account for his Virtue. In such a System Vice is Madness, Cunning is Folly, Wisdom and Virtue are the same thing, where, notwithstanding all the crooked Paths and By-roads, the wayward Appetites and Inclinations of Men, sovereign Reason is sure to reform whatever seems amiss, to reduce that which is devious, make straight that which is crooked, and in the last Act wind up the whole Plot, according to the exactest Rules of Wisdom and Justice. In such a System or Society, governed by the wisest precepts, enforced by the highest rewards and discouragements, it is delightful to consider, how the regulation of Laws, the distribution of Good and Evil, the aim of moral Agents, do all conspire in due Subordination to promote the noblest End, to wit, the compleat Happiness or Well-being of the whole. In contemplating the Beauty of such a moral System, we may cry out with the Psalmist, *Very excellent Things are spoken of thee, thou City of God.*

XI. In a System of Spirits, subordinate to the Will, and under the Direction, of the Father of Spirits, governing them by Laws, and conducting them by Methods suitable to wise and good Ends, there will be great Beauty. But in an incoherent, fortuitous System governed by Chance, or in a blind System governed by Fate, or in any System where Providence doth not preside, how can Beauty be, which cannot be without order, which cannot be without design ? When a Man is conscious that his will is inwardly conformed to the Divine Will, producing Order and Harmony in the Universe, and conducting the whole by the justest Methods to the best End : This gives a beautiful Idea. But on the other hand, a Consciousness of Virtue overlooked, neglected, distressed by Men, and not regarded or

rewarded by God, ill-used in this World, without Hope or Prospect of being better used in another, I wou'd fain know, where is the Pleasure of this Reflection, where is the Beauty of this Scene? Or how cou'd any Man, in his Senses, think the spreading such Notions the way to spread or propagate Virtue in the World? Is it not, I beseech you an ugly System in which you can suppose no Law and prove no Duty, wherein Men thrive by Wickedness and suffer by Virtue? Would it not be a disagreeable Sight to see an honest Man peeled by Sharpers, to see virtuous Men injured and despised while Vice triumph'd? An Enthusiast may entertain himself with Visions and fine Talk about such a System; but when it comes to be considered by Men of cool Heads, and close Reason, I believe they will find no Beauty nor Perfection in it; nor will it appear, that such a moral System can possibly come from the same Hand, or be of a piece with the natural, throughout which there shines so much Order, Harmony, and Proportion. *ALC.* Your Discourse serves to confirm me in my Opinion. You may remember, I declared, that touching this Beauty of Morality in the high Sense, a Man's first Thoughts are best; and that, if we pretend to examine, and inspect, and reason, we are in danger to lose sight of it. That in Fact there is such a thing cannot be doubted, when we consider that in these Days some of our Philosophers have a high Sense of Virtue, without the least Notion of Religion, a clear Proof of the Usefulness and Efficacy of our Principles!

XII. *CRI.* Not to dispute the Virtue of Minute Philosophers, we may venture to call its Cause in question, and make a doubt, whether it be an inexplicable Enthusiastic Notion of Moral Beauty, or rather, as to me it seems, what was already assigned by *Euphranor*, Complexion, Custom, and Religious Education? But, allowing what Beauty you please



to Virtue in an Irreligious System, it cannot be less in a Religious, unless you will suppose that her Charms diminish as her Dowry increaseth. The Truth is, a Believer hath all the Motives from the Beauty of Virtue in any sense whatsoever that an Unbeliever can possibly have, besides other Motives which an Unbeliever hath not. Hence it is plain, those of your Sect, who have Moral Virtue, owe it not to their peculiar Tenets, which serve only to lessen the Motives to Virtue. Those therefore, who are good, are less good, and those who are bad are more bad, than they wou'd have been were they Believers. *EUPH.* To me it seems, those heroic infidel Inamorato's of abstracted Beauty are much to be pitied, and much to be admired. *Lyficles* hearing this, said with some Impatience; Gentlemen, You shall have my whole Thoughts upon this Point plain and frank. All that is said about a Moral Sense, or Moral Beauty, in any signification, either of *Alciphron* or *Euphranor*, or any other, I take to be at bottom meer Bubble and Pretence. The καλόν and the πρέπον, the beautiful and decent, are Things outward, relative, and superficial, which have no Effect in the dark, but are specious Topics to discourse and expatiate upon, as some formal Pretenders of our Sect, though in other Points very Orthodox, are used to do. But shou'd one of them get into Power, you wou'd find him no such Fool as *Euphranor* imagines. He wou'd soon shew he had found out, that the Love of one's Country is a Prejudice: That Mankind are Rogues and Hypocrites, and that it were Folly to sacrifice one's self for the sake of such: That all Regards center in this Life, and that, as this Life is to every Man his own Life, it clearly follows that Charity begins at Home. Benevolence to Mankind is perhaps pretended, but Benevolence to himself is practised by the Wise. The livelier sort of our Philosophers do not scruple to own these Maxims; and as for the graver, if they are true to their Principles, one may guess

what they must think at the Bottom. *CRI.* Whatever may be the Effect of pure Theory upon certain select Spirits, of a peculiar Make, or in some other Parts of the World, I do verily think that in this Country of ours, Reason, Religion, Law; are all together little enough to subdue the Outward to the Inner Man; and that it must argue a wrong Head and weak Judgment to suppose, that without them Men will be enamoured of the golden Mean. To which my Countrymen perhaps are less inclined than others, there being in the Make of an *English* Mind a certain Gloom and Eagerness, which carries to the sad Extreme; Religion to Fanaticism; Free-thinking to Atheism; Liberty to Rebellion: Nor shou'd we venture to be governed by Taste, even in matters of less Consequence. The Beautitul in Dress, Furniture, and Building, is, as *Euphranor* hath observed, something real and well grounded: And yet our *English* do not find it out of themselves. What wretched Work do they and other Northern People make, when they follow their own Taste of Beauty in any of these Particulars, instead of acquiring the true, which is to be got from ancient Models and the Principles of Art, as in the Case of Virtue from great Models and Meditation, so far as natural Means can go? But in no Case is it to be hoped, that τὸ καλὸν will be the leading Idea of the many, who have quick Senses, strong Passions, and gross Intellects.

XIII. *ALC.* The fewer they are, the more ought we esteem and admire such Philosophers, whose Souls are touched and transported with this sublime Idea. *CRI.* But then one might expect from such Philosophers, so much good Sense and Philanthropy, as to keep their Tenets to themselves, and consider their weak Brethren, who are more strongly affected by certain Senses and Notions of another kind, than that of the Beauty of pure disinterested Virtue. *Cratylus*, a Man prejudiced against the Christian Religion,

on, of a crazy Constitution, of a Rank above most Mens Ambition, and a Fortune equal to his Rank, had little Capacity for sensual Vices, or Temptation to dishonest ones. *Cratylus* having talked himself, or imagined that he had talked himself, into a Stoical Enthusiasm about the Beauty of Virtue, did, under the Pretence of making Men heroically virtuous, endeavour to destroy the Means of making them reasonably and humanly so: A clear Instance, that neither Birth nor Books nor Conversation can introduce a Knowledge of the World into a conceited Mind, which will ever be its own Object, and contemplate Mankind in its own Mirrour! *ALC.* *Cratylus* was a Lover of Liberty, and of his Country, and had a mind to make Men incorrupt and virtuous, upon the purest and most disinterested Principles. *CRI.* His Conduct seems just as wise, as if a Monarch shou'd give out, that there was neither Jail nor Executioner in his Kingdom to enforce the Laws, but that it wou'd be beautiful to observe them, and that in so doing Men wou'd taste the pure Delight which results from Order and *Decorum*. *ALC.* After all, is it not true that certain ancient Philosophers, of great Note, held the same Opinion with *Cratylus*, declaring that he did not come up to the Character, or deserve the Title of a good Man, who practised Virtue for the sake of any thing but its own Beauty? *CRI.* I believe, indeed, that some of the Ancients said such Things as gave Occasion for this Opinion. *Aristotle* \* distinguisheth between two Characters of a good Man, the one he calleth ἀγαθός, or simply good, the other καλός καὶ γαθος, from whence the Compound Term κτλοκαγαθία, which cannot, perhaps, be render'd by any one Word in our Language. But his Sense is plainly this: ἀγαθός he defineth to be that Man to whom the

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\* *Ethic. ad Eudemum*, lib. 7, cap. ult;

good Things of Nature are good; for, according to him, those Things, which are vulgarly esteemed the greatest Goods, as Riches, Honours, Power, and bodily Perfections, are indeed good by Nature, but they happen nevertheless to be hurtful and bad to some Persons, upon the account of evil Habits: Inasmuch as neither a Fool, nor an unjust Man, nor an Intemperate can be at all the better for the Use of them, any more than a sick Man for using the Nourishment proper for those who are in Health. But καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός is that Man in whom are to be found all Things worthy and decent and laudable, purely as such, and for their own sake, and who practiseth Virtue from no other Motive but the sole Love of her own innate Beauty. That Philosopher observes likewise, that there is a certain political Habit, such as the *Spartans* and others had, who thought Virtue was to be valued and practised on account of the natural Advantages that attend it. For which Reason he adds, They are indeed good Men, but they have not the καλοκαγαθία, or supreme consummate Virtue. From hence it is plain that, according to *Aristotle*, a Man may be a good Man without believing Virtue its own Reward, or being only moved to Virtue by the Sense of Moral Beauty. It is also plain, that he distinguisheth the political Virtues of Nations, which the Publick is every where concerned to maintain, from this sublime and speculative kind. It might also be observed, that his exalted Idea did consist with supposing a Providence which inspects and rewards the Virtues of the best Men. For saith he in another Place\*, if the Gods have any Care of Human Affairs, as it appears they have, it shou'd seem reasonable to suppose, they are most delighted with the most excellent Nature, and most approaching their own, which is the Mind, and that they will reward those who chiefly love and cul-

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\* Ad Nicom. l. 10. c. 8.

private what is most dear to them. The same Philosopher observes\*, that the Bulk of Mankind are not naturally disposed to be awed by Shame, but by Fear; nor to abstain from vicious Practices, on account of their Deformity, but only of the Punishment which attends them. And again†, he tells us that Youth, being of it self averse from Abstinence and Sobriety, shou'd be under the Restraint of Laws regulating their Education and Employment, and that the same Discipline shou'd be continued even after they became Men. For which, saith he, we want Laws, and, in one word, for the whole ordering of Life, inas-much as the Generality of Mankind obey rather Force than Reason, and are influenced rather by Penalties than the Beauty of Virtue; *καταναγκάζει τὸ καλόν*. From all which it is very plain, what *Aristotle* wou'd have thought of those, who shou'd go about to lessen or destroy the Hopes and Fears of Mankind, in order to make them virtuous on this sole Principle of the Beauty of Virtue.

XIV. *ALC.* But, whatever the *Stagirite* and his Peripatetics might think, is it not certain that the Stoics maintained this Doctrine in its highest Sense, asserting the Beauty of Virtue to be all-sufficient, that Virtue was her own Reward, that this alone cou'd make a Man happy, in spite of all those Things which are vulgarly esteemed the greatest Woes and Miseries of Human Life? And all this they held at the same time that they believed, the Soul of Man to be of a corporeal Nature, and in Death dissipated like a Flame or Vapour. *CRI.* It must be owned, the Stoics sometimes talk, as if they believed the Morality of the Soul. *Seneca* in a Letter of his to *Lucilius*, speaks much like a Minute Philosopher, in this Particular. But in several other Places, he de-

\* Ibid. c. 9.

† Ibid.

clares himself of a clear contrary Opinion, affirming that the Souls of Men after Death mount aloft into the Heavens, look down upon Earth, entertain themselves with the Theory of cœlestial Bodies, the Course of Nature, and the Conversation of wise and excellent Men, who having lived in distant Ages and Countries upon Earth, make one Society in the other World. It must also be acknowledged, that *Marcus Antoninus* sometimes speaks of the Soul as perishing, or dissolving into its Elementary Parts: But it is to be noted, that he distinguisheth three Principles in the Composition of Human Nature, the *σῶμα ψυχῆ, νῦς, \** Body, Soul, Mind, or as he otherwise expresseth himself, *σαρκία πνεύματιον* and *ἡγεμονικόν*, Flesh, Spirit, and governing Principle. What he calls the *ψυχῆ*, or Soul, containing the brutal Part of our Nature, is indeed represented as a Compound dissoluble, and actually dissolved by Death: But the *νῦς* or *τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*, the Mind or ruling Principle he held to be of a pure cœlestial Nature, *θεοῦ ἀπόσπασμα* a Particle of God, which he sends back intire to the Stars and the Divinity. Besides, among all his magnificent Lessons and splendid Sentiments, upon the Force and Beauty of Virtue, he is positive as to the Being of God, and that not meerly as a plastic Nature, or Soul of the World, but in the strict Sense of a Providence inspecting and taking care of Human Affairs †. The Stoics therefore, though their Style was high, and often above Truth and Nature, yet, it cannot be said, that they so resolved every Motive to a virtuous Life into the sole Beauty of Virtue, as to endeavour to destroy the Belief of the Immortality of the Soul and a distributive Providence. After all, allowing the disinterested Stoics (therein not unlike our modern Quietists) to have made Virtue its own sole Re-

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\* L. 3. c. 16.

† Marc. Antonin. l. 2. §. 11.

ward, in the most rigid and absolute Sense, yet what is this to those who are no Stoics? If we adopt the whole Principles of that Sect, admitting their Notions of Good and Evil, their celebrated Apathy, and, in one word, setting up for compleat Stoics, we may possibly maintain this Doctrine with a better Grace; at least it will be of a piece and consistent with the whole. But he who shall borrow this splendid Patch from the Stoics, and hope to make a Figure by inserting it into a Piece of modern Composition, seasoned with the Wit and Notions of these Times, will indeed make a Figure, but perhaps it may not be in the Eyes of a wise Man the Figure he intended.

XV. Though it must be owned, the present Age is very indulgent to every thing that aims at profane Raillery; which is alone sufficient to recommend any fantastical Composition to the Public. You may behold the Tinsel of a modern Author pass upon this knowing and learned Age for good Writing; affected Strains for Wit; Pedantry for Politeness; Obscurities for Depths; Ramblings for Flights; the most awkward Imitation for original Humour; and all this upon the sole Merit of a little artful Profaneness.

*ALC.* Every one is not alike pleased with Writings of Humour, nor alike capable of them. It is the fine Irony of a Man of Quality, 'That certain Reverend Authors, who can condescend to Lay-wit, are nicely qualified to hit the Air of Breeding and Gentility, and that they will in time, no doubt, refine their Manner to the Edification of the polite World; who have been so long seduced by the way of Raillery and Wit.' The Truth is, the various Taste of Readers requireth various Kinds of Writers. Our Sect hath provided for this with great Judgment. To proselyte the graver sort we have certain profound Men at Reason and Argument. For the Coffee-houses and Populace we have Declaimers of a copious Vein. Of such a Writer it is no Re-  
proach

proach to say, *fluit lutulentus*; he is the fitter for his Readers. Then, for Men of Rank and Politeness we have the finest and wittiest *Railleurs* in the World, whose Ridicule is the surest Test of Truth. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, are those ingenious *Railleurs* Men of Knowledge? *ALC.* Very knowing. *EUPH.* Do they know for Instance the *Copernican* System, or the Circulation of the Blood? *ALC.* One wou'd think you judg'd of our Sect, by your Country Neighbours: There is no body in Town but knows all those Points. *EUPH.* You believe then Antipodes, Mountains in the Moon, and the Motion of the Earth. *ALC.* We do. *EUPH.* Suppose, five or six Centuries ago, a Man had maintained these Notions among the *beau Esprits* of an *English* Court; how do you think they would have been received? *ALC.* With great Ridicule. *EUPH.* And now it wou'd be ridiculous to ridicule them. *ALC.* It wou'd. *EUPH.* But Truth was the same then and now. *ALC.* It was. *EUPH.* It shou'd seem, therefore, that Ridicule is no such sovereign Touchstone and Test of Truth, as you Gentlemen imagine. *ALC.* One thing we know: Our Rallery and Sarcasms gall the black Tribe, and that is our Comfort. *CRI.* There is another thing it may be worth your while to know: That Men in a Laughing Fit may applaud a Ridicule, which shall appear contemptible when they come to themselves; witness the Ridicule of *Socrates* by the Comic Poet, the Humour and Reception it met with no more proving that, than the same will yours, to be just, when calmly considered by Men of Sense. *ALC.* After all, thus much is certain, our ingenious Men make Converts by deriding the Principles of Religion. And, take my word, it is the most successful and pleasing Method of Conviction. These Authors laugh Men out of their Religion, as *Horace* did out of their Vices; *Admissi circum præcordia ludunt*. But a Bigot cannot relish or find out their Wit.



XVI. *C R I.* Wit without Wisdom, if there be such a thing, is hardly worth finding. And as for the Wisdom of these Men, it is of a kind so peculiar one may well suspect it. *Cicero* was a Man of Sense, and no Bigot, nevertheless he makes *Scipio* own himself much more vigilant and vigorous in the Race of Virtue, from supposing Heaven the Prize\*. And he introduceth *Cato* declaring, he wou'd never have undergone those virtuous Toils for the Service of the Public, if he had thought his Being was to end with this Life†. *ALC.* I acknowledge *Cato*, *Scipio*, and *Cicero*, were very well for their Times, but you must pardon me, if I do not think they arrived at the high consummate Virtue of our modern Free-thinkers. *EUPH.* It shou'd seem then that Virtue flourisheth more than ever among us. *ALC.* It shou'd. *EUPH.* And this abundant Virtue is owing to the Method taken by your profound Writers to recommend it. *ALC.* This I grant. *EUPH.* But you have acknowledged, that the Enthusiastic Lovers of Virtue are not the many of your Sect, but only a few select Spirits. To which *Alci-phron* making no Answer, *Crito* addressed himself to *Euphranor*: To make, said he, a true Estimate of the Worth and Growth of modern Virtue, you are not to count the virtuous Men, but rather to consider the quality of their Virtue. Now you must know, the Virtue of these refined Theorists is something so pure and genuine, that a very little goes far, and is in truth invaluable. To which that reasonable interested Virtue, of the old *English* or *Spartan* kind, can bear no proportion. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alci-phron*, are there not Diseases of the Soul, as well as of the Body? *ALC.* Without doubt. *EUPH.* And are not those Diseases vicious Habits? *ALC.*

\* Somn. Scipionis.

† De Senectute.

They are. *EUPH.* And, as bodily Distempers are cured by Physic, thole of the Mind are cured by Philosophy; are they not? *ALC.* I acknowledge it. *EUPH.* It seems, therefore, that Philosophy is a Medicine for the Soul of Man. *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* How shall we be able to judge of Medicines, or know which to prefer? Is it not from the Effects wrought by them? *ALC.* Doubtless. *EUPH.* Where an Epidemical Distemper rages, suppose a new Physician shou'd condemn the known established Practice, and recommend another Method of Cure, wou'd you not, in proportion as the Bills of Mortality increased, be tempted to suspect this new Method, notwithstanding all the plausible Discourse of its Abettors? *ALC.* This serves only to amuse and lead us from the question. *CRI.* It puts me in mind of my Friend *Lamprocles*, who needed but one Argument against Infidels. I observed, said he, that, as Infidelity grew, there grew Corruption of every kind, and new Vices. This simple Observation on matter of Fact was sufficient to make him, notwithstanding the Remonstrance of several ingenious Men, imbue and season the Minds of his Children betimes with the Principles of Religion. The new Theories, which our acute Moderns have endeavoured to substitute in place of Religion, have had their full Course in the present Age, and produced their Effect on the Minds and Manners of Men. That Men are Men is a sure Maxim: But it is as sure that *Englishmen* are not the same Men they were; whether better or worse, more or less virtuous, I need not say. Every one may see and judge. Though, indeed, after *Aristides* had been banished, and *Socrates* put to death at *Athens*, a Man, without being a Conjuror, might guess what the Beauty of Virtue cou'd do in *England*. But there is now neither room nor occasion for guessing. We have our own Experience to open our Eyes; which yet if we continue to keep shut, till the Remains  
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of religious Education are quite worn off from the Minds of Men, it is to be feared we shall then open them wide, not to avoid, but to behold and lament our Ruin. *ALC.* Be the Consequences what they will, I can never bring my self to be of a mind with those, who measure Truth by Convenience. Truth is the only Divinity that I adore. Wherever Truth leads I shall follow. *EUPH.* You have then a Passion for Truth? *ALC.* Undoubtedly. *EUPH.* For all Truths? *ALC.* For all. *EUPH.* To know or to publish them? *ALC.* Both. *EUPH.* What! wou'd you undeceive a Child that was taking Physic? Wou'd you officiously set an Enemy right, that was making a wrong Attack? Wou'd you help an enraged Man to his Sword? *ALC.* In such Cases, common Sense directs one how to behave. *EUPH.* Common Sense, it seems then, must be consulted whether a Truth be salutary or hurtful, fit to be declared or concealed. *ALC.* How! you wou'd have me conceal and stifle the Truth, and keep it to my self? Is this what you aim at? *EUPH.* I only make a plain Inference from what you grant. As for my self, I do not believe your Opinions true. And although you do, you shou'd not therefore, if you wou'd appear consistent with yourself, think it necessary or wise to publish hurtful Truths. What Service can it do Mankind to lessen the Motives to Virtue, or what Damage to increase them? *ALC.* None in the World. But I must needs say, I cannot reconcile the received Notions of a God and Providence to my Understanding, and my Nature abhors the Baseness of conniving at a Falshood. *EUPH.* Shall we therefore appeal to Truth, and examine the Reasons by which you are withheld from believing these Points? *ALC.* With all my Heart, but enough for the present. We will make this the Subject of our next Conference.



### The FOURTH DIALOGUE.

- I. *Prejudices concerning a Deity.* II. *Rules laid down by Alciphron to be observed in proving a God.* III. *What Sort of Proof he expects.* IV. *Whence we collect the being of other Thinking Individuals.* V. *The same Method à tortiori proves the Being of God.* VI. *Alciphron's second Thoughts on this Point.* VII. *God speaks to Men.* VIII. *How Distance is perceived by Sight.* IX. *The proper Objects of Sight at no Distance.* X. *Lights, Shades and Colours variously combined form a Language.* XI. *The Signification of this Language learned by Experience.* XII. *God explaineth himself to the Eyes of Men by the arbitrary Use of sensible Signs.* XIII. *The Prejudice and two-fold Aspect of a Minute Philosopher.* XIV. *God present to Mankind, informs, admonishes, and directs them in a sensible Manner.* XV. *Admirable Nature and Use of this visual Language.* XVI. *Minute Philosophers content to admit a God in certain Senses.* XVII. *Opinion of some who hold that Knowledge and Wisdom are not properly in God.* XVIII. *Dangerous Tendency of this Notion.* XIX. *Its Original.* XX. *The Sense of Schoolmen upon it.* XXI. *Scholastic Use of the Terms Analogy and Analogical explained: Analogical Perfections of God misunderstood.* XXII. *God intelligent, wise, and good in the proper Sense of the Words.* XXIII. *Objection from Moral Evil considered.* XXIV. *Men argue from their own Defects against a Deity.* XXV. *Religious Worship reasonable and expedient.*

**E**ARLY the next Morning, as I looked out of my Window, I saw *Alciphron* walking in the Garden with all the Signs of a Man in deep Thought. Upon which I went down to him. *Alciphron*, said I, this early and profound Meditation puts me in no small Fright. How so ! Because I shou'd be sorry to be convinced there was no God. The Thought of Anarchy in Nature is to me more shocking than in Civil Life ; inasmuch as Natural Concerns are more important than Civil and the Basis of all others. I grant, replied *Alciphron*, that some Inconvenience may possibly follow from disproving a God, but as to what you say of Fright and Shocking, all that is nothing but mere Prejudice. Men frame an Idea or Chimæra in their own Minds, and then fall down and worship it. Notions govern Mankind, but of all Notions, that of God's governing the World hath taken the deepest Root and spread the farthest : It is therefore in Philosophy an heroi-cal Atchievement to dispossess this imaginary Monarch of his Government, and banish all those Fears and Spectres which the Light of Reason alone can dispel ;

*Non radii solis, non lucida tela diei  
Discutiant, sed Naturæ species ratioque\*.*

My Part, said I, shall be to stand by, as I have hitherto done, and take Notes of all that passeth during this memorable Event, while a Minute Philosopher not six Foot high attempts to dethrone the Monarch of the Universe. Alas ! replied *Alciphron*, Arguments are not to be measured by Feet and Inches. One Man may see more than a Million ; and a short Argument, managed by a Free-thinker, may be suffi-

cient to overthrow the most Gigantic Chimæra. As we were engaged in this Discourse, *Crito* and *Euphranor* joined us. I find you have been beforehand with us to day, said *Crito* to *Alciphron*, and taken the Advantage of Solitude and early Hours, while *Euphranor* and I were asleep in our Beds. We may therefore expect to see Atheism placed in the best Light, and supported by the strongest Arguments.

II. *ALC.* The Being of a God is a Subject upon which there has been a world of Common-place, which it is needless to repeat. Give me leave therefore to lay down certain Rules and Limitations, in order to shorten our present Conference. For as the End of debating is to persuade, all those Things which are foreign to this End shou'd be left out of our Debate. First then, let me tell you, I am not to be persuaded by Metaphysical Arguments; such for Instance as are drawn from the Idea of an All-perfect Being, or the Absurdity of an infinite Progression of Causes. This sort of Arguments I have always found dry and jejune; and, as they are not suited to my way of Thinking, they may perhaps puzzle, but never will convince me. Secondly, I am not to be persuaded by the Authority either of past or present Ages, of Mankind in general, or of particular wise Men, all which passeth for little or nothing with a Man of sound Argument and free Thought. Thirdly, All Proofs drawn from Utility or Convenience are foreign to the purpose. They may prove indeed the Usetulness of the Notion, but not the Existence of the Thing. Whatever Legislators or Statesmen may think, Truth and Convenience are very different Things to the rigorous Eyes of a Philosopher. And now, that I may not seem partial, I will limit myself also not to object, in the first place, from any thing that may seem irregular or unaccountable in the Works of Nature, against a Cause of infinite Power and Wisdom; because I already  
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know the Answer you wou'd make, to wit, That no one can judge of the Symmetry and Use of the Parts of an infinite Machine, which are all relative to each other, and to the whole, without being able to comprehend the intire Machine or the whole Universe. And in the second place, I shall engage my self not to object against the Justice and Providence of a Supreme Being, from the Evil that befalls good Men, and the Prosperity which is often the Portion of wicked Men in this Life, because I know that, instead of admitting this to be an Objection against a Deity, you wou'd make it an Argument for a future State; in which there shall be such a Retribution of Rewards and Punishments, as may vindicate the Divine Attributes, and set all Things right in the End. Now these Answers, though they shou'd be admitted for good ones are in truth no Proofs of the Being of God, but only Solutions of certain Difficulties which might be objected, supposing it already proved by proper Arguments. Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to save Time and Trouble both to you and myself. *C R I.* I think that, as the proper End of our Conference ought to be supposed the Discovery and Defence of Truth, so Truth may be justified, not only by persuading its Adversaries, but, where that cannot be done, by shewing them to be unreasonable. Arguments, therefore, which carry Light, have their Effect, even against an Opponent who shuts his Eyes, because they shew him to be obstinate and prejudiced. Besides, this Distinction between Arguments that puzzle and that convince, is least of all observed by Minute Philosophers, and need not therefore be observed by others in their favour. But, perhaps *Euphranor* may be willing to encounter you on your own Terms, in which Case I have nothing farther to say.

III. *EUPH.* *Alciphron* acts like a skilful General, who is bent upon gaining the Advantage of the

Ground, and alluring the Enemy out of their Trenches. We, who believe a God, are intrenched within Tradition, Custom, Authority, and Law. And nevertheless, instead of attempting to force us, he proposes that we shou'd voluntarily abandon these Intrenchments, and make the Attack, when we may act on the defensive with much Security and Ease, leaving him the Trouble to dispossess us of what we need not resign. Those Reasons (continued he, addressing himself to *Alciphron*) which you have mustered up in this Morning's Meditation, if they do not weaken, must establish our Belief of a God; for the utmost is to be expected from so great a Master in his Profession, when he sets his Strength to a Point. *ALC.* I hold the confused Notion of a Deity, or some invisible Power, to be of all Prejudices the most unconquerable. When half a dozen ingenious Men are got together over a Glass of Wine, by a cheerful Fire, in a Room well lighted, we banish with ease all the Spectres of Fancy or Education, and are very clear in our Decisions. But, as I was taking a solitary Walk before it was broad Day-light in yonder Grove, methought the Point was not quite so clear; nor cou'd I readily recollect the Force of those Arguments, which used to appear so conclusive at other Times. I had I know not what Awe upon my Mind, and seemed haunted by a sort of Panic, which I cannot otherwise account for, than by supposing it the Effect of Prejudice: For you must know, that I, like the rest of the World, was once upon a Time catechised and tutored into the Belief of a God or Spirit. There is no surer Mark of Prejudice, than the believing a Thing without Reason. What Necessity then can there be that I shou'd set myself the difficult Task of proving a Negative, when it is sufficient to observe that there is no Proof of the Affirmative, and that the admitting it without Proof is unreasonable? Prove therefore your Opinion, or, if you cannot, you may indeed remain in possession of it,



it, but you will only be possessed of a Prejudice. *EUPH.* O *Alciphron*, to content you we must prove, it seems, and we must prove upon your own Terms. But, in the first place, let us see what sort of Proof you expect. *ALC.* Perhaps I may not expect it, but I will tell you what sort of Proof I wou'd have: And that is in short, such Proof as every Man of Sense requires of a Matter of Fact, or the Existence of any other particular Thing. For Instance, shou'd a Man ask why I believe there is a King of *Great Britain*? I might answer because I had seen him; Or a King of *Spain*? because I had seen those who saw him. But as for this King of Kings, I neither saw him myself, nor any one else that ever did see him. Surely if there be such a Thing as God, it is very strange, that he shou'd leave himself without a Witness; that Men shou'd still dispute his Being; and that there shou'd be no one evident, sensible, plain Proof of it without recourse to Philosophy or Metaphysics. A Matter of Fact is not to be proved by Notions, but by Facts. This is clear and full to the Point. You see what I wou'd be at. Upon these Principles I defy Superstition. *EUPH.* You believe then as far as you can see. *ALC.* That is my Rule of Faith. *EUPH.* How! will you not believe the Existence of Things which you hear, unless you also see them? *ALC.* I will not say so neither. When I insisted on seeing I wou'd be understood to mean perceiving in general: Outward Objects make very different Impressions upon the animal Spirits, all which are comprised under the common Name of Sense. And whatever we can perceive by any Sense we may be sure of.

IV. *EUPH.* What! do you believe then there are such Things as animal Spirits? *ALC.* Doubtless. *EUPH.* By what Sense do you perceive them? *ALC.* I do not perceive them immediately by any of my Senses. I am nevertheless persuaded of their

Existence, because I can collect it from their Effects and Operations. They are the Messengers, which running to and fro in the Nerves, preserve a Communication between the Soul and outward Objects. *EUPH.* You admit then the Being of a Soul. *ALC.* Provided I do not admit an immaterial Substance, I see no Inconvenience in admitting there may be such a Thing as a Soul. And this may be no more than a thin fine Texture of subtile Parts or Spirits residing in the Brain. *EUPH.* I do not ask about its Nature. I only ask whether you admit that there is a Principle of Thought and Action, and whether it be perceivable by Sense. *ALC.* I grant that there is such a Principle, and that it is not the Object of Sense itself, but inferred from Appearances which are perceived by Sense. *EUPH.* If I understand you rightly, from animal Functions and Motions you infer the Existence of animal Spirits, and from reasonable Acts you infer the Existence of a reasonable Soul. Is it not so? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* It shou'd seem, therefore, that the Being of Things imperceptible to Sense may be collected from Effects and Signs, or sensible Tokens. *ALC.* It may. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, is not the Soul that which makes the principal Distinction between a real Person and a Shadow, a living Man and a Carcase? *ALC.* I grant it is. *EUPH.* I cannot, therefore, know that you for Instance are a distinct thinking Individual, or a living real Man, by surer or other Signs than those from which it can be inferred that you have a Soul. *ALC.* You cannot. *EUPH.* Pray tell me, are not all acts immediately and properly perceived by Sense reducible to Motion? *ALC.* They are. *EUPH.* From Motions therefore you infer a Mover or Cause: and from reasonable Motions (or such as appear calculated for a reasonable End) a rational Cause, Soul, or Spirit. *ALC.* Even so.

V. *EUPH.*

V. *EUPH.* The Soul of Man actuates but a small Body, an insignificant Particle, in respect of the great Masses of Nature, the Elements, and heavenly Bodies, and System of the World. And the Wisdom that appears in those Motions, which are the Effect of Human Reason, is incomparably less than that which discovers it self, in the structure and use of organized natural Bodies, Animal or Vegetable. A Man with his Hand can make no Machine so admirable as the Hand it self: Nor can any of those Motions, by which we trace out Human Reason, approach the skill and contrivance of those wonderful Motions of the Heart and Brain and other vital parts, which do not depend on the Will of Man. *ALC.* All this is true. *EUPH.* Doth it not follow then that from natural Motions, independent of Man's Will, may be inferred both Power and Wisdom incomparably greater than that of the Human Soul? *ALC.* It shou'd seem so. *EUPH.* Further, is there not in natural Productions and Effects a visible Unity of counsel and design? Are not the Rules fixed and immoveable? Do not the same Laws of Motion obtain throughout? The same in *China* and here, the same two thousand years ago and at this day? *ALC.* All this I do not deny. *EUPH.* Is there not also a Connexion or Relation between Animals and Vegetables, between both and the Elements, between the Elements and Heavenly Bodies; so that from their mutual Respects, Influences, Subordinations, and Uses, they may be collected to be parts of one whole, conspiring to one and the same end, and fulfilling the same design? *ALC.* Supposing all this to be true. *EUPH.* Will it not then follow, that this vastly great or infinite Power and Wisdom must be supposed in one and the same Agent, Spirit, or Mind, and that we have, at least, as clear, full and immediate Certainty of the being of this infinitely wise and powerful Spirit, as of any one Human

man Soul whatsoever besides our own? *ALC.* Let me consider; I suspect we proceed too hastily. What! Do you pretend you can have the same Assurance of the Being of a God, that you can have of mine whom you actually see stand before you and talk to you? *EUPH.* The very same, if not greater. *ALC.* How do you make this appear? *EUPH.* By the person *Alciphron* is meant an individual thinking thing, and not the Hair, Skin or visible Surface, or any part of the outward Form, Colour, or Shape of *Alciphron*. *ALC.* This I grant. *EUPH.* And in granting this, you grant that in a strict Sense, I do not see *Alciphron*, i. e. that individual thinking thing, but only such visible signs and tokens, as suggest and infer the Being of that invisible thinking Principle or Soul. Even so, in the self same manner it seems to me, that though I cannot with Eyes of Flesh behold the Invisible God; yet I do in the strictest Sense behold and perceive by all my Senses such Signs and Tokens, such Effects and Operations, as suggest, indicate, and demonstrate an invisible God, as certainly and with the same Evidence, at least, as any other Signs, perceived by Sense, do suggest to me the Existence of your Soul, Spirit, or thinking Principle; which I am convinced of only by a few Signs or Effects, and the Motions of one small organized Body: Whereas I do, at all times and in all places, perceive sensible Signs, which evince the Being of God. The point, therefore, doubted or denied by you at the beginning now seems manifestly to follow from the Premises. Throughout this whole Inquiry, have we not considered every step with care, and made not the least advance without clear Evidence? You and I examined and assented singly to each foregoing Proposition: What shall we do then with the Conclusion? For my part, if you do not help me out, I find myself under an absolute necessity of admitting it for true. You must

must therefore be content, henceforward to bear the blame, if I live and die in the Belief of a God.

VI. *ALC.* It must be confest, I do not readily find an answer. There seems to be some Foundation for what you say. But on the other hand, if the point was so clear as you pretend, I cannot conceive how so many sagacious Men of our Sect shou'd be so much in the dark, as not to know or believe one Syl-  
lable of it. *EUPH.* O *Alciphron*, it is not our present business to account for the Oversights, or vindicate the Honour of those great Men the Free-thinkers, when their very Existence is in danger of being called in question. *ALC.* How so? *EUPH.* Be pleased to recollect the Concessions you have made, and then shew me, if the Arguments for a Deity be not conclusive, by what better Argument you can prove the Existence of that thinking Thing, which in strictness constitutes the Free-thinker. As soon as *Euphranor* had uttered these Words, *Alciphron* stopt short and stood in a posture of Meditation, while the rest of us continued our walk and took two or three turns, after which he joined us again with a smiling Countenance, like one who had made some Discovery. I have found, said he, what may clear up the point in dispute, and give *Euphranor* intire satisfaction; I wou'd say an Argument which will prove the Existence of a Free-thinker, the like whereof cannot be applied to prove the Existence of a God. You must know then, that your Notion of our perceiving the Existence of God, as certainly and immediately as we do that of a Human Person, I cou'd by no means digest, though I must own it puzzled me, till I had considered the matter. At first methought, a particular Structure, Shape, or Motion was the most certain Proof of a thinking, reasonable Soul. But a little attention satisfied me, that these things have no necessary Connexion with Reason, Knowledge, and Wisdom. And that allowing them to be certain Proofs of a living Soul,  
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they cannot be so of a thinking and reasonable one. Upon second Thoughts, therefore, and a minute Examination of this point, I have found that nothing so much convinces me of the Existence of another Person as his speaking to me. It is my hearing you talk that, in strict and philosophical Truth, is to me the best Argument for your Being. And this is a peculiar Argument inapplicable to your purpose: for you will not, I suppose, pretend that God speaks to Man in the same clear and sensible manner, as one Man doth to another.

VII. *EUPH.* How! is then the Impression of Sound so much more evident than that of other Senses? Or, if it be, is the voice of Man louder than that of Thunder? *ALC.* Alas! You mistake the point. What I mean is not the Sound of Speech merely as such, but the arbitrary use of sensible Signs, which have no Similitude or necessary Connexion with the things signified, so as by the apposite Management of them, to suggest and exhibit to my mind an endless variety of things, differing in nature, time and place, thereby informing me, entertaining me, and directing me how to act, not only with regard to things near and present, but also with regard to things distant and future. No matter, whether these Signs are pronounced or written, whether they enter by the Eye or the Ear: they have the same use, and are equally Proofs of an intelligent, thinking, designing Cause. *EUPH.* But what if it should appear that God really speaks to Man; would this content you? *ALC.* I am for admitting no inward Speech, no holy Instincts, or Suggestions of Light or Spirit. All that, you must know, passeth with Men of Sense for nothing. If you do not make it plain to me, that God speaks to Men by outward sensible Signs, of such sort and in such manner, as I have defined, you do nothing. *EUPH.* But if it shall appear plainly, that God speaks to Men, by the inter-  
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vention and use of arbitrary, outward, sensible Signs, having no Resemblance or necessary Connexion with the things they stand for and suggest; if it shall appear, that by innumerable Combinations of these Signs, an endless variety of things is discovered and made known to us; and that we are thereby instructed or informed in their different Natures; that we are taught and admonished what to shun, and what to pursue; and are directed how to regulate our Motions, and how to act with respect to things distant from us, as well in time as place; will this content you? *ALC.* It is the very thing I wou'd have you make out; for therein consists the force and use and nature of Language.

VIII. *EUPH.* Look, *Alciphron*, do you not see the Castle upon yonder Hill? *ALC.* I do. *EUPH.* Is it not at a great Distance from you? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, is not Distance a Line turned End-wise to the Eye? *ALC.* Doubtless, *EUPH.* And can a Line, in that Situation, project more than one single Point on the Bottom of the Eye? *ALC.* It cannot. *EUPH.* Therefore the Appearance of a long and of a short Distance is of the same Magnitude, or rather of no Magnitude at all, being in all Cases one single Point. *ALC.* It seems so. *EUPH.* Shou'd it not follow from hence, that Distance is not immediately perceived by the Eye? *ALC.* It shou'd. *EUPH.* Must it not then be perceived by the mediation of some other Thing? *ALC.* It must. *EUPH.* To discover what this is, let us examine what Alteration there may be in the Appearance of the same Object, placed at different Distances from the Eye. Now I find by Experience that, when an Object is removed still farther and farther off in a direct Line from the Eye, its visible Appearance still grows lesser and fainter, and this Change of Appearance, being proportional and universal, seems to me to be that by which we apprehend the various Degrees

grees of Distance. *ALC.* I have nothing to object to this. *EUPH.* But Littleness or Faintness, in their own Nature, seem to have no necessary Connexion with greater Length of Distance. *ALC.* I admit this to be true. *EUPH.* Will it not follow then, that they cou'd never suggest it but from Experience? *ALC.* It will. *EUPH.* That is to say, we perceive Distance, not immediately, but by mediation of a Sign, which hath no Likeness to it, or necessary Connexion with it, but only suggests it from repeated Experience as Words do Things. *ALC.* Hold, *Euphranor*; now I think of it, the Writers in Optics tell us of an Angle made by the two Optic Axes, where they meet in the visible Point or Object; which Angle the obtuser it is the nearer it shews the Object to be, and by how much the acuter by so much the farther off; and this by a necessary demonstrable Connexion. *EUPH.* The Mind then finds out the Distance of Things by Geometry. *ALC.* It doth. *EUPH.* Shou'd it not follow therefore that no body cou'd see but those who had learned Geometry, and knew something of Lines and Angles? *ALC.* There is a sort of natural Geometry which is got without Learning. *EUPH.* Pray inform me, *Alciphron*, in order to frame a Proof of any kind, or deduce one Point from another, is it not necessary, that I perceive the Connexion of the Terms in the Premises, and the Connexion of the Premises with the Conclusion; and, in general, to know one Thing by means of another, must I not first know that other Thing? when I perceive your Meaning by your Words, must I not first perceive the Words themselves? and must I not know the Premises before I infer the Conclusion? *ALC.* All this is true. *EUPH.* Whoever therefore collects a nearer Distance from a wider Angle, or a farther Distance from an acuter Angle, must first perceive the Angles themselves. And he who doth not perceive those Angles, can infer nothing from them. Is it so or not? *ALC.* It is as you say.

*EUPH.*



*EUPH.* Ask now the first Man you meet, whether he perceives or knows any thing of those Optic Angles? Or whether he ever thinks about them, or makes any Inferences from them, either by natural or artificial Geometry? What Answer do you think he wou'd make? *ALC.* To speak the Truth, I believe his Answer wou'd be, that he knew nothing of those Matters. *EUPH.* It cannot therefore be, that Men judge of Distance by Angles: Nor consequently can there be any Force in the Argument you drew from thence, to prove that Distance is perceived by means of something which hath a necessary Connexion with it. *ALC.* I agree with you.

IX. *EUPH.* To me it seems, that a Man may know whether he perceives a Thing or no; and if he perceives it, whether it be immediately or mediately: And if mediately, whether by means of something like or unlike, necessarily or arbitrarily connected with it. *ALC.* It seems so. *EUPH.* And is it not certain, that Distance is perceived only by Experience, if it be neither perceived immediately by itself, nor by means of any Image, nor of any Lines and Angles, which are like it, or have a necessary Connexion with it? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* Doth it not seem to follow from what hath been said and allowed by you; that before all Experience a Man wou'd not imagine, the Things he saw were at any Distance from him? *ALC.* How! let me see. *EUPH.* The Littleness or Faintness of Appearance, or any other Idea or Sensation, not necessarily connected with, or resembling Distance, can no more suggest different Degrees of Distance, or any Distance at all, to the Mind, which hath not experienced a Connexion of the Things signifying and signified, than Words can suggest Notions before a Man hath learned the Language. *ALC.* I allow this to be true. *EUPH.* Will it not thence follow, that a Man born blind, and made to see, wou'd, upon first  
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receiving his Sight, take the Things he saw, not to be at any Distance from him, but in his Eye, or rather in his Mind? *ALC.* I must own it seems so; and yet, on the other hand, I can hardly persuade myself, that, if I were in such a State, I shou'd think those Objects, which I now see at so great Distance, to be at no Distance at all. *EUPH.* It seems then, that you now think the Objects of Sight are at a Distance from you. *ALC.* Doubtless I do. Can any one question but yonder Castle is at a great Distance? *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, can you discern the Doors, Windows, and Battlements of that same Castle? *ALC.* I cannot. At this Distance it seems only a small round Tower. *EUPH.* But I, who have been at it, know that it is no small round Tower, but a large square Building with Battlements and Turrets, which it seems you do not see. *ALC.* What will you infer from thence? *EUPH.* I wou'd infer, that the very Object, which you strictly and properly perceive by Sight, is not that Thing which is several Miles distant. *ALC.* Why so? *EUPH.* Because a little round Object is one thing, and a great square Object is another. Is it not? *ALC.* I cannot deny it. *EUPH.* Tell me, is not the visible Appearance alone the proper Object of Sight? *ALC.* It is. What think you now (said *Euphranor* pointing towards the Heavens) of the visible Appearance of yonder Planet? Is it not a round luminous Flat, no bigger than a Sixpence? *ALC.* What then? *EUPH.* Tell me then, what you think of the Planet itself. Do you not conceive it to be a vast Opaque Globe, with several unequal Risings and Vallies? *ALC.* I do. *EUPH.* How can you therefore conclude, that the proper Object of your Sight exists at a Distance? *ALC.* I confess I know not. *EUPH.* For your farther Conviction, do but consider that crimson Cloud. Think you that if you were in the very Place where it is, you wou'd perceive any Thing like what you now see? *ALC.* By  
no

no means. I shou'd perceive only a dark Mist. *EUPH.* Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the Castle, the Planet, nor the Cloud, which you see here, are those real ones which you suppose exist at a Distance?

X. *ALC.* What am I to think then? Do we see any thing at all, or is it altogether Fancy and Illusion?

*EUPH.* Upon the whole, it seems the proper Objects of Sight are Light and Colours, with their several Shades and Degrees, all which, being infinitely diversified and combined, do form a Language wonderfully adapted to suggest and exhibit to us the Distances, Figures, Situations, Dimensions, and various Qualities of tangible Objects; not by Similitude, nor yet by Inference of necessary Connexion, but by the arbitrary Imposition of Providence, just as Words suggest the Things signified by them.

*ALC.* How! Do we not, strictly speaking, perceive by Sight such Things as Trees, Houses, Men, Rivers, and the like? *EUPH.* We do, indeed, perceive or apprehend those Things by the Faculty of Sight. But will it follow from thence, that they are the proper and immediate Objects of Sight, any more than that all those Things are the proper and immediate Objects of Hearing, which are signified by the Help of Words or Sounds? *ALC.* You wou'd have us think then, that Light, Shades, and Colours, variously combined, answer to the several Articulations of Sound in Language, and that, by means thereof, all sorts of Objects are suggested to the Mind through the Eye, in the same manner as they are suggested by Words or Sounds through the Ear; that is, neither from necessary Deduction to the Judgment, nor from Similitude to the Fancy, but purely and solely from Experience, Custom, and Habit. *EUPH.* I wou'd not have you think any thing, more than the Nature of Things obligeth you to think, nor submit in the least to my Judgment, but only to the Force of Truth, which is an Imposition  
that

that I suppose the freest Thinkers will not pretend to be exempt from. *ALC.* You have led me, it seems, Step by Step, till I am got I know not where. But I shall try to get out again, if not by the Way I came, yet by some other of my own finding. Here *Alciphron*, having made a short Pause, proceeded as follows.

XI. Answer me, *Euphranor*, shou'd it not follow from these Principles, that a Man born blind, and made to see, wou'd at first Sight, not only not perceive their Distance, but also not so much as know the very Things themselves which he saw, for Instance, Men or Trees? which surely to suppose must be absurd. *EUPH.* I grant, in consequence of those Principles, which both you and I have admitted, that such a one wou'd never think of Men, Trees, or any other Objects that he had been accustomed to perceive by Touch, upon having his Mind filled with new Sensations of Light and Colours, whose various Combinations he doth not yet understand, or know the Meaning of, no more than a *Chinese*, upon first hearing the Words *Man* and *Tree*, wou'd think of the Things signified by them. In both Cases, there must be Time and Experience, by repeated Acts, to acquire a Habit of knowing the Connexion between the Signs and Things signified, that is to say, of understanding the Language, whether of the Eyes or of the Ears. And I conceive no Absurdity in all this. *ALC.* I see therefore, in strict Philosophical Truth, that Rock only in the same Sense that I may be said to hear it, when the Word *Rock* is pronounced. *EUPH.* In the very same. *ALC.* How comes it to pass then, that every one shall say he sees, for Instance, a Rock or a House, when those things are before his Eyes; but no body will say he hears a Rock or a House, but only the words or sounds themselves, by which those things are said to be signified or suggested, but not heard? Besides, if Vision be only a Language speaking to the Eyes, it may be asked; When did  
Men

Men learn this Language? To acquire the knowledge of so many Signs, as go to the making up a Language, is a work of some difficulty. But will any Man say he hath spent time, or been at pains, to learn this Language of Vision? *EUPH.* No wonder, we cannot assign a time beyond our remotest Memory. If we have been all practising this Language, ever since our first entrance into the World: If the Author of Nature constantly speaks to the Eyes of all Mankind, even in their earliest Infancy, whenever the Eyes are open in the Light, whether alone or in Company: It doth not seem to me at all strange, that Men shou'd not be aware they had ever learned a Language, begun so early, and practised so constantly, as this of Vision. And, if we also consider that it is the same throughout the whole World, and not, like other Languages, differing in different places, it will not seem unaccountable, that Men shou'd mistake the Connexion between the proper Objects of Sight and the things signified by them, to be founded in necessary Relation, or Likeness, or that they shou'd even take them for the same things. Hence it seems easy to conceive, why Men, who do not think, shou'd confound in this Language of Vision the Signs with the things signified, otherwise than they are wont to do, in the various particular Languages formed by the several Nations of Men.

XII. It may be also worth while to observe, that Signs being little considered in themselves, or for their own sake, but only in their relative Capacity, and for the sake of those things whercof they are Signs, it comes to pass, that the mind often overlooks them, so as to carry its Attention immediately on to the things signified. Thus, for example, in reading we run over the Characters with the slightest regard, and pass on to the meaning. Hence it is frequent for Men to say, they see Words, and Notions, and Things in reading of a Book; whereas in strict-

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ness,

ness, they see only the Characters, which suggest Words, Notions, and Things. And by parity of Reason, may we not suppose, that Men, not resting in, but overlooking, the immediate and proper Objects of Sight, as in their own Nature of small moment, carry their Attention onward to the very things signified, and talk as if they saw the secondary Objects? which, in truth and strictness, are not seen but only suggested and apprehended by means of the proper Objects of Sight, which alone are seen. *ALC.* To speak my mind freely, this Dissertation grows tedious, and runs into points too dry and minute for a Gentleman's Attention. I thought said *Crito*, we had been told, the Minute Philosophers loved to consider things closely and minutely. *ALC.* That is true, but in so polite an Age who wou'd be a meer Philosopher? There is a certain scholastic Accuracy which ill suits the freedom and ease of a well-bred Man. But, to cut short this Chicane, I propound it fairly to your own Conscience, whether you really think, that God himself speaks every day and in every place to the Eyes of all Men? *EUPH.* That is really and in truth my Opinion; and it shou'd be yours too, if you are consistent with your self, and abide by your own Definition of Language. Since you cannot deny, that the Great Mover and Author of Nature constantly explaineth himself to the Eyes of Men, by the sensible intervention of arbitrary Signs, which have no Similitude or Connexion with the things signified; so as by compounding and disposing them, to suggest and exhibit an endless variety of Objects differing in nature, time, and place, thereby informing and directing Men, how to act with respect to things distant and future, as well as near and present. In consequence, I say, of your own Sentiments and Concessions, you have as much reason to think, the universal Agent or God speaks to your Eyes, as you can have for thinking any particular Person speaks to your Ears. *ALC.* I cannot help thinking, that some  
Fallacy

Fallacy runs throughout this whole Ratiocination; though perhaps I may not readily point it out. Hold! let me see. In Language the Signs are arbitrary, are they not? *EUPH.* They are. *ALC.* And consequently, they do not always suggest real matters of Fact. Whereas this natural Language, as you call it, or these visible Signs do always suggest things, in the same uniform way, and have the same constant regular Connexion with matters of Fact: whence it shou'd seem, the Connexion was necessary, and therefore, according to the Definition premised, it can be no Language. How do you solve this Objection? *EUPH.* You may solve it your self, by the help of a Picture or Looking-glass. *ALC.* You are in the right. I see there is nothing in it. I know not what else to say to this Opinion, more than that it is so odd and contrary to my way of thinking, that I shall never assent to it.

XIII. *EUPH.* Be pleased to recollect your own Lectures upon Prejudice, and apply them in the present case. Perhaps they may help you to follow where Reason leads, and to suspect Notions which are strongly riveted, without having been ever examined. *ALC.* I disdain the suspicion of Prejudice. And I do not speak only for my self. I know a Club of most ingenious Men, the freest from Prejudice of any Men alive, who abhor the Notion of a God, and I doubt not wou'd be very able to untie this knot. Upon which Words of *Alciphron*, I, who had acted the part of an indifferent stander-by, observed to him, that it misbecame his Character and repeated Professions, to own an Attachment to the Judgment, or build upon the presumed Abilities of other Men how ingenious soever: and that this proceeding might encourage his Adversaries to have recourse to Authority, in which perhaps they wou'd find their account more than he. Oh! said *Crito*, I have often observed the Conduct of Minute Philosophers. When one

of them has got a ring of Disciples round him, his method is to exclaim against Prejudice, and recommend thinking and reasoning, giving to understand that himself is a Man of deep Researches and close Argument, one who examines impartially and concludes warily. The same Man in other Company, if he chance to be pressed with Reason, shall laugh at Logic and assume the lazy supine Airs of a fine Gentleman, a Wit, a Railleur, to avoid the dryness of a regular and exact Inquiry. This double Face of the Minute Philosopher is of no small use to propagate and maintain his Notions. Though to me it seems a plain Case, that if a fine Gentleman will shake off Authority, and appeal from Religion to Reason, unto Reason he must go: And if he cannot go without leading strings, surely he had better be led by the Authority of the Public, than by that of any knot of Minute Philosophers. *ALC.* Gentlemen, this Discourse is very irksome and needless. For my part, I am a friend to Inquiry. I am willing Reason shou'd have its full and free Scope. I build on no Man's Authority. For my part I have no interest in denying a God. Any Man may believe or not believe a God as he pleases for me. But after all, *Euphranor* must allow me to stare a little at his Conclusions. *EUPH.* The Conclusions are yours as much as mine, for you were led to them by your own Concessions.

XIV. You it seems stare to find, that God is not far from every one of us, and that in him we live and move and have our Being. You, who in the beginning of this Morning's Conference, thought it strange, that God shou'd leave himself without a witness, do now think it strange the witness shou'd be so full and clear. *ALC.* I must own I do. I was aware, indeed, of a certain Metaphysical Hypothesis, of our seeing all things in God by the union of the Humane Soul with the intelligible Substance of the Deity, which neither I nor any one else cou'd

make



make sense of. But I never imagined it cou'd be pretended, that we saw God with our fleshly Eyes as plain as we see any Human Person whatsoever, and that he daily speaks to our Senses in a manifest and clear Dialect. *CRI.* This Language hath a necessary Connexion with Knowledge, Wisdom and Goodness. It is equivalent to a constant Creation, betokening an immediate act of Power and Providence. It cannot be accounted for by mechanical Principles, by Atoms, Attractions, or Effluvia. The instantaneous Production and Reproduction of so many Signs combined, dissolved, transposed, diversified, and adapted to such an endless variety of purposes, ever shifting with the occasions and suited to them, being utterly inexplicable and unaccountable by the Laws of Motion, by Chance, by Fate, or the like blind Principles, doth set forth and testify the immediate Operation of a Spirit or thinking Being; and not merely of a Spirit, which every Motion or Gravitation may possibly infer, but of one wise, good and provident Spirit, who directs and rules and governs the World. Some Philosophers, being convinced of the Wisdom and Power of the Creator, from the make and contrivance of organized Bodies and orderly System of the World, did nevertheless imagine, that he left this System with all its parts and contents well adjusted and put in motion, as an Artist leaves a Clock, to go thenceforward of it self for a certain Period. But this visual Language proves, not a Creator merely, but a provident Governor actually and intimately present and attentive to all our Interests and Motions; who watches over our Conduct, and takes care of our minutest Actions and Designs, throughout the whole course of our lives, informing, admonishing, and directing incessantly, in a most evident and sensible manner. This is truly wonderful. *EUPH.* And is it not so, that Men shou'd be encompassed by such a wonder, without reflecting on it?

XV. Something there is of Divine and Admirable in this Language, addressed to our Eyes, that may well awaken the Mind, and deserve its utmost Attention; it is learned with so little pains, it expresseth the Differences of Things so clearly and aptly, it instructs with such Facility and Dispatch, by one Glance of the Eye conveying a greater Variety of Advices, and a more distinct Knowledge of Things, than cou'd be got by a Discourse of several Hours. And, while it informs, it amuses and entertains the Mind with such singular Pleasure and Delight. It is of such excellent Use in giving a Stability and Permanency to Humane Discourse, in recording Sounds and bestowing Life on dead Languages, enabling us to converse with Men of remote Ages and Countries. And it answers so apposite to the Uses and Necessities of Mankind, informing us more distinctly of those Objects, whose Nearness and Magnitude qualify them to be of greatest Detriment or Benefit to our Bodies, and less exactly, in Proportion as their Littleness or Distance make them of less Concern to us. *ALC.* And yet these strange Things affect Men but little. *EUPH.* But they are not strange, they are familiar, and that makes them be overlooked. Things which rarely happen strike; whereas Frequency lessens the Admiration of Things, though in themselves ever so admirable. Hence a common Man, who is not used to think and make Reflexions, wou'd probably be more convinced of the Being of a God, by one single Sentence heard once in his life from the Sky, than by all the Experience he has had of this visual Language, contrived with such exquisite skill, so constantly addressed to his Eyes, and so plainly declaring the Nearness, Wisdom, and Providence of him with whom we have to do. *ALC.* After all, I cannot satisfy my self, how Men shou'd be so little surpris'd or amazed about this visive Faculty, if it was really of a nature so surpris'ing and amazing. *EUPH.* But let

let us suppose a Nation of Men blind from their Infancy, among whom a Stranger arrives, the only Man who can see in all the Country: Let us suppose this Stranger travelling with some of the Natives, and that one while he foretels to them, that, in case they walk straight forward, in half an Hour they shall meet Men or Cattle or come to a House; that if they turn to the right and proceed, they shall in a few Minutes be in danger of falling down a Precipice; that shaping their course to the left, they will in such a time arrive at a River, a Wood, or a Mountain. What think you? Must they not be infinitely surpris'd, that one, who had never been in their Country before, shou'd know it so much better than themselves? And wou'd not those Predictions seem to them as unaccountable and incredible, as Prophecy to a Minute Philosopher? *ALC.* I cannot deny it. *EUPH.* But it seems to require intense thought, to be able to unravel a Prejudice that has been so long forming, to get over the vulgar Error of Ideas common to both Senses, and so to distinguish between the Objects of Sight and Touch\*, which have grown (if I may so say) blended together in our Fancy, as to be able to suppose our selves exactly in the State, that one of those Men wou'd be in, if he were made to see. And yet this I believe is possible, and might seem worth the pains of a little thinking, especially to those Men whose proper Employment and Profession it is to think, and unravel Prejudices, and confute Mistakes. I frankly own I cannot find my way out of this Maze, and shou'd gladly be set right by those who see better than my self. *CRI.* The pursuing this Subject in their own Thoughts wou'd possibly open a new Scene, to those speculative Gentlemen of

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\* See the annexed Treatise wherein this Point and the whole Theory of Vision are more fully explained.

the Minute Philosophy. It puts me in mind of a passage in the Psalmist, where he represents God to be covered with Light as with a Garment, and wou'd methinks be no ill Comment on that ancient Notion of some Eastern Sages : That God had Light for his Body, and Truth for his Soul. This Conversation lasted till a Servant came to tell us the Tea was ready : Upon which we walked in, and found *Lyficles* at the Tea-table.

XVI. As soon as we sat down, I am glad, said *Alciphron*, that I have here found my Second, a fresh Man to maintain our common Cause, which, I doubt, *Lyficles* will think hath suffered by his absence. *LTS.* Why so? *ALC.* I have been drawn into some Concessions you won't like. *LTS.* Let me know what they are. *ALC.* Why, that there is such a thing as a God, and that his Existence is very certain. *LTS.* Bless me ! How came you to entertain so wild a Notion? *ALC.* You know we profess to follow Reason wherever it leads. And in short I have been reasoned into it. *LTS.* Reasoned? You shou'd say amused with Words, bewildered with Sophistry. *EUPH.* Have you a mind to hear the same Reasoning that led *Alciphron* and me Step by Step, that we may examine whether it be Sophistry or no? *LTS.* As to that I am very easy. I guess all that can be said on that Head. It shall be my Business to help my Friend out, whatever Arguments drew him in. *EUPH.* Will you admit the Premises and deny the Conclusions? *LTS.* What if I admit the Conclusion? *EUPH.* How ! will you grant there is a God? *LTS.* Perhaps I may. *EUPH.* Then we are agreed. *LTS.* Perhaps not. *EUPH.* O *Lyficles*, you are a subtle Adversary. I know not what you wou'd be at. *LTS.* You must know then, that at bottom the Being of a God is a Point in it self of small consequence, and a Man may make this Concession without yielding much. The great Point

is what Sense the word God is to be taken in. The very *Epicureans* allowed the Being of Gods; but then they were indolent Gods, unconcerned with Human Affairs. *Hobbes* allowed a corporeal God; and *Spinoza* held the Universe to be God. And yet no body doubts they were staunch Free-thinkers. I cou'd wish indeed the word God were quite omitted, because in most minds it is coupled with a sort of superstitious Aw, the very Root of all Religion. I shall not, nevertheless, be much disturbed though the name be retained, and the Being of God allowed in any Sense but in that of a Mind, which knows all things, and beholds Human Actions, like some Judge or Magistrate with infinite Observation and Intelligence. The Belief of a God in this Sense fills a Man's Mind with Scruples, lays him under Constraints and embitters his very Being: But in another Sense, it may be attended with no great ill Consequence. This I know was the Opinion of our great *Diagoras*, who told me he wou'd never have been at the pains, to find out a Demonstration that there was no God, if the received Notion of God had been the same with that of some Fathers and Schoolmen. *EUPH.* Pray what was that?

XVII. *LRS.* You must know, *Diagoras*, a Man of much reading and inquiry, had discovered that once upon a time, the most profound and speculative Divines finding it impossible to reconcile the Attributes of God, taken in the common Sense, or in any known Sense, with Human Reason, and the Appearances of things, taught that the words Knowledge, Wisdom, Goodness, and such like, when spoken of the Deity, must be understood in a quite different Sense, from what they signify in the vulgar Acceptation, or from any thing that we can form a Notion of, or conceive. Hence, whatever Objections might be made against the Attributes of God they easily solved,

solved, by denying those Attributes belonged to God, in this or that or any known particular Sense or Notion; which was the same thing as to deny they belonged to him at all. And thus denying the Attributes of God they in effect deny'd his Being, though perhaps they were not aware of it. Suppose, for instance, a Man shou'd object, that future Contingencies were inconsistent with the Fore-knowledge of God, because it is repugnant that certain Knowledge shou'd be of an uncertain thing: it was a ready and an easy answer to say, that this may be true, with respect to Knowledge taken in the common Sense, or in any Sense that we can possibly form any Notion of; but that there wou'd not appear the same Inconsistency, between the contingent Nature of Things and Divine Foreknowledge; taken to signify somewhat that we know nothing of, which in God supplies the place of what we understand by Knowledge; from which it differs not in Quantity or Degree of Perfection, but altogether, and in kind, as Light doth from Sound; and even more, since these agree in that they are both Sensations: whereas Knowledge in God hath no sort of Resemblance or Agreement with any Notion, that Man can frame of Knowledge. The like may be said of all the other Attributes, which indeed may by this means be equally reconciled with every thing or with nothing: But all Men who think must needs see, this is cutting knots and not untying them. For how are things reconciled with the Divine Attributes, when these Attributes themselves are in every intelligible Sense denied; and consequently the very Notion of God taken away, and nothing left but the Name, without any meaning annexed to it? In short, the Belief that there is an unknown Subject of Attributes absolutely unknown is a very innocent Doctrine; which the acute *Diagoras* well saw, and was therefore wonderfully delighted with this System.

XVIII. For, said he, if this cou'd once make its way and obtain in the World, there wou'd be an end of all natural or rational Religion, which is the Basis both of the Jewish and the Christian: for he who comes to God, or enters himself in the Church of God, must first believe that there is a God in some intelligible Sense; and not only that there is something in general without any proper Notion, though never so inadequate, of any of its Qualities or Attributes; for this may be Fate, or Chaos, or Plastic Nature, or any thing else as well as God. Nor will it avail to say, there is something in this unknown Being analogous to Knowledge and Goodness; that is to say, which produceth those Effects, which we cou'd not conceive to be produced by Men in any Degree, without Knowledge and Goodness. For this is in Fact to give up the Point in dispute between Theists and Atheists, the Question having always been, not whether there was a Principle, (which Point was allowed by all Philosophers as well before as since *Anaxagoras*) but whether this Principle was a *verus*, a thinking intelligent Being: That is to say, whether that Order and Beauty and Use, visible in Natural Effects, cou'd be produced by any thing but a Mind or Intelligence, in the proper Sense of the Word; and whether there must not be true, real, and proper Knowledge in the first Cause. We will therefore acknowledge, that all those natural Effects which are vulgarly ascribed to Knowledge and Wisdom, proceed from a Being in which there is, properly speaking, no Knowledge or Wisdom at all, but only something else, which, in reality, is the Cause of those things which Men, for want of knowing better, ascribe to what they call Knowledge and Wisdom and Understanding. You wonder perhaps to hear a Man of Pleasure, who diverts himself as I do, philosophize at this rate. But you shou'd consider that much is to be got by **conversing** with ingenious Men,

Men, which is a short way to Knowledge, that saves a Man the drudgery of Reading and Thinking And now we have granted to you that there is a God in this indefinite Sense, I wou'd fain see what use you can make of this Concession. You cannot argue from unknown Attributes, or which is the same thing, from Attributes in an unknown Sense. You cannot prove, that God is to be loved for his Goodness, or feared for his Justice, or respected for his Knowledge: All which Consequences, we own, wou'd follow from those Attributes admitted in an intelligible Sense. But we deny, that those or any other Consequences can be drawn from Attributes admitted in no particular Sense, or in a Sense which none of us understand. Since therefore nothing can be inferred from such an Account of God, about Conscience, or Worship, or Religion, you may e'en make the best of it; and, not to be singular, we will use the Name too, and so at once there is an end of Atheism. *EUPH.* This Account of a Deity is new to me. I do not like it, and therefore shall leave it to be maintain'd by those who do.

XIX. *CRI.* It is not new to me. I remember not long since to have heard a Minute Philosopher triumph upon this very Point; which put me on inquiring what Foundation there was for it in the Fathers or Schoolmen. And, for ought that I can find, it owes its Original to those Writings, which have been published under the Name of *Dionysius the Areopagite*. The Author of which, it must be owned, hath written upon the Divine Attributes in a very singular Style. In his Treatise of the Cœlestial Hierarchy \* he saith, that God is something above all Essence and Life, ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν καὶ ζωὴν; and again in his Treatise of the Divine Names †, that he is above

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\* De Hierarch. Cœlest. c. 2.

† De Nom. Div. c. 7.  
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all Wisdom and Understanding, ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν σοφίαν καὶ σύνεσιν, ineffable and innumerable, ἀῤῥήτως καὶ ἀνώνυμος; the Wisdom of God he terms an unreasonable, unintelligent, and foolish Wisdom; τὴν ἄλογον καὶ ἄνουν καὶ ἡωρὰν σοφίαν. But then the Reason he gives, for expressing himself in this strange manner, is, that the Divine Wisdom is the Cause of all Reason, Wisdom, and Understanding, and therein are contained the Treasures of all Wisdom and Knowledge. He calls God ὑπέρσοφος and ὑπέρβιος; as if Wisdom and Life were Words not worthy to express the Divine Perfections: And he adds, that the Attributes unintelligent and unperceiving must be ascribed to the Divinity, not κατ' ἑλλειψιν by way of Defect, but καθ' ὑπεροχὴν by way of Eminency; which he explains by our giving the Name of Darkness to Light inaccessible. And, notwithstanding the Harshness of his Expressions in some Places, he affirms over and over in others, that God knows all Things; not that he is beholden to the Creatures for his Knowledge, but by knowing himself, from whom they all derive their Being, and in whom they are contained as in their Cause. It was late before these Writings appear to have been known in the World; and although they obtained Credit during the Age of the Schoolmen, yet since critical Learning hath been cultivated, they have lost that Credit, and are at this Day given up for spurious, as containing several evident Marks of a much later Date than the Age of *Dionysius*. Upon the whole, although this Method of growing in Expression, and dwindling in Notion, of clearing up Doubts by Nonsense, and avoiding Difficulties by running into affected Contradictions, may perhaps proceed from a well-meant Zeal; yet it appears not to be according to Knowledge; and instead of reconciling Atheists to the Truth, hath, I doubt, a Tendency to confirm them in their own Persuasion. It shou'd seem, therefore, very weak and rash in a Christian to adopt this harsh Language of an Apocryphal Writer, preferably to that of the Holy

Holy Scriptures. I remember, indeed, to have read of a certain Philosopher, who lived some Centuries ago, that used to say, if these supposed Works of *Dionysius* had been known to the Primitive Fathers, they wou'd have furnished them admirable Weapons against the Hereticks, and wou'd have saved a world of Pains. But the Event since their Discovery hath by no means confirmed his Opinion. It must be owned, the celebrated *Picus* of *Mirandula*, among his Nine Hundred Conclusions (which that Prince, being very young, proposed to maintain by public Disputation at *Rome*) hath this for one; to wit, that it is more improper to say of God, he is an Intellect or intelligent Being, than to say of a reasonable Soul that it is an Angel: Which Doctrine it seems was not relished. And *Picus*, when he comes to defend it, supports himself altogether by the Example and Authority of *Dionysius*, and in effect explains it away into a meer verbal Difference, affirming, that neither *Dionysius* nor himself ever meant to deprive God of Knowledge, or to deny that he knows all Things: But that, as Reason is of kind peculiar to Man, so by Intellection he understands a kind or manner of Knowing peculiar to Angels: And that the Knowledge, which is in God, is more above the Intellection of Angels, than Angel is above Man. He adds that, as his Tenet consists with admitting the most perfect Knowledge in God, so he wou'd by no means be understood to exclude from the Deity Intellection it self, taken in the common or general Sense, but only that peculiar sort of Intellection proper to Angels, which he thinks ought not to be attributed to God any more than Human Reason\*. *Picus*, therefore, though he speaks as the Apocryphal *Dionysius*, yet when he explains himself, it is evident he speaks like other Men. And although the forementioned

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\* Pic. Mirand. in Apolog. p. 155. Ed. Bas.

Books of the Cœlestial Hierarchy and of the Divine Names, being attributed to a Saint and Martyr of the Apostolical Age, were respected by the Schoolmen, yet it is certain they rejected or softened his harsh Expressions, and explained away or reduced his Doctrine to the received Notions taken from Holy Scripture, and the Light of Nature.

XX. *Thomas Aquinas* expresseth his Sense of this Point in the following manner. All Perfections, saith he, derived from God to the Creatures are in a certain higher Sense, or (as the Schoolmen term it) eminently in God. Whenever, therefore, a Name borrowed from any Perfection in the Creature is attributed to God, we must exclude from its Signification every thing that belongs to the imperfect Manner, wherein that Attribute is found in the Creature. Whence he concludes, that Knowledge in God is not an Habit, but a pure Act\*. And again the same Doctor observes, that our Intellect gets its Notions of all sorts of Perfections from the Creatures, and that as it apprehends those Perfections, so it signifies them by Names. Therefore, saith he, in attributing these Names to God, we are to consider two Things; first, The Perfections themselves as Goodness, Life, and the like, which are properly in God; and, secondly, The Manner which is peculiar to the Creature, and cannot, strictly and properly speaking, be said to agree to the Creator†. And although *Suarez*, with other Schoolmen, teacheth, that the Mind of Man conceiveth Knowledge and Will to be in God as Faculties or Operations, by Analogy only to created Beings; yet he gives it plainly as his Opinion, that when Knowledge is said not to be properly in God, it must be understood in a Sense in-

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\* Sum. Theolog. p. 1. Quest. 14. Art. 1.

† Ibid. Quest. 13. Art. 3.

cluding Imperfection, such as discursive Knowledge; or the like imperfect kind found in the Creatures: And that, none of those Imperfections in the Knowledge of Men or Angels belonging to the formal Notion of Knowledge, or to Knowledge as such, it will not thence follow that Knowledge, in its proper formal Sense, may not be attributed to God: And of Knowledge taken in general for the clear evident understanding of all Truth, he expressly affirms that it is in God, and that this was never denied by any Philosopher who believed a God\*. It was, indeed, a current Opinion in the Schools, that even Being it self shou'd be attributed analogically to God and the Creatures. That is, they held that God, the supreme, independent, self-originate Cause and Source of all Beings, must not be supposed to exist in the same Sense with created Beings, not that he exists less truly, properly, or formally than they, but only because he exists in a more eminent and perfect Manner.

XXI. But to prevent any Man's being led, by mistaking the Scholastic Use of the Terms *Analogy* and *Analogical*, into an Opinion that we cannot frame in any Degree, a true and proper Notion of Attributes applied by Analogy, or, in the School Phrase, predicated analogically, it may not be amiss to inquire into the true Sense and Meaning of those Words. Every one knows, that Analogy is a *Greek* Word used by Mathematicians, to signify a Similitude of Proportions. For Instance, when we observe that Two is to Six, as Three is to Nine, this Similitude or Equality of Proportion is termed Analogy. And although Proportion strictly signifies the Habitude or Relation of one Quantity to another, yet, in a looser and translated Sense, it hath been applied to signify every other Habitude; and consequently the Term Analogy comes to signify all Similitude of Re-

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\* Suarez Disp. Metaph. Tom. 2. Disp. 30. Sect. 15.

lations, or Habitudes whatsoever. Hence, the Schoolmen tell us there is Analogy between Intellect and Sight; forasmuch as Intellect is to the Mind, what Sight is to the Body? And that he who governs the State is analogous to him who steers a Ship. Hence a Prince is analogically stiled a Pilot, being to the State as a Pilot is to his Vessel\*. For the farther clearing of this Point it is to be observed, that a two-fold Analogy is distinguished by the Schoolmen, metaphorical and proper. Of the first Kind there are frequent Instances in Holy Scripture, attributing Human Parts and Passions to God. When he is represented as having a Finger, an Eye, or an Ear, when he is said to repent, to be angry, or grieved, every one sees the Analogy is meerly metaphorical. Because those Parts and Passions, taken in the proper Signification, must in every Degree necessarily, and from the formal Nature of the Thing, include Imperfection. When therefore it is said, the Finger of God appears in this or that Event, Men of common Sense mean no more, but that it is as truly ascribed to God, as the Works wrought by Human Fingers are to Man: and so of the rest. But the case is different, when Wisdom and Knowledge are attributed to God. Passions and Senses as such imply Defect; but in Knowledge simply, or as such, there is no Defect. Knowledge therefore, in the proper formal meaning of the Word, may be attributed to God proportionably, that is preserving a Proportion to the infinite Nature of God. We may say, therefore, that as God is infinitely above Man, so is the Knowledge of God infinitely above the Knowledge of Man, and this is what *Cajetan* calls *Analogia propriè facta*. And after this same Analogy, we must understand all those Attributes to belong to the Deity, which in themselves simply, and as such, denote Perfection. We

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\* Vide *Cajetan. de Nom. Analog. c. 3.*

may therefore consistently with what hath been premised, affirm that all sorts of Perfection, which we can conceive in a finite Spirit, are in God, but without any of that alloy which is found in the Creatures. This Doctrine therefore of Analogical Perfections in God, or our knowing God by Analogy, seems very much misunderstood and misapplied by those who wou'd infer from thence, that we cannot frame any direct or proper Notion, though never so inadequate, of Knowledge or Wisdom, as they are in the Deity, or understand any more of them than one born blind can of Light and Colours.

XXII. And now, Gentlemen, it may be expected I shou'd ask your Pardon, for having dwelt so long on a point of Metaphysics, and introduced such unpolished and unfashionable Writers as the Schoolmen into good Company: but as *Lyficles* gave the occasion, I leave him to answer for it. *LYS.* I never dreamt of this dry Dissertation. But, if I have been the occasion of discussing these Scholastic Points, by my unluckily mentioning the Schoolmen, it was my first fault of the kind, and I promise it shall be the last. The meddling with crabbed Authors of any sort is none of my taste. I grant one meets now and then with a good Notion in what we call dry Writers, such an one for example as this I was speaking of, which I must own struck my Fancy. But then for these we have such as *Prodicus* or *Diagoras*, who look into obsolete Books, and save the rest of us that trouble. *CRI.* So you pin your Faith upon them. *LYS.* It is only for some odd Opinions, and matters of Fact, and critical Points. Besides, we know the Men to whom we give credit: They are judicious and honest, and have no end to serve but Truth. And I am confident some Author or other has maintained the forementioned Notion in the same Sense as *Diagoras* related it. *CRI.* That may be. But it never was a received Notion, and never will, so long as  
Men

Men believe a God; the same Arguments that prove a first Cause proving an intelligent Cause: Intelligent; I say, in the proper Sense: Wise and Good in the true and formal Acceptation of the Words. Otherwise it is evident, that every Syllogism brought to prove those Attributes, or (which is the same thing) to prove the Being of a God, will be found to consist of four terms, and consequently can conclude nothing. But for your part, *Alciphron*, you have been fully convinced, that God is a thinking intelligent Being in the same sense with other Spirits, though not in the same imperfect manner or degree.

XXIII. *ALC.* And yet I am not without my Scruples: For with Knowledge you infer Wisdom, and with Wisdom Goodness. But how is it possible, to conceive God so good, and Man so wicked? It may perhaps with some Colour be alledged, that a little soft shadowing of Evil sets off the bright and luminous parts of the Creation, and so contributes to the Beauty of the whole Piece: But, for Blots so large and so black it is impossible to account by that Principle. That there shou'd be so much Vice and so little Virtue upon Earth, and that the Laws of God's Kingdom shou'd be so ill observed by his Subjects, is what can never be reconciled with that surpassing Wisdom and Goodness of the supreme Monarch. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, wou'd you argue that a State was ill administred, or judge of the manners of its Citizens, by the Disorders committed in the Goal or Dungeon? *ALC.* I wou'd not. *EUPH.* And for ought we know, this Spot with the few Sinners on it, bears no greater Proportion to the Universe of Intelligences, than a Dungeon doth to a Kingdom. It seems we are led not only by Revelation but by common Sense, observing and inferring from the Analogy of visible Things, to conclude there are innumerable Orders of intelligent Beings more happy and more perfect than Man,

whose Life is but a Span, and whose place this earthly Globe is but a Point, in respect of the whole System of God's Creation. We are dazzled indeed with the Glory and Grandeur of Things here below, because we know no better. But I am apt to think, if we knew what it was to be an Angel for one hour, we shou'd return to this World, though it were to sit on the brightest Throne in it, with vastly more loathing and reluctance, than we wou'd now descend into a loathsome Dungeon or Sepulchre.

XXIV. *CRI.* To me it seems natural, that such a weak passionate and short-sighted Creature as Man, shou'd be ever liable to Scruples of one kind or other. But, as this same Creature is apt to be over positive in judging, and over hasty in concluding, it falls out, that these Difficulties and Scruples about God's Conduct are made Objections to his Being. And so Men come to argue from their own Defects against the Divine Perfections. And, as the Views and Humours of Men are different and often opposite, you may sometimes see them deduce the same atheistical Conclusion from contrary Premises. I knew an Instance of this, in two Minute Philosophers of my Acquaintance, who used to argue each from his own Temper against a Providence. One of them, a Man of a choleric and vindictive Spirit, said he cou'd not believe a Providence, because *London* was not swallowed up or consumed by Fire from Heaven, the Streets being as he said full of People, who shew no other Belief or Worship of God, but perpetually praying that he wou'd damn, rot, sink, and confound them. The other, being of an indolent and easy Temper, concluded there cou'd be no such thing as a Providence, for that a Being of consummate Wisdom must needs employ himself better, than in minding the Prayers, and Actions, and little Interests of Mankind. *ALC.* After all, if God have no Passions, how can it be true that Vengeance is his? Or  
how



how can he be said to be jealous of his Glory? *CRI.* We believe that God executes Vengeance without Revenge, and is jealous without Weakness, just as the mind of Man sees without Eyes, and apprehends without Hands.

XXV. *ALC.* To put a Period to this Discourse, we will grant, there is a God in this dispassionate Sense; but what then? What hath this to do with Religion or Divine Worship? To what purpose, are all these Prayers, and Praises, and Thanks-givings, and Singing of Psalms, which the foolish Vulgar call serving God? What sense or use or end is there in all these things? *CRI.* We worship God, we praise and pray to him: not because we think that he is proud of our Worship, or fond of our Praise or Prayers, and affected with them as Mankind are, or that all our Service can contribute in the least Degree to his Happiness or Good: But because it is good for us, to be so disposed towards God: because it is just and right and suitable to the Nature of Things, and becoming the Relation we stand in to our supreme Lord and Governor. *ALC.* If it be good for us to worship God; it shou'd seem that the Christian Religion, which pretends to teach Men the Knowledge and Worship of God, was of some use and benefit to Mankind. *CRI.* Doubtless. *ALC.* If this can be made appear, I shall own myself very much mistaken. *CRI.* It is now near Dinner time. Wherefore if you please, we will put an end to this Conversation for the present, and to-morrow morning resume our Subject.

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## The FIFTH DIALOGUE.

- I. *Minute Philosophers join in the Cry, and follow the Scent of others.* II. *Worship prescribed by the Christian Religion suitable to God and Man.* III. *Power and Influence of the Druids.* IV. *Excellency and Usefulness of the Christian Religion.* V. *It ennobles Mankind and makes them happy.* VI. *Religion neither Bigotry nor Superstition.* VII. *Physicians and Physic for the Soul.* VIII. *Character of the Clergy.* IX. *Natural Religion and Humane Reason not to be disparaged.* X. *Tendency and Use of the Gentile Religion.* XI. *Good Effects of Christianity.* XII. *Englishmen compared with ancient Greeks and Romans.* XIII. *The Modern Practice of Duelling.* XIV. *Character of the old Romans, how to be formed.* XV. *Genuine Fruits of the Gospel.* XVI. *Wars and Factions not an Effect of the Christian Religion.* XVII. *Civil Rage and Massacres in Greece and Rome.* XVIII. *Virtue of ancient Greeks.* XIX. *Quarrels of Polemical Divines.* XX. *Tyranny, Usurpation, Sophistry of Ecclesiastics.* XXI. *The Universities censured.* XXII. *Divine Writings of a certain modern Critic.* XXIII. *Learning the Effect of Religion.* XXIV. *Barbarism of the Schools.* XXV. *Restoration of Learning and polite Arts, to whom owing.* XXVI. *Prejudice and Ingratitude of Minute Philosophers.* XXVII. *Their Pretensions and Conduct inconsistent.* XXVIII. *Men and Brutes compared with respect to Religion.* XXIX. *Christianity the only Means to establish Natural Religion.* XXX. *Free-thinkers mistake their Talents; have a strong Imagination.*

*gination. XXXI. Tithes and Church-lands. XXXII. Men distinguished from Human Creatures. XXXIII. Distribution of Mankind into Birds, Beasts, and Fishes. XXXIV. Plea for Reason allowed, but Unfairness taxed. XXXV. Freedom a Blessing or a Curse as it is used. XXXVI. Priestcraft not the reigning Evil.*

I. **W**E amused ourselves next Day every one to his Fancy, till Nine of the Clock, when Word was brought that the Tea-table was set in the Library, which is a Gallery on a Ground-floor, with an arched Door at one End opening into a Walk of Limes; where, as soon as we had drank Tea, we were tempted by fine Weather to take a Walk which led us to a small Mount of easy Ascent, on the Top whereof we found a Seat under a spreading Tree. Here we had a Prospect on one hand of a narrow Bay or Creek of the Sea, inclosed on either Side by a Coast beautified with Rocks and Woods, and green Banks and Farm-houses. At the End of the Bay was a small Town placed upon the Slope of a Hill, which from the Advantage of its Situation made a considerable Figure. Several Fishing-boats and Lighters gliding up and down on a Surface as smooth and bright as Glats enlivened the Prospect. On the other Side we looked down on green Pastures, Flocks, and Herds, basking beneath in Sun-shine, while we in our superior Situation enjoy'd the Freshness of Air and Shade. Here we felt that sort of joyful Instinct which a rural Scene and fine Weather inspire; and proposed no small Pleasure, in resuming and continuing our Conference without Interruption till Dinner: But we had hardly seated ourselves, and looked about us, when we saw a Fox run by the Foot of our Mount into an adjacent Thicket. A few Minutes after, we heard a confused Noise of the opening of Hounds, the winding of Horns, and the roaring of Country Squires. While our Attention was suspended by this

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Event, a Servant came running out of Breath and told *Crito*, that his Neighbour *Ctesippus*, a Squire of Note, was fallen from his Horse attempting to leap over a Hedge, and brought into the Hall, where he lay for dead. Upon which we all rose and walked hastily to the House, where we found *Ctesippus* just come to himself, in the midst of half a dozen Sunburnt Squires in Frocks and short Wigs and Jockey-Boots. Being asked how he did? he answered it was only a broken Rib. With some Difficulty *Crito* persuaded him to lie on a Bed till the Chirurgeon came. These Fox-hunters, having been up early at their Sport, were eager for Dinner, which was accordingly hastened. They passed the Afternoon in a loud rustic Mirth, gave Proof of their Religion and Loyalty by the Healths they drank, talked of Hounds and Horses and Elections and Country Affairs till the Chirurgeon, who had been employed about *Ctesippus*, desired he might be put into *Crito's* Coach, and sent home, having refused to stay all Night. Our Guests being gone, we reposed ourselves after the Fatigue of this tumultuous Visit, and next Morning assembled again at the Seat on the Mount. Now *Lysicles*, being a nice Man, and a *bel esprit*, had an infinite Contempt for the rough Manners and Conversation of Fox-hunters, and cou'd not reflect with Patience that he had lost, as he called it, so many Hours in their Company. I flattered myself, said he, that there had been none of this Species remaining among us: Strange that Men shou'd be diverted with such uncouth Noise and Hurry, or find Pleasure in the Society of Dogs and Horses! How much more elegant are the Diversions of the Town! There seems, replied *Euphranor*, to be some Resemblance between Fox-hunters and Free-thinkers; the former exerting their animal Faculties in pursuit of Game, as you Gentlemen employ your Intellectuals in the pursuit of Truth. The kind of Amusement is the same, although

though the Object be different. *LRS.* I had rather be compared to any Brute upon Earth than a rational Brute. *CR I.* You wou'd then have been less displeased with my Friend *Pythocles*, whom I have heard compare the common sort of Minute Philosophers, not to the Hunters, but the Hounds. For, said he, you shall often see among the Dogs a loud Babler, with a bad Nose, lead the unskilful part of the Pack, who join all in his Cry without following any Scent of their own, any more than the Herd of Free-thinkers follow their own Reason.

II. But *Pythocles* was a blunt Man, and must never have known such Reasoners among them as you Gentlemen, who can sit so long at an Argument, dispute every Inch of Ground, and yet know when to make a reasonable Concession. *LRS.* I don't know how it comes to pass, but methinks *Alciphron* makes Concessions for himself and me too. For my own part, I am not altogether of such a yielding Temper : But yet I don't care to be singular neither. *CR I.* Truly, *Alciphron*, when I consider where we are got, and how far we are agreed, I conceive it probable we may agree altogether in the end. You have granted that a Life of Virtue is upon all Accounts eligible, as most conducive both to the general and particular Good of Mankind : And you allow, that the Beauty of Virtue alone is not a sufficient Motive with Mankind to the Practice of it. This led you to acknowledge, that the Belief of a God wou'd be very useful in the World ; and that consequently you shou'd be disposed to admit any reasonable Proof of his Being : Which Point hath been proved, and you have admitted the Proof. If then we admit a Divinity, why not Divine Worship ? And if Worship, why not Religion to teach this Worship ? And if a Religion, why not the Christian, if a better cannot be assigned, and it be already established by the Laws of our Country, and handed down

down to us from our Fore-fathers? Shall we believe a God, and not pray to him for future Benefits nor thank him for the past? Neither trust in his Protection, nor love his Goodness, nor praise his Wisdom, nor adore his Power? And if these Things are to be done, can we do them in a Way more suitable to the Dignity of God or Man, than is prescribed by the Christian Religion? *ALC.* I am not perhaps altogether sure that Religion must be absolutely bad for the Public: But I cannot bear to see Policy and Religion walk hand in hand: I do not like to see Human Rights attached to the Divine: I am for no *Pontifex Maximus*, such as in ancient or in modern *Rome*: No High Priest, as in *Judea*: No Royal Priests, as in *Egypt* and *Sparta*: No such Things as *Dairos* of *Japan*, or *Lamas* of *Tartary*.

III. I knew a late witty Gentleman of our Sect, who was a great Admirer of the ancient *Druids*. He had a mortal Antipathy to the present established Religion, but used to say he shou'd like well to see the *Druids* and their Religion restored, as it anciently flourished in *Gaul* and *Britain*; for it wou'd be right enough that there shou'd be a Number of contemplative Men set apart to preserve a Knowledge of Arts and Sciences, to educate Youth, and teach Men the Immortality of the Soul and the moral Virtues. Such, said he, were the *Druids* of old, and I shou'd be glad to see them once more established among us. *CR I.* How wou'd you like, *Alciphron*, that Priests shou'd have Power to decide all Controversies, adjudge Property, distribute Rewards and Punishments; that all who did not acquiesce in their Decrees shou'd be excommunicated, held in Abhorrence, excluded from all Honours and Privileges, and deprived of the common Benefit of the Laws; and that now and then, a Number of Lay-men shou'd be crammed together in a Wicker-idol, and burnt for an Offering to their Pagan Gods? How shou'd you like living under such Priests

Priests and such a Religion? *ALC.* Not at all. Such a Situation wou'd by no means agree with Free-thinkers. *CRI.* And yet such were the *Druids* and such their Religion, if we may trust *Cæsar's* Account of them \*. *LRS.* I am now convinced more than ever, there ought to be no such Thing as an established Religion of any kind. Certainly all the Nations of the World have been hitherto out of their Wits. Even the *Athenians* themselves, the wisest and freest People upon Earth, had, I know not what, foolish Attachment to their established Church. They offered it seems a Talent as a Reward to whoever shou'd kill *Diagoras* the *Melian*, a Free-thinker of those Times who derided their Mysteries: And *Protagoras*, another of the same Turn, narrowly escaped being put to Death, for having wrote something that seemed to contradict their received Notions of the Gods. Such was the Treatment our generous Sect met with at *Athens*. And I make no doubt, but these *Druids* wou'd have sacrificed many a Holocaust of Free-thinkers. I wou'd not give a single Farthing to exchange one Religion for another. Away with all together, Root and Branch, or you had as good do nothing. No *Druids* or Priests of any sort for me: I see no occasion for any of them.

IV. *EUPH.* What *Lyficles* saith puts me in mind of the Close of our last Conference, wherein it was agreed, in the following to resume the Point we were then entered upon, to wit, the Use or Benefit of the Christian Religion, which *Alciphron* expected *Crito* shou'd make appear. *CRI.* I am the readier to undertake this Point, because I conceive it to be no difficult one, and that one great Mark of the Truth of Christianity is, in my mind, its Tendency to do good, which seems the North Star to conduct our Judgment

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\* De Bello Gallico, l. 6.

in moral Matters, and in all Things of a practic Nature; Moral or practical Truths being ever connect-ed with universal Benefit. But to judge rightly of this Matter, we shou'd endeavour to act like *Lyficles* upon another Occasion, taking into our View the Sum of Things, and considering Principles as branch-ed forth into Consequences to the utmost Extent we are able. We are not so much to regard the Humour or Caprice, or imaginary Distresses of a few idle Men, whose Conceit may be offended, though their Con-science cannot be wounded; but fairly to consider the true Interest of Individuals as well as of Human Society. Now the Christian Religion, considered as a Fountain of Light, and Joy, and Peace, as a Source of Faith, and Hope, and Charity, (and that it is so will be evident to whoever takes his Notion of it from the Gospel) must needs be a Principle of Hap-piness and Virtue. And he who sees not, that the de-stroying the Principles of good Actions must de-stroy good Actions, sees nothing: And he who, see-ing this, shall yet persist to do it, if he be not wick-ed, who is?

V. To me it seems the Man can see neither deep nor far, who is not sensible of his own Misery, Sin-fulness, and Dependence; who doth not perceive, that this present World is not designed or adapted to make rational Souls happy; who wou'd not be glad of getting into a better State, and who wou'd not be overjoy'd to find, that the Road leading thither was the Love of God and Man, the practising every Vir-tue, the living reasonably while we are here upon Earth, proportioning our Esteem to the Value of Things, and so using this World as not to abuse it, for this is what Christianity requires. It neither in-joyns the Nastiness of the Cynic, nor the Insensibi-lity of the Stoic. Can there be a higher Ambition than to overcome the World, or a wiser than to sub-due our selves, or a more comfortable Doctrine than the



the Remission of Sins, or a more joyful Prospect than that of having our base Nature renewed and assimilated to the Deity, our being made Fellow-citizens with Angels and Sons of God? Did ever *Pythagoreans*, or *Platonists*, or *Stoics*, even in Idea or in Wish, propose to the Mind of Man purer Means or a nobler End? How great a Share of our Happiness depends upon Hope! How totally is this extinguished by the Minute Philosophy! On the other hand, how is it cherished and raised by the Gospel! Let any Man who thinks in earnest but consider these Things, and then say which he thinks deserveth best of Mankind, he who recommends, or he who runs down Christianity? Which he thinks likelier to lead a happy Life, to be a hopeful Son, an honest Dealer, a worthy Patriot, He who sincerely believes the Gospel, or He who believes not one Title of it? He who aims at being a Child of God, or He who is contented to be thought, and to be, one of *Epicurus's* Hogs? And in fact do but scan the Characters, and observe the Behaviour of the common sort of Men on both sides: Observe and say which live most agreeably to the Dictates of Reason? How Things shou'd be, the Reason is plain; how they are, I appeal to Fact.

VI. *ALC.* It is wonderful to observe how Things change Appearance, as they are viewed in different Lights, or by different Eyes. The Picture, *Crito*, that I form of Religion is very unlike yours, when I consider how it unmans the Soul, filling it with absurd Reveries and slavish Fears; how it extinguishes the gentle Passions, inspiring a Spirit of Malice, and Rage, and Persecution: When I behold bitter Resentments and unholy Wrath in those very Men, who preach up Meekness and Charity to others. *CRI.* It is very possible, that Gentlemen of your Sect may think Religion a Subject beneath their Attention; but yet it seems that whoever sets up for opposing any Doctrine, shou'd know what it is he disputes against.  
Know

Know then, that Religion is the virtuous Mean between Incredulity and Superstition. We do not therefore contend for superstitious Follies, or for the Rage of Bigots. What we plead for is Religion against Profaneness, Law against Confusion, Virtue against Vice, the Hope of a Christian against the Despondency of an Atheist. I will not justify bitter Repentments and unholy Wrath in any Man, much less in a Christian, and least of all in a Clergyman. But if Sallies of Human Passion shou'd sometimes appear even in the best, it will not surprize any one who reflects on the Sarcasms and ill Manners with which they are treated by the Minute Philosophers. For as Cicero somewhere observes, *Habet quandam aculeum Contumelia, quem pati prudentes ac viri boni difficillimè possunt.* But although you might sometimes observe particular Persons, professing themselves Christians, run into faulty Extremes of any kind through Passion and Infirmary, while Infidels of a more calm and dispassionate Temper shall perhaps behave better. Yet these natural Tendencies on either side prove nothing, either in favour of Infidel Principles, or against Christian. If a Believer doth Evil it is owing to the Man not to his Belief. And if an Infidel doth good it is owing to the Man and not to his Infidelity.

VII. *L.T.S.* To cut this Matter short, I shall borrow an Allusion to Physic, which one of you made use of against our Sect. It will not be denied, that the Clergy pass for Physicians of the Soul, and that Religion is a sort of Medicine which they deal in and administer. If then Souls in great numbers are diseased and lost, how can we think the Physician skilful or his Physic good? It is a common Complaint, that Vice increases, and Men grow daily more and more wicked. If a Shepherd's Flock be diseased or unsound, who is to blame but the Shepherd, for neglecting or not knowing how to cure them? a Fig therefore for such Shepherds, such Physic, and such  
Physi-

Physicians, who like other Mountebanks, with great Gravity and elaborate Harangues put off their Pills to the People, who are never the better for them. *EUPH.* Nothing seems more reasonable than this Remark, that Men shou'd judge of a Physician, and his Physic by its Effect on the Sick. But Pray, *Lyficles*, wou'd you judge of a Physician by those Sick, who take his Physic and follow his Prescriptions, or by those who do not? *LYS.* Doubtless by those who do. *EUPH.* What shall we say then, if great numbers refuse to take the Physic, or instead of it take Poison of a direct contrary Nature prescribed by others, who make it their Business to discredit the Physician and his Medicines, to hinder Men from using them, and to destroy their Effect by Drugs of their own? Shall the Physician be blamed for the miscarriage of those People? *LYS.* By no means. *EUPH.* By a parity of Reason shou'd it not follow, that the Tendency of religious Doctrines ought to be judged of by the Effects which they produce, not upon all who hear them, but upon those only who receive or believe them? *LYS.* It seems so. *EUPH.* Therefore to proceed fairly, shall we not judge of the Effects of Religion by the Religious, of Faith by Believers, of Christianity by Christians?

VIII. *LYS.* But I doubt these sincere Believers are very few. *EUPH.* But will it not suffice to justify our Principles, if in proportion to the Numbers which receive them, and the degree of Faith with which they are received, they produce good Effects. Perhaps the number of Believers are not so few as you imagine; and if they were, whose fault is that so much as of those who make it their professed Endeavour to lessen that number? And who are those but the Minute Philosophers? *LYS.* I tell you it is owing to the Clergy themselves, to the Wickedness and Corruption of Clergymen. *EUPH.* And who denies but there may be Minute Philosophers even among

mong the Clergy? *CRI.* In so numerous a Body it is to be presumed there are Men of all sorts. But notwithstanding the cruel Reproaches cast upon that Order by their Enemies, an equal Observer of Men and Things will, if I mistake not, be inclined to think those Reproaches owing as much to other Faults as those of the Clergy, especially if he considers the declamatory manner of those who censure them. *EUPH.* My Knowledge of the World is too narrow for me to pretend to judge of the Virtue and Merit and liberal Attainments of Men in the several Professions. Besides, I shou'd not care for the odious work of Comparilon: But I may venture to say, the Clergy of this Country where I live are by no means a disgrace to it: on the contrary, the People seem much the better for their Example and Doctrine. But supposing the Clergy to be (what all Men certainly are) Sinners and faulty; supposing you might spy out here and there among them even great Crimes and Vices, what can you conclude against the Profession it self from its unworthy Professors, any more than from the Pride, Pedantry, and bad Lines of some Philosophers against Philosophy, or of Lawyers against Law?

IX. It is certainly right to judge of Principles from their Effects, but then we must know them to be Effects of those Principles. It is the very Method I have observed, with respect to Religion and the Minute Philosophy. And I can honestly aver, that I never knew any Man or Family grow worse in proportion as they grew religious: But I have often observed that Minute Philosophy is the worst thing which can get into a Family, the readiest way to impoverish, divide and disgrace it. *ALC.* By the same Method of tracing Causes from their Effects, I have made it my Observation, that the Love of Truth, Virtue, and the Happiness of Mankind are specious Pretexts, but not the inward Principles that set Di-  
vines

vines at work : Else why shou'd they affect to abuse Human Reason, to disparage natural Religion, to traduce the Philosophers as they universally do? *CR.* Not so universally perhaps as you imagine. A Christian, indeed, is for confining Reason within its due Bounds ; and so is every reasonable Man. If we are forbid meddling with unprofitable Questions, vain Philosophy, and Science falsely so called, it cannot be thence inferred, that all Inquiries into profitable Questions, useful Philosophy, and true Science, are unlawful. A Minute Philosopher may indeed impute, and perhaps a weak Brother may imagine those Inferences, but Men of Sense will never make them. God is the common Father of Lights ; and all Knowledge really such, whether natural or revealed, is derived from the same Source of Light and Truth. To amass together Authorities upon so plain a Point wou'd be needless. It must be owned some Mens attributing too much to Human Reason, hath, as is natural, made others attribute too little to it. But thus much is generally acknowledged, that there is a natural Religion, which may be discovered and proved by the light of Reason, to those who are capable of such Proofs. But it must be withal acknowledged, that Precepts and Oracles from Heaven are incomparably better suited to popular Improvement and the good of Society, than the Reasonings of Philosophers ; and accordingly we do not find, that natural or rational Religion ever became the popular national Religion of any Country.

X. *ALC.* It cannot be denied, that in all Heathen Countries there have been received under the colour of Religion, a world of Fables and superstitious Rites. But I question whether they were so absur'd and of so bad Influence as is vulgarly represented, since their respective Legislators and Magistrates must, without doubt, have thought them useful. *CR.* It were needless to inquire into all the Rites and Notions of

the Gentile World. This hath been largely done when it was thought necessary. And whoever thinks it worth while may be easily satisfied about them. But as to the Tendency and Usefulness of the Heathen Religion in general, I beg leave to mention a Remark of St. *Augustine's*\*, who observes that the Heathens in their Religion had no Assemblies for preaching, wherein the People were to be instructed what Duties or Virtues the Gods required, no Place or Means to be taught what *Perfius* † exhorts them to learn.

*Disciteque ô miseri, & causas cognoscite rerum,  
Quid sumus, & quidnam victuri gignimur.—*

*ALC.* This is the true Spirit of the Party, never to allow a Grain of Use or Goodness to any thing out of their own Pale: But we have had learned Men who have done Justice to the Religion of the *Gentiles*. *CRI.* We do not deny but there was something useful in the old Religions of *Rome* and *Greece*, and some other Pagan Countries. On the contrary, we freely own they produced some good Effects on the People: But then these good Effects were owing to the Truths contained in those false Religions, the truer therefore the more useful. I believe you will find it a hard Matter to produce any useful Truth, any moral Precept, any salutary Principle or Notion in any Gentile System, either of Religion or Philosophy, which is not comprehended in the Christian, and either enforced by stronger Motives, or supported by better Authority, or carried to a higher Point of Perfection.

XI. Consequently you wou'd have us think our selves a finer People than the ancient *Greeks* or *Ro-*

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\* De civitate Dei l. 2.

† Sat. 3.

*mans.* *CRI.* If by finer you mean better, perhaps we are; and if we are not, it is not owing to the Christian Religion, but to the want of it. *ALC.* You say perhaps we are. I do not pique my self on my reading: But shou'd be very ignorant to be capable of being imposed on in so plain a Point. What! compare *Cicero* or *Brutus* to an *English* Patriot, or *Seneca* to one of our Parsons! Then that invincible Constancy and Vigour of Mind, that disinterested and noble Virtue, that adorable publick Spirit you so much admire, are things in them so well known, and so different from our Manners, that I know not how to excuse your *perhaps*. *Euphranor*, indeed, who passeth his Life in this obscure Corner, may possibly mistake the Characters of our Times, but you who know the World, how cou'd you be guilty of such a Mistake? *CRI.* O *Alciphron*, I wou'd by no means detract from the noble Virtue of ancient Heroes: But I observe those great Men were not the Minute Philosophers of their Times; that the best Principles upon which they acted are common to them with Christians, of whom it wou'd be no difficult Matter to assign many Instances, in every kind of Worth and Virtue, publick or private, equal to the most celebrated of the Ancients. Though perhaps their Story might not have been so well told, set off with such fine Lights and colourings of Style, or so vulgarly known and considered by every School-boy. But though it shou'd be granted, that here and there a *Greek* or *Roman* Genius, bred up under strict Laws and severe Discipline, animated to public Virtue by Statues, Crowns, Triumphal Arches, and such Rewards and Monuments of great Actions, might attain to a Character and Fame beyond other Men, yet this will prove only, that they had more Spirit and lived under a civil Polity more wisely ordered in certain points than ours; Which advantages of Nature and civil Institution will be no Argument for their Religion or against ours. On the contrary, it seems an invincible

Proof of the Power and Excellency of the Christian Religion, that, without the help of those civil Institutions and Incentives to Glory, it shou'd be able to inspire a Phlegmatic People with the noblest Sentiments, and soften the rugged Manners of Northern Boors into Gentleness and Humanity: and that these good Qualities shou'd become National, and rise and fall in proportion to the Purity of our Religion, as it approaches to, or recedes from the Plan laid down in the Gospel.

XII. To make a right Judgment of the Effects of the Christian Religion, let us take a survey of the prevailing Notions and Manners of this very Country where we live, and compare them with those of our Heathen Predecessors. *ALC.* I have heard much of the glorious Light of the Gospel, and shou'd be glad to see some Effects of it in my own dear Country, which, by the bye, is one of the most corrupt and profligate upon Earth, notwithstanding the boasted Purity of our Religion. But it wou'd look mean and diffident, to affect a Comparison with the barbarous Heathen, from whence we drew our Original: If you wou'd do Honour to your Religion, dare to make it with the most renowned Heathens of Antiquity. *CR I.* It is a common Prejudice, to despise the present and over-rate remote Times and Things. Something of this seems to enter into the Judgments Men make of the *Greeks* and *Romans*. For though it must be allowed, those Nations produced some noble Spirits and great Patterns of Virtue: yet upon the whole, it seems to me they were much inferior in point of real Virtue and good Morals, even to this corrupt and profligate Nation, as you are now pleased to call it in dishonour to our Religion; however you may think fit to characterize it, when you wou'd do honour to the Minute Philosophy. This, I think, will be plain to any one, who shall turn off his Eyes from a few shining Characters, to view the general Manners



Manners and Customs of those People. Their insolent treatment of Captives, even of the highest Rank and softer Sex, their unnatural exposing of their own Children, their bloody Gladiatorian Spectacles, compared with the common Notions of *Englishmen*, are to me a plain Proof, that our Minds are much softened by Christianity. Cou'd any thing be more unjust, than the condemning a young Lady to the most infamous Punishment and Death for the guilt of her Father, or a whole Family of Slaves, perhaps some hundreds for a Crime committed by one? Or more Abominable than their Bacchanals and unbridled Lusts of every kind? which, notwithstanding all that has been done by Minute Philosophers to debauch the Nation, and their successful Attempts on some part of it, have not yet been matched among us, at least not in every circumstance of Impudence and Effrontery. While the *Romans* were poor, they were temperate; but, as they grew rich, they became luxurious to a degree that is hardly believed or conceived by us. It cannot be denied, the old *Roman* Spirit was a great one. But it is as certain, there have been numberless Examples of the most resolute and clear Courage in *Britons*, and in general from a Religious Cause. Upon the whole, it seems an instance of the greatest Blindness and Ingratitude, that we do not see and own the exceeding great Benefits of Christianity, which, to omit higher considerations, hath so visibly softened, polished, and embellished our Manners.

XIII. *ALC.* O *Crito*, we are alarmed at Cruelty in a foreign Shape, but over-look it in a familiar one. Else how is it possible that you shou'd not see the Inhumanity of that barbarous Custom of Duelling, a thing avowed and tolerated and even reputable among us? Or that seeing this, you shou'd suppose our *Englishmen* of a more gentle disposition than the old *Romans*, who were altogether Strangers to it? *CRIT.*

I will by no means make an Apology for every *Goth* that walks the Streets, with a determined purpose to murder any Man who shall but spit in his Face, or give him the Lye. Nor do I think the Christian Religion is in the least answerable, for a practice so directly opposite to its Precepts, and which obtains only among the idle part of the Nation, your Men of Fashion; who, instead of Law, Reason or Religion, are governed by Fashion. Be pleased to consider that what may be, and truly is, a most scandalous reproach to a Christian Country, may be none at all to the Christian Religion: For the Pagan encouraged Men in several Vices, but the Christian in none. *ALC.* Give me leave to observe, that what you now say is foreign to the purpose. For the question, at present, is not concerning the respective tendencies of the Pagan and the Christian Religions, but concerning our Manners, as actually compared with those of ancient Heathens, who I aver had no such barbarous Custom as Duelling. *CRI.* And I aver that, bad as this is, they had a worse; and that was Poisoning. By which we have reason to think there were many more Lives destroyed, than by this *Gothic* Crime of Duelling: Inasmuch as it extended to all Ages, Sexes, and Characters, and as its Effects were more secret and unavoidable; and as it had more Temptations, Interest as well as Passion, to recommend it to wicked Men. And for the Fact, not to waste time, I refer you to the *Roman* Authors themselves. *LTS.* It is very true: Duelling is not so general a Nuisance as Poisoning, nor of so base a Nature. This Crime, if it be a Crime, is in a fair way to keep its ground in spite of the Law and the Gospel. The Clergy never preach against it, because themselves never suffer by it: and the Man of honour must not appear against the means of vindicating Honour. *CRI.* Though it be remarked by some of your Sect, that the Clergy are not used to preach against Duelling, yet I neither think the Remark it self just, nor the Reason assigned for

for it. In effect, one half of their Sermons, all that is said of Charity, Brotherly Love, Forbearance, Meekness, and Forgiving Injuries is directly against this wicked Custom; by which the Clergy themselves are so far from never suffering, that perhaps they will be found, all things considered, to suffer oftner than other Men. *LYS.* How do you make this appear? *CRI.* An Observer of Mankind may remark two kinds of Bully, the Fighting and the Tame, both public Nufances, the former (who is the more dangerous Animal, but by much the less common of the two) employs himself wholly and solely against the Laity, while the tame Species exert their Talents upon the Clergy. The Qualities constituent of this tame Bully are natural Rudeness joined with a delicate sense of Danger. For, you must know, the force of inbred Insolence and ill Manners is not diminished, though it acquire a new Determination, from the fashionable custom of calling Men to account for their Behaviour. Hence you may often see one of these tame Bullies ready to burst with Pride and ill Humour, which he dares not vent till a Parson has come in the way to his Relief. And the Man of Raillery, who wou'd as soon bite off his Tongue, as break a jest on the profession of Arms in the presence of a military Man, shall instantly brighten up, and assume a familiar Air with Religion and the Church before Ecclesiastics. *Dorcon*, who passeth for a Poltron and stupid in all other Company, and really is so, when he is got among Clergymen, affects a quite opposite Character. And many *Dorcons* there are, which owe their Wit and Courage to this Passive Order.

XIV. *ALC.* But, to return to the point in hand, can you deny, the old *Romans* were as famous for Justice and Integrity, as Men in these days for the contrary Qualities? *CRI.* The Character of the *Romans* is not to be taken from the Sentiments of *Tully*, or *Cato's* Actions, or a shining passage here and there

in their History, but from the prevailing tenor of their Lives and Notions. Now if they and our modern *Britons* are weighed in this same equal balance, you will, if I mistake not, appear to have been prejudiced in favour of the old *Romans* against your own Country, probably because it professeth Christianity. Whatever instances of Fraud or Injustice may be seen in Christians carry their own censure with them, in the care that is taken to conceal them, and the shame that attends their discovery. There is, even at this day, a sort of Modesty in all our public Councils and Deliberations. And I believe, the boldest of our Minute Philosophers wou'd hardly undertake in a popular Assembly, to propose any thing parallel to the Rape of the *Sabines*, the most unjust usage of *Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus*, or the ungrateful treatment of *Camillus*, which, as a learned Father observes, were instances of Iniquity agreed to by the public body of the *Romans*. And if *Rome* in her early days were capable of such flagrant Injustice, it is most certain she did not mend her Manners, as she grew great in Wealth and Empire, having produced Monsters in every kind of Wickedness, as far exceeding other Men, as they surpassed them in power. I freely acknowledge, the Christian Religion hath not had the same influence upon the Nation, that it wou'd in case it had been always professed in its Purity, and cordially believed by all Men. But I will venture to say, that if you take the *Roman* History from one end to the other, and impartially compare it with our own, you will neither find them so good, nor your Countrymen so bad as you imagine. On the contrary an indifferent Eye may, I verily think, perceive a vein of Charity and Justice, the effect of Christian Principles, run through the latter; which, though not equally discernible in all parts, yet discloseth it self sufficiently to make a wide difference upon the whole in spite of the general Appetites and Passions of Human Nature, as well as of the particular

lar hardness and roughness of the block out of which we were hewn. And it is observable (what the *Roman* Authors themselves do often suggest) that, even their Virtues and magnanimous Actions rose and fell with a sense of Providence, and a future State, and a Philosophy the nearest to the Christian Religion.

XV. *Crito* having spoke thus, paused. But *Alciphron* addressing himself to *Euphranor* and me, said, It is natural for Men, according to their several Educations and Prejudices, to form contrary Judgments upon the same things, which they view in very different lights. *Crito*, for instance, imagines that none but Salutary Effects proceed from Religion: on the other hand, if you appeal to the general Experience and Observation of other Men, you shall find it grown into a Proverb that Religion is the root of evil.

*Tantum Religio potuit suadere malorum.*

And this not only among *Epicureans* or other ancient Heathens, but among Moderns speaking of the Christian Religion. Now methinks it is unreasonable to oppose against the general concurring Opinion of the World, the Observation of a particular Person, or particular set of Zealots, whose Prejudice sticks close to them, and ever mixeth with their Judgment; and who read, collect, and observe with an Eye not' to discover the Truth, but to defend their Prejudice. *CRI.* Though I cannot think with *Alciphron*, yet I must own, I admire his Address and Dexterity in Argument. Popular and general Opinion is by him represented, on certain occasions, to be a sure mark of Error. But when it serves his ends that it shou'd seem otherwise, he can as easily make it a Character of Truth. But it will by no means follow, that a profane Proverb used by the Friends and  
admired

admired Authors of a Minute Philosopher, must therefore be a received Opinion, much less a Truth grounded on the Experience and Observation of Mankind. Sadness may spring from Guilt or Superstition, and Rage from Bigotry, but Darkness might as well be supposed the natural Effect of Sunshine, as sullen and furious Passions to proceed from the glad Tidings and divine Precepts of the Gospel. What is the Sum and Substance, Scope and End of Christ's Religion, but the Love of God and Man? To which all other Points and Duties are relative and subordinate, as Parts or Means, as Signs, Principles, Motives, or Effects. Now I wou'd fain know, how it is possible for Evil or Wickedness of any kind to spring from such a source. I will not pretend, there are no evil Qualities in Christians, nor good in Minute Philosophers. But this I affirm, that whatever evil is in us, our Principles certainly lead to Good; and whatever good there may be in you, it is most certain your Principles lead to evil.

XVI. *ALC.* It must be owned there is a fair outside, and many plausible things may be said, for the Christian Religion taken simply as it lies in the Gospel. But it is the Observation of one of our great Writers, that the first Christian Preachers very cunningly began with the fairest Face and the best moral Doctrines in the World. It was all Love, Charity, Meekness, Patience and so forth. But when by this means they had drawn over the World and got Power, they soon changed their Appearance, and shewed Cruelty, Ambition, Avarice and every bad quality. *CR I.* That is to say, some Men very cunningly preached and underwent a world of hardships, and laid down their lives to propagate the best Principles and the best Morals, to the end that others some Centuries after might reap the benefit of bad ones. Whoever may be cunning, there is not much Cunning in the maker of this Observation. *ALC.* And yet

yet ever since this Religion hath appeared in the World, we have had eternal Feuds, Factions, Massacres and Wars, the very reverse of that Hymn with which it is introduced in the Gospel: *Glory be to God on high, on Earth Peace, Good-will towards Men.* CRI. This I will not deny. I will even own that the Gospel and the Christian Religion have been often the Pretexts for these Evils; but it will not thence follow they were the Cause. On the contrary it is plain they cou'd not be the real proper Cause of these Evils, because a rebellious, proud, revengeful, quarrelsome Spirit is directly opposite to the whole Tenor and most express Precepts of Christianity: a Point so clear that I shall not prove it. And secondly, because all those Evils you mention were as frequent, nay much more frequent, before the Christian Religion was known in the World. They are the common Product of the Passions and Vices of Mankind, which are sometimes covered with the Masque of Religion by wicked Men, having the Form of Godliness without the Power of it. This Truth seems so plain, that I am surpris'd how any Man of Sense, Knowledge, and Candour can make a doubt of it.

XVII. Take but a view of Heathen *Rome*; what a Scene is there of Faction and Fury and civil Rage? Let any Man consider the perpetual Feuds between the *Patricians* and *Plebeians*, the bloody and inhuman Factions of *Marius* and *Sylla*, *Cinna* and *Octavius*, and the vast havoc of Mankind, during the two famous *Triumvirates*. To be short, let any Man of common Candour and common Sense but cast an Eye, from one end to the other of the *Roman* Story, and behold that long Scene of Seditions, Murders, Massacres, Proscriptions and Desolations of every kind, enhanced by every cruel circumstance of Rage, Rapine and Revenge, and then say, whether those Evils were introduced into the World with the Christian Religion, or whether they are not less frequent now than before? ALC.  
The

The ancient *Romans*, it must be owned, had a high and fierce Spirit, which produced eager Contentions and very bloody Catastrophes. The *Greeks*, on the other hand, were a polite and gentle sort of Men, softened by Arts and Philosophy. It is impossible to think of the little States and Cities of *Greece*, without wishing to have lived in those times, without admiring their Policy and envying their Happiness. *C R I.* Men are apt to consider the dark sides of what they possess, and the bright ones of things out of their reach. A fine Climate, elegant Taste, polite Amusements, love of Liberty, and a most ingenious inventive Spirit for Arts and Sciences were indisputable Prerogatives of ancient *Greece*. But as for Peace and Quietness, Gentleness and Humanity, I think we have plainly the advantage: For those envied Cities composed of gentle *Greeks* were not without their Factions, which persecuted each other with such Treachery, Rage, and Malice, that in respect of them our factious Folk are meer Lambs. To be convinced of this Truth, you need only look into *Thucydides* \*, where you will find those Cities in general involved in such bitter Factions, as for Fellow-Citizens without the formalities of War, to murder one another, even in their Senate-houses and their Temples, no regard being had to Merit, Rank, Obligation, or Nearness of Blood. And if Human Nature boiled up to so vehement a pitch in the politest People, what wonder that savage Nations shou'd scalp, roast, torture, and destroy each other, as they are known to do? It is therefore plain, that without Religion there wou'd not be wanting Pretexts for Quarrels and Debates; all which can very easily be accounted for by the natural Infirmities and Corruption of Men. It wou'd not perhaps be so easy to account for the Blindness of those, who impute the most hellish Effects

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\* Thucyd. l. 3.



to the most divine Principle, if they cou'd be suppos'd in earnest, and to have considered the Point. One may daily see ignorant and prejudiced Men make the most absurd Blunders: But that Free-thinkers, Divers to the Bottom of Things, Fair Inquirers, and Openers of Eyes should be capable of such a gross Mistake, is what one would not expect.

XVIII. *ALC.* The rest of Mankind we cou'd more easily give up: but as for the *Greeks*, Men of the most refined Genius express an high esteem of them, not only on account of those Qualities which you think fit to allow them, but also for their Virtues. *CRI.* I shall not take upon me to say how far some Men may be prejudiced against their Country, or whether others may not be prejudiced in favour of it. But upon the fullest and most equal Observation that I am able to make, it is my opinion, that, if by Virtue is meant Truth, Justice, Gratitude, there is incomparably more Virtue, now at this day in *England*, than at any time cou'd be found in ancient *Greece*. Thus much will be allowed, that we know few Countries, if any, where Men of eminent Worth, and famous for deserving well of the Public, met with harder Fate, and were more ungratefully treated than in the most polite and learned of the *Grecian* States. Though *Socrates* it must be owned wou'd not allow, that those Statesmen, by adorning the City, augmenting the Fleet, or extending the Commerce of *Athens*, deserved well of their Country; or cou'd with justice complain of the ungrateful Returns made by their Fellow-Citizens, whom, while they were in power, they had taken no care to make better Men, by improving and cultivating their Minds with the Principles of Virtue, which if they had done, they need'd not to have feared their Ingratitude. If I were to declare my opinion, what gave the chief Advantage to *Greeks* and *Romans* and other Nations, which have made the greatest Figure in the World, I shou'd be

apt

apt to think it was a peculiar Reverence for their respective Laws and Institutions, which inspired them with Steadiness and Courage, and that hearty generous Love of their Country, by which they did not merely understand a certain Language or Tribe of Men, much less a particular spot of Earth, but included a certain System of Manners, Customs, Notions, Rites, and Laws Civil and Religious. *ALC.* Oh! I perceive your Drift, you would have us reverence the Laws and religious Institutions of our Country: But herein we beg to be excused, if we do not think fit to imitate the *Greeks*, or to be governed by any Authority whatsoever. But to return: As for Wars and Factions, I grant they ever were and ever will be in the World upon some pretext or other, as long as Men are Men.

XIX. But there is a sort of War and Warriors peculiar to Christendom, which the Heathens had no notion of: I mean Disputes in Theology and Polemical Divines, which the World hath been wonderfully pestered with: these Teachers of Peace, Meekness, Concord, and what not! if you take their word for it: But, if you cast any eye upon their Practice, you find them to have been in all Ages the most contentious, quarrellsome, disagreeing Crew that ever appeared upon Earth. To observe the Skill and Sophistry, the Zeal and Eagerness, with which those Barbarians, the School Divines, split Hairs and contest about Chimæra's, gives me more Indignation, as being more absurd and a greater scandal to human Reason, than all the ambitious Intrigues, Cabals, and Politics of the Court of *Rome*. *CRI.* If Divines are quarrellsome, that is not so far forth as Divine, but as Undivine and Unchristian. Justice is a good thing; and the Art of Healing is excellent; nevertheless in the administering of Justice or Physic Men may be wronged or poisoned. But as Wrong  
cannot

cannot be Justice, or the Effect of Justice, so Poison cannot be Medicine or the Effect of Medicine, so neither can Pride or Strife be Religion or the effect of Religion. Having premised this, I acknowledge, you may often see hot-headed Bigots engage themselves in religious as well as civil Parties, without being of credit or service to either. And as for the Schoolmen in particular, I do not in the least think the Christian Religion concerned in the Defence of them, their Tenets, or their Method of handling them: but, whatever futility there may be in their Notions, or inelegancy in their Language, in pure justice to Truth one must own, they neither banter nor rail nor declaim in their Writings, and are so far from shewing Fury or Passion, that perhaps an impartial Judge will think, the Minute Philosophers are by no means to be compared with them, for keeping close to the Point, or for Temper and good Manners. But after all, if Men are puzzled, wrangle, talk nonsense, and quarrel about Religion, so they do about Law, Physic, Politics, and every thing else of moment. I ask whether in these Professions, or in any other, where men have refined and abstracted, they do not run into Disputes, Chicane, Nonsense, and Contradictions, as well as in Divinity? And yet this doth not hinder but there may be many excellent Rules, and just Notions, and useful Truths in all those Professions. In all Disputes human Passions too often mix themselves, in proportion as the Subject is conceived to be more or less important. But we ought not to confound the Cause of Men with the Cause of God, or make Human Follies an Objection to Divine Truths. It is easy to distinguish what looks like Wisdom from above, and what proceeds from the passion and weakness of Men. This is so clear a Point, that one wou'd be tempted to think, the not doing it was an Effect, not of Ignorance, but, of something worse.

XX. The Conduct we object to Minute Philosophers is a natural consequence of their Principles. Whatsoever they can reproach us with is an Effect, not of our Principles, but of Human Passion and Frailty. *ALC.* This is admirable. So we must no longer object to Christians the absurd Contentions of Councils, the Cruelty of Inquisitions, the Ambition and Usurpations of Churchmen. *CRI.* You may object them to Christians but not to Christianity. If the Divine Author of our Religion and his Disciples have sowed a good Seed; and together with this good Seed, the Enemies of his Gospel (among whom are to be reckoned the Minute Philosophers of all Ages) have sowed bad Seeds, whence spring Tares and Thistles; is it not evident, these bad Weeds cannot be imputed to the good Seed, or to those who sowed it? Whatever you do or can object against Ecclesiastical Tyranny, Usurpation, or Sophistry, may, without any blemish or disadvantage to Religion, be acknowledged by all true Christians; provided still that you impute those wicked effects to their true Cause, not blaming any Principles or Persons for them, but those that really produce or justify them. Certainly, as the Interests of Christianity are not to be supported by unchristian Methods, whenever these are made use of, it must be supposed there is some other latent Principle which sets them at work. If the very Court of *Rome* hath been known, from Motives of Policy, to oppose settling the Inquisition in a Kingdom, where the secular Power hath endeavoured to introduce it in spite of that Court\*: We may well suppose, that elsewhere Factions of State, and political Views of Princes, have given birth to Transactions seemingly religious, wherein at bottom neither Religion, nor Church, nor Churchmen, were at all

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\* P. Paolo storia dell' Inquisitione p. 42.

consider'd. As no Man of common Sense and Honesty will engage in a general Defence of Ecclesiastics, so I think no Man of common Candour can condemn them in general. Wou'd you think it reasonable, to blame all Statesmen, Lawyers, or Soldiers, for the Faults committed by those of their Profession, though in other Times, or in other Countries, and influenced by other Maxims and other Discipline? And if not, why do you measure with one Rule to the Clergy, and another to the Laity? Surely the best Reason that can be given for this is Prejudice. Shou'd any Man rake together all the Mischiefs that have been committed in all Ages and Nations, by Soldiers and Lawyers, you wou'd, I suppose, conclude from thence, not that the State shou'd be deprived of those useful Professions, but only that their Exorbitances shou'd be guarded against and punished. If you took the same equitable Course with the Clergy, there wou'd indeed be less to be said against you; but then you wou'd have much less to say. This plain obvious Consideration, if every one who read considered, wou'd lessen the Credit of your Declaimers. *ALC.* But when all is said that can be said, it must move a Man's Indignation to see reasonable Creatures, under the Notion of Study and Learning, employ'd in reading and writing so many voluminous Tracts, *de lanâ caprinâ*. *CR I.* I shall not undertake the Vindication of Theological Writings, a general Defence, being as needless as a general Charge is groundless. Only let them speak for themselves; and let no Man condemn them upon the Word of a Minute Philosopher. But we will imagine the very worst, and suppose a wrangling Pedant in Divinity disputes and ruminates and writes upon a refined Point, as useless and unintelligible as you please. Suppose this same Person bred a Layman, might he not have employ'd himself in tricking Bargains, vexatious Law-suits, Factions, Seditions, and such like Amusements, with much more Prejudice

to the Public? Suffer then curious Wits to spin Cobwebs; where is the hurt? *ALC.* The Mischief is, what Men want in light they commonly make up in Heat: Zeal, and ill Nature, being Weapons constantly exerted by the Partisans, as well as Champions, on either Side: And those perhaps not mean Pedants or Book-worms. You shall often see even the learned and eminent Divine lay himself out in explaining Things inexplicable, or contend for a barren Point of Theory, as if his Life, Liberty, or Fortune were at stake. *CRI.* No doubt all Points in Divinity are not of equal Moment. Some may be too fine spun, and others have more Stress laid on them than they deserve. Be the Subject what it will, you shall often observe that a Point by being controverted, singled out, examined, and nearly inspected, groweth considerable to the same Eye, that, perhaps, wou'd have overlooked it in a large and comprehensive View. Nor is it an uncommon thing, to behold Ignorance and Zeal united in Men, who are born with a Spirit of Party, though the Church or Religion have in Truth but small Share in it. Nothing is easier than to make a *Caricatura* (as the Painters call it) of any Profession upon Earth: But at bottom, there will be found nothing so strange in all this Charge upon the Clergy, as the Partiality of those who censure them, in supposing the common Defects of Mankind peculiar to their Order, or the Effect of religious Principles. *ALC.* Other Folks may dispute or squabble as they please, and no Body mind them; but it seems, these venerable Squabbles of the Clergy pass for Learning, and interest Mankind. To use the Words of the most ingenious Characterizer of our Times, “ A Ring is made, and  
 “ Readers gather in abundance. Every one takes  
 “ Party and encourages his own Side. This shall  
 “ be my Champion! This Man for my Money!  
 “ Well hit on our Side! Again a good Stroke!  
 “ There he was even with him! Have at him the  
 “ next

“next Bout ! Excellent Sport !\*” *CRI.* Methinks I trace the Man of Quality and Breeding in this delicate Satyr, which so politely ridicules those Arguments, Answers, Defences, and Replications which the Press groans under. *ALC.* To the infinite waste of Time and Paper, and all the while no Body is one whit the wiser. And who indeed can be the wiser for reading Books upon Subjects quite out of the way, incomprehensible, and most wretchedly written ? What Man of Sense or Breeding wou’d not abhor the Infection of prolix Pulpit Eloquence, or of that dry, formal, pedantic, stiff, and clumsy Style which smells of the Lamp and the College.

XXI. They who have the Weakness to reverence the Universities as Seats of Learning, must needs think this a strange Reproach ; but it is a very just one. For the most ingenious Men are now agreed, that they are only Nurseries of Prejudice, Corruption, Barbarism, and Pedantry. *LYS.* For my part, I find no Fault with Universities. All I know is, that I had the spending three hundred Pounds a Year in one of them, and think it the chearfullest time of my Life. As for their Books and Style I had not leisure to mind them. *CRI.* Whoever hath a mind to weed will never want work ; and he that shall pick out bad Books on every Subject will soon fill his Library. I do not know what Theological Writings *Alciphron* and his Friends may be conversant in ; but I will venture to say, one may find among our *English* Divines many Writers, who for compass of Learning, weight of Matter, Strength of Argument, and Purity of Style, are not inferiour to any in our Language. It is not my Design to apologize for the Universities : whatever is amiss in them (and what is there perfect among Men ?) I heartily wish amended. But

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\* Characteristics, Vol. III. c. 2.

Idare affirm, because I know it to be true, that any impartial Observer, although they shou'd not come up to what in Theory he might wish or imagine, will nevertheless find them much superior to those that in Fact are to be found in other Countries, and far beyond the mean Picture that is drawn of them by Minute Philosophers. It is natural for those to rail most at Places of Education, who have profited least by them. Weak and fond Parents will also readily impute to a wrong Cause, those Corruptions themselves have occasion'd, by allowing their Children more Money than they knew how to spend innocently. And too often a Gentleman who has been idle at the College, and kept idle Company, will judge of a whole University from his own Cabal. *ALC. Crito* mistakes the Point. I vouch the Authority, not of a Dunce or a Rake or absurd Parent, but of the most consummate Critic this Age has produced. This great Man characterizeth Men of the Church and Universities with the finest Touches and most masterly Pencil. What do you think he calls them? *EUPH.* What? *ALC.* Why, the black Fribe, Magicians, Formalists, Pedants, bearded Boys, and, having sufficiently derided and exploded them and their mean ungentle Learning, he sets most admirable Models of his own for good Writing: And it must be acknowledged they are the finest things in our Language; as I cou'd easily convince you, for I am never without something of that noble Writer about me. *EUPH.* He is then a noble Writer. *ALC.* I tell you he is a Nobleman. *EUPH.* But a Nobleman who writes is one thing, and a noble Writer another. *ALC.* Both Characters are coincident, as you may see.

XXII. Upon which *Alciphron* pulled a Treatise out of his Pocket, entitled a Soliloquy or Advice to an Author. Wou'd you behold, said he, looking round upon the Company, a noble Specimen of fine Writing; do but dip into this Book: which *Crito* opening read verbatim as follows \*.

\* Part 3. Sect. 2.



' *Where then are the Pleasures which Ambition promises*  
 ' *And Love affords? How's the gay World enjoy'd?*  
 ' *Or are those to be esteem'd no Pleasures*  
 ' *Which are lost by Dulness and Inaction?*  
 ' *But Indolence is the highest Pleasure.*  
 ' *To live and not to feel! To feel no Trouble.*  
 ' *What Good then? Life it self. And is*  
 ' *This properly to live? is sleeping Life?*  
 ' *Is this what I shou'd study to prolong?*  
 ' *Here the*  
 ' *Fantastic Tribe it self seems scandaliz'd.*  
 ' *A Civil War begins: The major Part*  
 ' *Of the capricious Vices do range themselves*  
 ' *On Reason's Side,*  
 ' *And declare against the languid Siren.*  
 ' *Ambition blushes at the offer'd Sweet.*  
 ' *Conceit and Vanity take superior Airs.*  
 ' *Ev'n Luxury ber self in her polite*  
 ' *And elegant Humour reproves th' Apostate*  
 ' *Sister.*  
 ' *And marks her as an Alien to true Pleasure.*  
 ' *Away thou*  
 ' *Drowsy Phantome! Haunt me no more for I*  
 ' *Have learned from better than thy Sisterhood*  
 ' *That Life and Happiness consist in Action*  
 ' *And Employment.*  
 ' *But here a busy Form sollicitus us,*  
 ' *Active, Industrious, Watchful and despising*  
 ' *Pains and Labour. She wears the serious*  
 ' *Countenance of Virtue, but with Features*  
 ' *Of Anxiety and Disquiet.*  
 ' *What is't she mutters? What looks she on with*  
 ' *Such Admiration and Astonishment?*  
 ' *Bags! Coffers! Heaps of shining Metal! What?*  
 ' *For the service of Luxury? For her?*  
 ' *These Preparations? Art thou then her Friend,*  
 ' *Grave Fancy! Is it for her thou toilest?*  
 ' *No, but for Provision against Want.*

- ‘ *But Luxury apart ! tell me now,*  
 ‘ *Hast thou not already a Competence ?*  
 ‘ *’Tis good to be secure against the Fear*  
 ‘ *Of starving. Is there then no Death but this ?*  
 ‘ *No other Passage out of Life ? Are other Doors*  
 ‘ *Secur’d if this be bar’d ? Say Avarice !*  
 ‘ *Thou emptiest of Phantoms, is it not vile*  
 ‘ *Cowardice thou serv’st ? what further have I then*  
 ‘ *To do with thee (thou doubly vile Dependent)*  
 ‘ *When once I have dismiss’d thy Patroness,*  
 ‘ *And despis’d her threats ?*  
 ‘ *Thus I contend with Fancy and Opinion.*

*Euphranor*, having heard thus far, cried out :  
 What ! will you never have done with your Poetry ?  
 another time may serve : But why shou’d we break  
 off our Conference to read a Play ? You are mistaken,  
 it is no Play nor Poetry, replied *Alciphron*, but a fa-  
 mous modern Critic moralizing in Prose. You must  
 know this great Man hath (to use his own Words) re-  
 vealed a *Grand Arcanum* to the World, having instruc-  
 ted Mankind in what he calls *Mirror-writing, Self-*  
*discoursing Practice, and Author Practice*, and shew’d  
 “ That by virtue of an intimate Recess, we may  
 “ discover a certain Duplicity of Soul, and divide our  
 “ *Self* into two Parties, or (as he varies the Phrase)  
 “ practically form the Dual Number.” In conse-  
 quence whereof, he hath found out that a Man may  
 argue with himself, and not only with himself, but  
 also with Notions, Sentiments, and Vices, which  
 by a marvellous *Prosopopœia* he converts into so ma-  
 ny Ladies, and so converted, he confutes and con-  
 founds them in a Divine Strain. Can any thing be  
 finer, bolder, or more sublime ? *EUPH.* It is very  
 wondrous. I thought indeed you had been reading a  
 Piece of a Tragedy. Is this he who despiseth our  
 Universities, and sets up for reforming the Style and  
 Taste of the Age ? *ALC.* The very same. This is  
 the admired Critic of our Times. Nothing can  
 stand

stand the Test of his correct Judgment, which is equally severe to Poets and Parsons. “ The *British* Muses (saith this great Man) lisp as in their Cradles: and their stammering Tongues, which nothing but Youth and Rawnels can excuse, have hitherto spoken in wretched Pun and Quibble. Our Dramatic *Shakespeare*, our *Fletcher*, *Johnson*, and our Epique *Milton* preserve this Style. And, according to him, even our later Authors aiming at a false Sublime, entertain our raw Fancy and unpractised Ear, which has not yet had leisure to form it self, and become truly musical.” *EUPH.* Pray what Effect may the Lessons of this great Man, in whose Eyes our learned Professors are but bearded Boys, and our most celebrated Wits but wretched Punsters, have had upon the Public? Hath he rubbed off the College Rust, cured the rudeness and rawness of our Authors, and reduced them to his own Attic Standard? Do they aspire to his true Sublime, or imitate his chaste unaffected Style? *ALC.* Doubtless the Taste of the Age is much mended: in proof whereof his Writings are universally admired. When our Author published this Treatise, he foresaw the public Taste wou’d improve apace; that Arts and Letters wou’d grow to great perfection; that there wou’d be a happy Birth of Genius: of all which things he spoke, as he saith himself, in a prophetic Style. *CRI.* And yet, notwithstanding the prophetic Predictions of this Critic, I do not find any Science that throve among us of late, so much as the Minute Philosophy. In this kind, it must be confessed, we have had many notable Productions. But whether they are such Master-pieces for good Writing, I leave to be determined by their Readers.

XXIII. In the mean time, I must beg to be excused, if I cannot believe your great Man on his bare word; when he wou’d have us think, that Ignorance and ill Taste are owing to the Christian Religion or

the Clergy, it being my sincere Opinion, that whatever Learning or Knowledge we have among us, is derived from that Order. If those, who are so sagacious at discovering a Mote in other Eyes, wou'd but purge their own, I believe they might easily see this Truth. For what but Religion cou'd kindle and preserve a Spirit towards Learning, in such a Northern rough People? *Greece* produced Men of active and subtile Genius. The public Conventions and *Æmulations* of their Cities forwarded that Genius: And their natural Curiosity was amused and excited by learned Conversations, in their public Walks and Gardens and Porticos. Our Genius leads to Amusements of a grosser kind: we breathe a grosser and a colder Air: and that Curiosity which was general in the *Athenians*, and the gratifying of which was their chief Recreation, is among our People of Fashion treated like Affectation, and as such banished from polite Assemblies and places of Resort; and without doubt wou'd in a little Time be banished the Country, if it were not for the great Reservoirs of Learning, where those Formalists, Pedants, and bearded Boys, as your profound Critic calls them, are maintained by the Liberality and Piety of our Predecessors. For it is as evident that Religion was the Cause of those Seminaries, as it is that they are the Cause or Source of all the Learning and Taste which is to be found, even in those very Men who are the declared Enemies of our Religion and public Foundations. Every one, who knows any thing, knows we are indebted for our Learning to the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues. This those severe Censors will readily grant. Perhaps they may not be so ready to grant, what all Men must see, that we are indebted for those Tongues to our Religion. What else cou'd have made foreign and dead Languages in such request among us? What cou'd have kept in being and handed them down to our times, through so many dark Ages in which the World was wasted and disfigured by Wars and Violence? What,  
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but a regard to the Holy Scriptures, and Theological Writings of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church? And in fact, do we not find that the Learning of those Times was solely in the Hands of Ecclesiastics, that they alone lighted the Lamp in succession one from another, and transmitted it down to After-ages; and that ancient Books were collected and preserved in their Colleges and Seminaries, when all Love and Remembrance of polite Arts and Studies was extinguished among the Laity, whose Ambition intirely turned to Arms?

XXIV. *ALC.* There is, I must needs say, one sort of Learning undoubtedly of Christian Original, and peculiar to the Universities; where our Youth spend several Years in acquiring that mysterious jargon of Scholasticism; than which there cou'd never have been contrived a more effectual Method, to perplex and confound Human Understanding. It is true, Gentlemen are untaught by the World what they have been taught at the College: but then their Time is doubly lost. *CRI.* But what if this scholastic Learning was not of Christian but of Mahometan Original, being derived from the *Arabs*? And what if this Grievance of Gentlemen's spending several Years in learning and unlearning this Jargon, be all Grimace and a Specimen only of the truth and candour of certain Minute Philosophers, who raise great Invectives from slight occasions, and judge too often without inquiring. Surely it wou'd be no such deplorable loss of Time, if a young Gentleman spent a few Months upon that so much despised and decried Art of Logic, a Surfeit of which is by no means the prevailing Nuisance of this Age. It is one thing to waste one's Time in learning and unlearning the barbarous Terms, wiredrawn Distinctions, and prolix Sophistry of the Schoolmen, and another to attain some exactness in Defining and Arguing: Things perhaps not altogether beneath the Dignity even of a Minute

Minute Philosopher. There was indeed a Time, when Logic was considered as its own Object : And that Art of Reasoning, instead of being transferred to Things turned altogether upon Words and Abstractions ; which produced a sort of Leprosy in all parts of Knowledge, corrupting and converting them into hollow verbal Disputations in a most impure Dialect. But those Times are passed ; and that, which had been cultivated as the principal Learning for some Ages, is now considered in another Light, and by no means makes that Figure in the Universities, or bears that Part in the Studies of young Gentlemen educated there, which is pretended by those admirable Reformers of Religion and Learning, the Minute Philosophers.

XXV. But who were they that encouraged and produced the Restoration of Arts and polite Learning ? What Share had the Minute Philosophers in this Affair ? *Matthias Corvinus* King of *Hungary*, *Alphonfus* King of *Naples*, *Cosmus de Medicis*, *Picus* of *Mirandula*, and other Princes and great Men, famous for Learning themselves, and for encouraging it in others with a munificent Liberality, were neither Turks nor Gentiles nor Minute Philosophers. Who was it that transplanted and revived the *Greek* Language and Authors, and with them all polite Arts and Literature in the West ? Was it not chiefly *Bessarion* a Cardinal, *Marcus Musurus* an Archbishop, *Theodore Gaza* a private Clergyman ? Has there been a greater and more renowned Patron, and Restorer of elegant Studies in every kind, since the days of *Augustus Caesar*, than *Leo* the tenth Pope of *Rome* ? Did any Writers approach the Purity of the *Classics* nearer than the Cardinals *Bembus* and *Sadoletus*, or than the Bishops *Jovius* and *Vida* ? not to mention an endless Number of ingenious Ecclesiastics, who flourished on the other side of the *Alpes* in the Golden Age (as the *Italians* call it) of *Leo* the Tenth, and wrote, both

both in their own Language and the *Latin*, after the best Models of Antiquity. It is true, this first Recovery of Learning preceded the Reformation, and lighted the way to it : But the Religious Controversies, which ensued, did wonderfully propagate and improve it in all Parts of Christendom. And surely, the Church of *England* is, at least, as well calculated for the Encouragement of Learning as that of *Rome*. Experience confirms this Observation ; and I believe the Minute Philosophers will not be so partial to *Rome* as to deny it, *ALC*. It is impossible your account of Learning beyond the *Alpes* shou'd be true. The noble Critic in my hands, having complimented the *French*, to whom he allows some good Authors, asserts of other Foreigners, particularly the *Italians*, “ That they may be reckoned no better “ than the Corrupters of true Learning and Erudition.” *CRI*. With some sorts of Critics, Dogmatical Censures and Conclusions are not always the result of perfect Knowledge or exact Inquiry : And if they harangue upon Taste, truth of Art, a just Piece, grace of Style, Attic Elegance and such Topics, they are to be understood only as those that would fain talk themselves into Reputation for Courage. To hear *Thrasymachus* speak of Resentment, Duels, and point of Honour, one wou'd think him ready to burst with Valour. *LRS*. Whatever Merit this Writer may have as a Demolisher, I always thought he had very little as a Builder. It is natural for careless Writers to run into Faults they never think of : But for an exact and severe Critic to shoot his Bolt at random, is unpardonable. If he, who professes at every turn an high esteem for polite Writing, shou'd yet despise those who most excel in it ; one would be tempted to suspect his Taste. But if the very Man, who of all Men talks most about Art, and Taste, and critical Skill, and wou'd be thought to have most considered those Points, shou'd often deviate from his own Rules, into  
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the false Sublime or the *mauvaise Plaisanterie* ; What reasonable Man wou'd follow the Taste and Judgment of such a Guide, or be seduced to climb the steep Ascent, or tread in the rugged Paths of Virtue on his Recommendation ?

XXVI. *ALC.* But to return, methinks *Crito* makes no Compliment to the Genius of his Country, in supposing that *Englishmen* might not have wrought out of themselves, all Art and Science and good Taste, without being beholden to Church or Universities, or ancient Languages. *CRI.* What might have been is only Conjecture. What has been, it is not difficult to know. That there is a Vein in *Britain*, of as rich an Ore as ever was in any Country, I will not deny ; but it lies deep, and will cost Pains to come at : And extraordinary Pains require an extraordinary Motive. As for what lies next the Surface, it seems but indifferent, being neither so good nor in such plenty as in some other Countries. It was the Comparison of an ingenious *Florentine*, that the celebrated Poems of *Tasso* and *Ariosto* are like two Gardens, the one of Cucumbers, the other of Melons. In the one you shall find few bad, but the best are not a very Good Fruit, in the other much the greater part are good for nothing, but those that are good are excellent. Perhaps the same Comparison may hold, between the *English* and some of their Neighbours. *ALC.* But suppose we should grant that the Christian Religion and its Seminaries might have been of use, in preserving or retrieving polite Arts and Letters ; what then ? Will you make this an Argument of its Truth ? *CRI.* I will make it an Argument of Prejudice and Ingratitude in those Minute Philosophers, who object Darknets, Ignorance, and Rudeness, as an Effect of that very thing, which above all others hath enlightened and civilized and embellished their Country : which is as truly indebted to it for Arts and Sciences (which nothing but Religion was ever known



known to have planted in such a Latitude) as for that general Sense of Virtue and Humanity, and the Belief of a Providence and future State, which all the Argumentation of Minute Philosophers hath not yet been able to abolish.

XXVII. *ALC.* It is strange you shou'd still persist to argue, as if all the Gentlemen of our Sect were Enemies to Virtue, and downright Atheists: Though I have assured you of the contrary, and that we have among us several, who profess themselves in the Interests of Virtue and Natural Religion, and have also declared, that I my self do now argue upon that Foot. *CRI.* How can you pretend, to be in the Interest of Natural Religion, and yet be professed Enemies of the Christian, the only established Religion which includes whatever is excellent in the Natural, and which is the only means of making those Precepts, Duties, and Notions, so called, become revered throughout the World? Would not he be thought weak or insincere, who shou'd go about to persuade People, that he was much in the Interests of an earthly Monarch; that he loved and admired his Government; when at the same time he shewed himself on all occasions, a most bitter Enemy of those very Persons and Methods, which above all others contributed most to his Service, and to make his Dignity known and revered, his Laws observed, or his Dominion extended? And is not this what Minute Philosophers do, while they set up for Advocates of God and Religion, and yet do all they can to discredit Christians and their Worship? It must be owned, indeed, that you argue against Christianity, as the Cause of Evil and Wickedness in the World; but with such Arguments, and in such a manner, as might equally prove the same thing of civil Government, of Meat and Drink, of every Faculty and Profession, of Learning, of Eloquence, and even of Human Reason it self. After all, even those of  
your

your Sect who allow themselves to be called Deists; if their Notions are thoroughly examined, will I fear be found to include little of Religion in them. As for the Providence of God watching over the Conduct of Human Agents, and dispensing Blessings or Chastisements, the Immortality of the Soul, a final Judgment, and future State of Rewards and Punishments; how few, if any, of your Free-thinkers have made it their Endeavour to possess Mens Minds with a serious sense of those great points of Natural Religion! How many, on the contrary, endeavour to render the Belief of them doubtful or ridiculous! *LTS.* To speak the Truth, I for my part, had never any liking to Religion of any kind, either revealed or unrevealed: And I dare venture to say the same for those Gentlemen of our Sect that I am acquainted with, having never observed them guilty of so much meanness, as even to mention the Name of God with Reverence, or speak with the least regard of Piety or any sort of Worship. There may perhaps be found one or two formal pretenders to Enthusiasm and Devotion, in the way of Natural Religion, who laughed at Christians for publishing Hymns and Meditations, while they plagued the World with as bad of their own: But the sprightly Men make a jest of all this. It seems to us meer Pedantry. Sometimes, indeed, in good Company one may hear a Word dropt in Commendation of Honour and Good-nature: but the former of these, by *Connoisseurs*, is always understood to mean nothing but Fashion, as the latter is nothing but Temper and Constitution, which guides a Man just as Appetite doth a Brute.

XXVIII. And after all these Arguments and Notions, which beget one another without end; to take the matter short, neither I nor my Friends for our Souls cou'd ever comprehend, why Man might not do very well, and govern himself without any Religion at all, as well as a Brute which is thought the sillier Creature of the two. Have Brutes Instincts,  
Senses,

Senses, Appetites, and Passions, to steer and conduct them? So have Men, and Reason over and above to consult upon occasion. From these Premises we conclude, the Road of Human Life is sufficiently lighted without Religion. *CRI.* Brutes having but small power, limited to things present or particular, are sufficiently opposed and kept in order, by the Force or Faculties of other Animals and the Skill of Man, without Conscience or Religion: But Conscience is a necessary balance to Human Reason, a Faculty of such mighty Extent and Power, especially toward Mischief. Besides, other Animals are, by the Law of their Nature, determined to one certain end or kind of Being, without Inclination or Means either to deviate or go beyond it. But Man hath in him a Will and higher Principle; by virtue whereof he may pursue different or even contrary ends, and either fall short of or exceed the Perfection natural to his Species in this World, as he is capable either, by giving up the Reins to his sensual Appetites, of degrading himself into the condition of Brutes, or else, by well ordering and improving his Mind, of being transformed into the similitude of Angels. Man alone of all Animals hath understanding to know his God. What availeth this Knowledge unless it be to ennoble Man, and raise him to an Imitation and Participation of the Divinity? Or what cou'd such Ennoblement avail if to end with this Life? Or how can these things take effect without Religion? But the points of Vice and Virtue, Man and Beast, Sense and Intellect, have been already at large canvassed. What! *Lyficles*, wou'd you have us go back where we were three or four days ago? *LIS.* By no means: I had much rather go forward, and make an end as soon as possible. But to save trouble, give me leave to tell you once for all, that, say what you can, you shall never persuade me so many ingenious agreeable Men are in the wrong, and a pack of snarling four Bigots in the right.

XXIX. *CRI.* O *Lyficles*, I neither look for Religion among Bigots, nor Reason among Libertines; each kind dilgrace their feveral Pretentions; the one owning no regard even to the plainest and moft important Truths, while the others exert an angry Zeal for points of leaft concern. And furely whatever there is of filly, narrow, and uncharitable in the Bigot, the fame is in great meafure to be imputed to the conceited Ignorance, and petulant Profaneneſs of the Libertine. And it is not at all unlikely that as Libertines make Bigots, ſo Bigots ſhou'd make Libertines, the Extreme of one party being ever obſerved to produce a contrary Extreme of another. And although, while theſe Adverſaries draw the Rope of Contention, Reason and Religion are often called upon, yet are they perhaps very little conſidered or concerned in the Conteſt. *Lyficles*, inſtead of answering *Crito*, turned ſhort upon *Alciphron*. It was always my Opinion, ſaid he, that nothing cou'd be fillier than to think of deſtroying Chriſtianity, by crying up Natural Religion. Whoever thinks highly of the one can never, with any conſiſtency, think meanly of the other; it being very evident, that Natural Religion, without Revealed, never was and never can be eſtabliſhed or received any where, but in the brains of a few idle ſpeculative Men. I was aware what your Conceſſions wou'd come to. The Belief of God, Virtue, a Future State, and ſuch fine Notions are, as every one may ſee with half an eye, the very Baſis and corner Stone of the Chriſtian Religion. Lay but this Foundation for them to build on, and you ſhall ſoon ſee what Superſtructures our Men of Divinity will raiſe from it. The Truth and Importance of theſe points once admitted, a Man need be no Conjuror to prove, upon that Principle, the Excellency and Uſefulneſs of the Chriſtian Religion: And then to be ſure, there muſt be Priests to teach and propagate this uſeful Religion. And if Priests, a regular

gular Subordination without doubt in this worthy Society, and a Provision for their Maintenance, such as may enable them to perform all their Rites and Ceremonies with Decency, and keep their sacred Character above Contempt. And the plain consequence of all this is a Confederacy between the Prince and the Priesthood to subdue the People : So we have let in at once upon us, a long train of Ecclesiastical Evils, Priestcraft, Hierarchy, Inquisition. We have lost our Liberty and Property, and put the Nation to vast Expence, only to purchase Bridles and Saddles for their own backs.

XXX. This being spoke with some Sharpness of Tone, and an upbraiding Air, touched *Alciphron* to the quick, who replied nothing, but shew'd Confusion in his Looks. *Crito* smiling look'd at *Euphranor* and me, then, casting an eye on the two Philosophers, spoke as follows : If I may be admitted to interpose good Offices, for preventing a Rupture between old Friends and Brethren in Opinion, I wou'd observe, that in this Charge of *Lyficles* there is something right and something wrong. It seems right to assert as he doth, that the real Belief of Natural Religion will lead a Man to approve of Revealed : But it is as wrong to assert, that Inquisitions, Tyranny, and Ruin must follow from thence. Your Free-Thinkers, without Offence be it said, seem to mistake their Talent. They imagine strongly, but reason weakly ; mighty at Exaggeration, and jejune in Argument ! Can no Method be found, to relieve them from the Terror of that fierce and bloody Animal an *English* Parson ? Will it not suffice to pair his Talons without chopping off his Fingers ? Then they are such wonderful Patriots for Liberty and Property ! When I hear these two Words in the mouth of a Minute Philosopher, I am put in mind of the *Teste di Ferro* at *Rome*. His Holiness, it seems, not having Power to assign Pensions on *Spanish* Benefices to any but Na-

P

tives

tives of *Spain*, always keeps at *Rome* two *Spaniards*, called *Teste di Ferro*, who have the Name of all such Pensions but not the Profit, which goes to *Italians*. As we may see every day, both Things and Notions placed to the account of Liberty and Property, which in reality neither have nor are meant to have any share in them. What! Is it impossible for a Man to be a Christian, but he must be a Slave; or a Clergyman, but he must have the Principles of an Inquilitor? I am far from screening and justifying Appetite of Domination or Tyrannical Power in Ecclesiastics. Some, who have been guilty in that respect, have sorely paid for it, and it is to be hoped they always will. But having laid the Fury and Folly of the ambitious Prelate, is it not time to look about and spy whether, on the other hand, some Evil may not possibly accrue to the State, from the overflowing Zeal of an Independent Whig? This I may affirm, without being at any pains to prove it, that the worst Tyranny this Nation ever felt was from the Hands of Patriots of that Stamp.

XXXI. *LVS.* I don't know. Tyranny is a harsh Word, and sometimes misapplied. When spirited Men of independent Maxims create a Ferment or make a Change in the State: He that loseth is apt to consider things in one light, and he that wins in another. In the mean time this is certainly good Policy, that we shou'd be frugal of our Money, and reserve it for better Uses, than to expend on the Church and Religion. *CRV.* Surely the old Apologue of the Belly and Members need not be repeated to such knowing Men. It shou'd seem as needless to observe, that all other States, which ever made any Figure in the World for Wisdom and Politeness, have thought Learning deserved Encouragement as well as the Sword; that Grants for religious Uses were as fitting as for Knights Service; and Foundations for propagating Piety, as necessary to the publick Welfare and Defence,

Defence, as either Civil or Military Establishments. But I ask who are at this Expence, and what is this Expence so much complained of? *LYS.* As if you had never heard of Church Lands and Tithes. *CR I.* But I wou'd fain know, how they can be charged as an Expence, either upon the Nation or private Men. Where nothing is exported the Nation loseth nothing: and it is all one to the Public, whether Money circulates at Home through the Hands of a Vicar or a Squire. Then as for private Men, who, for want of Thought, are full of Complaint about the payment of Tithes; can any Man justly complain of it as a Tax, that he pays what never belonged to him? The Tenant rents his Farm with this Condition, and pays his Landlord proportionably less, than if his Farm had been exempt from it: So he loseth nothing; it being all one to him, whether he pays his Pastor or his Landlord. The Landlord cannot complain that he has not what he hath no Right to, either by Grant, Purchase, or Inheritance. This is the Case of Tithes; and as for the Church Lands, he surely can be no Free-thinker, nor any Thinker at all, who doth not see that no Man whether Noble, Gentle, or Plebeian, hath any sort of Right or Claim to them, which he may not with equal Justice pretend to all the Lands in the Kingdom. *LYS.* At present indeed we have no Right, and that is our Complaint. *CR I.* You wou'd have then what you have no Right to. *LYS.* Not so neither: what we wou'd have is first a Right convey'd by Law, and in the next place, the Lands by virtue of such Right. *CR I.* In order to this, it might be expedient in the first place, to get an Act passed for excommunicating from all civil Rights every Man, that is a Christian, a Scholar, and wears a black Coat, as guilty of three capital Offences against the public Weal of this Realm. *LYS.* To deal frankly, I think it wou'd be an excellent good Act. It wou'd provide at once for several deserving Men, rare Artificers in Wit and Argument and Ridicule, who have, too ma-

ny of them, but small Fortunes with a great Arrear of Merit towards their Country, which they have so long enlightened and adorned *gratis*. *EUPH.* Pray tell me, *Lyficles*, are not the Clergy legally possessed of their Lands and Emoluments? *LYS.* No Body denies it. *EUPH.* Have they not been possessed of them from Time immemorial? *LYS.* This too I grant. *EUPH.* They claim then by Law and ancient Prescription. *LYS.* They do. *EUPH.* Have the oldest Families of the Nobility a better Title? *LYS.* I believe not. It grieves me to see so many overgrown Estates in the hands of ancient Families, on account of no other Merit, but what they brought with them into the World. *EUPH.* May you not then as well take their Lands too, and bestow them on the Minute Philosophers, as Persons of more Merit? *LYS.* So much the better. This enlarges our View, and opens a new Scène: It is very delightful in the Contemplation of Truth, to behold how one Theory grows out of another. *ALC.* Old *Pætus* used to say, that if the Clergy were deprived of their Hire, we shou'd lose the most popular Argument against them. *LYS.* But so long as Men live by Religion, there will never be wanting Teachers and Writers in Defence of it. *CRI.* And how can you be sure they wou'd be wanting though they did not live by it; since it is well known Christianity had its Defenders even when Men died by it? *LYS.* One thing I know, there is a rare Nursery of young Plants growing up, who have been carefully guarded against every Air of Prejudice, and sprinkled with the Dew of our choicest Principles; mean while, Wishes are wearisome, and to our infinite Regret nothing can be done, so long as there remains any Prejudice in favour of old Customs and Laws and national Constitutions, which, at bottom, we very well know and can demonstrate to be only Words and Notions.

XXXII. But, I can never hope, *Crito*, to make you think my Schemes reasonable. We reason each right upon



upon his own Principles, and shall never agree till we quit our Principles, which cannot be done by reasoning. We all talk of Just and Right and Wrong, and public Good, and all those things. The Names may be the same, but the Notions and Conclusions very different, perhaps diametrically opposite ; and yet each may admit of clear Proofs, and be inferred by the same way of reasoning. For instance, the Gentlemen of the Club which I frequent, define Man to be a sociable Animal : Consequently, we exclude from this Definition all those Human Creatures, of whom it may be said, we had rather have their Room than their Company. And such, though wearing the Shape of Man, are to be esteem'd in all account of Reason, not as Men, but only as Human Creatures. Hence it plainly follows, that Men of Pleasure, Men of Humour, and Men of Wit, are alone properly and truly to be considered as Men. Whatever therefore conduceth to the Emolument of such, is for the good of Mankind, and consequently very just and lawful, although seeming to be attended with Loss or Damage to other Creatures : inasmuch as no real injury can be done in life or property to those, who know not how to enjoy them. This we hold for clear and well connected Reasoning. But others may view things in another light, assign different Definitions, draw other Inferences, and perhaps consider, what we suppose the very Top and Flower of the Creation, only as a wart or excrescence of Human Nature. From all which there must ensue a very different System of Morals, Politics, Rights, and Notions. C R I. If you have a mind to argue, we will argue, if you have more mind to jest, we will laugh with you. LRS.

— *Ridentem dicere verum*

*Quid vetat ?*

This Partition of our kind into Men and Human Creatures, puts me in mind of another Notion, broached by one of our Club, whom we used to call the *Pythagorean*.

XXXIII. He made a threefold Partition of the Human Species, into Birds, Beasts, and Fishes, being of Opinion that the Road of Life lies upwards, in a perpetual Ascent through the Scale of Being: In such sort, that the Souls of Insects after death make their second Appearance, in the Shape of perfect Animals, Birds, Beasts, or Fishes; which upon their death are preferred into Human Bodies, and in the next Stage into beings of a higher and more perfect kind. This Man we considered at first as a sort of Heretic, because his Scheme seemed not to consist with our fundamental Tenet, the Mortality of the Soul: But he justified the Notion to be innocent, inasmuch as it included nothing of Reward or Punishment, and was not proved by any Argument, which supposed or implied either incorporeal Spirit or Providence, being only inferred, by way of Analogy, from what he had observed in Human Affairs, the Court, the Church, and the Army; wherein the Tendency is always upwards from lower Posts to higher. According to this System, the Fishes are those Men who swim in pleasure, such as *petits maitres*, *bons vivans*, and honest Fellows. The beasts are dry, drudging, covetous, rapacious Folk, and all those addicted to care and business like Oxen, and other dry land Animals, which spend their lives in labour and fatigue. The Birds are airy notional Men, Enthusiasts, Projectors, Philosophers, and such like: in each Species every Individual retaining a Tincture of his former State, which constitutes what is called Genius. If you ask me which Species of Human Creatures I like best, I answer, The flying Fish; that is, a Man of animal Enjoyment with a mixture of Whim. Thus you see we have our Creeds and our Systems, as well as graver Folks; with this Difference, that they are not strait-laced but sit easy, to be slipped off or on, as humour or occasion serves. And now I can, with the greatest æquani-

æquanimity imaginable, hear my Opinions argued against, or confuted.

XXXIV. *ALC.* It were to be wished, all Men were of that mind. But you shall find a sort of Men, whom I need not name, that cannot bear with the least temper, to have their Opinions examined or their Faults censured. They are against Reason, because Reason is against them. For our parts we are all for Liberty of Conscience. If our Tenets are absurd, we allow them to be freely argued and inspected; and by parity of Reason we might hope to be allowed the same Privilege, with respect to the Opinions of other Men.

*CRI.* O *Alciphron*, Wares that will not bear the light are justly to be suspected. Whatever therefore moves you to make this Complaint, take my Word I never will: But as hitherto I have allowed your Reason its full scope, so for the future I always shall. And though I cannot approve of railing or declaiming, not even in my self, whenever you have shewed me the way to it: Yet this I will answer for, that you shall ever be allowed to reason as closely and as strenuously as you can. But for the love of Truth, be candid, and do not spend your Strength and our Time, in points of no significancy, or foreign to the purpose, or agreed between us. We allow that Tyranny and Slavery are bad things: but why shou'd we apprehend them from the Clergy at this time? Rites and Ceremonies we own are not Points of chief moment in Religion: but why shou'd we ridicule things in their own Nature, at least Innocent, and which bear the Stamp of supreme Authority? That Men in Divinity, as well as other Subjects, are perplexed with useless Disputes, and are like to be as so long as the World lasts I freely acknowledge: But why must all the Human Weakness and Mistakes of Clergymen be imputed to wicked Designs? Why indiscriminately abuse their Character and Tenets? Is this like Candour,

dour, love of Truth, and Free-thinking? It is granted there may be found, now and then, spleen and ill-breeding in the Clergy: But are not the same Faults incident to *English* Laymen, of a retired Education and Country Life? I grant there is infinite Futility in the Schoolmen: but I deny that a Volume of that doth so much Mischief, as a Page of Minute Philosophy. That weak or wicked Men shou'd, by favour of the World, creep into Power and high Stations in the Church, is nothing wonderful: and that in such Stations they shou'd behave like themselves, is natural to suppose. But all the while it is evident, that not the Gospel but the World, not the Spirit but the Flesh, not God but the Devil, puts them upon their unworthy Atchievements. We make no difficulty to grant, that nothing is more infamous than Vice and Ignorance in a Clergyman; nothing more base than a Hypocrite, more frivolous than a Pedant, more cruel than an Inquisitor. But it must be also granted by you, Gentlemen, that nothing is more ridiculous and absurd, than for pedantic, ignorant, and corrupt Men to cast the first Stone, at every shadow of their own Defects and Vices in other Men.

XXXV. *ALC.* When I consider the detestable State of Slavery and Superstition, I feel my Heart dilate and expand it self to grasp that inestimable blessing of Liberty, absolute Liberty in its utmost unlimited Extent. This is the sacred and high Prerogative, the very life and health of our *English* Constitution. You must not therefore think it strange, if with a vigilant and curious Eye, we guard it against the minutest Appearance of Evil. You must even suffer us to cut round about, and very deep, and make use of the magnifying Glass, the better to view and extirpate every the least speck, which shall discover it self in what we are careful and jealous to preserve, as the Apple of our Eye. *CR I.* As for unbounded Liberty I leave it to Savages, among whom  
alone

alone I believe it is to be found: But, for the reasonable legal Liberty of our Constitution, I most heartily and sincerely wish it may for ever subsist and flourish among us. You and all other *Englishmen* cannot be too vigilant, or too earnest, to preserve this goodly frame, or to curb and disappoint the wicked Ambition of whoever, Laymen or Ecclesiastic, shall attempt to change our free and gentle Government into a slavish or severe one. But what Pretext can this afford for your Attempts against Religion, or indeed how can it be consistent with them? Is not the Protestant Religion a main part of our Legal Constitution? I remember to have heard a Foreigner remark, that we of this Island were very good Protestants, but no Christians. But whatever Minute Philosophers may wish, or Foreigners say, it is certain our Laws speak a different Language. *ALC.* This puts me in mind of the wise reasoning of a certain sage Magistrate, who, being pressed by the Raillery and Arguments of an ingenious Man, had nothing to say for his Religion but that, ten Millions of People inhabiting the same Island might, whether right or wrong, if they thought good, establish Laws for the worshipping of God in their Temples, and appealing to him in their Courts of Justice. And that in case ten thousand ingenious Men shou'd publickly deride and trample on those Laws, it might be just and lawful for the said ten Millions, to expel the said ten thousand ingenious Men out of their said Island. *EUPH.* And pray, what answer wou'd you make to this remark of the sage Magistrate? *ALC.* The answer is plain. By the Law of Nature, which is superior to all positive Institutions, Wit and Knowledge have a right to command Folly and Ignorance. I say, ingenious Men have by natural Right a Dominion over Fools. *EUPH.* What Dominion over the Laws and People of *Great Britain*, Minute Philosophers may be entitled to by Nature, I shall not dispute, but leave to be considered by the Public. *ALC.* This Doctrine, it  
must

must be owned, was never thoroughly understood before our own times. In the last age *Hobbes* and his Followers, though otherwise very great Men, declared for the Religion of the Magistrate, probably because they were afraid of the Magistrate; but times are changed, and the Magistrates may now be afraid of us. *CRI*. I allow the Magistrate may well be afraid of you in one sense, I mean, afraid to trust you. This brings to my Thoughts a Passage on the trial of *Leander* for a capital Offence: That Gentleman having picked out and excluded from his Jury, by peremptory exception, all but some Men of Fashion and Pleasure, humbly moved when *Dorcon* was going to kiss the Book, that he might be required to declare upon Honour, whether he believed either God or or Gospel. *Dorcon*, rather than hazard his Reputation as a Man of Honour and Free-thinker, openly avowed, that he believed in neither. Upon which the Court declared him unfit to serve on a Jury. By the same reason, so many were set aside, as made it necessary to put off the Trial. We are very easy, replied *Alciphron*, about being trusted to serve on Juries, if we can be admitted to serve in lucrative Employments. *CRI*. But what if the Government shou'd injoin, that every one, before he was sworn into Office, shou'd make the same Declaration which *Dorcon* was required to make? *ALC*. God forbid! I hope there is no such Design on foot. *CRI*. Whatever Designs may be on foot, thus much is certain: The Christian Reformed Religion is a principal Part and Corner-stone of our free Constitution; and I verily think, the only thing that makes us deserving of Freedom, or capable of enjoying it. Freedom is either a Blessing or a Curse as Men Use it. And to me it seems, that if our Religion were once destroy'd from among us, and those Notions, which pass for Prejudices of a Christian Education, erased from the minds of *Britons*, the best thing that cou'd befall us wou'd be the loss of our Freedom. Surely a People wherein

wherein there is such restless Ambition, such high Spirits, such Animosity of Faction, so great Interests in Contest, such unbounded Licence of Speech and Press, amidst so much Wealth and Luxury, nothing but those *veteres avie*, which you pretend to extirpate, cou'd have hitherto kept from ruin.

XXXVI. Under the Christian Religion this Nation hath been greatly improved. From a sort of Savages, we have grown civil, polite, and learned : we have made a decent and noble Figure both at home and abroad. And, as our Religion decreaseth, I am afraid we shall be found to have declined. Why then shou'd we persist in the dangerous Experiment? *ALC.* One wou'd think, *Crito*, you had forgot the many Calamities occasioned by Church-men and Religion. *CRI.* And one wou'd think, you had forgot what was answered this very day to that Objection. But, not to repeat eternally the same things, I shall observe in the first place, That if we reflect on the past State of Christendom, and of our Country in particular, with our Feuds and Factions subsisting while we were all of the same Religion, for instance, that of the White and Red Roses, so violent and bloody and of such long continuance ; we can have no assurance that those ill humours, which have since shewn themselves under the masque of Religion, wou'd not have broke out with some other Pretext, if this had been wanting. I observe in the second place, that it will not follow from any Observations you can make on our History, that the Evils, accidentally occasioned by Religion, bear any proportion either to the good Effects it hath really produced, or the Evils it hath prevented. Lastly, I observe, that the best things may by accident be the occasion of Evil ; which accidental Effect is not, to speak properly and truly, produced by the good thing it self, but by some evil thing, which, being neither Part, Property, nor Effect of it, happens to be joined with it. But I shou'd be ashamed

to insist and enlarge on so plain a Point, and shall only add that, whatever Evils this Nation might have formerly sustained from Superstition, no Man of common sense will say, the Evils felt or apprehended at present are from that Quarter. Priestcraft is not the reigning Distemper at this Day. And surely it will be owned, that a wise Man, who takes upon him to be vigilant for the public Weal, shou'd touch proper things at proper times, and not prescribe for a Surfeit when the Distemper is a Consumption. *ALC.* I think we have sufficiently discussed the Subject of this day's Conference. And now, let *Lyficles* take it as he will, I must in regard to my own Character, as a fair impartial Adversary, acknowledge there is something in what *Crito* hath said upon the Usefulness of the Christian Religion. I will even own to you that some of our Sect are for allowing it a Toleration. I remember, at a meeting of several ingenious Men, after much debate we came successively to divers Resolutions. The first was, that no Religion ought to be tolerated in the State: But this on more mature thought was judged impracticable. The second was that all Religions shou'd be tolerated, but none countenanced except Atheism: But it was apprehended, that this might breed Contentions among the lower sort of People. We came therefore to conclude in the third place, that some Religion or other shou'd be established for the use of the Vulgar. And after a long Dispute what this Religion shou'd be, *Lyfis* a brisk young Man, perceiving no signs of Agreement, proposed that the present Religion might be tolerated, till a better was found. But allowing it to be expedient, I can never think it true, so long as there lie unanswerable Objections against it, which if you please, I shall take the Liberty to propose at our next meeting. To which we all agreed.


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*ALCIPHRON:*  
OR, THE  
MINUTE PHILOSOPHER.  
IN  
SEVEN DIALOGUES.

*Containing an APOLOGY for the Christian Religion,  
against those who are called Free-thinkers.*

VOLUME *the* SECOND.




*The Balances of Deceit are in his Hand. Hosea xii. 7.*

*Τὸ Ἐξαπατᾷ αὐτὸν ὑφ' αὐτῆς, πάντων χαλεπώτατον. Plato.*

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
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THE



# THE MINUTE PHILOSOPHER.

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I.



THE following day being Sunday, our Philosophers lay long in bed, while the rest of us went to Church in the Neighbouring Town, where we dined at *Euphranor's*, and after evening Service returned to the two Philosophers, whom we found in the Library. They told us, That, if there was a God, he was present every where, as well as at Church; and that if we had been serving him one way, they did not neglect to do as much another; inasmuch as a free exercise of Reason must be allowed the most acceptable service and Worship, that a rational creature can offer to its Creator. However, said *Alciphron*, if you, Gentlemen, can but solve the difficulties which I shall propose to-morrow morning, I promise to go to Church next Sunday. After some general conversation of this kind, we sat down to a light Supper, and the next morning assembled at the same place as the day before, where being all seated, I observed, that the foregoing Week our Conferences had been carried on for a longer time, and with less interruption than I had ever known, or well cou'd be, in town, where Mens hours are so broken by visits, business, and amusements, that whoever is content to form his notions from conversation only, must needs have them  
very



very shatter'd and imperfect. And what have we got, replied *Alciphron*, by all these continued Conferences? For my part, I think my self just where I was, with respect to the main point that divides us, the Truth of the Christian Religion. I answered, That so many points had been examined, discussed, and agreed between him and his adversaries, that I hoped to see them come to an intire agreement in the end. For in the first place, said I, the principles and opinions of those who are called Free-thinkers, or Minute Philosophers, have been pretty clearly explained. It hath been also agreed, that Vice is not of that benefit to the Nation, which some Men imagine: That Virtue is highly useful to Mankind: But that the beauty of Virtue is not alone sufficient to engage them in the practice of it: That therefore the belief of a God and Providence ought to be encouraged in the State, and tolerated in good Company, as a useful notion. Further, it hath been proved that there is a God: That it is reasonable to worship him: And that the Worship, Faith, and Principles prescribed by the Christian Religion have a useful tendency. Admit, replied *Alciphron*, addressing himself to *Crito*, all that *Dion* saith to be true: Yet this doth not hinder my being just where I was, with respect to the main point. Since there is nothing in all this that proves the Truth of the Christian Religion: Though each of those particulars enumerated may, perhaps, prejudice in its favour. I am therefore to suspect my self at present for a prejudiced person; prejudiced, I say, in favour of Christianity. This, as I am a lover of Truth, puts me upon my guard against deception. I must therefore look sharp, and well consider every step I take.

II. *CRI.* You may remember, *Alciphron*, you proposed for the subject of our present conference the consideration of certain Difficulties and Objections, which you had to offer against the Christian Religion. We are now ready to hear and consider whatever you shall think fit to produce of that kind. Atheism, and a wrong notion of Christianity, as of something hurtful to Mankind, are great Prejudices; the removal of which may dispose a Man to argue with candor and submit to reasonable proof: But the removing Prejudices against an opinion, is not to be reckoned prejudicing in its favour. It may be hoped therefore, that you will be able to do justice to your cause, without being fond of it. *ALC.* O *Crito*! that Man may thank his stars to whom Nature hath given a sublime Soul, who can raise himself above popular opinions, and, looking down on the herd of Mankind, behold them scattered over the surface of the whole earth, divided and subdivided into numberless Nations and Tribes, differing in Notions and Tenets, as in Language, Manners, and Dress. The Man who takes a general view of the World and its Inhabitants, from this lofty stand, above the reach of Prejudice, seems to breathe a purer air, and to see by a clearer light: But how to impart this clear and extensive view to those who are wandering beneath in the narrow dark paths of Error! This indeed is a hard task; but, hard as it is, I shall try if by any means,

*Clara tuæ possim præpandere lumina menti.*

Lucret.

Know then, that all the various Casts or Sects of the sons of Men have each their Faith, and their religious

religious System, germinating and sprouting forth from that common grain of Enthusiasm, which is an original ingredient in the composition of Humane Nature, they shall each tell of intercourse with the invisible World, Revelations from Heaven, divine Oracles, and the like. All which pretensions, when I regard with an impartial eye, it is impossible I shou'd assent to all, and I find within my self something that withholds me from assenting to any of them. For although I may be willing to follow, so far as common Sense, and the light of Nature lead; yet the same reason that bids me yield to rational proof, forbids me to admit opinions without proof. This holds in general against all Revelations whatsoever. And be this my first Objection against the Christian in particular. *CRI.* As this Objection supposes there is no proof or reason for believing the Christian, if good reason can be assigned for such belief, it comes to nothing. Now I presume you will grant, the authority of the reporter is a true and proper reason for believing reports: And the better this authority, the juster claim it hath to our assent: But the authority of God is on all accounts the best: Whatever therefore comes from God, it is most reasonable to believe.

III. *ALC.* This I grant, but then it must be proved to come from God. *CRI.* And are not Miracles, and the accomplishments of Prophecies, joined with the excellency of its Doctrine, a sufficient proof that the Christian Religion came from God? *ALC.* Miracles, indeed, wou'd prove something: But what proof have we of these Miracles? *CRI.* Proof of the same kind that we have or can have of any facts done a great way off, and a long time ago. We have authentic accounts transmitted down to us from eye-witnesses, whom we can-

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not conceive tempted to impose upon us by any humane Motive whatsoever; inasmuch as they acted therein contrary to their Interests, their Prejudices, and the very Principles in which they had been nursed and educated. These accounts were confirmed by the unparallel'd subversion of the City of *Jerusalem*, and the dispersion of the *Jewish* Nation, which is a standing testimony to the Truth of the Gospel, particularly of the Predictions of our blessed Saviour. These accounts, within less than a Century, were spread throughout the World, and believed by great numbers of People. These same accounts were committed to writing, translated into several languages, and handed down with the same respect and consent of Christians in the most distant Churches. Do you not see, said *Alciphron*, staring full at *Crito*, that all this hangs by Tradition? And Tradition, take my word for it, gives but a weak hold: It is a chain, whereof the first links may be stronger than steel, and yet the last weak as wax, and brittle as glass. Imagine a picture copied successively by an hundred Painters, one from another; how like must the last copy be to the original! How lively and distinct will an image be, after an hundred reflections between two parallel Mirrours! Thus like, and thus lively do I think a faint vanishing Tradition, at the end of sixteen or seventeen hundred years. Some Men have a false heart, others a wrong head; and where both are true, the memory may be treacherous. Hence there is still something added, something omitted, and something varied from the Truth: And the sum of many such additions, deductions, and alterations, accumulated for several ages, do, at the foot of the account, make quite another thing. *CRI.* Ancient facts we may know by Tradition, oral or written: And this latter we may divide into two kinds, private and public, as

Writings

Writings are kept in the hands of particular Men, or recorded in public Archives. Now all these three sorts of Tradition, for ought I can see, concur to attest the genuine antiquity of the Gospels. And they are strengthened by collateral evidence from Rites instituted, Festivals observed, and Monuments erected by ancient Christians, such as Churches, Baptisteries, and Sepulchres. Now allowing your objection holds against oral Tradition, singly taken, yet I can think it no such difficult thing to transcribe faithfully. And things once committed to writing, are secure from slips of memory, and may with common care be preserved intire so long as the Manuscript lasts: And this, experience shews may be above a thousand years. The *Alexandrine* Manuscript is allowed to be above twelve hundred years old; and it is highly probable there were then extant copies four hundred years old. A Tradition therefore of above sixteen hundred years, need have only two or three links in its chain. And these links, notwithstanding that great length of time, may be very sound and intire. Since no reasonable Man will deny, that an ancient Manuscript may be of much the same credit now, as when it was first written. We have it on good authority, and it seems probable, that the primitive Christians were careful to transcribe copies of the Gospels and Epistles for their private use, and that other copies were preserved as public records, in the several Churches throughout the World, and that portions thereof were constantly read in their assemblies. Can more be said to prove the writings of Classic Authors, or ancient Records of any kind authentic? *Alciphron*, addressing his discourse to *Euphranor*, said, It is one thing to silence an adversary, and another to convince him. What do you think, *Euphranor*? *EUPH.* Doubtless it is. *ALC.*

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But what I want, is to be convinced. *EUPH.* That point is not so clear. *ALC.* But if a Man had ever so much mind, he cannot be convinced by probable arguments against Demonstration. *EUPH.* I grant he cannot.

IV. *ALC.* Now it is as evident as demonstration can make it, that no divine Faith can possibly be built upon Tradition. Suppose an honest credulous Countryman catechised and lectured every Sunday by his Parish-Priest: It is plain he believes in the Parson, and not in God. He knows nothing of Revelations, and Doctrines, and Miracles, but what the Priest tells him. This he believes, and this Faith is purely humane. If you say he has the Liturgy and the Bible for the foundation of his Faith, the difficulty still recurs. For as to the Liturgy, he pins his faith upon the civil Magistrate, as well as the Ecclesiastic: neither of which can pretend divine Inspiration. Then for the Bible, he takes both that and his Prayer-Book on trust from the Printer, who, he believes, made true Editions from true Copies. You see then faith, but what faith? Faith in the Priest, in the Magistrate, in the Printer, Editor, Transcriber, none of which can with any pretence be called Divine. I had the hint from *Cratylus*; it is a shaft out of his quiver, and believe me, a keen one. *EUPH.* Let me take and make trial of this same shaft in my hands. Suppose then your Countryman hears a Magistrate declare the Law from the Bench, or suppose he reads it in a Statute Book. What think you, is the Printer or the Justice the true and proper object of his Faith and Submission? Or do you acknowledge a higher authority whereon to found those loyal acts, and in which they do really terminate? Again suppose you read a passage in *Tacitus* that you believe true; would you say you assented to it on the authority of the  
Printer

Printer or Transcriber rather than the Historian?

*ALC.* Perhaps I wou'd, and perhaps I wou'd not. I do not think my self obliged to answer these points. What is this but transferring the question from one subject to another? That which we considered was neither Law nor prophane History, but religious Tradition, and Divine Faith. I see plainly what you aim at, but shall never take for an answer to one difficulty, the starting of another. *CR I.* O *Alciphron*, there is no taking hold of you who expect that others shou'd (as you were pleased to express it) hold fair and stand firm, while you plucked out their prejudices: How shall he argue with you but from your concessions, and how can he know what you grant except you will be pleased to tell him? *EUPH.* But to save you the trouble, for once I will suppose an answer. My question admits but of two answers; take your Choice. From the one it will follow, that by a parity of reason we can easily conceive, how a Man may have Divine Faith, though he never felt Inspiration or saw a Miracle: inasmuch as it is equally possible for the mind, through whatever conduit, oral or scriptural, divine Revelation be derived, to carry its thought and submission up to the source and terminate its faith, not in Humane but Divine authority: not in the instrument or vessel of conveyance, but in the great origine it self as its proper and true object. From the other answer it will follow, that you introduce a general scepticism into Humane Knowledge, and break down the hinges on which civil Government, and all the affairs of the World turn and depend: in a word that you wou'd destroy Humane Faith to get rid of Divine. And how this agrees with your professing that you want to be convinced I leave you to consider.

V. *ALC.* I shou'd in earnest be glad to be convinced one way or other, and come to some conclusion.

clusion. But I have so many objections in store, you are not to count much upon getting over one. Depend on it you shall find me behave like a Gentleman and lover of Truth. I will propose my objections briefly and plainly, and accept of reasonable answers as fast as you can give them. Come, *Euphranor*, make the most of your Tradition; you can never make that a constant and universal one, which is acknowledged to have been unknown, or at best disputed in the Church for several Ages: And this is the Case of the Canon of the new Testament. For though we have now a Canon as they call it settled; yet every one must see and own that Tradition cannot grow stronger by Age; and that what was uncertain in the primitive times cannot be undoubted in the subsequent. What say you to this, *Euphranor*? *EUPH.* I shou'd be glad to conceive your meaning clearly before I return an answer. It seems to me this objection of yours supposeth, that where a Tradition hath been constant and undisputed, such Tradition may be admitted as a proof, but that where the Tradition is defective, the proof must be so too. Is this your meaning? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* Consequently the Gospels and Epistles of *St. Paul*, which were universally received in the beginning, and never since doubted of by the Church, must, notwithstanding this objection, be in reason admitted for genuine. And if these Books contain, as they really do, all those points that come into controversy between you and me; what need I dispute with you about the authority of some other Books of the new Testament, which came later to be generally known and received in the Church? If a Man assents to the undisputed Books he is no longer an Infidel; though he shou'd not hold the Revelations, or the Epistle of *S. James* or *Jude*, or the latter of *S. Peter*, or the two last of *S. John* to be Canonical.

The



The additional authority of these portions of Holy Scripture may have its weight, in particular controversies between Christians, but can add nothing to arguments against an Infidel as such. Wherefore though I believe good reasons may be assigned for receiving these Books, yet these reasons seem now beside our purpose. When you are a Christian it will be then time enough to argue this point. And you will be the nearer being so, if the way be shorten'd by omitting it for the present. *ALC.* Not so near neither as you perhaps imagine: For, notwithstanding all the fair and plausible things you may say about Tradition, when I consider the Spirit of Forgery which reigned in the primitive times, and reflect on the several Gospels, Acts, and Epistles attributed to the Apostles, which yet are acknowledged to be spurious, I confess, I cannot help suspecting the whole. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, do you suspect all *Plato's* Writings for spurious, because the Dialogue upon Death, for instance, is allowed to be so? Or will you admit none of *Tully's* Writings to be genuine, because *Sigonius* imposed a Book of his own writing for *Tully's* Treatise *de Consolatione*, and the imposture passed for some time on the World? *ALC.* Suppose I admit for the Works of *Tully* and *Plato* those that commonly pass for such. What then? *EUPH.* Why then I wou'd fain know, whether it be equal and impartial in a Free-thinker, to measure the credibility of profane and sacred Books by a different rule. Let us know upon what foot we Christians are to argue with Minute Philosophers; whether we may be allowed the benefit of common maxims in Logic and Criticism? If we may, be pleased to assign a reason why supposititious Writings, which in the style and manner and matter bear visible marks of imposture, and have accordingly been rejected by the Church, can be  
made

made an argument against those which have been universally received, and handed down by an unanimous constant Tradition. There have been in all Ages and in all great Societies of Men, many capricious, vain or wicked Impostors, who for different ends have abused the World by spurious Writings, and created work for Critics both in profane and sacred Learning. And it would seem as silly to reject the true Writings of profane Authors for the sake of the spurious, as it would seem unreasonable to suppose, that among the Hereticks and several Sects of Christians, there should be none capable of the like Imposture.

VI. *ALC.* But, be the Tradition ever so well attested, and the Books ever so genuine, yet I cannot suppose them wrote by persons divinely inspired, so long as I see in them certain Characters inconsistent with such a supposition. Surely the purest language, the most perfect style, the exactest method, and in a word all the excellencies of good writing, might be expected in a piece composed or dictated by the Spirit of God: But Books, wherein we find the reverse of all this, it were impious, not, to reject, but, to attribute to the Divinity. *EUPH.* Say, *Alciphron*, are the Lakes, the Rivers, or the Ocean bounded by straight Lines? Are the Hills and Mountains exact Cones or Pyramids? or the Stars cast into regular figures? *ALC.* They are not. *EUPH.* But in the works of Insects, we may observe figures as exact as if they were drawn by the rule and compass. *ALC.* We may. *EUPH.* Should it not seem therefore that a regular exactness, or scrupulous attention to what Men call the rules of art, is not observed in the great productions of the Author of Nature? *ALC.* It should. *EUPH.* And when a great Prince declareth his Will in Laws and Edicts to his

his Subjects, is he careful about a pure style or elegant composition? Does he not leave his Secretaries and Clerks to express his sense in their own words? Is not the phrase on such occasions thought proper if it conveys as much as was intended? And wou'd not the divine strain of certain modern Critics be judged affected and improper for such uses?

*ALC.* It must be owned, Laws and Edicts and Grants, for Solœcism and Tautology, are very offensive to the harmonious ears of a fine Writer.

*EUPH.* Why then shou'd we expect in the Oracles of God an exactness, that wou'd be misbecoming and beneath the dignity of an earthly Monarch, and which bears no proportion or resemblance to the magnificent works of the Creation? *ALC.*

But granting that a nice regard to particles and critical rules is a thing too little and mean to be expected in Divine Revelations; and that there is more force and spirit and true greatness in a negligent, unequal style, than in the well-turned periods of a polite writer; Yet what is all this to the bald and flat compositions of those you call the Divine Penmen? I can never be persuaded, the supreme Being wou'd pick out the poorest and meanest of scriblers for his Secretaries. *EUPH.* O *Alciphron*, if I durst follow my own judgment, I shou'd be apt to think there are noble beauties in the style of the Holy Scripture: in the narrative parts a strain so simple and unaffected; in the devotional and prophetic, so animated and sublime: and in the doctrinal parts such an air of dignity and authority as seems to speak their original divine. But I shall not enter into a dispute about Taste; much less set up my judgment on so nice a point against that of the wits, and Men of genius, with which your Sect abounds. And I have no temptation to it, inasmuch as it seems to me, the Oracles of God are not the less so for being delivered in a plain dress  
rather

rather than in *the enticing words of Man's wisdom*. *ALC.* This may perhaps be an apology for some simplicity and negligence in writing.

VII. But what apology can be made for Nonsense, crude Nonsense? Of which I cou'd easily assign many instances, having once in my Life read the Scripture through with that very view. Look here, said he, opening a Bible, in the forty ninth Psalm, the Author begins very magnificently, calling upon all the inhabitants of the Earth to give ear, and assuring them his mouth shall speak of wisdom, and the meditation of his heart shall be of understanding.

*Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatus?*

He hath no sooner done with his Preface, but he puts this senseless question. "Wherefore shou'd I  
" fear in the days of evil; when the wickedness of  
" my heels shall compass me about? The iniquity of my heels! What Nonsense after such a solemn introduction! *EUPH.* For my own part, I have naturally weak eyes, and know there are many things that I cannot see, which are nevertheless distinctly seen by others. I do not therefore conclude a thing to be absolutely invisible; because it is so to me: And since it is possible it may be with my understanding, as it is with my eyes, I dare not pronounce a thing to be Nonsense, because I do not understand it. Of this passage many interpretations are given. The word render'd heels may signify fraud or supplantation: By some it is translated past wickedness, the heel being the hinder part of the foot; by others iniquity in the end of my days, the heel being one extremity of the body; by some the iniquity of my Enemies that may supplant me; by others my own faults  
or

or iniquities which I have passed over as light matters, and trampled under my feet. Some render it the iniquity of my ways ; others my transgressions which are like slips and slidings of the heel : And after all might not this expression so harsh and odd to *English* ears have been very natural and obvious in the *Hebrew* Tongue, which, as every other Language, had its idioms? the force and propriety whereof may as easily be conceived lost in a long tract of time, as the signification of some *Hebrew* words, which are not now intelligible, though nobody doubts but they had once a meaning as well as the other words of that Language. Granting therefore that certain passages in the Holy Scripture may not be understood, it will not thence follow that its Penmen wrote Nonsense : For I conceive Nonsense to be one thing and unintelligible another. *CRI.* An *English* Gentleman of my acquaintance one day entertaining some Foreigners at his House, sent a Servant to know the occasion of a sudden tumult in the yard, who brought him word, the Horses were fallen together by the ears : his Guests inquiring what the matter was, he translates it literally ; *Les Chevaux sont tombez ensemble par les oreilles.* Which made them stare ; what expressed a very plain sense in the original *English*, being incomprehensible when rendered word for word into *French* : And I remember to have heard a Man excuse the bulls of his Countrymen, by supposing them so many literal translations. *EUPH.* But not to grow tedious, I refer to the Critics and Commentators where you will find the use of this remark, which clearing up several obscure passages you took for Nonsense, may possibly incline you to suspect your own judgment of the rest. In this very Psalm you have pitched on, the good sense and moral contained in what follows, shou'd, methinks, make a candid reader judge favourably of

of the original sense of the Author, in that part which he cou'd not understand. Say, *Alciphron*, in reading the Classics, do you forthwith conclude every passage to be Nonsense, that you cannot make sense of? *ALC.* By no means; difficulties must be supposed to rise from different idioms, old customs, hints and allusions, clear in one time or place, and obscure in another. *EUPH.* And why will you not judge of Scripture by the same rule. Those sources of obscurity you mention are all common both to sacred and profane Writings: And there is no doubt, but an exacter knowledge in Language and Circumstances wou'd in both, cause difficulties to vanish like shades before the light of the Sun. *Jeremiah* to describe a furious invader saith; *Behold, he shall come up as a Lion from the swelling of Jordan against the habitation of the strong.* One wou'd be apt to think this passage odd and improper, and that it had been more reasonable to have said, *a Lion from the mountain or the desert.* But travellers, as an ingenious Man observes, who have seen the River *Jordan* bounded by low Lands with many reeds or thickets affording shelter to wild Beasts, (which being suddenly dislodged by a rapid overflowing of the River, rush into the upland Country) perceive the force and propriety of the Comparison; and that the difficulty proceeds, not from Nonsense in the Writer, but from Ignorance in the Reader. It is needless to amass together instances which may be found in every Commentator: I only beg leave to observe, that sometimes Men, looking higher or deeper than they need for a profound or remote sense, overlook the natural obvious sense, lying, if I may so say, at their feet, and so make difficulties instead of finding them. This seems to be the case of that celebrated passage, which hath created so much work in *St. Paul's* first Epistle to the *Corinthians*. 'What shall

‘ shall they do which are baptized for the dead, if  
 ‘ the dead rise not at all? why are they then bap-  
 ‘ tized for the dead? I remember to have heard  
 this text explained by *Laches* the Vicar of our  
 Parish to my Neighbour *Lycon*, who was much  
 perplexed about its meaning. If it had been tran-  
 slated as it might very justly, *baptized for the sake*  
*of the dead*, I do not see, said *Laches*, why people  
 shou’d be puzzled about the sense of this passage;  
 for tell me, I beseech you, for whose sake do you  
 think those Christians were baptized? For whose  
 sake, answered *Lycon*, but their own? How do  
 you mean, for their own sake in this life, or the  
 next? Doubtless in the next, for it was plain they  
 could get nothing by it in this. They were then,  
 replied *Laches*, baptized not for the sake of them-  
 selves while living, but for the sake of themselves  
 when dead; not for the living, but the dead. I  
 grant it. Baptism therefore must have been to  
 them a fruitless thing, if the dead rise not at all.  
 It must. Whence *Laches* inferred, That *St. Paul’s*  
 argument was clear and pertinent for the Resur-  
 rection: And *Lycon* allowed it to be *argumentum*  
*ad hominem* to those who had sought Baptism.  
 There is then, concluded *Laches*, no necessity for  
 supposing, that living Men were in those days bap-  
 tized instead of those who died without Baptism,  
 or of running into any other odd Suppositions, or  
 strained and far-fetched Interpretations to make  
 sense of this passage. *ALC.* Here and there a  
 difficult passage may be cleared: But there are  
 many which no art or wit of Man can account for,  
 What say you to those discoveries, made by some  
 of our learned Writers, of false citations from  
 the Old Testament found in the Gospel? *EUPH.*  
 That some few passages are cited by the Writers  
 of the New Testament, out of the Old, and by  
 the Fathers out of the New, which are not in so

many words to be found in them, is no new discovery of Minute Philosophers, but known and observed long before by Christian Writers; who have made no scruple to grant, that some things might have been inserted by careless or mistaken Transcribers into the Text, from the Margin, others left out, and others altered; whence so many various readings. But these are things of small moment, and that all other ancient Authors have been subject to; and upon which no point of Doctrine depends, which may not be proved without them. Nay further, if it be any advantage to your cause, it hath been observed, that the eighteenth *Psalms*, as recited in the twenty second chapter of the second book of *Samuel*, varies in above forty places, if you regard every little verbal or literal difference: And that a Critic may now and then discover small variations, is what no body can deny. But to make the most of these concessions, what can you infer from them, more than that the design of the Holy Scripture was not to make us exactly knowing in Circumstantials? and that the Spirit did not dictate every Particle and Syllable, or preserve them from every minute alteration by Miracle? which to believe, wou'd look like Rabbinical Superstition. *ALC.* But what marks of Divinity can possibly be in writings which do not reach the exactness even of Humane Art? *EUPH.* I never thought nor expected that the Holy Scripture shou'd shew it self divine, by a circumstantial accuracy of Narration, by exactness of Method, by strictly observing the rules of Rhetoric, Grammar, and Criticism, in harmonious Periods, in elegant and choice Expressions, or in technical Definitions and Partitions. These things wou'd look too like a Humane Composition. Methinks there is in that simple, unaffected, artless, unequal, bold, figurative Style of the Holy Scripture, a character singularly



gularly great and majestic, and that looks more like divine Inspiration, than any other Composition that I know. But, as I said before, I shall not dispute a point of Criticism with the gentlemen of your Sect, who, it seems, are the modern standard for Wit and Taste. *ALC.* Well, I shall not insist on small slips, or the inaccuracy of citing or transcribing : And I freely own, that Repetitions, want of Method, or want of Exactness in circumstances, are not the things that chiefly stick with me ; no more than the plain patriarchal Manners, or the peculiar Usages and Customs of the Jews and first Christians so different from ours ; and that to reject the Scripture on such accounts wou'd be to act like those *French* Wits, who censure *Homer* because they do not find in him the Style, Notions and Manners of their own Age and Country. Was there nothing else to divide us, I shou'd make no great difficulty of owning, That a popular uncorrect Style might answer the general ends of Revelation, as well, perhaps, as a more critical and exact one : But the Obscurity still sticks with me. Methinks if the supreme Being had spoke to Man, he wou'd have spoke clearly to him, and that the Word of God shou'd not need a comment.

VIII. *EUPH.* You seem, *Alciphron*, to think Obscurity a defect ; but if it shou'd prove to be no defect, there wou'd then be no force in this Objection. *ALC.* I grant there wou'd not. *EUPH.* Pray tell me, are not Speech and Style instrumental to convey Thoughts and Notions, to beget Knowledge, Opinion, and Assent ? *ALC.* This is true. *EUPH.* And is not the perfection of an instrument to be measured by the use to which it is subservient ? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* What therefore is a defect in one instrument, may be none in another. For instance, edged tools are in general

designed to cut ; but the uses of an Ax and a Razor being different, it is no defect in an Ax, that it hath not the keen edge of a Razor ; nor in a Razor, that it hath not the weight or strength of an Ax. *ALC.* I acknowledge this to be true. *EUPH.* And may we not say in general, that every instrument is perfect, which answers the purpose or intention of him who useth it? *ALC.* We may. *EUPH.* Hence it seems to follow, that no Man's Speech is defective in point of Clearness, though it shou'd not be intelligible to all Men, if it be sufficiently so to those who, he intended, shou'd understand it ; or though it shou'd not in all parts be equally clear, or convey a perfect knowledge, where he intended only an imperfect hint. *ALC.* It seems so. *EUPH.* Ought we not therefore to know the intention of the Speaker, to be able to know whether his style be obscure through defect or design? *ALC.* We ought. *EUPH.* But is it possible for Man to know all the ends and purposes of God's Revelations? *ALC.* It is not. *EUPH.* How then can you tell, but the obscurity of some parts of Scripture may well consist with the purpose which you know not, and consequently be no argument against its coming from God? The books of Holy Scripture were written in ancient languages, at distant times, on sundry occasions, and very different subjects: Is it not therefore reasonable to imagine, that some parts or passages might have been clearly enough understood by those, for whose proper use they were principally designed, and yet seem obscure to us, who speak another language, and live in other times? Is it at all absurd or unsuitable to the notion we have of God or Man, to suppose that God may reveal, and yet reveal with a reserve, upon certain remote and sublime subjects, content to give us hints and glimpses, rather than views? May we not also suppose

pose from the reason of things, and the analogy of Nature, that some points, which might otherwise have been more clearly explained, were left obscure merely to encourage our diligence and modesty? Two virtues; which, if it might not seem disrespectful to such great Men, I wou'd recommend to the Minute Philosophers. *Lyficles* replied, This indeed is excellent: You expect that Men of sense and spirit shou'd in great humility put out their eyes, and blindly swallow all the absurdities and nonsense that shall be offered to them for divine Revelation. *EUPH.* On the contrary, I wou'd have them open their eyes, look sharply, and try the Spirit, whether it is of God; and not supinely and ignorantly condemn in the gross, all Religions together, Piety with Superstition, Truth for the sake of Error, matters of Fact for the sake of Fictions; a conduct, which at first sight wou'd seem absurd in History, Physick, or any other branch of Humane Inquiry: But to compare the Christian System, or Holy Scriptures, with other pretences to divine Revelation, to consider impartially the Doctrines, Precepts, and Events therein contained; weigh them in the balance with any other religious, natural, moral, or historical accounts; and diligently to examine all those proofs internal and external, that for so many ages have been able to influence and persuade so many wise, learned and inquisitive Men: Perhaps they might find in it certain peculiar characters, which sufficiently distinguish it from all other Religions and pretended Revelations, whereon to ground a reasonable Faith. In which case I leave them to consider, whether it wou'd be right to reject with peremptory scorn a Revelation so distinguished and attested, upon account of Obscurity in some parts of it? and whether it wou'd seem beneath Men of their Sense and Spirit to acknowledge, that, for ought they know,

a light inadæquate to things, may yet be adæquate to the purpose of Providence? and whether it might be unbecoming their sagacity and critical skill to own, that literal Translations from Books in an ancient Oriental tongue, wherein there are so many peculiarities, as to the manner of writing, the figures of Speech, and structure of the Phrase, so remote from all our modern Idioms, and in which we have no other coæval writings extant, might well be obscure in many places, especially such as treat of subjects sublime and difficult in their own nature, or allude to things, customs or events, very distant from our knowledge? And lastly, whether it might not become their character, as impartial and unprejudiced Men, to consider the Bible in the same light they wou'd profane Authors? They are apt to make great allowance for Transpositions, Omissions, and literal Errors of Transcribers in other ancient Books, and very great for the difference of Style and Manner, especially in eastern Writings, such as the remains of *Zoroaster* and *Confucius*, and why not in the Prophets? In reading *Horace* or *Persius* to make out the sense, they will be at the pains to discover a hidden *Drama*, and why not in *Solomon* or *St. Paul*? I hear there are certain ingenious Men who despise King *David's* Poetry, and yet profess to admire *Homer* and *Pindar*. If there be no prejudice or affectation in this, let them but make a literal version from those Authors into *English* Prose, and they will then be better able to judge of the Psalms. *ALC.* You may discourse and expatiate; but notwithstanding all you have said or shall say, it is a clear point that a Revelation, which doth not reveal, can be no better than a contradiction in terms. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, do you not acknowledge the light of the Sun to be the most glorious production of Providence in this natural World? *ALC.*

*ALC.* Suppose I do. *EUPH.* This light, nevertheless, which you cannot deny to be of God's making, shines only on the surface of things, shines not at all in the Night, shines imperfectly in the twilight, is often interrupted, refracted, and obscured, represents distant things, and small things dubiously, imperfectly, or not at all. Is this true or no? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* Shou'd it not follow therefore, that to expect in this World a light from God without any mixture of shade or mystery, wou'd be departing from the rule and analogy of the Creation? and that consequently it is no argument the light of Revelation is not Divine, because it may not be so clear and full as you expect. *ALC.* As I profess my self candid and indifferent throughout this debate, I must needs own you say some plausible things, as a Man of argument will never fail to do in vindication of his prejudices.

IX. But, to deal plainly, I must tell you once for all, that you may question and answer, illustrate and enlarge for ever, without being able to convince me that the Christian Religion is of Divine Revelation. I have said several things, and have many more to say, which, believe me, have weight not only with my self, but with many great Men my very good friends, and will have weight whatever *Euphranor* can say to the contrary. *EUPH.* O *Alciphron*, I envy you the happiness of such acquaintance. But, as my lot fallen in this remote corner deprives me of that advantage, I am obliged to make the most of this opportunity, which you and *Lyficles* have put into my hands. I consider you as two able Chirurgeons, and you were pleased to consider me as a Patient, whose cure you have generously undertaken. Now a Patient must have full liberty to explain his case, and tell

all his Symptoms, the concealing or palliating of which might prevent a perfect cure. You will be pleased therefore to understand me, not as objecting to, or arguing against, either your Skill or Medicines, but only as setting forth my own case and the effects they have upon me. Say, *Alci-phron*, did you not give me to understand that you wou'd extirpate my prejudices? *ALC.* It is true: a good Physician eradicates every fibre of the disease. Come, you shall have a patient hearing. *EUPH.* Pray, was it not the opinion of *Plato*, that God inspired particular Men, as Organs or Trumpets, to proclaim and sound forth his Oracles to the World? \* And was not the same opinion also embraced by others the greatest Writers of Antiquity? *CRI.* *Socrates* seems to have thought that all true Poets spoke by Inspiration; and *Tully*, that there was no extraordinary Genius without it. This hath made some of our affected Free-thinkers attempt to pass themselves upon the World for Enthusiasts. *ALC.* What wou'd you infer from all this? *EUPH.* I wou'd infer that inspiration shou'd seem nothing impossible or absurd, but rather agreeable to the light of reason and the notions of Mankind. And this, I suppose, you will acknowledge, having made it an Objection against a particular Revelation, that there are so many pretences to it throughout the World. *ALC.* O *Euphranor*, he, who looks into the bottom of things, and resolves them into their first principles, is not easily amused with words. The word *Inspiration* sounds indeed big, but let us, if you please, take an original view of the thing signified by it. To inspire is a word borrowed from the *Latin*, and strictly taken means no more than to breathe or blow in: nothing therefore can be inspired but what can be blown or breathed, and nothing can be so but wind or vapour, which in-

\* *Plato in Ione.*

deed may fill or puff up Men with fanatical and hypochondriacal ravings. This sort of Inspiration I very readily admit. *EUPH.* What you say is subtle, and I know not what effect it might have upon me, if your profound discourse did not hinder its own operation. *ALC.* How so? *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, do you discourse or do you not? To me it seems that you discourse admirably. *ALC.* Be that as it will, it is certain I discourse. *EUPH.* But when I endeavour to look into the bottom of things, behold! A scruple riseth in my mind how this can be; for to *discourse* is a word of *Latin* derivation, which originally signifies to run about; and a Man cannot run about, but he must change place and move his Legs; so long therefore as you sit on this Bench, you cannot be said to discourse. Solve me this difficulty, and then perhaps I may be able to solve yours. *ALC.* You are to know, that discourse is a word borrowed from sensible things, to express an invisible action of the mind, reasoning or inferring one thing from another; and in this translated sense, we may be said to discourse, though we sit still. *EUPH.* And may we not as well conceive, that the term Inspiration might be borrowed from sensible things to denote an action of God, in an extraordinary manner, influencing, exciting, and enlightening the mind of a Prophet or an Apostle? who, in this secondary, figurative, and translated sense, may truly be said to be inspired, though there shou'd be nothing in the case of that wind or vapour implied in the original sense of the word? It seems to me, that we may by looking into our own minds plainly perceive certain instincts, impulses, and tendencies, which at proper periods and occasions spring up unaccountably in the Soul of Man. We observe very visible signs of the same in all other Animals. And these things being ordinary

dinary and natural, what hinders but we may conceive it possible for the humane Mind, upon an extraordinary account, to be moved in an extraordinary manner, and its faculties stirred up and actuated by a supernatural Power? That there are and have been, and are likely to be wild visions and hypochondriacal ravings, no body can deny; but to infer from thence, that there are no true Inspirations wou'd be too like concluding, that some Men are not in their senses, because other Men are fools. And though I am no Prophet, and consequently cannot pretend to a clear notion of this matter; yet I shall not therefore take upon me to deny, but a true Prophet or inspired Person, might have had as certain means, of discerning between divine Inspiration and hypochondriacal fancy, as you can between sleeping and waking, till you have proved the contrary. You may meet in the Book of *Jeremiab* with this passage: 'The Prophet that hath a dream let him tell a dream: And he that hath my word, let him speak my word faithfully: what is the chaff to the Wheat, saith the Lord? Is not my word like as a fire, saith the Lord, and like a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces'? \* You see here a distinction made between Wheat and Chaff, true and spurious, with the mighty force and power of the former. But I beg pardon for quoting Scripture to you, I make my appeal to the general sense of Mankind, and the Opinion of the wisest Heathens, which seems sufficient to conclude Divine Inspiration possible, if not probable, at least till you prove the contrary.

X. *ALC.* The possibility of Inspirations and Revelations I do not think it necessary to deny. Make the best you can of this concession. *EUPH.*



Now what is allowed possible we may suppose in fact. *ALC.* We may. *EUPH.* Let us then suppose, that God had been pleased to make a Revelation to Men; and that he inspired some as a means to instruct others. Having supposed this, can you deny, that their inspired Discourses and Revelations might have been committed to Writing, or that being written, after a long tract of time they might become in several places obscure; that some of them might even originally have been less clear than others, or that they might suffer some alteration by frequent transcribing, as other Writings are known to have done? Is it not even very probable that all these things wou'd happen? *ALC.* I grant it. *EUPH.* And granting this, with what pretence can you reject the Holy Scriptures as not being divine, upon the account of such signs or marks, as you acknowledge wou'd probably attend a Divine Revelation transmitted down to us through so many Ages? *ALC.* But allowing all that in reason you can desire, and granting that this may account for some obscurity, may reconcile some small differences, or satisfy us how some difficulties might arise by inserting, omitting or changing here and there a letter, a word, or perhaps a sentence: Yet these are but small matters, in respect of the much more considerable and weighty objections I cou'd produce, against the confessed doctrines, or subject matter of those Writings. Let us see what is contained in these sacred Books, and then judge whether it is probable or possible, such Revelations shou'd ever have been made by God? Now I defy the wit of Man to contrive any thing more extravagant, than the accounts we there find of Apparitions, Devils, Miracles, God manifest in the flesh, Regeneration, Grace, Self-denial, Resurrection of the dead, and such like *ægrî somnia*: things so odd, unaccount-

unaccountable, and remote from the apprehension of Mankind, you may as soon wash a Blackamore white, as clear them of absurdity. No critical skill can justify them, no tradition recommend them, I will not say for Divine Revelations, but even for the inventions of Men of Sense. *EUPH.* I had always a great opinion of your sagacity, but now, *Alciphron*, I consider you as something more than Man; else how shou'd it be possible for you to know, what or how far it may be proper for God to reveal? Methinks it may consist with all due deference to the greatest of Humane Understandings, to suppose them ignorant of many things, which are not suited to their faculties, or lie out of their reach. Even the Counsels of Princes lie often beyond the ken of their Subjects, who can only know so much as is revealed by those at the helm; and are often unqualified to judge of the usefulness and tendency even of that, till in due time the scheme unfolds, and is accounted for by succeeding events. That many points contained in holy Scripture are remote from the common apprehensions of Mankind, cannot be denied. But I do not see, that it follows from thence they are not of Divine Revelation. On the contrary, shou'd it not seem reasonable to suppose, that a Revelation from God shou'd contain something different in kind, or more excellent in degree, than what lay open to the common sense of Men, or cou'd even be discovered by the most sagacious Philosopher? Accounts of separate Spirits, good or bad, Prophecies, Miracles and such things are undoubtedly strange; but I wou'd fain see how you can prove them impossible or absurd. *ALC.* Some things there are so evidently absurd, that it wou'd be almost as silly to disprove them as to believe them: and I take these to be of that class.

XI. *EUPH.* But is it not possible, some Men may shew as much prejudice and narrowness in rejecting all such accounts, as others might easiness and credulity in admitting them? I never durst make my own observation or experience, the rule and measure of things spiritual, supernatural, or relating to another World, because I shou'd think it a very bad one, even for the visible and natural things of this; It wou'd be judging like the *Siamese*, who was positive it did not freeze in *Holland*, because he had never known such a thing as hard water or ice in his own Country. I cannot comprehend why any one, who admits the union of the Soul and Body, shou'd pronounce it impossible for the Humane Nature to be united to the Divine, in a manner ineffable and incomprehensible by Reason. Neither can I see any absurdity in admitting, that sinful Man may become regenerate or a new Creature, by the grace of God reclaiming him from a carnal Life to a spiritual Life of Virtue and Holiness. And since, the being governed by Sense and Appetite is contrary to the happiness and perfection of a rational Creature, I do not at all wonder that we are prescribed Self-denial. As for the Resurrection of the dead, I do not conceive it so very contrary to the Analogy of Nature, when I behold Vegetables left to rot in the earth, rise up again with new Life and Vigour, or a Worm to all appearance dead change its Nature, and that, which in its first being crawled on the Earth, become a new species, and fly abroad with Wings. And indeed when I consider, that the Soul and Body are things so very different and heterogeneous, I can see no reason to be positive, that the one must necessarily be extinguished upon the dissolution of the other; especially since I find in my self a strong natural desire of Immortality

lity, and I have not observed that natural Appetites are wont to be given in vain, or meerly to be frustrated. Upon the whole those points, which you account extravagant and absurd, I dare not pronounce to be so till I see good reason for it.

XII. C R I. No, *Alciphron*, your positive airs must not pass for proofs; nor will it suffice to say, things are contrary to common sense, to make us think they are so: By common Sense, I suppose shou'd be meant either the general sense of Mankind, or the improved reason of thinking Men. Now I believe that all those Articles, you have with so much capacity and fire at once summed up and exploded, may be shewn to be not disagreeable, much less contrary to common sense in one or other of these acceptations. That the Gods might appear and converse among Men, and that the Divinity might inhabit Humane Nature, were points allowed by the Heathens; and for this I appeal to their Poets and Philosophers, whose Testimonies are so numerous and clear, that it wou'd be an affront to repeat them to a Man of any Education. And though the notion of a Devil may not be so obvious, or so fully described, yet there appear plain traces of it, either from Reason or Tradition. The latter *Platonists*, as *Porphyry* and *Iamblichus*, are very clear in the point, allowing that evil Dæmons delude and tempt, hurt and possess Mankind. That the ancient *Greeks*, *Chaldeans*, and *Ægyptians*, believed both good and bad Angels, may be plainly collected from *Plato*, *Plutarch*, and the *Chaldean* Oracles. *Origen* observes, That almost all the Gentiles, who held the being of Dæmons, allowed there were bad ones \*. There is even something as early as *Homer*, that is thought by the

\* *Origen*. l. 7. contra Celsum.

learned Cardinal *Bessarion* † to allude to the fall of Satan, in the account of *Ate*, whom the Poet represents as cast down from Heaven by *Jove*, and then wandering about the Earth, doing mischief to Mankind. This same *Ate* is said by *Hesiod*, to be the Daughter of *Discord*; and by *Euripides*, in his *Hippolitus*, is mentioned as a tempter to evil, And it is very remarkable, that *Plutarch*, in his Book, *De vitando ære alieno*, speaks after *Empedocles*, of certain Dæmons that fell from Heaven, and were banished by God, *Δαίμονες θεηλάτοι καὶ ἔρανοπεπείς*. Nor is that less remarkable which is observed by *Ficinus* from *Pherecydes Syrus*, That there had been a downfall of Dæmons who revolted from God; and that *Ophioneus* (the old Serpent) was head of that rebellious Crew \*. Then as to other articles, let any one consider what the *Pythagoreans* taught of the Purgation and λύσις, or Deliverance of the Soul: What most Philosophers, but especially the *Stoics*, of subduing our Passions: What *Plato* and *Hierocles* have said of forgiving Injuries: What the acute and sagacious *Aristotle* writes, in his *Ethics* to *Nicomachus*, of the spiritual and divine Life, that Life, which, according to him, is too excellent to be thought Humane; insomuch as Man, so far forth as Man, cannot attain to it, but only so far forth as he hath something divine in him: And particularly, let him reflect on what *Socrates* taught, to wit, That Virtue is not to be learned from Men, that it is the Gift of God, and that good Men are not good by virtue of Humane Care or Diligence, *ἢ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται* †. Let any Man, who really thinks, but consider what other thinking Men have thought, who cannot be supposed prejudiced in

† In calumniat. Platonis l. 3. c. 7.

\* Vid. Argum. in Phædrum Platonis.

† Vid. Plat. in Protag. & alibi passim.

favour of Revealed Religion; and he will see cause, if not to think with reverence of the Christian Doctrines of Grace, Self-denial, Regeneration, Sanctification, and the rest, even the most mysterious, at least to judge more modestly and warily, than those who shall, with a confident air, pronounce them absurd, and repugnant to the Reason of Mankind. And in regard to a future State, the common sense of the Gentile World, modern or ancient, and the opinions of the wisest Men of Antiquity, are things so well known, that I need say nothing about them. To me it seems, the Minute Philosophers, when they appeal to Reason and common Sense, mean only the Sense of their own Party: A coin, how current soever among themselves, that other Men will bring to the touchstone, and pass for no more than it is worth. *LYS.* Be those notions agreeable to what or whose Sense they may, they are not agreeable to mine. And if I am thought ignorant for this, I pity those who think me so.

XIII. I enjoy my self, and follow my own courses, without remorse or fear; which I should not do, if my Head were filled with Enthusiasm; whether Gentile or Christian, Philosophical or Revealed, it is all one to me. Let others know or believe what they can, and make the best on't, I, for my part, am happy and safe in my Ignorance, *CRI.* Perhaps not so safe neither. *LYS.* Why, surely you won't pretend that Ignorance is criminal? *CRI.* Ignorance alone is not a crime. But that wilful Ignorance, affected Ignorance, Ignorance from Sloth, or conceited Ignorance, is a fault, might easily be proved by the testimony of Heathen Writers; and it needs no proof to shew, that if Ignorance be our fault, we cannot be secure in it as an excuse. *LYS.* Honest *Crito* seems to hint, that

that a Man shou'd take care to inform himself, while alive, lest his neglect be punished when he is dead. Nothing is so pusillanimous and unbecoming a Gentleman, as Fear: Nor cou'd you take a likelier course to fix and rivet a Man of honour in Guilt, than by attempting to frighten him out of it. This is the stale, absurd Stratagem of Priests, and that which makes them, and their Religion, more odious and contemptible to me than all the other Articles put together. *CRI.* I wou'd fain know why it may not be reasonable for a Man of honour, or any Man who has done amiss to fear? Guilt is the natural Parent of fear; and nature is not used to make men fear where there is no occasion. That impious and profane Men shou'd expect divine punishment, doth not seem so absurd to conceive: And that under this expectation they shou'd be uneasy and even afraid, how consistent soever it may or may not be with honour, I am sure consists with reason. *LYS.* That thing of Hell and eternal Punishment is the most absurd, as well as the most disagreeable thought that ever entered into the head of mortal Man. *CRI.* But you must own that it is not an absurdity peculiar to Christians, since *Socrates*, that great Free-thinker of *Athens*, thought it probable there may be such a thing as impious Men for ever punished in Hell \*. It is recorded of this same *Socrates*, that he has been often known to think for four and twenty hours together, fixed in the same posture, and wrapt up in meditation. *LYS.* Our modern Free-thinkers are a more lively sort of Men. Those old Philosophers were most of them whimsical. They had in my judgment a dry, narrow, timorous way of thinking, which by no means came up to the frank humour of our times. *CRI.* But I appeal to your own judgment, if a Man, who knows not the na-

\* Vid Platon. in Gorgia.

ture of the Soul, can be assured by the light of reason, whether it is mortal or immortal ?

*An simul intereat nobiscum morte perempta,  
An tenebras orci visat vastasque lacunas ?*

*LYS.* But what if I know the nature of the Soul ? What if I have been taught that whole secret by a modern Free-thinker ? a Man of science who discovered it not by a tiresome introversion of his faculties, not by amusing himself in a labyrinth of notions, or stupidly thinking for whole days and nights together, but by looking into things and observing the analogy of nature.

XIV. This great Man is a Philosopher by fire, who has made many processes upon vegetables. It is his opinion that Men and Vegetables are really of the same species ; that Animals are moving Vegetables, and Vegetables fixed Animals ; that the mouths of the one and the roots of the other serve to the same use, differing only in position ; that blossoms and flowers answer to the most indecent and concealed parts in the humane body ; that vegetable and animal bodies are both alike organized, and that in both there is Life or a certain motion and circulation of juices through proper Tubes or Vessels. I shall never forget this able Man's unfolding the nature of the Soul in the following manner. The Soul, said he, is that specific form or principle from whence proceed the distinct qualities or properties of things. Now, as Vegetables are a more simple and less perfect compound, and consequently more easily analysed than Animals, we will begin with the contemplation of the Souls of Vegetables. Know then, that the Soul of any Plant, Rosemary for instance, is neither more nor less than its essential Oil. Upon this depends its peculiar



culiar fragrance, taste, and medicinal virtues, or in other words its life and operations. Separate or extract this essential Oil by Chymic art, and you get the Soul of the Plant : what remains being a dead Carcase, without any one property or virtue of the Plant, which is preserved entire in the Oil, a Drachm. whereof goes further than several pounds of the Plant. Now this same essential Oil is itself a composition of Sulphur and Salt, or of a gross unctuous substance, and a fine subtile principle or volatile Salt imprisoned therein. This volatile Salt is properly the essence of the Soul of the Plant, containing all its virtue, and the Oil is the vehicle of this most subtile part of the Soul, or that which fixes and individuates it. And as, upon separation of this Oil from the Plant, the Plant died, so a second death or death of the Soul ensues upon the resolution of this essential Oil into its principles; as appears by leaving it exposed for some time to the open air, so that the volatile Salt or Spirit may fly off; after which the Oil remains dead and insipid, but without any sensible diminution of its weight, by the loss of that volatile essence of the Soul, that æthereal aura, that spark of entity, which returns and mixes with the Solar light, the universal Soul of the World, and only source of Life, whether Vegetable, Animal, or Intellectual; which differ only according to the grossness or fineness of the vehicles, and the different textures of the natural Alembics, or in other words, the organized Bodies, where the abovementioned volatile essence inhabits and is elaborated, where it acts and is acted upon. This Chymical System lets you at once into the nature of the Soul, and accounts for all it's phænomena. In that compound which is called Man, the Soul or essential Oil is what commonly goes by the name of Animal Spirit : for you must know, it is a point agreed by Chymists, that

Spirits are nothing but the more subtile Oils. Now in proportion, as the essential Oil of Man is more subtile than that of other Creatures, the volatile Salt that impregnates it is more at liberty to act, which accounts for those specifick properties and actions of Humane Kind, which distinguish them above other Creatures. Hence you may learn why among the wise ancients, Salt was another name for wit, and in our times a dull Man is said to be insipid or insulse. Aromatic Oils maturated by great length of time turn to Salts: this shews why Humane Kind, grow wiser by age. And what I have said of the twofold death or dissolution, first of the compound, by separating the Soul from the organical Body, and secondly of the Soul it self, by dividing the volatile Salt from the Oil, illustrates and explains that notion of certain ancient Philosophers: that as the Man was a compound of soul and body, so the Soul was compounded of the mind or intellect, and its æthereal vehicle; and that the separation of Soul and Body or death of the Man is, after a long tract of time, succeeded by a second death of the Soul it self, to wit the separation or deliverance of the intellect from its vehicle, and reunion with the Sun. *EUPH.* O *Lyficles* your ingenious friend has opened a new Scene, and explained the most obscure and difficult points in the clearest and easiest manner. *LYS.* I must own this account of things struck my fancy. I am no great lover of Creeds or Systems; but when a notion is reasonable and grounded on experience I know how to value it. *CR I.* In good earnest, *Lyficles*, do you believe this account to be true? *LYS.* Why then in good earnest I don't know whether I do or no. But I can assure you the ingenious Artist himself has not the least doubt about it. And to believe an Artist in his art is a just maxim and short way to

to Science. *CRI.* But what relation hath the Soul of Man to Chymic art? The same reason, that bids me trust a skilful Artist in his art, inclines me to suspect him out of his art. Men are too apt to reduce unknown things to the standard of what they know, and bring a prejudice or tincture from things they have been conversant in, to judge thereby of things in which they have not been conversant. I have known a Fidler gravely teach that the Soul was Harmony; a Geometrician very positive that the Soul must be extended; and a Physician, who having pickled half a dozen embryos and dissected as many Rats and Frogs, grew conceited and affirmed there was no Soul at all, and that it was a vulgar error. *LYS.* My notions sit easy. I shall not engage in pedantic disputes about them. They who don't like them may leave them. *EUPH.* This, I suppose, is said much like a Gentleman.

XV. But pray, *Lyficles*, tell me whether the Clergy come within that general rule of yours; that an Artist may be trusted in his art? *LYS.* By no means. *EUPH.* Why so? *LYS.* Because I take my self to know as much of those matters as they do. *EUPH.* But you allow, that in any other profession, one who hath spent much time and pains may attain more knowledge, than a Man of equal or better parts, who never made it his particular business. *LYS.* I do. *EUPH.* And nevertheless in things religious and divine you think all Men equally knowing. *LYS.* I do not say all Men. But I think all Men of sense competent judges. *EUPH.* What! are the divine attributes and dispensations to Mankind, the true end and happiness of rational Creatures, with the means of improving and perfecting their Beings, more easy and obvious points than those which make the sub-

ject of every common profession? *LYS.* Perhaps not: but one thing I know, some things are so manifestly absurd, that no authority shall make me give into them. For instance, if all Mankind shou'd pretend to persuade me that the Son of God was born upon earth in a poor Family, was spit upon, buffeted and crucified, lived like a Beggar and died like a Thief, I shou'd never believe one syllable of it. Common sense shews every one, what figure it wou'd be decent for an earthly Prince or Ambassador to make; and the Son of God, upon an embassy from Heaven, must needs have made an appearance beyond all others of great *eclat*, and in all respects the very reverse of that which Jesus Christ is reported to have made, even by his own Historians. *EUPH.* O *Lyficles*, though I had ever so much mind to approve and applaud your ingenious reasoning, yet I dare not assent to this for fear of *Crito*. *LYS.* Why so? *EUPH.* Because he observed just now, that Men judge of things they do not know, by prejudices from things they do know. And I fear he wou'd object that you, who have been conversant in the grand *Monde*, having your head filled with a notion of Attendants and Equipage and Liveries, the familiar badges of Humane Grandeur, are less able to judge of that which is truly divine; and that one who had seen less, and thought more, wou'd be apt to imagine a pompous parade of worldly greatness, not the most becoming the Author of a spiritual Religion, that was designed to wean Men from the world, and raise them above it. *CRI.* Do you think, *Lyficles*, if a Man shou'd make his entrance into *London* in a rich suit of Clothes, with a hundred gilt Coaches, and a thousand laced Footmen; that this wou'd be a more divine appearance, and have more of true grandeur in it, than if he had power with a word to heal all manner of diseases,

to raise the dead to life, and still the raging of the Winds and Sea? *LYS.* Without all doubt it must be very agreeable to common sense to suppose, that he cou'd restore others to life who cou'd not save his own. You tell us, indeed, that he rose again from the dead: but what occasion was there for him to die, the just for the unjust, the Son of God for wicked Men? and why in that individual place? Why at that very time above all others? Why did he not make his appearance earlier, and preach in all parts of the World, that the benefit might have been more extensive? Account for all these points and reconcile them, if you can, to the common notions and plain sense of Mankind. *CRI.* And what if those, as well as many other points, shou'd lie out of the road that we are acquainted with; must we therefore explode them, and make it a rule to condemn every proceeding as senseless, that doth not square with the vulgar sense of Man; If the precepts and certain primary tenets of Religion appear in the eye of Reason good and useful; and if they are also found to be so by their effects; we may, for the sake of them, admit certain other points or doctrines recommended with them, to have a good tendency, to be right and true; although we cannot discern their goodness or truth by the meer light of Humane Reason, which may well be supposed an insufficient judge of the proceedings, counsels, and designs of Providence, and this sufficeth to make our conviction reasonable.

XVI. It is an allowed point that no Man can judge of this or that part of a machine taken by it self, without knowing the whole, the mutual relation or dependence of its parts, and the end for which it was made. And, as this is a point acknowledged in corporeal and natural things, ought we not by a parity of reason to suspend our

judgment of a single unaccountable part of the Divine Oeconomy, till we are more fully acquainted with the moral System, or world of Spirits, and are let into the designs of God's Providence, and have an extensive view of his dispensations past, present, and future? Alas! *Lyficles*, what do you know even of your self, whence you come, what you are, or whither you are going? To me it seems, that a Minute Philosopher is like a conceited Spectator, who never looked behind the Scenes, and yet wou'd judge of the machinery; who from a transient glimpse of a part only of some one scene, wou'd take upon him to censure the plot of a Play. *LYS.* As to the plot I won't say; but in half a Scene a Man may judge of an absurd Actor. With what colour or pretext can you justify the vindictive, froward, whimsical behaviour of some inspired Teachers or Prophets? Particulars that serve neither for profit nor pleasure I make a shift to forget; but in general the truth of this charge I do very well remember. *CRI.* You need be at no pains to prove a point I shall neither justify nor deny. That there have been humane passions, infirmities, and defects in persons inspired by God, I freely own; nay, that very wicked Men have been inspired, as *Balaam* for instance and *Caia-phas*, cannot be denied. But what will you infer from thence? Can you prove it impossible, that a weak or sinful Man shou'd become an instrument to the Spirit of God, for conveying his purpose to other Sinners? Or that Divine Light may not, as well as the light of the Sun, shine on a foul vessel without polluting its rays? *LYS.* To make short work, the right way wou'd be to put out our eyes, and not judge at all. *CRI.* I do not say so, but I think it wou'd be right, if some sanguine persons upon certain points suspected their own judgment. *ALC.* But the very things said to be inspired;

taken

taken by themselves and in their own nature, are sometimes so wrong, to say no worse, that a Man may pronounce them not to be divine at first sight; without troubling his head about the System of Providence or Connexion of Events: As one may say that Grass is green, without knowing or considering how it grows, what uses it is subservient to, or how it is connected with the mundane System. Thus for instance, the spoiling of the *Ægyptians*, and the extirpation of the *Canaanites*, every one at first glance sees to be cruel and unjust, and may therefore without deliberating pronounce them unworthy of God. CRI. But, *Alciphron*, to judge rightly of these things, may it not be proper to consider how long the *Israelites* had wrought under those severe Task-masters of *Egypt*, what injuries and hardships they had sustained from them, what crimes and abominations the *Canaanites* had been guilty of, what right God hath to dispose of the things of this World, to punish Delinquents, and to appoint both the manner and the instruments of his Justice? Man, who has not such right over his fellow-creatures, who is himself a fellow-sinner with them, who is liable to error as well as passion, whose views are imperfect, who is governed more by Prejudice, than the Truth of things, may not improbably deceive himself, when he sets up for a judge of the proceedings of the holy, omniscient, impassive Creator and Governor of all things.

XVII. *ALC.* Believe me, *Crito*, Men are never so industrious to deceive themselves, as when they engage to defend their Prejudices. You wou'd fain reason us out of all use of our Reason: Can any thing be more irrational? To forbid us to reason on the Divine Dispensations, is to suppose, they will not bear the test of reason; or, in other words, that God acts without reason, which ought  
not

not to be admitted, no, not in any single instance : For if in one, why not in another ? Whoever therefore allows a God, must allow that he always acts reasonably. I will not therefore attribute to him Actions and Proceedings that are unreasonable. He hath given me Reason to judge withal ; and I will judge by that unerring Light, lighted from the universal lamp of Nature. *CRI.* O *Alciphron* ! as I frankly own the common remark to be true, That when a Man is against Reason, it is a shrewd sign Reason is against him ; so I shou'd never go about to dissuade any one, much less one who so well knew the value of it, from using that noble talent. On the contrary, upon all subjects of moment, in my opinion, a Man ought to use his Reason ; but then, whether it may not be reasonable to use it with some deference to superior Reason, it will not, perhaps, be amiss to consider. *ALC.* It must surely derogate from the Wisdom of God, to suppose his conduct cannot bear being inspected, not even by the twilight of Humane Reason. *EUPH.* You allow, then, God to be wise ? *ALC.* I do. *EUPH.* What ! infinitely wise ? *ALC.* Even infinitely. *EUPH.* His Wisdom, then, far exceeds that of Man. *ALC.* Vastly. *EUPH.* Probably more than the Wisdom of Man, that of a Child, *ALC.* Without all question. *EUPH.* What think you, *Alciphron*, must not the conduct of a Parent seem very unaccountable to a Child, when its inclinations are thwarted, when it is put to learn the Letters, when it is obliged to swallow bitter Physick, to part with what it likes, and to suffer, and do, and see many things done contrary to its own judgment, however reasonable or agreeable to that of others ? *ALC.* This I grant. *EUPH.* Will it not therefore follow from hence by a parity of reason, that the little child, Man, when it takes up-



on it to judge of the Schemes of Parental Providence, and a thing of yesterday, to criticise the Oeconomy of the Ancient of days? will it not follow, I say, that such a judge, of such matters, must be apt to make very erroneous judgments? esteeming those things in themselves unaccountable, which he cannot account for; and concluding of some certain points, from an appearance of arbitrary carriage towards him, which is suited to his infancy and ignorance, that they are in themselves capricious or absurd, and cannot proceed from a wise, just, and benevolent God. This single consideration, if duly attended to, wou'd, I verily think, put an end to many conceited reasonings against Revealed Religion. *ALC.* You wou'd have us then conclude, that things, to our wisdom unaccountable, may nevertheless proceed from an abyss of Wisdom which our line cannot fathom; and that prospects viewed but in part, and by the broken tinged light of our Intellects, though to us they may seem disproportionate and monstrous, may nevertheless appear quite otherwise to another eye, and in a different situation: In a word, that as Humane Wisdom is but childish Folly, in respect of the divine, so the Wisdom of God may sometimes seem Foolishness to Men.

XVIII. *EUPH.* I wou'd not have you make these conclusions, unless in reason you ought to make them: But if they are reasonable, why shou'd you not make them? *ALC.* Some things may seem reasonable at one time, and not at another: And I take this very apology you make, for Credulity and Superstition, to be one of those things. When I view it in its Principles, it seems naturally to follow from just concessions; but when I consider its consequences, I cannot agree to it. A Man had as good abdicate his Nature, as disclaim the use

use of Reason. A Doctrine is unaccountable, therefore it must be Divine ! *EUPH.* Credulity and Superstition are qualities so disagreeable and degrading to Humane Nature, so surely an effect of weakness, and so frequently a cause of wickedness, that I shou'd be very much surpris'd to find a just course of reasoning lead to them. I can never think that Reason is a blind guide to folly, or that there is any connexion between Truth and Falshood, no more than I can think a thing's being unaccountable a proof that it is Divine : Though at the same time I cannot help acknowledging, it follows from your own avow'd principles, that a thing's being unaccountable, or incomprehensible to our Reason, is no sure argument to conclude it is not Divine ; especially when there are collateral proofs of its being so. A Child is influenced by the many sensible effects it hath felt, of paternal love and care and superior wisdom, to believe and do several things with an implicit faith and obedience : And if we in the same manner, from the truth and reasonableness which we plainly see in so many points within our cognisance, and the advantages which we experience from the seed of the Gospel sown in good ground, were disposed to an implicit Belief of certain other points, relating to schemes we do not know, or subjects to which our Talents are perhaps disproportionate, I am tempted to think it might become our duty without dishonouring our Reason ; which is never so much dishonoured as when it is foiled, and never in more danger of being foiled, than by judging where it hath neither means nor right to judge. *LYS.* I wou'd give a good deal, to see that ingenious Gamester *Glaucus* have the handling of *Euphranor* one night at our Club. I own he is a peg too high for me in some of his notions : But then

then he is admirable at vindicating Humane Reason against the impositions of Priestcraft.

XIX. *ALC.* He wou'd undertake to make it as clear as day light, that there was nothing worth a straw in Christianity, but what every one knew, or might know, as well without as with it, before as since *Jesus Christ*. *CRI.* That great Man, it seems, teacheth, that common sense alone is the Pole-Star; by which Mankind ought to steer; and that what is called Revelation must be ridiculous, because it is unnecessary and useless, the natural talents of every Man being sufficient, to make him happy, good, and wise, without any further correspondence with Heaven either for light or aid. *EUPH.* I have already acknowledged how sensible I am, that my situation in this obscure corner of the Country deprives me of many advantages, to be had from the conversation of ingenious Men in Town. To make my self some amends, I am obliged to converse with the dead and my own Thoughts, which last I know are of little weight against the authority of *Glaucus*, or such like great Men in the Minute Philosophy. But what shall we say to *Socrates*, for he too was of an opinion very different from that ascribed to *Glaucus*? *ALC.* For the present we need not insist on authorities, ancient or modern, or inquire which was the greater Man *Socrates* or *Glaucus*. Though, methinks, for so much as authority can signify, the present times, gray and hoary with age and experience, have a manifest advantage over those that are falsely called *ancient*. But not to dwell on authorities, I tell you in plain *English*, *Euphranor*, we do not want your Revelations; and that for this plain reason, those that are clear every body knew before, and those that are obscure no body is the better for. *EUPH.* Whether it was possible

ſible for Mankind to have known all parts of the Chriſtian Religion, beſides myſteries and poſitive inſtitutions, is not the queſtion between us ; and that they actually did not know them, is too plain to be denied. This, perhaps, was for want of making a due uſe of Reaſon. But, as to the uſefulneſs of Revelation, it ſeems much the ſame thing whether they cou'd not know, or wou'd not be at the pains to know, the Doctrines revealed. And as for thoſe Doctrines which were too obſcure to penetrate, or too ſublime to reach, by natural Reaſon ; how far Mankind may be the better for them is more, I had almoſt ſaid, than even you or *Glaucus* can tell.

XX. *ALC.* But whatever may be pretended as to obſcure Doctrines and Diſpenſations, all this hath nothing to do with Prophecies, which, being altogether relative to Mankind, and the events of this World, to which our faculties are ſurely well enough proportioned, one might expect ſhou'd be very clear, and ſuch as might inform inſtead of puzzling us. *EUPH.* And yet it muſt be allowed that as ſome Prophecies are clear, there are others very obſcure ; but left to my ſelf, I doubt I ſhou'd never have inferred from thence that they were not Divine. In my own way of thinking I ſhou'd have been apt to conclude, that the Prophecies we underſtand are a proof for Inſpiration ; but that thoſe we do not underſtand are no proof againſt it. Inaſmuch as for the latter our ignorance or the reſerve of the Holy Spirit may account, but for the other nothing, for ought that I ſee, can account but Inſpiration. *ALC.* Now I know ſeveral ſagacious Men, who conclude very differently from you, to wit, that the one ſort of Prophecies are nonſenſe, and the other contrived after the events. Behold the difference between a Man of free thought  
and

and one of narrow principles ! *EUPH.* It seems then they reject the Revelations because they are obscure, and *Daniel's* Prophecies because they are clear. *ALC.* Either way a Man of sense sees cause to suspect there has been foul play. *EUPH.* Your Men of sense are, it seems, hard to please. *ALC.* Our Philosophers are Men of piercing eyes. *EUPH.* I suppose such Men never make transient judgments from transient views ; but always establish fixed conclusions upon a thorough inspection of things. For my own part, I dare not engage with a Man, who has examined those points so nicely, as it may be presumed you have done : But I cou'd name some eminent writers of our own, now living, whose Books on the subject of Prophecy have given great satisfaction to Gentlemen, who pass for Men of sense and learning, here in the Country. *ALC.* You must know. *Euphranor*, I am not at leisure to peruse the learned Writings of Divines, on a subject which a Man may see through with half an eye. To me it is sufficient, that the point itself is odd and out of the road of nature. For the rest, I leave them to dispute and settle among themselves, where to fix the precise time when the Scepter departed from *Judah* ; or whether in *Daniel's* Prophecy of the *Messiah* we shou'd compute by the *Chaldean* or the *Julian* year. My only conclusion concerning all such matters is, that I will never trouble myself about them. *EUPH.* To an extraordinary genius, who sees things with half an eye, I know not what to say : But for the rest of Mankind, one wou'd think it shou'd be very rash in them to conclude, without much and exact inquiry, on the unsafe side of a question which concerns their chief interest. *ALC.* Mark it well : a true Genius in pursuit of Truth makes swift advances on the wings of General maxims, while little minds creep and grovel amidst mean particularities.

particularities. I lay it down for a certain Truth; that by the fallacious arts of Logic and Criticism, straining and forcing, palliating, patching and distinguishing, a Man may justify or make out any thing; and this remark, with one or two about prejudice, saves me a world of trouble. *EUPH.* You, *Alciphron*, who soar sublime on strong and free pinions, vouchsafe to lend a helping hand to those whom you behold entangled in the birdlime of prejudice. For my part, I find it very possible to suppose Prophecy may be Divine, although there shou'd be some obscurity at this distance, with respect to dates of time or kinds of years. you your self own Revelation possible; and allowing this I can very easily conceive it may be odd, and out of the road of nature. I can without amazement meet in Holy Scripture divers Prophecies, whereof I do not see the completion, divers texts I do not understand, divers mysteries above my comprehension, and ways of God to me unaccountable. Why may not some Prophecies relate to parts of History I am not well enough acquainted with, or to events not yet come to pass? It seems to me that Prophecies unfathomed by the hearer, or even the speaker himself, have been afterward verified and understood in the event; and it is one of my maxims, That, *what hath been may be.* Though I rub my Eyes, and do my utmost to extricate my self from prejudice, yet it still seems very possible to me, that, what I do not, a more acute, more attentive, or more learned Man may understand: At least thus much is plain; the difficulty of some points or passages doth not hinder the clearness of others, and those parts of Scripture, which we cannot interpret, we are not bound to know the sense of. What evil or what inconvenience, if we cannot comprehend what we are not obliged to comprehend, or if we cannot account for

for those things which it doth not belong to us to account for? Scriptures not understood, at one time, or by one person, may be understood at another time, or by other persons. May we not perceive, by retrospect on what is past, a certain progress from darker to lighter, in the series of the Divine Oeconomy towards Man? And may not future events clear up such points as at present exercise the faith of Believers? Now I cannot help thinking (such is the force either of truth or prejudice) that in all this, there is nothing strained or forced, or which is not reasonable and natural to suppose.

XXI. *ALC.* Well, *Euphranor*, I will lend you a helping hand, since you desire it, but think fit to alter my method: For you must know, the main points of Christian Belief have been infused so early, and inculcated so often, by nurses, paedagogues, and priests, that, be the proofs ever so plain, it is a hard matter to convince a mind, thus tinctured and stained, by arguing against revealed Religion from its internal characters. I shall therefore let my self to consider things in another light, and examine your Religion by certain external characters or circumstantials, comparing the system of Revelation with collateral accounts of ancient Heathen writers, and shewing how ill it consists with them. Know then, that the Christian Revelation supposing the *Jewish*, it follows, that if the *Jewish* be destroyed the Christian must of course fall to the Ground. Now, to make short work, I shall attack this *Jewish* Revelation in its head. Tell me, are we not obliged, if we believe the *Mosaic* account of things, to hold the world was created not quite six thousand years ago? *EUPH.* I grant we are. *ALC.* What will you say now, if other ancient records carry up the History of the world

many thousand years beyond this period? What if the *Ægyptians* and *Chinese* have accounts extending to thirty or forty thousand years? What if the former of these nations have observed twelve hundred eclipses, during the space of forty eight thousand years, before the time of *Alexander* the great? What if the *Chinese* have also many observations antecedent to the *Jewish* account of the Creation? What if the *Chaldeans* had been observing the Stars for above four hundred thousand years? And what shall we say if we have Successions of Kings and their Reigns, marked for several thousand years before the beginning of the world, assigned by *Moses*? Shall we reject the accounts and records of all other nations, the most famous, ancient, and learned in the world, and preserve a blind reverence for the Legislator of the *Jews*? *EUPH.* And pray if they deserve to be rejected, why shou'd we not reject them? What if those monstrous Chronologies contain nothing but names without Actions and manifest fables? What if those pretended observations of *Ægyptians* and *Chaldeans* were unknown or unregarded by ancient Astronomers? What if the *Jesuits* have shewn the inconsistency of the like *Chinese* pretensions with the Truth of the *Ephemerides*? What if the most ancient *Chinese* observations allow'd to be authentic, are those of two fixed Stars, one in the winter Solstice, the other in the Vernal Equinox, in the reign of their King *Yao*, which was since the Flood? \* *ALC.* You must give me leave to observe, the *Romish* Missionaries are of small credit in this point. *EUPH.* But what knowledge have we, or can we have, of those *Chinese* affairs, but by their means? The same persons that tell us of these accounts refute them; if we reject their authority in one case, what right have we to build upon it in another? *ALC.* When I consider that the

\* *Blanchini* *Histor. Univers. c. 17.*



*Chinese* have annals of more than forty thousand years, and that they are a learned ingenious and acute People, very curious, and addicted to Arts and Sciences, I profess I cannot help paying some regard to their accounts of time. *EUPH.* Whatever advantage their situation and political maxims may have given them, it doth not appear they are so learned or so acute in point of Science as the *Europeans*. The general character of the *Chinese*, if we may believe *Trigaltius* and other writers, is that they are men of a trifling and credulous curiosity, addicted to search after the Philosopher's Stone, and a Medicine to make Men immortal, to Astrology, Fortune-telling, and Presages of all kinds. Their ignorance in Nature and Mathematics is evident, from the great hand the *Jesuits* make of that kind of knowledge among them. But what shall we think of those extraordinary annals, if the very *Chinese* themselves give no credit to them for more than three thousand years before *Jesus Christ*? If they do not pretend to have begun to write history above four thousand years ago? And if the oldest books they have now extant in an intelligible character, are not above two thousand years old? One wou'd think a Man of your Sagacity, so apt to suspect every thing out of the common road of nature, shou'd not without the clearest proof admit those annals for authentic, which record such strange things as the Sun's not setting for ten days, and Gold raining three days together. Tell me, *Alciphron*, can you really believe these things without inquiring by what means the tradition was preserved, through what hands it passed, or what reception it met with, or who first committed it to writing? *ALC.* To omit the *Chinese* and their Story, it will serve my purpose as well to build on the authority of *Manetho* that learned *Egyptian* Priest, who had such opportunities of searching

into the most ancient accounts of time, and copying into his Dynasties the most venerable and authentic records inscribed on the pillars of *Hermes*. *EUPH*. Pray, *Alciphron*, where were those chronological pillars to be seen? *ALC*. In the *Sciriadical* land. *EUPH*. And where is that country? *ALC*. I don't know. *EUPH*. How were those records preserved for so many ages down to the time of this *Hermes*, who is said to have been the first inventor of letters? *ALC*. I do not know. *EUPH*. Did any other writers, before or since *Manetho*, pretend to have seen, or transcribed, or known any thing about these pillars? *ALC*. Not that I know. *EUPH*. Or about the place where they are said to have been. *ALC*. If they did, it is more than I know. *EUPH*. Do the *Greek* Authors that went into *Ægypt*, and consulted the *Ægyptian* priests, agree with these accounts of *Manetho*? *ALC*. Suppose they do not. *EUPH*. Doth *Diodorus*, who lived since *Manetho*, follow, cite, or so much as mention this same *Manetho*? *ALC*. What will you infer from all this? *EUPH*. If I did not know you and your principles, and how vigilantly you guard against imposture, I shou'd infer that you were a very credulous Man. For what can we call it but credulity to believe most incredible things on most slender authority, such as fragments of an obscure writer, disagreeing with all other Historians, supported by an obscure authority of *Hermes's* pillars, for which you must take his word, and which contain things so improbable as Successions of Gods and Demi-gods, for many thousand years, *Vulcan* alone having reigned nine thousand? There is little in these venerable Dynasties of *Manetho*, besides names and numbers; and yet in that little we meet with very strange things, that wou'd be thought Romantic in another writer:

writer: For instance, the *Nile* overflowing with honey, the Moon grown bigger, a speaking Lamb, seventy Kings who reigned as many days one after another, a King a day \*. If you are known *Alciphron*, to give credit to these things, I fear you will lose the honour of being thought incredulous.

*ALC.* And yet these ridiculous fragments, as you wou'd represent them, have been thought worth the pains and lucubrations of very learned Men. How can you account for the work that the great *Joseph Scaliger* and Sir *John Marsham* make about them? *EUPH.* I do not pretend to account for it. To see *Scaliger* add another *Julian* period to make room for such things as *Manetho's* Dynasties, and Sir *John Marsham* take so much learned pains to piece, patch, and mend those obscure fragments, to range them in Synchronisms, and try to adjust them with sacred Chronology, or make them consistent with themselves and other accounts, is to me very strange and unaccountable. Why they, or *Eusebius*, or yourself, or any other learned Man shou'd imagine those things deserve any regard I leave you to explain.

*XXII. ALC.* After all it is not easy to conceive what shou'd move, not only *Manetho*, but also other *Ægyptian* Priests, long before his time, to set up such great pretences to antiquity, all which however differing from one another, agree in this, that they overthrow the *Mosaic* History? How can this be accounted for without some real foundation? What point of pleasure or profit, or power, cou'd set Men on forging Successions of ancient names, and periods of time for ages before the world began? *EUPH.* Pray, *Alciphron*, is there any thing so strange or singular in this vain humour of extending the antiquity of nations beyond the Truth? Hath it not been observed in most parts

\* Scal. Can. Ifag. l. 2.

of the world? Doth it not even in our own times shew it self, especially among those dependent and subdued people, who have little else to boast of. To pass over others of our Fellow-subjects, who, in proportion as they are below their neighbours in wealth and power, lay claim to a more remote antiquity; are not the pretensions of *Irishmen* in this way known to be very great? If I may trust my Memory O *Flaberty*, in his *Ogygia*, mentions some transactions in *Ireland* before the Flood. The same humour, and from the same cause, appears to have prevailed in *Sicily*, a Country for some Centuries past, subject to the Dominion of Foreigners: During which time, the *Sicilians* have published divers fabulous accounts, concerning the original and antiquity of their cities, wherein they vye with each other. It is pretended to be proved by ancient Inscriptions, whose existence or authority seems on a level with that of *Hermes's* Pillars, that *Palermo* was founded in the days of the Patriarch *Isaac* by a colony of *Hebrews*, *Phœnicians* and *Syrians*, and that a Grandson of *Esau* had been Governor of a tower subsisting within these two hundred years in that city\*. The antiquity of *Messina* hath been carried still higher, by some who wou'd have us think it was enlarged by *Nimrod*†. The like pretensions are made by *Catania*, and other Towns of that Island, who have found Authors of as good credit as *Manetho* to support them. Now I shou'd be glad to know why the *Ægyptians*, a subdued people, may not probably be supposed to have invented fabulous accounts from the same motive, and like others valued themselves on extravagant pretensions to Antiquity, when in all other respects they were so much inferior to their Masters? That people had been suc-

\* Fazelli Hist. Sicul. decad. 1. lib. 8.

† Reina Notizie Istoriche di Messina,

cessively conquered by *Ethiopians*, *Assyrians*, *Babylonians*, *Persians*, and *Grecians*, before it appears that those wonderful Dynasties of *Manetho* and the Pillars of *Hermes* were ever heard of; as they had been by the two first of those Nations before the time of *Solon* himself, the earliest *Greek* that is known to have consulted the Priests of *Ægypt*; Whose accounts were so extravagant that even the *Greek* Historians, though unacquainted with Holy Scripture, were far from given an intire credit to them. *Herodotus* making a report upon their authority, saith, Those to whom such things seem credible may make the best of them, for himself declaring that it was his purpose to write what he heard\*. And both he and *Diodorus* do, on divers occasions, shew the same Diffidence in the narratives of those *Ægyptian* Priests. And as we observed of the *Ægyptians*, it is no less certain that the *Phœnicians*, *Assyrians* and *Chaldeans* were each a conquered and reduced People, before the rest of the world appear to have heard any thing of their pretensions to so remote Antiquity. *CRI.* But what occasion is there to be at any pains to account for the humour of fabulous Writers? Is it not sufficient to see that they relate Absurdities; that they are unsupported by any foreign Evidence; that they do not appear to have been in Credit, even among their own Countrymen, and that they are inconsistent one with another? That Men shou'd have the Vanity to impose on the World by false accounts, is nothing strange; it is much more so, that after what hath been done towards undeceiving the world by so many learned Critics, there shou'd be Men found capable of being abused by those paltry scraps of *Manetho*, *Berosus*, *Ctesias*, or the like fabulous or Counterfeit

\* *Herodotus* in *Euterpe*.

Writers. *ALC.* Give me leave to observe, those learned Critics may prove to be Ecclesiastics, perhaps some of them Papists. *CR I.* what do you think of Sir *Isaac Newton*, was he either Papist or Ecclesiastic? Perhaps you may not allow him to have been in Sagacity, or Force of mind, equal to the great Men of the Minute Philosophy: But it cannot be denied that he had read and thought much upon the subject, and that the result of his inquiry was a perfect contempt of all those celebrated Rivals to *Moses*. *ALC.* It hath been observed by Ingenious Men, that Sir *Isaac Newton*, though a Layman, was deeply prejudiced, witness his great regard to the Bible. *CR I.* And the same may be said of Mr. *Locke*, Mr. *Boyle*, Lord *Bacon*, and other famous Laymen, who, however knowing in some points, must nevertheless be allowed not to have attained that keen Discernment, which is the peculiar distinction of your Sect.

XXIII. But perhaps there may be other reasons beside prejudice, to incline a Man to give *Moses* the preference, on the Truth of whose History the Government, Manners, and Religion of his Countrymen were founded and framed; of whose History there are manifest traces in the most ancient books and traditions of the *Gentiles*, particularly of the *Brackmans* and *Persees*; whose history is confirmed by the late Invention of arts and sciences, the gradual Peopling of the world, the very Names of antient nations, and even by the Authority and Arguments of that renowned Philosopher *Lucretius*, who, on other points, is so much admired and followed by those of your Sect. Not to mention that the continual Decrease of fluids, the Sinking of hills, and the Diminution of Planetary motions afford so many Natural Proofs, which shew this world had a beginning; as the

Civil

Civil or Historical proofs abovementioned do plainly point out, this beginning to have been about the time assigned in Holy Scripture. After all which I beg leave to add one Observation more. To any one who considers that, on digging into the earth, such quantities of shells, and, in some places, bones and horns of animals are found, found and intire after having lain there in all probability some thousands of years; it thou'd seem probable, that Gems, Medals, and Implements in metal or stone, might have lasted intire, buried under ground forty or fifty thousand years, if the world had been so old. How comes it then to pass that no remains are found, no antiquities of those numerous ages preceding the Scripture accounts of time; no fragments of buildings, no publick monuments, no intaglias, cammeos, statues, basso relievos, medals, inscriptions, utensils, or artificial works of any kind are ever discover'd, which may bear testimony to the existence of those mighty Empires, those Successions of Monarchs, Heroes, and Demi-gods, for so many thousand years? Let us look forward and suppose ten or twenty thousand years to come, during which time we will suppose, that plagues, famines, wars, and earthquakes shall have made great havock in the world, is it not highly probable that at the end of such a period, Pillars, Vases, and Statues now in being of Granite, or Porphyry, or Jasper, (Stones of such hardness, as we know them to have lasted two thousand years above ground, without any considerable alteration) wou'd bear record of these and past ages? or that some of our current Coins might then be dug up, or old Walls and the foundations of Buildings shew themselves, as well as the shells and stones of the Primæval World are preserved down to our times. To me it seems to follow from these considerations, which common

sense

sense and experience make all men judges of, that we may see good reason to conclude, the world was created about the time recorded in Holy Scripture. And if we admit a thing so extraordinary as the Creation of this World, it shou'd seem that we admit something strange, and odd, and new to Humane Apprehension, beyond any other miracle whatsoever.

XXIV. *Alciphron* fate musing and made no answer, whereupon *Lyficles* expressed himself in the following manner. I must own I shou'd rather suppose with *Lucretius*, that the world was made by chance, and that Men grew out of the earth, like Pumpions, than pin my faith on those wretched fabulous fragments of Oriental History. And as for the learned Men, who have taken pains to illustrate and piece them together, they appear to me no better than so many musty Pedants. An ingenious Free-thinker may perhaps now and then make some use of their Lucubrations, and play one absurdity against another. But you are not therefore to think, he pays any real regard to the authority of such apocryphal Writers, or believes one syllable of the *Chinese*, *Babylonian*, or *Egyptian* Traditions. If we seem to give them a preference before the Bible, it is only because they are not established by Law. This is my plain sense of the matter, and I dare say it is the general sense of our Sect; who are too rational to be in earnest on such trifles, though they sometime give hints of deep Erudition, and put on a grave face to divert themselves with Bigots. *ALC.* Since *Lyficles* will have it so, I am content not to build on accounts of time preceding the *Mosaic*. I must nevertheless beg leave to observe, there is another point of a different nature, against which there do not lie the same exceptions, that deserves to be considered,



ed, and may serve our purpose as well. I presume it will be allowed that Historians, treating of times within the *Mosaic* account, ought by impartial Men to be placed on the same foot with *Moses*. It may therefore be expected, that those, who pretend to vindicate his Writings, shou'd reconcile them with parallel accounts of other Authors, treating of the same times, things, and persons. And, if we are not attached singly to *Moses*, but take our notions from other Writers, and the probability of things, we shall see good cause to believe, the *Jews* were only a crew of leprous *Ægyptians*, driven from their Country on account of that loathsome Distemper; and that their Religion, pretended to have been delivered from Heaven at mount *Sinai*, was in truth learned in *Egypt*, and brought from thence. CRI. Not to insist, on what cannot be denied, that an Historian writing of his own times is to be believed, before others who treat of the same subject several ages after, it seems to me that it is absurd to expect we shou'd reconcile *Moses* with profane Historians, till you have first reconciled them one with another. In answer therefore to what you observe, I desire you wou'd consider in the first place, that *Manetho*, *Chæremon*, and *Lyfimachus* had published inconsistent accounts of the *Jews*, and there going forth from *Ægypt*\*: In the second place, that their Language is a plain proof they were not of *Ægyptian*, but either of *Phœnician*, of *Syrian*, or of *Chaldæan*, original: and in the third place, that it doth not seem very probable to suppose, their Religion, the Basis or Fundamental principle of which was the Worship of one only Supreme God, and the principal Design of which was to abolish Idolatry, cou'd be derived from *Ægypt*, the most Idolatrous of all nations. It must be owned, the separate situation and

\* Joseph. contra Apion. l. 1.

institutions of the *Jews* occasioned, their being treated by some Foreigners, with great ignorance and contempt of them and their original. But *Strabo*, who is allowed to have been a judicious and inquisitive Writer, though he was not acquainted with their true History, makes more honourable mention of them. He relates that *Moses*, with many other Worshippers of one Infinite God, not approving the Image worship of the *Egyptians* and other nations, went out from *Ægypt* and settled in *Jerusalem*, where they built a Temple to one only God without Images\*.

XXV. *ALC.* We who assert the cause of Liberty against Religion, in these later ages of the world, lie under great disadvantages, from the loss of ancient Books, which cleared up many points to the eyes of those great Men, *Celsus*, *Porphyrus*, and *Julian*, which at a greater distance and with less help cannot so easily be made out by us: but, had we those Records, I doubt not we might demolish the whole System at once. *CRI.* And yet I make some doubt of this; because those great Men, as you call them, with all those advantages cou'd not do it. *ALC.* That must needs have been owing to the Dulness and Stupidity of the world in those days, when the art of reasoning was not so much known and cultivated as of late: But those Men of true genius saw through the deceit themselves, and were very clear in their opinion, which convinces me they had good reason on their side. *CRI.* And yet that great Man *Celsus* seems to have had very flight and inconstant notions: One while, he talks like a thorough *Epicurean*; another, he admits Miracles, Prophecies, and a future state of rewards and punishments. What think you, *Alciphron*, is it not something capricious in so great a Man, among other advantages which he ascribes

\* Strab. l. 16.

to Brutes above Humane Kind, to suppose they are Magicians and Prophets; that they have a nearer commerce and union with the Divinity; that they know more than Men; and that Elephants, in particular, are of all others most religious animals and strict observers of an Oath\*.

*ALC.* A great genius will be sometimes whimsical. But what do you say to the Emperor *Julian*, was not he an extraordinary Man? *CRI.* He seems by his writings to have been lively and satirical. Further, I make no difficulty of owning that he was a generous, temperate, gallant, and facetious Emperor: But at the same time it must be allow'd, because his own Heathen Panegyrist *Ammianus Marcellinus* † allows it, that he was a prating, light, vain, superstitious sort of Man. And therefore his Judgment or Authority can be but of small weight with those, who are not prejudiced in his favour. *ALC.* But of all the great Men who wrote against Revealed Religion, the greatest without question was that truly great Man *Porphyry*, the loss of whose invaluable work can never be sufficiently lamented. This profound Philosopher went to the bottom and original of things. He most learnedly confuted the Scriptures, shew'd the Absurdity of the *Mosaic* accounts, undermined and exposed the Prophecies, and ridiculed allegorical Interpretations\*. The moderns, it must be owned, have done great things and shewn themselves able Men; yet I cannot but regret the loss of what was done by a person of such vast abilities, and who lived so much nearer the Fountain-head; though his authority survives his writings, and must still have its weight with impartial Men, in spite of the enemies of Truth. *CRI.*

\* Origen. contra Celsum, l. 4.

† Am. Marcellin. l. 25.

\* Luc. Holstenius de vita & scriptis Porphyrii.

*Porphry*, I grant was a thorough Infidel, though he appears by no means to have been incredulous. It seems he had a great opinion of Wizards and Necromancers, and believed the Mysteries, Miracles, and Prophecies of *Theurgists* and *Egyptian* priests. He was far from being an enemy to obscure Jargon; and pretended to extraordinary Extasies. In a word this great Man appears to have been as unintelligible as a Schoolman, as superstitious as a Monk, and as fanatical as any Quietist or Quaker; and, to compleat his character as a Minute Philosopher, he was under strong temptations to lay violent hands on himself. We may frame a notion of this Patriarch of Infidelity, by his judicious way of thinking upon other points as well as the Christian Religion. So sagacious was he as to find out, that the Souls of insects, when separated from their bodies, become rational: That Demons of a thousand shapes assist in making Philtrums and Charms, whose spiritual bodies are nourished and fattened by the Steams of libations and sacrifices: that the Ghosts of those, who died violent deaths, use to haunt and appear about their Sepulchres. This same egregious Philosopher adviseth a wise Man not to eat flesh, lest the impure Soul of the Brute that was put to violent death shou'd enter, along with the flesh, into those who eat it. He adds, as a matter of fact confirmed by many experiments, that those who wou'd insinuate into themselves the Souls of such animals, as have the gift of foretelling things to come, need only eat a principal part, the heart for instance of a Stag or a Mole, and so receive the Soul of the animal, which will prophesy in them like a God\*. No wonder if Men whose minds were preoccupied by Faith and Tenets of such a peculiar kind shou'd be averse from the reception of the Gospel.

\* Vide Porphyrium de abstinentia, de sacrificiis, de diis & demonibus.

Upon the whole, we desire to be excused if we do not pay the same deference to the judgment of men, that appear to us whimsical, superstitious, weak and visionary, which those impartial Gentlemen do, who admire their Talents, and are proud to tread in their Footsteps. *ALC.* Men see things in different views : what one admires another contemns ; it is even possible for a prejudiced mind, whose attention is turned towards the Faults and Blemishes of things, to fancy some shadow of defect in those great Lights which in our own days have enlightened, and still continue to enlighten the world.

XXVI. But pray tell me, *Crito*, what you think of *Josephus* ? He is allowed to have been a Man of learning and judgment. He was himself an assertor of revealed Religion. And Christians, when his authority serves their turn, are used to cite him with respect. *CRI.* All this I acknowledge. *ALC.* Must it not then seem very strange, and very suspicious to every impartial Inquirer, that this learned *Jew* writing the History of his own Country, of that very place, and those very times, where and when *Jesus Christ* made his appearance, shou'd yet say nothing of the character, miracles, and doctrine of that Extraordinary Person ? Some ancient Christians were so sensible of this, that, to make amends, they inserted a famous Passage in that Historian ; which imposture hath been sufficiently detected by able Critics in the last age. *CRI.* Though there are not wanting able Critics on the other side of the question, yet, not to enter upon the discussion of that celebrated passage, I am content to give you all you can desire, and suppose it not genuine, but the pious fraud of some wrong-headed Christian, who cou'd not brook the omission in *Josephus* : But this will never make such omission

omission a real objection against Christianity. Nor is there, for ought I can see, any thing in it whereon to ground either admiration or suspicion ; inasmuch as it shou'd seem very natural, supposing the Gospel account exactly true, for *Josephus* to have said nothing of it ; considering that the view of that writer was to give his country some figure in the eye of the World, which had been greatly prejudic'd against the *Jews*, and knew little of their history, to which end the Life and Death of our Saviour wou'd not in any wise have conduc'd ; considering that *Josephus* cou'd not have been an eye-witness of our Saviour or his Miracles ; considering that he was a *Pharisee* of Quality and Learning, foreign as well as *Jewish*, one of great Employment in the State, and that the Gospel was preached to the poor ; that the first Instruments of spreading it, and the first Converts to it were mean and illiterate, that it might not seem the work of Man, or beholding to Humane interest or power ; considering the general prejudice of the *Jews*, who expected in the *Messiah* a temporal and conquering Prince, which prejudice was so strong, that they chose rather to attribute our Saviour's miracles to the Devil, than acknowledge him to be the Christ : Considering also the hellish Disorder and Confusion of the *Jewish* State in the Days of *Josephus*, when Mens minds were fill'd and astonish'd with unparallel'd wars, dissensions, massacres, and seditions of that devoted people. Laying all these things together, I do not think it strange, that such a man, writing with such a view, at such a time, and in such circumstances, shou'd omit to describe our Blessed Saviour's life and death, or to mention his miracles, or to take notice of the State of the Christian Church, which was then as a grain of Mustard seed beginning to take Root and germinate. And this will seem still less strange,

if

if it be considered, that the Apostles in a few years after our Saviour's death departed from *Jerusalem*, setting themselves to convert the *Gentiles*, and were dispersed throughout the world ; that the Converts in *Jerusalem* were, not only of the meanest of the people, but also few ; the three thousand, added to the Church in one day upon *Peter's* preaching in that city, appearing to have been not Inhabitants but Strangers from all parts assembled to celebrate the feast of *Pentecost* ; and that all the time of *Josephus* and for several years after, during a Succession of fifteen Bishops, the Christians at *Jerusalem* observed the *Mosaic Law*\*, and were consequently, in outward appearance, one people with the rest of the *Jews*, which must have made them less observable. I wou'd fain know what reason we have to suppose, that the Gospel, which in its first Propagation seemed to overlook the great or considerable men of this world, might not also have been overlooked by them, as a thing not suited to their apprehensions and way of thinking ? Besides, in those early times might not other learned *Jews*, as well as † *Gamaliel*, suspend their judgment of this new way, as not knowing what to make or say of it, being on one hand unable to quit the Notions and Traditions in which they were brought up, and, on the other, not daring to resist or speak against the Gospel, lest they shou'd be found to fight against God ? Surely at all events, it cou'd never be expected, that an unconverted *Jew* shou'd give the same account of the Life, Miracles, and Doctrine of *Jesus Christ*, as might become a Christian to have given ; nor on the other hand was it at all improbable, that a Man of sense shou'd beware to lessen or traduce what, for ought

\* Sulp. Sever. Sacr. Hist. l 2. & Euseb. Chron. lib. poster.

† Acts v.

he knew, might have been a heavenly Dispensation, between which two courses the middle was to say nothing, but pass it over in a doubtful or a respectful silence. And it is observable, that where this Historian occasionally mentions *Jesus Christ* in his account of St. *James's* death, he doth it without any reflection, or saying either good or bad, though at the same time he shews a regard for the Apostle. It is observable, I say, that speaking of *Jesus* his expression is, who was called the Christ, not who pretended to be the Christ, or who was falsely called the Christ, but simply τὸ λεγόμενον Χριστὸν\*. It is evident *Josephus* knew there was such a Man as *Jesus*, and that he was said to be the Christ; and yet he condemns neither him nor his followers; which to me seems an Argument in their favour. Certainly if we suppose *Josephus* to have known or been persuaded that he was an Impostor, it will be difficult to account for his not saying so in plain terms. But if we suppose him in *Gamaliel's* way of thinking, who suspended his judgment, and was afraid of being found to fight against God, it shou'd seem natural for him to behave in that very manner, which according to you makes against our Faith, but I verily think makes for it. But what if *Josephus* had been a Bigot, or even a *Sadducee*, an Infidel, an Atheist? What then! we readily grant there might have been Persons of Rank, Politicians, Generals, and Men of Letters, then as well as now, *Jetes* as well as *Englishmen*, who believed no revealed Religion: And that some such persons might possibly have heard of a man in low life, who performed miracles by Magic, without informing themselves, or perhaps ever inquiring, about his Mission and Doctrine. Upon the whole, I cannot comprehend, why any Man shou'd con-

\* Jos. Ant. l. 20. c. 3.



clude against the Truth of the Gospel, from *Josephus's* omitting to speak of it, any more than from his omitting to embrace it. Had the first Christians been Chief Priests and Rulers, or Men of science and learning, like *Philo* and *Josephus*, it might perhaps with better colour have been objected, that their Religion was of Humane Contrivance, than now that it hath pleased God by weak things to confound the Strong. This I think sufficiently accounts, why in the beginning the Gospel might overlook or be overlooked by Men of a certain rank and character.

XXVII. *ALC.* And yet it seems an odd argument in proof of any Doctrine, that it was preached by simple people to simple people. *CR I.* Indeed if there was no other attestation to the Truth of the Christian Religion, this must be owned a very weak one. But if a Doctrine begun by instruments, mean as to all Humane Advantages, and making its first progress among those, who had neither wealth nor Art nor power to grace or encourage it, shou'd in a short time by it's own innate Excellency, the mighty force of Miracles, and the demonstration of the Spirit, not only without, but against, all worldly Motives spread through the world, and subdue Men of all ranks and conditions of life, wou'd it not be very unreasonable to reject or suspect it, for the want of humane means? And might not this with much better reason be thought an Argument of its coming from God?

*ALC.* But still an inquisitive Man will want the Testimony of Men of learning and knowledge.

*CR I.* But from the first Century onwards, there was never wanting the testimony of such Men, who wrote learnedly in defence of the Christian Religion, who lived, many of them, when the memory of things was fresh, who had abilities to judge and

means to know, and who gave the clearest proofs of their conviction and sincerity. *ALC.* But all the while these Men were Christians, prejudiced Christians, and therefore their Testimony is to be suspected. *CR I.* It seems then you wou'd have *Jews* or Heathens attest the Truths of Christianity. *ALC.* That is the very thing I want. *CR I.* But how can this be ? or if it cou'd, wou'd not any rational Man be apt to suspect such Evidence, and ask, how it was possible for a Man really to believe such things himself and not become a Christian ? the Apostles and first Converts were themselves *Jews*, and brought up in a veneration for the Law of *Moses*, and in all the prejudices of that people : many Fathers, Christian Philosophers, and learned Apologists for the Faith, who had been bred *Gentiles*, were without doubt imbued with prejudices of Education : and if the finger of God and force of Truth converted both the one and the other from *Judaism* or *Gentilism*, in spite of their prejudices to Christianity, is not their Testimony so much the stronger ? You have then the suffrages of both *Jews* and *Gentiles*, attesting to the Truth of our Religion in the earliest ages. But to expect or desire the attestation of *Jews* remaining *Jews*, or of *Gentiles* remaining *Gentiles*, seems unreasonable : nor can it be imagined that the Testimony of Men, who were not converted themselves, shou'd be the likeliest to convert others. We have indeed the Testimony of Heathen Writers to prove, That about the time of our Saviour's birth, there was a general expectation in the east of a *Messiah* or Prince, who shou'd found a new Dominion : That there were such people as Christians : That they were cruelly persecuted and put to death : That they were innocent and holy in life and worship : And that there did really exist in that time, certain persons and facts mentioned in the New Testament :

Testament : And for other points, we have learned Fathers, several of whom had been, as I already observed, bred Heathens, to attest their Truth.

*ALC.* For my part I have no great opinion of the capacity or learning of the Fathers, and many learned Men, especially of the reformed Churches abroad, are of the same mind, which saves me the trouble of looking my self into their voluminous Writings. *CR I.* I shall not take upon me to say, with the Minute Philosopher *Pomponatius* \*, that *Origen*, *Basil*, *Augustin*, and divers other Fathers, were equal to *Plato*, *Aristotle*, and the greatest of the *Gentiles* in Humane Knowledge. But, if I may be allowed to make a judgment from what I have seen of their writings, I shou'd think several of them Men of great parts, eloquence, and learning, and much superior to these who seem to undervalue them. Without any affront to certain modern Critics or Translators, *Erasmus* may be allowed a man of fine taste, and a fit judge of sense and good writing, though his judgment in this point was very different from theirs. Some of our reformed Brethern, because the *Romanists* attribute too much, seem to have attributed too little to them, from a very usual, though no very judicious opposition ; which is apt to lead men to remark defects, without making proper allowances, and to say things which neither piety, candour, nor good sense require them to say.

XXVIII. *ALC.* But though I shou'd acknowledge, that a concurring Testimony of many learned and able Men throughout the first ages of Christianity may have its weight, yet when I consider the great number of Forgeries and Heresies that sprung up in those times, it very much weakens

\* Lib. de immortalitate animæ.

their credit. *C R I.* Pray, *Alciphron*, wou'd it be allowed a good Argument in the mouth of a Papist against the Reformation, that many absurd Sects sprung up at the same time with it? Are we to wonder, that when good seed is sowing, the enemy shou'd sow tares? But at once to cut off several Objections, let us suppose in fact, what you do not deny possible, that there is a God, a Devil, and a Revelation from Heaven committed to writing many Centuries ago. Do but take a view of Humane Nature, and consider, what wou'd probably follow upon such a supposition; and whether it is not very likely there shou'd be Half-believers, mistaken Bigots, holy Frauds, ambitious, interested, disputing, conceited, schismatical, hæretical, absurd Men among the Professors of such revealed Religion, as well as after a course of ages, various readings, omissions, transpositions, and obscurities in the text of the sacred Oracles? And if so, I leave you to judge, whether it be reasonable to make those events an Objection against the being of a thing, which wou'd probably and naturally follow upon the Supposal of its Being. *A L C.* After all, say what you will, this variety of Opinions must needs shake the faith of a reasonable Man. Where there are so many different Opinions on the same point, it is very certain they cannot all be true, but it is certain they may all be false. And the means to find out the Truth! when a Man of sense sets about this Inquiry, he finds himself on a sudden startled and amused with hard words and knotty questions. This makes him abandon the pursuit, thinking the game not worth the chase. *C R I.* But wou'd not this Man of sense do well to consider, it must argue want of discernment, to reject divine Truths for the sake of Humane Follies? Use but the same candour and impartiality in treating of Religion, that you wou'd think proper

per on other subjects. We desire no more, and expect no less. In Law, in Physic, in Politics, wherever men have refined, is it not evident they have been always apt to run into disputes and chicane? But will that hinder you from admitting, there are many good rules and just notions, and useful truths in all those professions. Physicians may dispute, perhaps vainly and unintelligibly, about the Animal System: they may assign different causes of Distempers, some explaining them by the elementary qualities, hot and cold, moist and dry, yet this doth not hinder, but the Bark may be good for an Ague, and Rhubarb for a Flux. Nor can it others by chymical, others by mechanical principles, be inferred from the different sects, which from time to time have sprung up in that profession, the Dogmatic, for instance, Empiric, Methodic, Galenic, Paracelsian, or the hard words and knotty questions and idle theories which have grown from them, or been engrafted on them, that, therefore, we shou'd deny the Circulation of the Blood, or reject their excellent rules about Exercise, Air, and Diet. *ALC.* It seems you wou'd screen Religion by the example of other professions, all which have produced Sects and Disputes as well as Christianity, which may in itself be true and useful, notwithstanding many false and fruitless Notions engrafted on it by the wit of Man. Certainly if this had been observed or believed by many acute Reasoners, they wou'd never have made the multiplicity of Religious Opinions and Controversies an Argument against Religion in general. *CRI.* How such an obvious Truth shou'd escape Men of sense and inquiry I leave you to account: But I can very easily account for gross mistakes in those, who pass for Free-thinkers without ever thinking; or, if they do think, whose meditations are employ'd

on other points of a very different nature, from a serious and impartial Inquiry about Religion.

XXIX. But to return : what or where is the profession of Men, who never split into schisms, or never talk nonsense ? Is it not evident, that out of all the kinds of knowledge, on which the Humane mind is employ'd, there grow certain excrescences, which may be pared off, like the clippings of hair or nails in the body, and with no worse consequence. Whatever Bigots or Enthusiasts, whatever notional or scholastic Divines may say or think, it is certain the Faith derived from Christ and his Apostles, was not a piece of empty Sophistry ; they did not deliver and transmit down to us *καὴν ἀπάτην* but *γυμνὴν γνώμην*, to use the expression of a holy Confessor \*. And, to pretend to demolish their foundation for the sake of Humane Superstructure, be it hay or stubble or what it will, is no Argument of just thought or reason ; any more than it is of fairness, to suppose a doubtful sense fixed, and argue from one side of the question in disputed points. Whether, for instance, the beginning of *Genesis* is to be understood in a literal or allegorical sense ? Whether the Book of *Job* be an History or a Parable ? Being points disputed between Christians, an Infidel can have no right to argue from one side of the Question, in those or the like cases. This or that Tenet of a Sect, this or that contraverted Notion is not what we contend for at present, but the general Faith taught by Christ and his Apostles, and preserved by universal and perpetual Tradition in all the Churches down to our own times. To tax or strike at this Divine Doctrine, on account of things foreign and adventitious, the speculations and disputes of curious Men, is in my mind an absurdity of the same kind, as it would be to cut down a fine tree yielding Fruit and Shade, because its leaves afforded

\* Sect. Hister. Eccles. l. x.

nourishment

nourishment to Caterpillars, or because Spiders may now and then weave cobwebs among the branches. *ALC.* To divide and distinguish wou'd take time. We have several Gentlemen very capable of judging in the gross, but that want of attention for irksome and dry Studies or minute Inquiries. To which as it would be very hard to oblige Men against their will, so it must be a great wrong to the world, as well as themselves, to debar them from the Right of deciding according to their natural sense of things. *CR I.* It were to be wished those capable Men wou'd employ their judgment and attention on the same objects. If theological Inquiries are unpalatable, the field of nature is wide. How many Discoveries to be made! how many Errors to be corrected in arts and sciences! how many Vices to be reformed in life and manners! Why do men single out such points as are innocent and useful, when there are so many pernicious mistakes to be amended? Why set themselves to destroy the hopes of Humane Kind and encouragements to Virtue? Why delight to judge where they disdain to inquire? Why not employ their noble Talents on the Longitude or Perpetual Motion? *ALC.* I wonder you shou'd not see the difference between points of Curiosity and Religion. Those employ only Men of a genius or humour suited to them; but all Mankind have a right to censure, and are concerned to judge of these, except they will blindly submit to be governed, by the stale wisdom of their Ancestors and the established Laws of their Country. *CR I.* It shou'd seem, if they are concerned to judge, they are not less concerned to examine before they judge. *ALC.* But after all the examination and inquiry that mortal Man can make about Revealed Religion, it is impossible to come at any rational sure footing.

XXX. There

XXX. There is, indeed, a deal of specious talk about Faith founded upon Miracles; but when I examine this matter thoroughly, and trace Christian Faith up to its original, I find it rests upon much darkness and scruple and uncertainty. Instead of points evident or agreeable to Humane Reason, I find a wonderful narrative of the Son of God tempted in the wilderness by the Devil, a thing utterly unaccountable, without any end, or use or reason whatsoever. I meet with strange Histories of Apparitions of Angels and Voices from Heaven, with surprising accounts of Dæmoniacs, things quite out of the road of common Sense or Observation, with several incredible feats said to have been done by Divine Power, but more probably the Inventions of Men; nor the less likely to be so, because I cannot pretend to say with what view they were invented. Designs deeply laid are dark, and the less we know the more we suspect: But, admitting them for true, I shall not allow them to be miraculous, until I thoroughly know the power of what are called second causes and the force of Magic. C R I. You seem, *Alciphron*, to analyse, not Faith, but Infidelity, and trace it to its Principles; which, from your own account, I collect to be dark and doubtful scruples and surmises, hastiness in judging, and narrowness in thinking, grounded on a fanciful notion which over-rates the little scantling of your own Experience, and on real ignorance of the views of Providence, and of the qualities, operations, and mutual respects of the several kinds of beings, which are, or may be, for ought you know, in the Universe. Thus obscure, uncertain, conceited, and conjectural are the Principles of Infidelity. Whereas on the other hand, the Principles of Faith seem to be points plain and clear. It is a clear point, that this Faith in Christ was spread  
abroad



abroad throughout the world soon after his death. It is a clear point, that this was not effected by humane Learning, Politics, or Power. It is a clear point, that in the early times of the Church there were several men of Knowledge and Integrity, who embraced this Faith not from any, but against all, temporal motives. It is a clear point, that, the nearer they were to the fountain-head, the more opportunity they had to satisfy themselves, as to the Truth of these facts which they believed. It is a clear point, that the less interest there was to persuade, the more need there was of Evidence to convince them. It is a clear point, that they relied on the Authority of those who declared themselves Eye-witnesses of the Miracles and Resurrection of Christ. It is a clear point, that those professed Eye-witnesses suffered much for this their Attestation, and finally sealed it with their Blood. It is a clear point, that these Witnesses, weak and contemptible as they were, overcame the world, spread more light, preached purer morals, and did more benefit to Mankind, than all the Philosophers and Sages put together. These points appear to me clear and sure, and, being allow'd such, they are plain, just, and reasonable motives of assent; they stand upon no fallacious ground, they contain nothing beyond our sphere, neither supposing more knowledge nor other faculties than we are really masters of; and if they shou'd not be admitted for morally certain, as I believe they will by fair and unprejudiced Inquirers, yet the allowing them to be only probable is sufficient to stop the mouth of an Infidel. These plain points, I say, are the Pillars of our Faith, and not those obscure ones by you supposed, which are in truth the unsound, uncertain Principles of Infidelity, to a rash, prejudiced, and assuming Spirit. To raise an Argument, or answer an objection, from hidden powers of Nature

or

or Magic is groping in the dark ; but by the evident light of sense men might be sufficiently certified of sensible Effects, and matters of Fact, such as the Miracles and Resurrection of Christ : and the Testimony of such Men may be transmitted to After-ages, with the same moral certainty as other Historical Narrations: and those same miraculous Facts, compared by Reason with the Doctrines they were brought to prove, do afford to an unbiassed mind strong Indications of their coming from God, or a superior Principle, whose Goodness retrieved the Moral World, whose Power commanded the Natural, and whose Providence extended over both. Give me leave to say, that nothing dark, nothing incomprehensible, or mysterious, or unaccountable, is the ground or motive, the principle or foundation, the proof or reason of our Faith, although it may be the object of it. For it must be owned, that, if by clear and sure principles we are rationally led to believe a point less clear, we do not therefore reject such point, because it is mysterious to conceive, or difficult to account for, nor wou'd it be right so to do. As for *Jews* and *Gentiles*, anciently attributing our Saviour's Miracles to Magic, this is so far from being a proof against them, that to me it seems rather a Proof of the Facts, without disproving the Cause to which we ascribe them, As we do not pretend to know the Nature and Operations of Dæmons, the History, Laws, and System of rational Beings, and the Schemes or Views of Providence, so far as to account for every action and appearance recorded in the Gospel ; so neither do you know enough of those things, to be able from that Knowledge of yours to object against Accounts so well attested. It is an easy matter to raise Scruples upon many authentic parts of Civil History, which, requiring a more perfect knowledge of Facts, Circumstances, and Councils,

than

than we can come at to explain them, must be to us inexplicable. And this is still more easy with respect to the History of Nature, in which, if Surmises were admitted for Proofs against things odd, strange, and unaccountable, if our scanty Experience were made the rule and measure of Truth, and all those Phænomena rejected, that we, through ignorance of the Principles, and Laws, and System of Nature, cou'd not explain, we shou'd indeed make Discoveries, but it wou'd be only of our own Blindness and Presumption. And why Men that are so easily and so often gravell'd in common Points, in things natural and visible, shou'd yet be so sharp-sighted and dogmatical about the invisible World, and its Mysteries, is to me a point utterly unaccountable by all the Rules of Logic and good Sense. Upon the whole, therefore, I cannot help thinking there are Points sufficiently plain, and clear, and full, whereon a Man may ground a reasonable Faith in Christ: but that the attacks of Minute Philosophers against this faith are grounded upon Darkness, Ignorance, and Presumption. *ALC.* I doubt I shall still remain in the dark as to the Proofs of the Christian Religion, and always presume there is nothing in them.

XXXI. For how is it possible, at this remote distance, to arrive at any Knowledge, or frame any Demonstration about it? *CRI.* What then? Knowledge, I grant, in a strict sense cannot be had without Evidence or Demonstration; but probable Arguments are a sufficient ground of Faith. Who ever supposed that scientific Proofs were necessary to make a Christian? Faith alone is required; and provided that, in the main and upon the whole, Men are persuaded, this saving Faith may consist with some degrees of Obscurity, Scruple, and Error. For although the Light of Truth  
be

be unchangeable, and the same in its eternal Source, the Father of Lights: Yet, with respect to us, it is variously weakened and obscured, by passing through a long Distance or gross Medium, where it is intercepted, distorted, or tinged by the Prejudices and Passions of Men. But all this notwithstanding, he that will use his Eyes may see enough for the purposes either of Nature, or of Grace; though by a light, dimmer indeed, or clearer, according to the Place, or the Distance, or the Hour, or the Medium. And it will be sufficient, if such Analogy appears between the Dispensations of Grace and Nature, as may make it probable (although much shou'd be unaccountable in both) to suppose them derived from the same Author, and the workmanship of one and the same Hand. *ALC.* Those who saw and touched and handled *Jesus Christ* after his Resurrection, if there were any such, may be said to have seen by a clear Light: But to us the Light is very dim, and yet it is expected we shou'd believe this Point as well as they. For my part, I believe, with *Spinoza*, that Christ's Death was Literal, but his Resurrection Allegorical\*. *CRI.* And for my part, I can see nothing in this celebrated Infidel, that shou'd make me desert matters of Fact, and moral Evidence, to adopt his Notions. Though I must needs own I admit an allegorical Resurrection that proves the real, to wit, a Resurrection of Christ's Disciples from Weakness to Resolution, from Fear to Courage, from Despair to Hope, of which, for ought I can see, no rational Account can be given, but the sensible Evidence that our Lord was truly, really, and literally risen from the dead: But as it cannot be denied that his Disciples, who were Eye-witnesses of his Miracles and Resurrection, had stronger Evidence than we can have of those Points:

\* V. *Spinozæ* Epist. ad Oldenburgium.

So it cannot be denied, that such Evidence was then more necessary, to induce Men to embrace a new Institution, contrary to the whole System of their Education, their Prejudices, their Passions, their Interests, and every Humane Motive. Though to me it seems, the moral Evidence and probable Arguments within our reach, are abundantly sufficient to make prudent thinking Men adhere to the Faith, handed down to us from our Ancestors, established by the Laws of our Country, requiring Submission in Points above our Knowledge, and for the rest recommending Doctrines the most agreeable to our Interest and our Reason. And, however strong the Light might have been at the Fountain-head, yet its long Continuance and Propagation, by such unpromising Instruments throughout the World, have been very wonderful. We may now take a more comprehensive View of the Connexion, Order, and Progress of the divine Dispensations, and, by a retrospect on a long Series of past Ages, perceive a Unity of Design running throughout the whole, a gradual disclosing and fulfilling the purposes of Providence, a regular Progress from Types to Antitypes, from things Carnal to things Spiritual, from Earth to Heaven. We may behold Christ crucified, that stumbling-block to the *Jews*, and foolishness to the *Greeks*, putting a final Period to the Temple Worship of the one, and the Idolatry of the other, and that Stone, which was cut out of the Mountain without Hands, and brake in Pieces all other Kingdoms, become it self a great Mountain.

XXXII. If a due Reflection on these things be not sufficient to beget a Reverence for the Christian Faith in the Minds of Men, I shou'd rather impute it to any other Cause, than a wise and cautious Incredulity: When I see their easiness of Faith in the  
common

common concerns of Life, where there is no Prejudice or Appetite to bias or disturb their natural Judgment: When I see those very Men that in Religion will not stir a step without Evidence, and at every turn expect Demonstration, trust their Health to a Physician, and their Lives to a Sailor with an implicit Faith, I cannot think they deserve the honour of being thought more incredulous than other Men, or that they are more accustomed to know, and for this reason less inclined to believe. On the contrary, one is tempted to suspect, that Ignorance hath a greater share than Science in our modern Infidelity, and that it proceeds more from a wrong Head, or an irregular Will, than from deep Researches. *LYS.* We do not, it must be owned, think that Learning or deep Researches are necessary to pass right Judgments upon things. I sometimes suspect that Learning is apt to produce and justify Whims, and sincerely believe we shou'd do better without it. Our Sect are divided on this Point, but much the greater part think with me. I have heard more than once very observing Men remark, that Learning was the true humane Means which preserved Religion in the World, and that, if we had it in our power to prefer Blockheads in the Church, all wou'd soon be right. *C R I.* Men must be strangely in love with their Opinions, to put out their Eyes rather than part with them. But it has been often remarked, by observing Men that there are no greater Bigots than Infidels. *LYS.* What a Free-thinker and a Bigot, impossible! *C R I.* Not so impossible neither, that an Infidel shou'd be bigoted to his Infidelity. Methinks I see a Bigot, wherever I see a Man over-bearing and positive without knowing why, laying the greatest stress on Points of smallest moment, hasty to judge of the Conscience, Thoughts, and inward Views of other

Men

Men, impatient of reasoning against his own Opinions, and choosing them with Inclination rather than Judgment, an Enemy to Learning, and attached to mean Authorities. How far our Modern Infidels agree with this Description, I leave to be considered by those who really consider and think for themselves. *LYS.* We are no Bigots, we are Men that discover Difficulties in Religion, that tie Knots and raise Scruples, which disturb the Repose and interrupt the golden Dreams of Bigots, who therefore cannot endure us. *CRI.* They who cast about for Difficulties, will be sure to find or make them upon every subject: But he that wou'd, upon the foot of Reason, erect himself into a Judge, in order to make a wise Judgment on a Subject of that nature, will not only consider the doubtful and difficult Parts of it, but take a comprehensive View of the whole, consider it in all its Parts and Relations, trace it to its Original, examine its Principles, Effects, and Tendencies, its Proofs internal and external; he will distinguish between the clear Points and the obscure, the certain and the uncertain, the essential and circumstantial, between what is genuine and what foreign: he will consider the different sorts of Proof, that belong to different things, where Evidence is to be expected, where Probability may suffice, and where it is reasonable to suppose there shou'd be Doubts and Scruples: He will proportion his Pains and Exactness to the Importance of the Inquiry, and check that Disposition of his Mind to conclude all those Notions, groundless Prejudices, with which it was imbued before it knew the Reason of them. He will silence his Passions, and listen to Truth: He will endeavour to untie Knots as well as to tie them, and dwell rather on the light parts of things than the obscure: He will balance the force of his Understanding with the difficulty of the

Subject, and to render his Judgment impartial, hear Evidence on all sides, and, so far as he is led by Authority, choose to follow that of the honestest and wisest Men. Now it is my sincere Opinion, the Christian Religion may well stand the Test of such an Inquiry. *LYS.* But such an Inquiry wou'd cost too much Pains and Time. We have thought of another Method, the bringing Religion to the Test of Wit and Humour: This we find a much shorter, easier, and more effectual Way. And as all Enemies are at liberty to choose their Weapons, we make choice of those we are most expert at: And we are the better pleased with this Choice, having observed that of all things a solid Divine hates a Jest. To consider the whole of the Subject, to read and think on all sides, to object plainly, and answer directly, upon the foot of dry Reason and Argument, wou'd be a very tedious and troublesome Affair. Besides it is attacking Pedants at their own Weapons. How much more delicate and artful is it, to give a hint, to cover one's self with an *Ænigma*, to drop a *double Entendre*, to keep it in one's Power to recover, and slip aside, and leave his Antagonist beating the Air? This hath been practised with great Success, and I believe it the top Method to gain Proselytes, and confound Pedants. *CRI.* I have seen several things written in this way, which, I suppose, were copied from the Behaviour of a fly sort of Scorners one may sometimes meet with. Suppose a conceited Man that wou'd pass for witty, tipping the Wink upon one, thrusting out his Tongue at another; one while waggishly smiling, another with a grave Mouth and ludicrous Eyes; often affecting the Countenance of one who smother'd a Jest, and sometimes bursting out in a Horse-laugh: What a Figure wou'd this be, I will not say in the Senate or Council, but in a private Visit among well-



well-bred Men? And yet this is the Figure that certain great Authors, who in this Age wou'd pass for Models, and do pass for Models, make in their polite and elaborate Writings on the most weighty Points. *ALC.* I who profess my self an Admirer, an Adorer of Reason, am obliged to own, that in some Cases the Sharpness of Ridicule can do more than the Strength of Argument. But if we exert our selves in the use of Mirth and Humour, it is not for want of other Weapons. It shall never be said that a Free-thinker was afraid of Reasoning. No, *Crito*, we have Reasons in store, the best are yet to come; and if we can find an Hour for another Conference before we set out to morrow morning, I'll undertake you shall be plied with Reasons, as clear, and home, and close to the Point as you cou'd wish.






## The SEVENTH DIALOGUE.

- I. *Christian Faith impossible.* II. *Words stand for Ideas.* III. *No Knowledge or Faith without Ideas,* IV. *Grace, no Idea of it.* V. *Abstract Ideas what and how made.* VI. *Abstract general Ideas impossible.* VII. *In what Sense there may be general Ideas.* VIII. *Suggesting Ideas not the only use of Words.* IX. *Force as difficult to form an Idea of as Grace.* X. *Notwithstanding which useful Propositions may be formed concerning it.* XI. *Belief of the Trinity and other Mysteries not absurd.* XII. *Mistakes about Faith an occasion of profane Raillery.* XIII. *Faith its true Nature and Effects.* XIV. *Illustrated by Science.* XV. *By Arithmetic in particular.* XVI. *Sciences conversant about Signs.* XVII. *The true End of Speech, Reason, Science, and Faith.* XVIII. *Metaphysical Objections as strong against Humane Sciences as Articles of Faith.* XIX. *No Religion, because no Humane Liberty.* XX. *Farther Proof against Humane Liberty.* XXI. *Fatalism a Consequence of erroneous Suppositions.* XXII. *Man an accountable Agent.* XXIII. *Inconsistency, Singularity, and Credulity of Minute Philosophers.* XXIV. *Untrodden Paths and new Light of the Minute Philosophers.* XXV. *Sophistry of the Minute Philosophers.* XXVI. *Minute Philosophers ambiguous, enigmatical, unsathomable.* XXVII.

XXVII. *Scepticism of the Minute Philosophers.*  
 XXVIII. *How a Sceptic ought to behave.* XXIX.  
*Minute Philosophers why difficult to convince.*  
 XXX. *Thinking not the epidemical Evil of these*  
*times.* XXXI. *Infidelity not an Effect of Reason*  
*or Thought, its true Motives assigned.* XXXII.  
*Variety of Opinions about Religion, Effects there-*  
*of.* XXXIII. *Method for proceeding with Mi-*  
*nute Philosophers.* XXXIV. *Want of Thought*  
*and want of Education Defects of the present Age.*

I.  HE Philosophers having resolved to set out for *London* next Morning, we assembled at break of day in the Library. *Alciphron* began with a Declaration of his Sincerity, assuring us he had very maturely and with a most unbiassed Mind considered all that had been said the day before. He added that upon the whole he cou'd not deny several probable Reasons were produced for embracing the Christian Faith. But, said he, those Reasons being only probable can never prevail against absolute Certainty and Demonstration. If therefore I can demonstrate your Religion to be a thing altogether absurd and inconsistent, your probable Arguments in its defence do from that Moment lose their Force, and with it all Right to be answer'd or considered. The concurring Testimony of sincere and able Witnesses hath without question great weight in humane Affairs. I will even grant that things odd and unaccountable to Humane Judgment or Experience, may sometimes claim our Assent on that sole Motive. And I will also grant it possible, for a Tradition to be convey'd with moral Evidence through many Centuries. But at the same time you will grant to me, that a thing demonstrably and palpably false is not to be admitted on any Testimony whatever, which

at best can never amount to Demonstration. To be plain, no Testimony can make Nonsense Sense; no moral Evidence can make Contradictions consistent. Know then, that as the Strength of our Cause doth not depend upon, so neither is it to be decided by any critical Points of History, Chronology, or Languages. You are not to wonder, if the same sort of Tradition and moral Proof, which governs our Assent with respect to Facts in civil or natural History, is not admitted as a sufficient Voucher for metaphysical Absurdities and absolute Impossibilities. Things obscure and unaccountable in humane Affairs, or the Operations of Nature, may yet be possible, and, if well attested, may be assented unto: But religious Assent or Faith can be evidently shewn in its own nature to be impracticable, impossible, and absurd. This is the primary Motive to Infidelity. This is our Citadel and Fortrefs, which may, indeed, be graced with outworks of various Erudition, but, if those are demolished, remains in it self and of its own proper Strength impregnable. *EUPH.* This, it must be owned, reduceth our Inquiry within a narrow Compass: Do but make out this, and I shall have nothing more to say. *ALC.* Know then, that the shallow Mind of the Vulgar, as it dwells only on the outward Surface of things, and considers them in the gross, may be easily imposed on. Hence a blind Reverence for Religious Faith and Mystery. But when an acute Philosopher comes to dissect and analyse these Points, the Imposture plainly appears: And as he has no Blindness, so he has no Reverence for empty Notions, or, to speak more properly, for meer Forms of Speech, which mean nothing, and are of no use to Mankind.

II. Words are Signs: They do or shou'd stand for Ideas; which so far as they suggest they are significant. But words that suggest no Ideas are insignificant. He who annexeth a clear Idea to every Word he makes use of speaks Sense; but where such Ideas are wanting, the Speaker utters Nonsense. In order therefore to know whether any Man's Speech be senseless and insignificant, we have nothing to do but lay aside the Words and consider the Ideas suggested by them. Men, not being able immediately to communicate their Ideas one to another, are obliged to make use of sensible Signs or Words; the use of which is to raise those Ideas in the Hearer, which are in the Mind of the Speaker: And if they fail of this End they serve to no Purpose. He who really thinks hath a train of Ideas succeeding each other and connected in his Mind: And when he expresseth himself by Discourse, each Word suggests a distinct Idea to the Hearer or Reader; who by that means hath the same train of Ideas in his, which was in the Mind of the Speaker or Writer. As far as this Effect is produced, so far the Discourse is intelligible, hath sense and meaning. Hence it follows, that whoever can be supposed to understand what he reads or hears must have a train of Ideas raised in his Mind, correspondent to the train of Words read or heard. These plain Truths, to which Men readily assent in Theory, are but little attended to in Practice, and therefore deserve to be enlarged on and inculcated however obvious and undeniable. Mankind are generally averse from thinking though apt enough to entertain Discourse either in themselves or others: the Effect whereof is, that their Minds are rather stored with Names than Ideas, the husk of Science rather than the thing. And yet these Words without meaning do often make Distinctions of Parties, the Subject matter of their

Disputes, and the Object of their Zeal: This is the most general Cause of Error, which doth not influence ordinary Minds alone, but even those who pass for acute and learned Philosophers are often employ'd about Names instead of Things or Ideas, and are supposed to know when they only pronounce hard Words without a meaning.

III. Though it is evident that as Knowledge is the Perception of the Connexion or Disagreement between Ideas, he who doth not distinctly perceive the Ideas marked by the terms, so as to form a mental Proposition answering to the verbal, cannot possibly have Knowledge: No more can he be said to have Opinion or Faith which imply a weaker Assent, but still it must be to a Proposition, the Terms of which are understood as clearly, although the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas may not be so evident, as in the case of Knowledge. I say, all degrees of Assent whether founded on Reason or Authority, more or less cogent, are internal Acts of the Mind which alike terminate in Ideas as their proper Object: Without which there can be really no such thing as Knowledge, Faith, or Opinion. We may perhaps raise a Dust and Dispute about Tenets purely verbal; but what is this at bottom more than meer trifling? All which will be easily admitted with respect to Humane Learning and Science; wherein it is an allowed Method to expose any Doctrine or Tenet by stripping them of the Words, and examining what Ideas are underneath, or whether any Ideas at all? This is often found the shortest way to end Disputes, which might otherwise grow and multiply without end, the Litigants neither understanding one another nor themselves. It were needless to illustrate what shines by its own Light, and is admitted by all thinking Men. My endeavour shall be

be only to apply it in the present Case. I suppose I need not be at any pains to prove, that the same Rules of Reason and good Sense which obtain in all other Subjects ought to take place in Religion. As for those who consider Faith and Reason as two distinct Provinces, and wou'd have us think good Sense has nothing to do where it is most concerned, I am resolved never to argue with such Men, but leave them in quiet Possession of their Prejudices. And now, for the particular Application of what I have said, I shall not single out any nice disputed Points of School Divinity, or those that relate to the Nature and Essence of God, which being allow'd infinite you might pretend to screen them, under the general Notion of Difficulties attending the Nature of Infinity.

IV. Grace is the main Point in the Christian Dispensation, nothing is oftener mentioned or more considered throughout the New Testament; wherein it is represented as somewhat of a very particular kind, distinct from any thing revealed to the *Jews*, or known by the light of Nature. This same Grace is spoken of as the Gift of God, as coming by *Jesus Christ*, as reigning, as abounding, as operating. Men are said to speak through Grace, to believe through Grace. Mention is made of the Glory of Grace, the Riches of Grace, the Stewards of Grace. Christians are said to be Heirs of Grace, to receive Grace, grow in Grace, be strong in Grace, to stand in Grace, and to fall from Grace. And lastly, Grace is said to justify and to save them. Hence Christianity is styled the Covenant or Dispensation of Grace. And it is well known that no Point hath created more Controversy in the Church than this Doctrine of Grace. What Disputes about its Nature, Extent, and Effects, about universal, efficacious, sufficient, preventing, irresistible

irristible Grace have employ'd the Pens of Protestant as well as Popish Divines, of Jansenists and Molinists, of Lutherans, Calvinists, and Arminians, as I have not the least curioly to know, so I need not say. It sufficeth to observe, that there have been and are still subsisting great contests upon these Points. Only one thing I shou'd desire to be informed of, to wit, what is the clear and distinct Idea marked by the Word Grace? I presume a Man may know the bare meaning of a Term, without going into the depth of all those learned Inquiries. This surely is an easy Matter, provided there is an Idea annexed to such Term. And if there is not, it can be neither the subject of a rational Dispute, nor the Object of real Faith. Men may indeed impose upon themselves or others, and pretend to argue and believe, when at bottom there is no Argument or Belief, farther than meer verbal trifling. Grace taken in the vulgar Sense, either for Beauty, or Favour, I can easily understand. But when it denotes an active, vital, ruling Principle, influencing and operating on the Mind of Man, distinct from every natural Power or Motive, I profess my self altogether unable to understand it, or frame any distinct Idea of it; and therefore I cannot assent to any Proposition concerning it, nor consequently have any Faith about it: And it is a self evident Truth, that God obligeth no Man to Impossibilities. At the request of a Philosophical Friend, I did cast an Eye on the Writings he shew'd me of some Divines, and talked with others on this Subject, but after all I had read or heard cou'd make nothing of it, having always found whenever I laid aside the Word *Grace*, and looked into my own Mind, a perfect vacuity or privation of all Ideas. And, as I am apt to think Mens Minds and Faculties are made much alike, I suspect that other Men, if they examined what they



they call Grace with the same exactness and indifference, wou'd agree with me that there was nothing in it but an empty Name. This is not the only Instance, where a Word often heard and pronounced is believed intelligible, for no other reason but because it is familiar. Of the same kind are many other Points reputed necessary Articles of Faith. That which in the present case imposeth upon Mankind I take to be partly this. Men speak of this holy Principle as of something that acts, moves, and determines, taking their Ideas from corporeal things, from Motion and the Force or *Momentum* of Bodies, which being of an obvious and sensible Nature they substitute in place of a thing spiritual and incomprehensible, which is a manifest Delusion. For though the Idea of corporeal Force be never so clear and intelligible, it will not therefore follow that the Idea of Grace, a thing perfectly incorporeal, must be so too. And though we may reason distinctly, perceive, assent, and form Opinions about the one, it will by no means follow that we can do so of the other. Thus it comes to pass, that a clear sensible Idea of what is real produceth, or rather is made a pretence for, an imaginary spiritual Faith that terminates in no Object; a thing impossible! For there can be no Assent where there are no Ideas: And where there is no Assent there can be no Faith: And what cannot be, that no Man is obliged to. This is as clear as any thing in *Euclid*.

V. The same Method of Reasoning may be applied by any Man of Sense, to confute all other the most essential Articles of the Christian Faith. You are not therefore to wonder that a Man who proceeds on such solid Grounds, such clear and evident Principles, shou'd be deaf to all you can say from moral Evidence, or probable Arguments,  
which

which are nothing in the balance against Demonstration. *EUPH.* The more Light and Force there is in this Discourse, the more you are to blame for not having produced it sooner. For my part, I shou'd never have said one Word against Evidence. But let me see whether I understand you rightly. You say, every Word in an intelligible Discourse must stand for an Idea; which Ideas as far as they are clearly and distinctly apprehended, so far the Discourse hath meaning, without which it is useless, and insignificant. *ALC.* I do. *EUPH.* For instance, when I hear the Words *Man*, *Triangle*, *Colour*, pronounced; they must excite in my Mind distinct Ideas of those things whereof they are Signs, otherwise I cannot be said to understand them. *ALC.* Right. *EUPH.* And this is the only true use of Language. *ALC.* That is what I affirm. *EUPH.* But every time the Word *Man* occurs in Reading or Conversation, I am not conscious that the particular distinct Idea of a Man is excited in my mind. For instance, when I read in *St. Paul's* Epistle to the *Galatians* these Words: *If a Man thinketh himself to be something, when he is nothing, he deceiveth himself.* Methinks I comprehend the Force and Meaning of this Proposition, although I do not frame to my self the particular distinct Idea of a Man. *ALC.* It is very true, you do not form in your Mind the particular Idea of *Peter*, *James*, or *John*, of a fair or a black, a tall or a low, a fat or a lean, a straight or a crooked, a wise or a foolish, a sleeping or waking Man, but the abstract general Idea of *Man*, prescinding from, and exclusive of all particular Shape, Size, Complexion, Passions, Faculties, and every individual Circumstance. To explain this Matter more fully, you are to understand there is in the Humane Mind, a Faculty of contemplating the general Nature of things, separate from all those Particularities

ties which distinguish the Individuals one from another. For Example, in *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, you may observe in each a certain Collection of Stature, Figure, Colour, and other peculiar Properties by which they are known asunder, distinguished from all other Men, and, if I may so say, individuated. Now leaving out of the Idea of a Man, that which is peculiar to the Individual, and retaining only that which is common to all Men, you form an abstract universal Idea of *Man* or *Humane Nature*, which includes no particular Stature, Shape, Colour, or other quality whether of Mind or Body. After the same manner you may observe particular Triangles to differ one from another, as their sides are equal or unequal, and their Angles greater or lesser; whence they are denominated æquilateral, æquicrural, or scalenum, obtusangular, acutangular, or rectangular. But the Mind excluding out of its Idea, all these peculiar Properties and Distinctions frameth the general abstract Idea of a Triangle; which is neither æquilateral, æquicrural, nor scalenum, neither obtusangular, acutangular, nor rectangular, but all and none of these at once\*. The same may be said of the general abstract Idea of Colour, which is something distinct from and exclusive of Blue, Red, Green, Yellow, and every other particular Colour, including only that general Essence in which they all agree. And what has been said of these three general Names, and the abstract general Ideas they stand for may be applied to all others. For you must know, that particular Things or Ideas being infinite, if each were marked or signified by a distinct proper Name, Words must have been innumerable, and Language an endless impossible thing. Hence it comes to pass, that

\* See *Locke* on *Humane Understanding*, b. 4. c. 7.

appellative or general Names stand, immediately and properly, not for particular but for abstract general Ideas, which they never fail to excite in the mind, as oft as they are used to any significant Purpose. And without this, there cou'd be no Communication or Enlargement of Knowledge, no such thing as universal Science or Theorems of any kind. Now for understanding any Proposition or Discourse, it is sufficient that distinct Ideas are thereby raised in your mind, correspondent to those in the Speaker's, whether the Ideas so raised are particular or only abstract and general Ideas. Forasmuch, nevertheless, as these are not so obvious and familiar to vulgar minds, it happens that some Men may think they have no Idea at all, when they have not a particular Idea; but the truth is, you had the abstract general Idea of Man, in the instance assigned, wherein you thought you had none. After the same manner, when it is said, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones; or that Colour is the Object of Sight, it is evident the Words do not stand for this or that Triangle or Colour, but for abstract general Ideas, excluding every thing peculiar to the Individuals, and including only the universal Nature common to the whole kind of Triangles or of Colours.

VI. *EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, are those abstract general Ideas clear and distinct? *ALC.* They are above all others clear and distinct, being the only proper Object of Science, which is altogether conversant about Universals. *EUPH.* And do you not think it very possible for any Man to know, whether he has this or that clear and distinct Idea or no? *ALC.* Doubtless. To know this he needs only examine his own Thoughts and look into his own mind. *EUPH.* But upon looking

ing into my own mind, I do not find that I have or can have these general abstract Ideas of a Man or a Triangle abovementioned, or of Colour prescinded from all particular Colours\*. Though I shut mine Eyes, and use mine utmost Efforts, and reflect on all that passeth in my own mind, I find it utterly impossible to form such Ideas. *ALC.* To reflect with due Attention and turn the mind inward upon it self, is a difficult Task and not every one's Talent. *EUPH.* Not to insist on what you allowed, that every one might easily know for himself whether he has this or that Idea or no: I am tempted to think no body else can form those Ideas any more than I can. Pray, *Alciphron*, which are those things you wou'd call absolutely impossible? *ALC.* Such as include a Contradiction. *EUPH.* Can you frame an Idea of what includes a Contradiction? *ALC.* I cannot. *EUPH.* Consequently whatever is absolutely impossible you cannot form an Idea of. *ALC.* This I grant. *EUPH.* But can a Colour or Triangle, such as you describe their abstract general Ideas, really exist? *ALC.* It is absolutely impossible such things shou'd exist in Nature. *EUPH.* Shou'd it not follow then that they cannot exist in your mind, or in other words that you cannot conceive or frame an Idea of them? *ALC.* You seem *Euphranor* not to distinguish between pure Intellect and Imagination. Abstract general Ideas I take to be the Object of pure Intellect, which may conceive them although they cannot perhaps be imagined. *EUPH.* I do not perceive that I can by any Faculty, whether of Intellect or Imagination, conceive or frame an Idea of that which is impossible and includes a Contradiction. And I

\* See the Introduction to a Treatise concerning the Principles of Humane Knowledge Printed in the year MDCCX. where the absurdity of abstract Ideas is fully considered.

am very much at a loss to account for your admitting that in common Instances, which you wou'd make an Argument against Divine Faith and Mysteries.

VII. *ALC.* There must be some mistake in this. How is it possible there shou'd be general Knowledge without general Propositions, or these without general Names, which cannot be without general Ideas by standing for which they become general? *EUPH.* But may not words become general, by being made to stand indiscriminately for all particular Ideas, which from a mutual Resemblance belong to the same kind, without the Intervention of any abstract general Idea? *ALC.* Is there then no such thing as a general Idea? *EUPH.* May we not admit general Ideas, though we shou'd not admit them to be made by abstraction, or though we shou'd not allow of general abstract Ideas? To me it seems, a particular Idea may become general by being used to stand for or represent other Ideas; and that, general Knowledge is conversant about Signs or general Ideas made such by their signification; and which are considered rather in their relative Capacity, and as substituted for others, than in their own Nature, or for their own sake. A Black Line, for Instance, an Inch long, though in it self particular, may yet become Universal, being used as a Sign to stand for any Line whatsoever. *ALC.* It is your Opinion then, that words become general by representing an indefinite Number of particular Ideas. *EUPH.* It seems so to me. *ALC.* Whenever therefore I hear a general Name, it must be supposed to excite some one or other particular Idea of that Species in my mind. *EUPH.* I cannot say so neither. Pray, *Alciphron*, doth it seem to you necessary, that as often as the word Man occurs in Reading or Discourse, you must

must form in your Mind the Idea of a particular Man? *ALC.* I own, it doth not: And not finding particular Ideas always suggested by the Words, I was led to think I had abstract general Ideas suggested by them. And this is the Opinion of all Thinking Men who are agreed, the only use of Words is to suggest Ideas. And indeed what other use can we assign them?

VIII. *EUPH.* Be the use of Words or Names what it will, I can never think it is to do things impossible. Let us then inquire what it is? and see if we can make Sense of our daily Practice. Words it is agreed are Signs: It may not therefore be amiss to examine the use of other Signs in order to know that of Words. Counters, for instance, at a Card-Table are used, not for their own sake, but only as Signs substituted for Money as Words are for Ideas. Say now *Alciphron*, is it necessary every time these Counters are used throughout the whole Progress of a Game, to frame an Idea of the distinct Sum or Value that each represents? *ALC.* by no means: It is sufficient the Players at first agree on their respective Values, and at last substitute those Values in their stead. *EUPH.* And in casting up a Sum, where the Figures stand for Pounds, Shillings, and Pence, do you think it necessary, throughout the whole Progress of the Operation, in each Step to form Ideas of Pounds, Shillings, and Pence? *ALC.* I do not, it will suffice if in the Conclusion those Figures direct our Actions with respect to Things. *EUPH.* From hence it seems to follow that Words may not be insignificant, although they shou'd not, every time they are used, excite the Ideas they signify in our Minds, it being sufficient, that we have it in our power to substitute Things or Ideas for their Signs when there is occasion. It seems also to follow, that

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there may be another use of Words, besides that of marking and suggesting distinct Ideas, to wit, the influencing our Conduct and Actions; which may be done either by forming Rules for us to act by, or by raising certain Passions, Dispositions, and Emotions in our Minds. A Discourse, therefore, that directs how to act or excites to the doing or forbearance of an Action may, it seems, be useful and significant, although the Words whereof it is composed shou'd not bring each a distinct Idea into our Minds. *ALC.* It seems so. *EUPH.* Pray tell me, *Alciphron*, is not an Idea altogether inactive? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* An Agent therefore, an active Mind, or Spirit cannot be an Idea or like an Idea. Whence it shou'd seem to follow, that those Words which denote an active Principle, Soul, or Spirit do not, in a strict and proper Sense, stand for Ideas: And yet they are not insignificant neither: since I understand what is signified by the term *I*, or *my self*, or know what it means although it be no Idea, nor like an Idea, but that which thinks and wills and apprehends Ideas and operates about them. *ALC.* What wou'd you infer from this? *EUPH.* What hath been inferred already, that Words may be significant although they do not stand for Ideas\*. The contrary whereof having been presumed seems to have produced the Doctrine of abstract Ideas. *ALC.* Will you not allow then that the Mind can abstract? *EUPH.* I do not deny it may abstract in a certain sense, inasmuch as those things that can really exist, or be really perceived asunder, may be conceived asunder, or abstracted one from the other; for instance a Man's Head from his Body, Colour from Motion, Figure from Weight. But it will not

\* See the Principles of Humane Knowledge. Sect. 135. and the Introduction. Sect. 20.



thence follow, that the Mind can frame abstract general Ideas, which appear to be impossible. *ALC.* And yet it is a current Opinion, that every substantive Name marks out and exhibits to the Mind one distinct Idea separate from all others. *EUPH.* Pray, *Alciphron*, is not the Word *Number* such a substantive Name? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* Do but try now whether you can frame an Idea of Number in abstract exclusive of all Signs, Words and Things number'd. I profess, for my own part I cannot. *ALC.* Can it be so hard a matter to form a simple Idea of Number, the Object of a most evident demonstrable Science? Hold, let me see, if I can't abstract the Idea of Number, from the numeral Names and Characters, and all particular numerable things. Upon which *Alciphron* paused a while and then said; to confess the Truth I do not find that I can. *EUPH.* But though, it seems, neither you nor I can form distinct simple Ideas of Number, we can nevertheless make a very proper and significant use of numeral Names. They direct us in the disposition and management of our Affairs, and are of such necessary use, that we shou'd not know how to do without them. And yet, if other Mens Faculties may be judged of by mine, to attain a precise simple abstract Idea of Number, is as difficult as to comprehend any Mystery in Religion.

IX. But to come to your own Instance, let us examine what Idea we can frame of Force abstracted from Body, Motion, and outward sensible Effects. For my self, I do not find that I have or can have any such Idea. *ALC.* Surely every one knows what is meant by Force. *EUPH.* And yet I question whether every one can form a distinct Idea of Force. Let me intreat you, *Alciphron*, be not amused by Terms, lay aside the word *Force*,

and exclude every other thing from your Thoughts, and then see what precise Idea you have of Force. *ALC.* Force is that in Bodies which produceth Motion and other sensible Effects. *EUPH.* It is then something distinct from those Effects. *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* Be pleased now to exclude the consideration of its Subject and Effects, and contemplate Force it self in its own precise Idea. *ALC.* I profess I find it no such easy matter. *EUPH.* Take your own Advice, and shut your eyes to assist your Meditation. Upon this *Alciphron* having closed his eyes, and mused a few Minutes, declared he cou'd make nothing of it. And that, replied *Euphranor*, which it seems neither you nor I can frame an Idea of, by your own Remark of Mens Minds and Faculties being made much alike, we may suppose others have no more an Idea of than we. *ALC.* We may. *EUPH.* But, notwithstanding all this, it is certain there are many Speculations, Reasonings, and Disputes, refined Subtilties and nice Distinctions about this same Force. And to explain its Nature, and distinguish the several notions or kinds of it, the Terms *Gravity*, *Reaction*, *vis inertiae*, *vis insita*, *vis impressa*, *vis mortua*, *vis viva*, *impetus*, *momentum*, *solicitatio*, *conatus*, and divers other such like Expressions have been used by learned Men: And no small Controversies have arisen about the Notions or Definitions of these terms. It had puzzled Men to know whether Force is spiritual or corporeal, whether it remains after Action, how it is transferred from one Body to another. Strange Paradoxes have been framed about its Nature, Properties, and Proportions: For instance, that contrary Forces may at once subsist in the same quiescent Body: That the Force of Percussion in a small particle is Infinite: For which and other Curiosities of the same sort, you may consult *Borellus*

*rellus de vi percussione*, the *Lezioni Accademiche* of *Toricelli*, the *Exercitationes* of *Hermanus*, and other Writers. It is well known to the learned World, what a Controversy hath been carried on between Mathematicians, particularly Monsieur *Leibnitz* and Monsieur *Papin* in the *Leipsic Acta Eruditorum* about the Proportion of Forces, whether they be each to other in a Proportion compounded of the simple Proportions of the Bodies and the Celerities, or in one compounded of the simple Proportion of the Bodies and the duplicate Proportion of the Celerities? A Point, it seems, not yet agreed; As indeed the reality of the thing it self is made a Question. *Leibnitz* distinguisheth between the *nîsus elementaris*, and the *impetus*, which is formed by a repetition of the *nîsus elementaris*, and seems to think they do not exist in Nature, but are made only by an abstraction of the Mind. The same Author treating of original, active Force, to illustrate his Subject hath recourse to the substantial Forms and *Entelecheia* of *Aristotle*. And the ingenious *Toricelli* saith of Force and Impetus, that they are subtile Abstracts and spiritual Quintessences; and concerning the *momentum* and the velocity of heavy Bodies falling, he saith they are *un certa che*, and *un non so che*, that is in plain *English* he knows not what to make of them. Upon the whole therefore, may we not pronounce, that excluding Body, Time, Space, Motion and all its sensible Measures and Effects, we shall find it as difficult to form an Idea of Force as of Grace? *ALC.* I do not know what to think of it,

X. *EUPH.* And yet, I presume, you allow there are very evident Propositions or Theorems relating to Force, which contain useful Truths: for instance, that a Body with conjunct Forces describes the Diagonal of a Parallelogram, in the

same time that it wou'd the Sides with separate, Is not this a Principle of very extensive use? Doth not the Doctrine of the Composition and Resolution of Forces depend upon it, and, in consequence thereof, numberless Rules and Theorems directing Men how to act, and explaining *Phænomena* throughout the Mechanics and mathematical Philosophy? And if, by considering this Doctrine of Force, Men arrive at the Knowledge of many Inventions in Mechanics, and are taught to frame Engines, by means of which things difficult and otherwise impossible may be performed, and if the same Doctrine which is so beneficial here below, serveth also as a Key to discover the Nature of the Celestial Motions, shall we deny that it is of use, either in Practice or Speculation, because we have no distinct Idea of Force? Or that which we admit with regard to *Force*, upon what pretence can we deny concerning *Grace*? If there are Queries, Disputes, Perplexities, diversity of Notions and Opinions about the one, so there are about the other also: If we can form no precise distinct Idea of the one, so neither can we of the other. Ought we not therefore by a parity of Reason to conclude, there may be divers true and useful Propositions concerning the one as well as the other? And that Grace may be an Object of our Faith, and influence our Life and Actions, as a Principle destructive of evil habits and productive of good ones, although we cannot attain a distinct Idea of it, separate or abstracted from God the Author, from Man the Subject, and from Virtue and Piety its Effects?

XI. Shall we not admit the same Method of arguing, the same Rules of Logic, Reason, and good Sense to obtain in things Spiritual, and things Corporeal, in Faith and Science, and shall we not use the same Candour, and make the same Allowances,

ances, in examining the Revelations of God and the Inventions of Men? For ought I see, that Philosopher cannot be free from Bias and Prejudice, or be said to weigh things in an equal Ballance who shall maintain the Doctrine of Force and reject that of Grace, who shall admit the abstract Idea of a Triangle, and at the same time ridicule the Holy Trinity. But, however partial or prejudiced other Minute Philosophers might be, you have laid it down for a Maxim, that the same Logic which obtains in other Matters must be admitted in Religion. *LYS.* I think, *Alciphron*, it wou'd be more prudent to abide by the way of Wit and Humour, than thus to try Religion by the dry Test of Reason and Logic. *ALC.* Fear not: By all the Rules of right Reason, it is absolutely impossible that any Mystery, and least of all the Trinity shou'd really be the Object of Man's Faith. *EUPH.* I do not wonder you thought so, as long as you maintained that no Man cou'd assent to a Proposition, without perceiving or framing in his Mind distinct Ideas marked by the Terms of it. But although Terms are Signs, yet having granted that those Signs may be significant, though they shou'd not suggest Ideas represented by them, provided they serve to regulate and influence our Wills, Passions, or Conduct, you have consequently granted, that the Mind of Man may assent to Propositions containing such Terms, when it is so directed or affected by them, notwithstanding it shou'd not perceive distinct Ideas marked by those Terms. Whence it seems to follow, that a Man may believe the Doctrine of the Trinity, if he finds it revealed in Holy Scripture, That the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are God, and that there is but one God? Although he doth not frame in his Mind, any abstract or distinct Ideas of Trinity, Substance, or Personality, provided, that this

Doctrine of a Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier makes proper Impressions on his Mind, producing therein, Love, Hope, Gratitude, and Obedience, and thereby becomes a lively operative Principle influencing his Life and Actions, agreeably to that Notion of saving Faith which is required in a Christian. This I say, whether right or wrong, seems to follow from your own Principles and Concessions. But for further satisfaction, it may not be amiss to inquire, whether there be any thing parallel to this Christian Faith in the Minute Philosophy. Suppose, a fine Gentleman or Lady of Fashion, who are too much employ'd to think for themselves, and are only Free-thinkers at second hand, have the advantage of being betimes initiated in the Principles of your Sect, by conversing with Men of Depth and Genius, who have often declared it to be their Opinion, the World is governed either by Fate or by Chance, it matters not which; will you deny it possible for such Persons to yield their Assent to either of these Propositions? *ALC.* I will not. *EUPH.* And may not such their Assent be properly called *Faith*? *ALC.* It may. *EUPH.* And yet it is possible, those Disciples of the Minute Philosophy may not dive so deep, as to be able to frame any abstract, or precise, or any determinate Idea whatsoever, either of Fate or of Chance. *ALC.* This too I grant, *EUPH.* So that according to you, this same Gentleman or Lady may be said to believe or have Faith where they have not Ideas. *ALC.* They may. *EUPH.* And may not this Faith or Persuasion produce real Effects, and shew it self in the Conduct and Tenor of their Lives, freeing them from the Fears of Superstition, and giving them a true Relish of the World, with a noble Indolence or Indifference about what comes after. *ALC.* It may. *EUPH.* And may not Christians, with equal Reason, be allowed

allowed to believe the Divinity of our Saviour, or that in him God and Man make one Person, and be verily persuaded thereof, so far as for such Faith or Belief to become a real Principle of Life and Conduct, inasmuch as by Virtue of such Persuasion they submit to his Government, believe his Doctrine, and practise his Precepts, although they frame no abstract Idea of the Union between the Divine and Humane Nature; nor may be able to clear up the Notion of Person to the Contentment of a Minute Philosopher. To me it seems evident, that if none but those who had nicely examined, and cou'd themselves explain, the Principle of Individuation in Man, or untie the Knots and answer the Objections, which may be raised even about Humane Personal Identity, wou'd require of us to explain the Divine Mysteries, we shou'd not be often called upon for a clear and distinct Idea of *Person* in relation to the Trinity, nor wou'd the Difficulties on that Head be often objected to our Faith. *ALC.* Methinks, there is no such Mystery in Personal Identity. *EUPH.* Pray in what do you take it to consist? *ALC.* In Consciousness. *EUPH.* Whatever is possible may be supposed. *ALC.* It may. *EUPH.* We will suppose now (which is possible in the Nature of Things, and reported to be fact) that a Person, through some violent Accident or Distemper, shou'd fall into such a total Oblivion, as to lose all Consciousness of his past Life, and former Ideas. I ask, is he not still the same Person? *ALC.* He is the same Man, but not the same Person. Indeed you ought not to suppose that a Person loseth its former Consciousness; for this is impossible, though a Man perhaps may; but then he becomes another Person. In the same Person, it must be owned, some old Ideas may be lost, and some new ones got; but a total Change is inconsistent with Identity of Person. *EUPH.* Let

us then suppose that a Person hath Ideas, and is conscious during a certain space of Time, which we will divide into three equal Parts, whereof the later Terms are marked by the Letters A, B, C. In the first Part of Time, the Person gets a certain Number of Ideas, which are retained in A: During the second Part of Time, he retains one half of his old Ideas, and loseth the other half, in place of which he acquires as many new ones: So that in B his Ideas are half old and half new. And in the third Part, we suppose him to lose the Remainder of the Ideas acquired in the First, and to get new ones in their stead, which are retained in C, together with those acquired in the second Part of Time. Is this a possible fair Supposition? *ALC.* It is. *EUPH.* Upon these Premises I am tempted to think, one may demonstrate, that Personal Identity doth not consist in Consciousness. *ALC.* As how? *EUPH.* You shall judge; but thus it seems to me. The Persons in A and B are the same, being conscious of common Ideas by supposition. The Person in B is (for the same Reason) one and the same with the Person in C. Therefore the Person in A, is the same with the Person in C, by that undoubted Axiom, *Quæ convenient uni tertio convenient inter se*. But the Person in C hath no Idea in common with the Person in A. Therefore Personal Identity doth not consist in Consciousness. What do you think, *Alciphron*, is not this a plain Inference? *ALC.* I tell you what I think: You will never assist my Faith, by puzzling my Knowledge.

XII. There is, if I mistake not, a practical Faith, or Assent, which sheweth it self in the Will and Actions of a Man, although his Understanding may not be furnished with those abstract, precise, distinct Ideas, which, whatever a Philosopher may



may pretend, are acknowledged to be above the Talents of common Men; among whom, nevertheless, may be found, even according to your own Concession, many Instances of such practical Faith, in other matters which do not concern Religion. What shou'd hinder therefore, but that Doctrines relating to Heavenly Mysteries, might be taught in this saving Sense to vulgar Minds, which you may well think incapable of all Teaching and Faith in the Sense you suppose. Which mistaken Sense, said *Crito*, has given occasion to much profane and misapplied Raillery. But all this may very justly be retorted on the Minute Philosophers themselves, who confound Scholasticism with Christianity, and impute to other Men those Perplexities, Chimæras, and inconsistent Ideas, which are often the Workmanship of their own Brains, and proceed from their own wrong way of Thinking. Who doth not see that such an ideal abstracted Faith is never thought of by the Bulk of Christians, Husbandmen, for Instance, Artisans or Servants? Or what Footsteps are there in the Holy Scripture to make us think, that the wiredrawing of abstract Ideas was a Task enjoined either Jews or Christians? Is there any thing in the Law or the Prophets, the Evangelists or Apostles that looks like it? Every one whose Understanding is not perverted by Science falsely so called, may see, the saving Faith of Christians is quite of another kind, a vital operative Principle, productive of Charity and Obedience. *ALC.* What are we to think then of the Disputes and Decisions of the famous Council of *Nice*, and so many subsequent Councils? What was the Intention of those venerable Fathers the *Homoousians* and the *Homoiousians*? Why did they disturb themselves and the World with hard Words, and subtile Controversies? *CRI.* Whatever their Intention was, it cou'd not be to beget

nice abstracted Ideas of Mysteries in the Minds of common Christians, this being evidently impossible: Nor doth it appear that the Bulk of Christian Men did in those Days think it any Part of their Duty, to lay aside the Words, shut their Eyes, and frame those abstract Ideas; any more than Men now do of Force, Time, Number, or several other things, about which they nevertheless believe, know, argue and dispute. To me it seems, that, whatever was the Source of these Controversies, and howsoever they were managed, wherein Humane Infirmary must be supposed to have had its Share, the main End was not, on either side, to convey precise positive Ideas to the Minds of Men, by the use of those contested Terms, but rather a negative Sense, tending to exclude Polytheism on the one hand, and Sabellianism on the other\*. *ALC.* But what shall we say of so many learned and ingenious Divines, who from time to time have obliged the World with new Explications of Mysteries, who, having themselves professedly laboured to acquire accurate Ideas, wou'd recommend their Discoveries and Speculations to others for Articles of Faith? *CRI.* To all such Innovators in Religion I wou'd say with *Jerome*, “Why after so many Centuries do you pretend to teach us what was untaught before? Why explain what neither *Peter* nor *Paul* thought necessary to be explained? †” And it must be owned, that the Explication of Mysteries in Divinity, allowing the Attempt as fruitless as the Pursuit of the Philosopher's Stone in Chymistry, or the Perpetual Motion in Mechanics, is no more than they, chargeable on the Profession it self, but only on the wrongheaded Professors of it.

\* *Sozomen.* l. 2. c. 8.

† *Hieronym.* ad *Pammachium* & *Oceanum* de erroribus *Origenis*.

XIII. It seems, that what hath been now said may be applied to other Mysteries of our Religion. Original Sin, for Instance, a Man may find it impossible to form an Idea of in abstract, or of the manner of its Transmission, and yet the Belief thereof may produce in his Mind a salutary Sense of his own Unworthiness, and the Goodness of his Redeemer: from whence may follow good Habits, and from them good Actions, the genuine Effects of Faith, which considered in its true Light, is a thing neither repugnant nor incomprehensible, as some Men wou'd persuade us, but suited even to vulgar Capacities, placed in the Will and Affections rather than in the Understanding, and producing holy Lives, rather than subtile Theories. Faith, I say, is not an indolent Perception but an operative Persuasion of Mind, which ever worketh some suitable Action, Disposition or Emotion in those who have it; as it were easy to prove and illustrate by innumerable Instances, taken from Humane Affairs. And, indeed, while the Christian Religion is considered as an Institution fitted to ordinary Minds, rather than to the nicer Talents, whether improved or puzzled, of speculative Men; and our Notions about Faith are accordingly taken from the Commerce of the World, and Practice of Mankind, rather than from the peculiar Systems of Refiners; it will, I think, be no difficult Matter to conceive and justify the Meaning and Use of our Belief of Mysteries, against the most confident Assertions and Objections of the Minute Philosophers, who are easily to be caught in those very Snares, which they have spun and spread for others. And that Humour of Controversy, the Mother and Nurse of Heresies, wou'd doubtless very much abate, if it was considered that things are to be rated, not by the Colour, Shape, or Stamp, so truly

ly as by the Weight. If the Moment of Opinions had been by some litigious Divines made the Measure of their Zeal, it might have spared much Trouble both to themselves and others. Certainly one that takes his Notions of Faith, Opinion, and Assent from Common Sense, and Common Use, and has maturely weighed the Nature of Signs and Language, will not be so apt to controvert the Wording of a Mystery, or to break the Peace of the Church, for the sake of retaining or rejecting a Term.

XIV. *ALC.* It seems, *Euphranor*, and you wou'd persuade me into an Opinion, that there is nothing so singularly absurd as we are apt to think, in the Belief of Mysteries; and that a Man need not renounce his Reason to maintain his Religion. But if this were true, how comes it to pass, that, in proportion as Men abound in Knowledge, they dwindle in Faith? *EUPH.* O *Alciphron*, I have learned from you, that there is nothing like going to the Bottom of things, and analysing them into their first Principles. I shall therefore make an Essay of this Method, for clearing up the Nature of Faith: with what Success, I shall leave you to determine; for I dare not pronounce my self on my own Judgment, whether it be right or wrong: But thus it seems to me. The Objections made to Faith are by no means an Effect of Knowledge, but proceed rather from an Ignorance of what Knowledge is; which Ignorance may possibly be found even in those who pass for Masters of this or that particular Branch of Knowledge. Science and Faith agree in this, that they both imply an Assent of the Mind: And, as the Nature of the First is most clear and evident, it shou'd be first considered in order to cast a Light on the other. To trace things from their Original, it seems that  
the

the Humane Mind, naturally furnished with the Ideas of things particular and concrete, and being design'd, not for the bare Intuition of Ideas, but for Action or Operation about them, and pursuing her own Happiness therein, stands in need of certain general Rules or Theorems to direct her Operations in this pursuit; the supplying which Want is the true, original, reasonable End of studying the Arts and Sciences. Now these Rules being general, it follows, that they are not to be obtained by the meer Consideration of the original Ideas, or particular Things, but by the means of Marks or Signs, which, being so far forth universal, become the immediate Instruments and Materials of Science. It is not therefore by meer Contemplation of particular Things, and much less of their abstract general Ideas, that the Mind makes her Progress, but by an apposite Choice and skilful Management of Signs: For Instance, Force and Number, taken in concrete with there Adjuncts, Subjects, and Signs, are what every one knows; and considered in abstract, so as making precise Ideas of themselves, they are what no Body can comprehend. That their abstract Nature, therefore, is not the Foundation of Science, is plain: And that barely considering their Ideas in concrete, is not the Method to advance in the respective Sciences, is what every one that reflects may see; nothing being more evident, than that one who can neither write nor read, in common Use understands the meaning of Numeral Words, as well as the best Philosopher or Mathematician.

XV. But here lies the Difference: the one, who understands the Notation of Numbers, by means thereof is able to express briefly and distinctly all the Variety and Degrees of Number, and to perform with ease and dispatch several arithmetical Operations,

perations, by the help of general Rules. Of all which Operations as the Use in Humane Life is very evident, so it is no less evident, that the performing them depends on the aptness of the Notation. If we suppose rude Mankind without the Use of Language, it may be presumed, they wou'd be ignorant of Arithmetic: But the Use of Names, by the Repetition whereof in a certain Order they might express endless Degrees of Number, wou'd be the first Step towards that Science. The next Step wou'd be, to devise proper Marks of a permanent Nature, and visible to the Eye, the Kind and Order whereof must be chose with Judgment, and accommodated to the Names. Which Marking, or Notation, wou'd, in Proportion as it was apt and regular, facilitate the Invention and Application of general Rules, to assist the Mind in reasoning, and judging, in extending, recording, and communicating its Knowledge about Numbers: in which Theory and Operations, the Mind is immediately occupied about the Signs or Notes, by Mediation of which it is directed to act about Things, or Number in concrete (as the Logicians call it) without ever considering the simple, abstract, intellectual, general Idea of Number. I imagine one need not think much to be convinced, that the Science of Arithmetic, in its Rise, Operations, Rules, and Theorems, is altogether conversant about the artificial Use of Signs, Names, and Characters. These Names and Characters are universal, inasmuch as they are Signs. The Names are referred to Things, and the Characters to Names, and both to Operation. The Names being few, and proceeding by a certain Analogy, the Characters will be more useful, the simpler they are, and the more aptly they express this Analogy. Hence the old Notation by Letters was more useful than Words written at length: And the modern

modern Notation by Figures, expressing the Progression or Analogy of the Names by their simple Places, is much preferable to that for Ease and Expedition, as the Invention of Algebraical Symbols is to this for extensive and general Use. As Arithmetic and Algebra are Sciences of great Clearness, Certainty, and Extent, which are immediately conversant about Signs, upon the skillful Use and Management whereof they intirely depend, so a little Attention to them may possibly help us to judge of the Progress of the Mind in other Sciences, which, though differing in Nature, Design, and Object, may yet agree in the general Methods of Proof and Inquiry.

XVI. If I mistake not, all Sciences, so far as they are universal and demonstrable by Humane Reason, will be found conversant about Signs as their immediate Object, though these in the Application are referred to Things: the Reason whereof is not difficult to comprehend. For as the Mind is better acquainted with some sort of Objects, which are earlier suggested to it, strike it more sensibly, or are more easily comprehended than others, it is naturally led to substitute those Objects for such as are more subtle, fleeting, or difficult to conceive. Nothing, I say, is more natural, than to make the Things we know, a Step towards those we do not know; and to explain and represent Things less familiar by others which are more so. Now, it is certain we imagine before we reflect, and we perceive by Sense before we imagine; and of all our Senses the Sight is the most clear, distinct, various, agreeable, and comprehensive. Hence it is natural to assist the Intellect by the Imagination, the Imagination by Sense, and the other Senses by Sight. Hence, Figures, Metaphors, and Types. We illustrate spiritual  
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Things by corporeal; we substitute Sounds for Thoughts, and written Letters for Sounds; Emblems, Symbols, and Hieroglyphics for Things too obscure to strike, and too various or too fleeting to be retained. We substitute Things imaginable, for Things intelligible, sensible Things for imaginable, smaller Things for those that are too great to comprehend easily, and greater Things for such as are too small to be discerned distinctly, present Things for absent, permanent for perishing, and visible for invisible. Hence the Use of Models and Diagrams. Hence right Lines are substituted for Time, Velocity, and other things of very different Natures. Hence we speak of Spirits in a figurative Style, expressing the Operations of the Mind by Allusions and Terms, borrowed from sensible Things, such as *apprehend, conceive, reflect, discourse*, and such like: And hence those Allegories which illustrate Things intellectual by Visions exhibited to the Fancy. *Plato*, for Instance, represents the Mind presiding in her Vehicle by the Driver of a winged Chariot, which sometimes moults and droops: this Chariot is drawn by two Horses, the one good and of a good Race, the other of a contrary kind, symbolically expressing the Tendency of the Mind towards the Divinity, as she soars or is born aloft by two Instincts like Wings, the one in the Intellect towards Truth, the other in the Will towards Excellence, which Instincts moult or are weakened by sensual Inclinations, expressing also her alternate Elevations and Depressions, the Struggles between Reason and Appetite, like Horses that go an unequal Pace, or draw different Ways, embarrassing the Soul in her Progress to Perfection. I am inclined to think the Doctrine of Signs a Point of great Importance, and general Extent, which, if duly considered, wou'd

cast.



cast no small light upon Things, and afford a just and genuine Solution of many Difficulties.

XVII. Thus much, upon the whole, may be said of all Signs: That they do not always suggest Ideas signified to the Mind, That when they suggest Ideas, they are not general abstract Ideas: That they have other Uses besides barely standing for and exhibiting Ideas, such as raising proper Emotions, producing certain Dispositions or Habits of Mind, and directing our Actions in pursuit of that Happiness, which is the ultimate End and Design, the Primary Spring and Motive, that sets rational Agents at work: That the true End of Speech, Reason, Science, Faith, Assent in all its different Degrees, is not meerly, or principally, or always the imparting or acquiring of Ideas, but rather something of an active, operative Nature, tending to a conceived Good, which may sometimes be obtained, not only although the Ideas marked are not offered to the Mind, but even although there shou'd be no possibility of offering or exhibiting any such Idea to the Mind: For Instance, the Algebraic Mark, which denotes the Root of a negative Square, hath its Use in Logistic Operations, although it be impossible to form an Idea of any such Quantity. And what is true of Algebraic Signs, is also true of Words or Language, modern Algebra being in fact a more short, apposite, and artificial Sort of Language, and it being possible to express by Words at length, though less conveniently, all the Steps of an Algebraical Process. And it must be confessed, that even the Mathematical Sciences themselves, which above all others are reckoned the most clear and certain, if they are considered, not as Instruments to direct our Practice, but as Speculations to employ our Curiosity, will be found to fall short in

many Instances of those clear and distinct Ideas, which, it seems, the Minute Philosophers of this Age, whether knowingly or ignorantly, expect and insist upon in the Mysteries of Religion.

XVIII. Be the Science or Subject what it will, whensoever Men quit Particulars for Generalities, things Concrete for Abstractions, when they forsake practical Views, and the useful Purposes of Knowledge for barren Speculation, considering Means and Instruments as ultimate Ends, and labouring to attain precise Ideas which they suppose indiscriminately annexed to all Terms, they will be sure to embarrass themselves with Difficulties and Disputes. Such are those which have sprung up in Geometry about the Nature of the Angle of Contact, the Doctrine of Proportions, of Indivisibles Infinitesimals, and divers other Points; notwithstanding all which, that Science is very rightly esteemed an excellent and useful one, and is really found to be so in many Occasions of Humane Life, wherein it governs and directs the Actions of Men, so that by the Aid or Influence thereof those Operations become just and accurate, which wou'd otherwise be faulty and uncertain. And from a parity of Reason, we shou'd not conclude any other Doctrines which govern, influence or direct the Mind of Man to be, any more than that, the less true or excellent, because they afford matter of Controversy and useless Speculation to curious and licentious Wits: Particularly those Articles of our Christian Faith, which, in proportion as they are believed, persuade, and, as they persuade, influence the Lives and Actions of Men. As to the perplexity of Contradictions and abstracted Notions, in all parts whether of Humane Science or Divine Faith, Cavillers may equally object, and unwary Persons incur, while the judicious avoid it.

There

There is no need to depart from the received Rules of Reasoning to justify the Belief of Christians. And if any pious Men think otherwise, it may be supposed an Effect, not of Religion, or of Reason, but only of Humane Weakness. If this Age be singularly productive of Infidels, I shall not therefore conclude it to be more knowing, but only more presuming, than former Ages: And their Conceit, I doubt, is not the Effect of Consideration. To me it seems, that the more thoroughly and extensively any Man shall consider and scan the Principles, Objects, and Methods of proceeding in Arts and Sciences, the more he will be convinced, there is no weight in those plausible Objections that are made against the Mysteries of Faith, which it will be no difficult matter for him to maintain or justify in the received Method of arguing, on the common Principles of Logic, and by numberless avow'd parallel Cases, throughout the several Branches of Humane Knowledge, in all which the Supposition of abstract Ideas creates the same Difficulties.

XIX. *ALC.* I will allow, *Euphranor*, this Reasoning of yours to have all the Force you meant it shou'd have. I freely own there may be Mysteries: That we may believe, where we do not understand: And that Faith may be of use although its Object is not distinctly apprehended. In a word, I grant there may be Faith and Mysteries in other Things but not in Religion: And that for this plain Reason: Because it is absurd to suppose, there shou'd be any such thing as Religion; and if there be no Religion it follows there cannot be Religious Faith or Mysteries. Religion, it is evident, implies the Worship of a God; which Worship supposeth Rewards and Punishments, which suppose Merits and Demerits, Actions good

and evil, and these suppose Humane Liberty, a thing impossible; and consequently Religion a thing built thereon must be an unreasonable absurd thing. There can be no rational Hopes or Fears where there is no Guilt, nor any Guilt where there is nothing done, but what unavoidably follows from the Structure of the World and the Laws of Motion. Corporeal Objects strike on the Organs of Sense, whence ensues a Vibration in the Nerves, which, being communicated to the Soul or Animal Spirit in the Brain or Root of the Nerves, produceth therein that Motion called Volition: And this produceth a new Determination in the Spirits, causing them to flow into such Nerves as must necessarily by the Laws of Mechanism produce such certain Actions. This being the Case, it follows that those things which vulgarly pass for Humane Actions are to be esteemed Mechanical, and that they are falsely ascribed to a free Principle. There is therefore no Foundation for Praise or Blame, Fear or Hope, Reward or Punishment, nor consequently for Religion, which, as I observed before, is built upon and supposeth those things. *EUPH.* You imagine, *Alciphron*, if I rightly understand you, that Man is a sort of Organ played on by outward Objects, which according to the different shape and texture of the Nerves produce different Motions and Effects therein. *ALC.* Man may, indeed, be fitly compared to an Organ; but a Puppet is the very Thing. You must know, that certain Particles issuing forth in right Lines from all sensible Objects compose so many Rays, or Filaments, which drive, draw, and actuate every part of the Soul and Body of Man, just as Threads or Wires do the joints of that little wooden Machine vulgarly called a *Puppet*: With this only difference that the latter are gross and visible to common eyes, whereas the former are too fine and subtile to be discerned

discerned by any but a sagacious Free-thinker. This admirably accounts for all those Operations, which we have been taught to ascribe to a thinking Principle within us. *EUPH.* This is an ingenious Thought, and must be of great use in freeing Men from all Anxiety about Moral Notions, as it transfers the Principle of Action from the Humane Soul to things outward and foreign. But I have my Scruples about it. For you suppose the Mind in a literal sense to be moved and its Volitions to be meer Motions. Now if another shou'd affirm, as it is not impossible some or other may, that the Soul is incorporeal, and that Motion is one thing and Volition another, I wou'd fain know how you cou'd make your Point clear to such a one. It must be owned very clear to those who admit the Soul to be corporeal, and all her Acts to be but so many Motions. Upon this Supposition, indeed, the Light wherein you place Humane Nature is no less true, than it is fine and new. But let any one deny this Supposition, which is easily done, and the whole Superstructure falls to the ground. If we grant the abovementiond Points, I will not deny a fatal Necessity must ensue. But I see no reason for granting them. On the contrary it seems plain, that Motion and Thought are two Things as really and as manifestly distinct as a Triangle and a Sound. It seems therefore, that in order to prove the necessity of Humane Actions, you suppose what wants Proof as much as the very Point to be proved.

XX. *ALC.* But supposing the Mind incorporeal, I shall, nevertheless, be able to prove my Point. Not to amuse you with far fetched Arguments, I shall only desire you to look into your own Breast and observe how things pass there, when an Object offers it self to the Mind. First the Un-

derstanding considers it: In the next Place the Judgment decrees about it, as a thing to be chosen or rejected, to be omitted or done, in this or that manner: And this Decree of the Judgment doth necessarily determine the Will, whose Office is meerly to execute what is ordained by another Faculty: Consequently there is no such thing as Freedom of the Will: For that which is necessary cannot be free. In Freedom there shou'd be an Indifference to either side of the Question, a Power to act or not to act, without prescription or controul: And without this Indifference and this Power, it is evident the Will cannot be free. But it is no less evident, that the Will is not indifferent in its Actions, being absolutely determined and governed by the Judgment. Now whatever moves the Judgment, whether the greatest present Uneasiness, or the greatest apparent Good, or whatever else it be, it is all one to the Point in hand. The Will being ever concluded and controlled by the Judgment is in all Cases alike under Necessity. There is, indeed, throughout the whole of Humane Nature, nothing like a Principle of Freedom, every Faculty being determined in all its Acts by something foreign to it. The Understanding, for Instance, cannot alter its Idea, but must necessarily see it such as it presents it self. The Appetites by a natural Necessity are carried towards their respective Objects. Reason cannot infer indifferently any thing from any thing, but is limited by the Nature and Connexion of things, and the eternal Rules of Reasoning. And as this is confessedly the Case of all other Faculties, so it equally holds with respect to the Will it self, as hath been already shewn. And if we may credit the Divine Characterizer of our Times, this above all others must be allowed the most slavish Faculty.

“ Appetite (saith that noble Writer) which is el-  
 “ der

“ der Brother to Reason, being the Lad of strong-  
“ er growth, is sure on every contest to take the  
“ Advantage of drawing all to his own side: And  
“ Will, so highly boasted, is but at best a Foot-  
“ ball or Top between those Youngsters who  
“ prove very unfortunately matched, till the  
“ youngest, instead of now and then a kick or lash  
“ bestow’d to little purpose, forsakes the Ball or  
“ Top it self, and begins to lay about his elder  
“ Brother”. *CRI.* This beautiful Parable for  
Style and Manner might equal those of a known  
*English* Writer, in low Life renowned for Allego-  
ry, were it not a little incorrect, making the weak-  
er Lad find his account in laying about the stronger.  
*ALC.* This is helped by supposing the stronger  
Lad the greater Coward: But, be that as it will,  
so far as it relates to the Point in hand, this is a  
clear state of the Case. The same Point may be  
also proved from the Prescience of God. That  
which is certainly foreknown will certainly be.  
And what is certain is necessary. And necessary  
Actions cannot be the Effect of Free-will. Thus  
you have this fundamental Point of our Free-  
thinking Philosophy demonstrated different ways.  
*EUPH.* Tell me, *Alciphron*, do you think it im-  
plies a Contradiction, that God shou’d make a  
Man Free? *ALC.* I do not. *EUPH.* It is then  
possible there may be such a thing. *ALC.* This I  
do not deny. *EUPH.* You can therefore con-  
ceive and suppose such a Free Agent. *ALC.* Ad-  
mitting that I can; what then? *EUPH.* Wou’d  
not such an one think that he acted? *ALC.* He  
wou’d. *EUPH.* And condemn himself for some  
Actions and approve himself for others? *ALC.*  
This too I grant. *EUPH.* Wou’d he not think  
he deserved Reward or Punishment? *ALC.* He  
wou’d. *EUPH.* And are not all these Characters  
actually found in Man? *ALC.* They are. *EUPH.*  
Tell

Tell me now, what other Character of your supposed Free Agent may not actually be found in Man? For if there is none such, we must conclude that Man hath all the marks of a Free Agent. *ALC.* Let me see! I was certainly overseen in granting it possible, even for Almighty Power, to make such a thing as a Free Humane Agent. I wonder how I came to make such an absurd Concession, after what had been, as I observed before, demonstrated so many different ways. *EUPH.* O *Alciphron*, it is vulgarly observed that Men judge of others by themselves. But in judging of me by this Rule, you may be mistaken. Many things are plain to one of your Sagacity, which are not so to me, who am often bewildered rather than enlightened by those very Proofs, that with you pass for clear and evident. And, indeed, be the Inference never so just, yet so long as the Premises are not clear, I cannot be thoroughly convinced. You must give me leave therefore to propose some Questions, the Solution of which may perhaps shew what at present I am not able to discern. *ALC.* I shall leave what hath been said with you, to consider and ruminate upon. It is now time to set out on our Journey; there is, therefore, no room for a long String of Question and Answer.

XXI. *EUPH.* I shall then only beg leave in a summary Manner, to make a Remark or two on what you have advanced. In the first place I observe, you take that for granted which I cannot grant, when you assert whatever is certain the same to be necessary. To me, Certain and Necessary seem very different; there being nothing in the former notion that implies Constraint, nor consequently which may not consist with a Man's being accountable for his Actions. If it is foreseen that such an Action shall be done; May it not also be fore-



foreseen that it shall be an Effect of Humane Choice and Liberty? In the next place I observe, that you very nicely abstract and distinguish the Actions of the Mind, Judgment, and Will: That you make use of such Terms as Power, Faculty, Act, Determination, Indifference, Freedom, Necessity, and the like, as if they stood for distinct abstract Ideas: And that this Supposition seems to ensnare the Mind into the same Perplexities and Errors, which, in all other Instances, are observed to attend the Doctrine of Abstraction. It is self evident, that there is such a thing as Motion; and yet there have been sound Philosophers, who, by refined Reasoning, wou'd undertake to prove there was no such thing. Walking before them was thought the proper Way to confute those ingenious Men. It is no less evident, that Man is a free Agent: and though by abstracted Reasonings you shou'd puzzle me, and seem to prove the contrary, yet so long as I am conscious of my own Actions, this inward Evidence of plain Fact will bear me up against all your Reasonings, however subtile and refined. The confusing plain Points by obscure ones, may perhaps convince me of the Ability of your Philosophers, but never of their Tenets. I cannot conceive why the acute *Cratylus* shou'd suppose a Power of Acting in the Appetite and Reason, and none at all in the Will? Allowing, I say, the Distinction of three such Beings in the Mind, I do not see how this cou'd be true. But if I cannot abstract and distinguish so many Beings in the Soul of Man so accurately as you do, I do not find it necessary, since it is evident to me in the gross and concrete that I am a free Agent. Nor will it avail to say, the Will is governed by the Judgment, or determined by the Object, while, in every sudden common Case, I cannot discern nor abstract the Decree of the Judgment from the Command of the Will;

Will; while I know the sensible Object to be absolutely inert: And lastly, while I am conscious that I am an active Being, who can and do determine my self. If I shou'd suppose things spiritual to be corporeal, or refine things actual and real into general abstracted Notions, or by metaphysical Skill split things simple and individual into manifold Parts, I do not know what may follow: But if I take things as they are, and ask any plain untutored Man, whether he acts or is free in this or that particular Action, he readily assents, and I as readily believe him from what I find within. And thus, by an Induction of Particulars, I may conclude Man to be a free Agent, although I may be puzzled to define or conceive a Notion of Freedom in general and abstract. And if Man be free he is plainly accountable. But if you shall define, abstract, suppose, and it shall follow that according to your Definitions, Abstractions, and Suppositions, there can be no Freedom in Man, and you shall thence infer that he is not accountable, I shall make bold to depart from your metaphysical abstracted Sense, and appeal to the common Sense of Mankind.

XXII. If we consider the Notions that obtain in the World of Guilt and Merit, Praise and Blame, Accountable and Unaccountable, we shall find the common Question in order to applaud or censure, acquit or condemn a Man, is, whether he did such an Action? and whether he was himself when he did it? which comes to the same thing. It shou'd seem therefore that in the ordinary Commerce of Mankind, any Person is esteemed accountable simply as he is an Agent. And though you shou'd tell me that Man is inactive, and that the sensible Objects act upon him, yet my own Experience assures me of the contrary. I know I act, and what I  
act

act I am accountable for. And if this be true, the Foundation of Religion and Morality remains unshaken. Religion, I say is concerned no farther than that Man shou'd be Accountable: And this he is according to my Sense, and the common Sense of the World, if he acts; and that he doth act is self evident. The Grounds, therefore, and Ends of Religion are secured; whether your philosophic Notion of Liberty agrees with Man's Actions or no, and whether his Actions are certain or contingent, the Question being not whether he did it with a Free Will, or what determined his Will? not, whether it was certain or foreknown that he wou'd do it? but only whether he did it wilfully? as what must entitle him to the Guilt or Merit of it. *ALC.* But still, the Question recurs, whether Man bee Free? *EUPH.* To determine this Question, ought we not first to determine what is meant by the word *Free*? *ALC.* We ought. *EUPH.* In my Opinion, a Man is said to be Free, so far forth as he can do what he will. Is this so or is it not? *ALC.* It seems so. *EUPH.* Man therefore acting according to his Will, is to be accounted Free. *ALC.* This I admit to be true in the Vulgar Sense. But a Philosopher goes higher, and inquires whether Man be free to will? *EUPH.* That is, whether he can will as he wills? I know not how Philosophical it may be to ask this Question, but it seems very unintelligible. The Notions of Guilt and Merit, Justice and Reward are in the Minds of Men, antecedent to all Metaphysical Disquisitions: And according to those received natural Notions, it is not doubted that Man is accountable, that he acts, and is self-determined.

XXIII. But a Minute Philosopher shall, in virtue of wrong Suppositions, confound things most evidently distinct; Body, for Instance, with Spirit, Motion with Volition, Certainty with Necessity; and an Abstracter or Refiner shall so analyse the most simple instantaneous Act of the Mind, as to distinguish therein divers Faculties and Tendencies, Principles and Operations, Causes and Effects; and having abstracted, supposed, and reasoned upon Principles gratuitous and obscure, such a one he will conclude it is no Act at all, and Man no Agent but a Puppet, or an Organ play'd on by outward Objects, and his Will a Top or a Football. And this passeth for Philosophy and Free-thinking. Perhaps this may be what it passeth for, but it by no means seems a natural or just way of Thinking. To me it seems, that if we begin from things particular and concrete, and thence proceed to general Notions and Conclusions, there will be no Difficulty in this Matter. But if we begin with Generalities, and lay our Foundation in abstract Ideas, we shall find our selves entangled and lost in a Labyrinth of our own making. I need not observe, what every one must see, the ridicule of proving Man no Agent, and yet pleading for free Thought and Action, of setting up at once for Advocates of Liberty and Necessity. I have hastily thrown together these Hints or Remarks, on what you call a fundamental Article of the Minute Philosophy, and your Method of proving it, which seems to furnish an admirable Specimen of the Sophistry of abstract Ideas. If in this summary way I have been more dogmatical than became me, you must excuse what you occasioned, by declining a joint and leisurely Examination of the Truth.

*ALC.* I think we have examined Matters sufficiently. *CR I.* To all you have said against Humane Liberty,

Liberty, it is a sufficient Answer to observe that your Arguments proceed upon an erroneous Supposition, either of the Soul's being corporeal, or of abstract Ideas. And on the other hand, there is not need of much Inquiry to be convinced of two Points, than which none are more evident, more obvious, and more universally admitted by Men of all sorts, learned or unlearned, in all Times and Places, to wit, that Man acts and is accountable for his Actions. Whatever Abstracters, Refiners, or Men prejudiced to a false Hypothesis may pretend, it is, if I mistake not, evident to every thinking Man of common Sense, that Humane Minds are so far from being Engines or Foot-balls, acted upon and bandied about by corporeal Objects, without any inward Principle of Freedom or Action, that the only original true Notions that we have of Freedom, Agent, or Action, are obtained by reflecting on our selves, and the Operations of our own Minds. The Singularity and Credulity of Minute Philosophers, who suffer themselves to be abused by the Paralogisms of three or four eminent Patriarchs of Infidelity in the last Age, is, I think, not to be matched; there being no Instance of bigotted Superstition, the Ringleaders whereof have been able to seduce their Followers more openly and more widely from the plain Dictates of Nature and common Sense.

XXIV, *ALC.* It has been always an Objection against the Discoverers of Truth, that they depart from received Opinions. The Character of Singularity is a Tax on Free-thinking: And as such we most willingly bear it, and glory in it. A Genuine Philosopher is never modest in a false Sense, to the preferring Authority before Reason, or an old and common Opinion before a true one. Which false Modesty, as it discourages Men from treading in untrodden

untrodden Paths, or striking out new Light, is above all other Qualities the greatest Enemy to Free-thinking. *CR I.* Authority in disputable Points will have its Weight with a judicious Mind, which yet will follow Evidence wherever it leads. Without preferring we may allow it a good Second to Reason. Your Gentlemen, therefore, of the Minute Philosophy, may spare a World of Common Place upon Reason, and Light, and Discoveries. We are not attached to Authority against Reason, nor afraid of untrodden Paths that lead to Truth, and are ready to follow a new Light when we are sure it is no *ignis fatuus*. Reason may oblige a Man to believe against his Inclinations; but why shou'd a Man quit salutary Notions for others not less unreasonable than pernicious? Your Schemes and Principles, and boasted Demonstrations have been at large proposed and examined. You have shifted your Notions, successively retreated from one Scheme to another, and in the End renounced them all. Your Objections have been treated in the same Manner, and with the same Event. If we except all that relates to the particular Errors and Faults of private Persons, and Difficulties which, from the Nature of Things, we are not obliged to explain, it is surprising to see, after such magnificent Threats, how little remains, that can amount to a pertinent Objection against the Christian Religion. What you have produced has been tried by the fair Test of Reason; and though you shou'd hope to prevail by Ridicule when you cannot by Reason, yet in the upshot, I apprehend you will find it impracticable to destroy all Sense of Religion. Make your Countrymen ever so vicious, ignorant, and profane, Men will still be disposed to look up to a supreme Being. Religion, right or wrong, will subsist in some Shape or other, and some worship there will surely be  
either

either of God or the Creature. As for your Ridicule, can any thing be more ridiculous, than to see the most unmeaning Men of the Age set up for Free-thinkers, Men so strong in Assertion, and yet so weak in Argument, Advocates for Freedom introducing a Fatality, Patriots trampling on the Laws of their Country, and Pretenders to Virtue, destroying the Motives of it? Let any impartial Man but cast an eye on the Opinions of the Minute Philosophers, and then say if any thing can be more ridiculous, than to believe such things, and at the same time laugh at Credulity.

XXV. *LYS.* Say what you will, we have the Laughers on our side: And as for your Reasoning I take it to be another Name for Sophistry. *CRI.* And I suppose by the same Rule you take your own Sophisms for Arguments. To speak plainly, I know no sort of Sophism that is not employ'd by Minute Philosophers against Religion. They are guilty of a *Petitio Principii*, in taking for granted that we believe Contradictions; of *non Causa pro Causa*, in affirming that uncharitable Feuds and Discords are the Effects of Christianity; of *Ignoratio elenchi*, in expecting Demonstration where we pretend only to Faith. If I was not afraid to offend the Delicacy of polite Ears, nothing were easier than to assign Instances of every kind of Sophism, which wou'd shew how skilful your own Philosophers are in the practice of that Sophistry you impute to others. *EUPH.* For my own part, if Sophistry be the Art or Faculty of deceiving other Men, I must acquit these Gentlemen of it. They seem to have led me a progress through Atheism, Libertinism, Enthusiasm, Fatalism, not to convince me of the Truth of any of them, so much as to confirm me in my own way of Thinking. They have expos'd their fairy Ware not to

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cheat but divert us. As I know them to be professed Masters of Ridicule, so in a serious sense I know not what to make of them. *ALC.* You do not know what to make of us! I shou'd be sorry you did. He must be a superficial Philosopher that is soon fathomed.

XXVI. *CRI.* The ambiguous Character is, it seems, the sure way to Fame and Esteem in the learned World, as it stands constituted at present. When the ingenious Reader is at a loss to determine whether his Author be Atheist or Deist or Polytheist, Stoic or Epicurean, Sceptic or Dogmatist, Infidel or Enthusiast, in jest or in earnest, he concludes him without hesitation to be ænigmatical and profound. In fact, it is true of the most admired Writers of the Age, That no Man alive can tell what to make of them, or what they would be at. *ALC.* We have among us Moles that dig deep under ground, and Eagles that soar out of sight. We can act all Parts and become all Opinions, putting them on or off with great freedom of Wit and Humour. *EUPH.* It seems then you are a pair of inscrutable, unfathomable, fashionable Philosophers. *ALC.* It cannot be denied. *EUPH.* But, I remember, you set out with an open dogmatical Air, and talked of plain Principles and evident Reasoning, promised to make things as clear as Noon-day, to extirpate wrong Notions and plant right in their stead. Soon after, you began to recede from you first Notions and adopt others: you advanced one while and retreated another, yielded and retracted, said and unsaid: And after having followed you through so many untrodden Paths and intricate Mazes I find my self never the nearer. *ALC.* Did we not tell you the Gentlemen of our Sect are great Proficients in Raillery? *EUPH.* But, methinks, it is a  
vain



vain Attempt, for a plain Man of any settled Belief or Principles to engage with such slippery, fugitive, changeable Philosophers. It seems as if a Man shou'd stand still in the same place, while his Adversary chooses and changes his Situation, has full range and liberty to traverse the Field, and attack him on all sides and in all shapes, from a nearer or farther distance, on Horse-back or on Foot, in light or heavy Armour, in close Fight or with missive Weapons. *ALC.* It must be owned, a Gentleman hath great Advantage over a strait-laced Pedant or Bigot. *EUPH.* But after all, what am I the better for the Conversation of two such knowing Gentlemen; I hoped to have unlearned my Errors, and to have learned Truths from you, but, to my great disappointment, I do not find that I am either untaught or taught. *ALC.* To unteach Men their Prejudices is a difficult task: And this must first be done, before we can pretend to teach them the Truth. Besides, we have at present no time to prove and argue. *EUPH.* But suppose my Mind white Paper, and without being at any pains to extirpate my Opinions, or prove your own, only say what you wou'd write thereon, or what you wou'd teach me in case I were teachable. Be for once in earnest, and let me know some one Conclusion of yours before we part; or I shall intreat *Crito* to violate the Laws of Hospitality towards those who have violated the Laws of Philosophy, by hanging out false Lights to one benighted in Ignorance and Error. I appeal to you (said he turning to *Crito*) whether these Philosophical Knight-errants shou'd not be confined in this Castle of yours, till they make Reparation. *Euphranor* has Reason, said *Crito*, and my Sentence is that you remain here in durance, till you have done something towards satisfying the Engagement I am under, having promised,

he shou'd know your Opinions from your selves, which you also agreed to.

XXVII. *ALC.* Since it must be so, I will now reveal what I take to be the Sum and Substance, the grand Arcanum and ultimate Conclusion of our Sect, and that in two Words, ΠΑΝΤΑ ΤΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ. *CR I.* You are then a downright Sceptic. But, Sceptic as you are, you own it, probable there is a God, certain that the Christian Religion is useful, possible it may be true, certain that if it be the Minute Philosophers are in a bad way. This being the Case, how can it be questioned what course a wise Man shou'd take? Whether the Principles of Christians or Infidels are truest may be made a Question, but which are safest can be none. Certainly if you doubt of all Opinions you must doubt of your own; and then, for ought you know, the Christian may be true. The more doubt, the more room there is for Faith, a Sceptic of all Men having the least Right to demand Evidence. But, whatever uncertainty there may be in other Points, thus much is certain: either there is or is not a God: there is or is not a Revelation: Man either is or is not an Agent: The Soul is or is not Immortal. If the Negatives are not sure, the Affirmatives are possible. If the Negatives are improbable, the Affirmatives are probable. In Proportion, as any of your ingenious Men finds himself unable to prove any one of these Negatives, he hath grounds to suspect he may be mistaken. A Minute Philosopher, therefore, that wou'd act a consistent part, shou'd have the Diffidence, the Modesty, and the Timidity, as well as the Doubts, of a Sceptic; not pretend to an Ocean of Light, and then lead us to an Abyss of Darknes. If I have any Notion of Ridicule, this is most ridiculous. But your ridiculing what, for ought you know,

know, may be true, I can make no sense of. It is neither acting as a wise Man with regard to your own Interest, nor as a good Man with regard to that of your Country.

XXVIII. *Tully* saith somewhere, *aut undique religionem tolle aut usquequaque conserva*: Either let us have no Religion at all or let it be respected. If any single Instance can be shewn of a People that ever prospered without some Religion, or if there be any Religion better than the Christian, propose it in the grand Assembly of the Nation to change our Constitution, and either live without Religion, or introduce that new Religion. A Sceptic, as well as other Men, is Member of a Community, and can distinguish between Good and Evil, Natural or Political. Be this then his Guide as a Patriot, though he be no Christian. Or, if he doth not pretend even to this discernment, let him not pretend to correct or alter what he knows nothing of: Neither let him that only doubts behave as if he cou'd demonstrate. *Timagoras* is wont to say, I find my Country in possession of certain Tenets: they appear to have an useful Tendency, and, as such, are encouraged by the Legislature; they make a main part of our Constitution: I do not find these Innovators can disprove them, or substitute things more useful and certain in their stead: out of regard therefore to the Good of Mankind, and the Laws of my Country, I shall acquiesce in them. I do not say *Timagoras* is a Christian, but I reckon him a Patriot. Not to inquire in a Point of so great concern is folly, but it is still a higher degree of folly to condemn without inquiring. *Lyficles* seemed heartily tired of this Conversation. It is now late, said he to *Alciphron*, and all things are ready for our departure. Every one hath his own

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way of Thinking ; and it is as impossible for me to adopt another Man's, as to make his Complexion and Features mine. *Alciphron* pleaded that, having complied with *Euphranor's* Conditions, they were now at Liberty : And *Euphranor* answered that, all he desired having been to know their Tenets, he had nothing further to pretend.

XXIX. The Philosophers being gone, I observed to *Crito* how unaccountable it was, that Men so easy to confute shou'd yet be so difficult to convince. This, said *Crito*, is accounted for by *Aristotle*, who tells us that Arguments have not an Effect on all Men, but only on them whose Minds are prepared by Education and Custom, as Land is for Seed \*. Make a Point never so clear, it is great odds, that a Man, whose Habits and the Bent of whose Mind lie a contrary way, shall be unable to comprehend it. So weak a thing is Reason in Competition with Inclination. I replied, this answer might hold with respect to other Persons and other Times : but when the question was of inquisitive Men, in an Age wherein Reason was so much cultivated, and Thinking so much in vogue, it did not seem satisfactory. I have known it remarked, said *Crito*, by a Man of much Observation, that in the present Age Thinking is more talk'd of but less practis'd than in ancient times ; and that since the Revival of Learning Men have read much and wrote much but thought little : insomuch that with us to think closely and justly is the least part of a learned Man, and none at all of a polite Man. The Free-thinkers, it must be owned, make great Pretensions to Thinking, and yet they shew but little Exactness in it. A lively Man, said he, and what the World calls a Man of sense are often des-

\* *Ethic. ad Nicom. l. 10, c. 9.*

titute of this Talent, which is not a meer gift of Nature, but must be improved and perfected, by much Attention and Exercise on very different Subjects, a thing of more pains and time than the hasty Men of parts in our Age care to take. Such were the Sentiments of a judicious Friend of mine : And, if you are not already sufficiently convinced of these Truths, you need only cast an eye on the dark and confused, but nevertheless admired, Writers of this famous Sect : And then you will be able to judge, whether those who are led by Men of such wrong Heads can have very good ones of their own. Such, for instance, was *Spinoza* the great Leader of our modern Infidels, in whom are to be found many Schemes and Notions much admired and followed of late years : such as undermining Religion under the pretence of vindicating and explaining it : The maintaining it not necessary to believe in Christ according to the Flesh : The persuading Men that Miracles are to be understood only in a spiritual and allegorical sense : That Vice is not so bad a thing as we are apt to think : That Men are meer Machines impelled by fatal Necessity. I have heard, said I, *Spinoza* represented as a Man of close Argument and Demonstration. He did, replied *Crito*, demonstrate ; but it was after such a manner, as any one may demonstrate any thing. Allow a Man the privilege to make his own Definitions of common Words, and it will be no hard matter for him to infer Conclusions, which in one sense shall be true and in another false, at once seeming Paradoxes and manifest Truisms. For example, let but *Spinoza* define natural Right to be natural Power, and he will easily demonstrate, that whatever a Man can do he hath a right to do \*. Nothing can be plainer than the folly of this Proceeding : but

\* *Traſtat. Politic. c. 2.*

our Pretenders to the *lumen siccum* are often so passionately prejudiced against Religion, as to swallow the grossest Nonsense and Sophistry of weak and wicked Writers for Demonstration.

XXX. And so great a Noise do these Men make, with their thinking, reasoning, and demonstrating, as to prejudice some well-meaning Persons against all Use and improvement of Reason. Honest *Demea*, having seen a Neighbour of his ruined by the Vices of a Free-thinking Son, contracted such a Prejudice against Thinking, that he wou'd not suffer his own to read *Euclid*, being told it might teach him to think ; till a Friend convinced him the epidemical Distemper was not Thinking, but only the want and affectation of it. I know an eminent Free-thinker, who never goes to bed, without a Gallon of Wine in his Belly, and is sure to replenish before the Fumes are off his Brain, by which means he has not had one sober Thought these seven Years ; another, that wou'd not for the World lose the Privilege and Reputation of Free-thinking, who games all Night, and lies in bed all Day : And as for the Outside or Appearance of Thought in that meagre Minute Philosopher *Ibycus*, it is an Effect, not of thinking, but of carking, cheating, and writing in an Office. Strange, said he, that such Men shou'd set up for Free-thinkers ! But it is yet more strange that other Men shou'd be out of Conceit with Thinking and Reasoning, for the sake of such Pretenders. I answered, that some good Men conceived an Opposition between Reason and Religion, Faith and Knowledge, Nature and Grace ; and that, consequently, the way to promote Religion was, to quench the light of Nature, and discourage all rational Inquiry.

XXXI. How right the Intentions of these Men may be, replied *Crito*, I shall not say ; but surely their Notions are very wrong. Can any thing be more dishonourable to Religion, than the representing it as an unreasonable, unnatural, ignorant Institution ? God is the Father of all Lights whether natural or revealed. Natural Concupiscence is one thing, and the Light of Nature another. You cannot therefore argue from the Former against the Latter : Neither can you from Science falsely so called, against real Knowledge. Whatever therefore is said of the one in Holy Scripture is not to be interpreted of the other. I insisted, that Humane Learning in the hands of Divines, had from time to time, created great Disputes and Divisions in the Church. As abstracted Metaphysics, replied *Crito*, have always had a Tendency to produce Disputes among Christians, as well as other Men, so it shou'd seem that genuine Truth and Knowledge wou'd allay this Humour, which makes Men sacrifice the undisputed Duties of Peace and Charity to disputable Notions. After all, said I, whatever may be said for Reason, it is plain, the Sceptics and Infidels of the Age are not to be cured by it. I will not dispute this Point, said *Crito* ; in order to cure a Distemper, you shou'd consider what produced it. Had Men reasoned themselves into a wrong Opinion, one might hope to reason them out of it. But this is not the Case ; the Infidelity of most Minute Philosophers seeming an Effect of very different Motives from Thought and Reason, little Incidents, Vanity, Disgust, Humour, Inclination, without the least assistance from Reason, are often known to make Infidels. Where the general Tendency of a Doctrine is disagreeable, the Mind is prepared to relish and improve every thing that with the least Pretence seems to make against it.

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Hence the coarse Manners of a Country Curate, the polite ones of a Chaplain, the Wit of a Minute Philosopher, a Jest, a Song, a Tale can serve instead of a Reason for Infidelity. *Bupalus* preferred a Rake in the Church, and then made use of him as an Argument against it. Vice, Indolence, Faction, and Fashion produce Minute Philosophers, and meer Petulancy not a few. Who then can expect a thing so irrational and capricious shou'd yield to Reason? It may, nevertheless, be worth while to argue against such Men, and expose their Fallacies, if not for their own sake, yet for the sake of others; as it may lessen their Credit, and prevent the growth of their Sect, by removing a Prejudice in their Favour, which sometimes inclines others as well as themselves to think they have made a Monopoly of Humane Reason.

XXXII. The most general Pretext which looks like Reason, is taken from the Variety of Opinions about Religion. This is a resting Stone to a lazy and superficial mind: But one of more Spirit and a juster way of Thinking, makes it a Step whence he looks about, and proceeds to examine, and compare the differing Institutions of Religion. He will observe, which of these is the most sublime and rational in its Doctrines, most venerable in its Mysteries, most useful in its Precepts, most decent in its Worship? Which createth the noblest Hopes, and most worthy Views? He will consider their Rise and Progress; which oweth least to Humane Arts or Arms? Which flatters the Senses and gross Inclinations of Men? Which adorns and improves the most excellent Part of our Nature? Which hath been propagated in the most wonderful Manner? Which hath surmounted the greatest Difficulties, or shew'd the most disinterested Zeal and Sincerity in its Professors? He will inquire,  
which



which best accords with Nature and History? He will consider, what favours of the World, and what looks like Wisdom from above? He will be careful to separate Humane Allay from that which is Divine; and upon the whole, form his Judgment like a reasonable Free-thinker. But instead of taking such a rational Course, one of these hasty Sceptics shall conclude without demurring, there is no Wisdom in Politics, no Honesty in Dealings, no Knowledge in Philosophy, no Truth in Religion: And all by one and the same sort of Inference, from the numerous Examples of Folly, Knavery, Ignorance, and Error, which are to be met with in the World. But, as those who are unknowing in every thing else, imagine themselves sharp-sighted in Religion, this learned Sophism is ofteneft levelled against Christianity.

XXXIII. In my Opinion, he, that wou'd convince an Infidel who can be brought to Reason, ought in the first place clearly to convince him of the Being of a God, it seeming to me, that any Man who is really a Theist, cannot be an Enemy to the Christian Religion: And that the Ignorance or Disbelief of this fundamental Point, is that which at bottom constitutes the Minute Philosopher. I imagine they, who are acquainted with the great Authors in the Minute Philosophy, need not be told of this. The being of a God is capable of clear Proof, and a proper Object of Humane Reason; whereas the Mysteries of his Nature, and indeed whatever there is of Mystery in Religion, to endeavour to explain, and prove by Reason, is a vain Attempt. It is sufficient if we can shew there is nothing absurd or repugnant in our Belief of those Points, and, instead of framing Hypotheses to explain them, we use our Reason only for answering the Objections brought against them. But  
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on all Occasions, we ought to distinguish the serious, modest, ingenuous Man of Sense, who hath Scruples about Religion, and behaves like a prudent Man in doubt, from the Minute Philosophers, those profane and conceited Men, who must needs proselyte others to their own Doubts. When one of this Stamp presents himself, we shou'd consider what Species he is of: Whether a first or a second-hand Philosopher, a Libertine, Scornor, or Sceptic? Each Character requiring a peculiar Treatment. Some Men are too ignorant to be humble, without which there can be no Docility: But though a Man must in some degree have thought and considered to be capable of being convinced, yet it is possible the most ignorant may be laugh'd out of his Opinions. I knew a Woman of Sense reduce two Minute Philosophers, who had long been a Nuisance to the Neighbourhood, by taking her Cue from their predominant Affectations. The one set up for being the most incredulous Man upon Earth, the other for the most unbounded Freedom. She observed to the first, that he who had Credulity sufficient to trust the most valuable Things, his Life and Fortune, to his Apothecary and Lawyer, ridiculously affected the Character of Incredulous, by refusing to trust his Soul, a Thing in his own account but a meer Trifle, to his Parish-Priest. The other, being what you call a Beau, she made sensible how absolute a Slave he was in point of Dress, to him the most important thing in the World, while he was earnestly contending for a Liberty of Thinking, with which he never troubled his Head; and how much more it concerned and became him to assert an Independency on Fashion, and obtain Scope for his Genius, where it was best qualified to exert it self. The Minute Philosophers at first hand are very few, and considered in themselves, of small consequence: But their

Fol<sup>e</sup>

Followers, who pin their Faith upon them, are numerous, and not less confident than credulous; there being something in the Air and Manner of these second-hand Philosophers, very apt to disconcert a Man of Gravity and Argument, and much more difficult to be born than the Weight of their Objections.

XXXIV. *Crito* having made an end, *Euphranor* declared it to be his Opinion, that it wou'd much conduce to the public Benefit, if, instead of discouraging Free-thinking, there was erected in the midst of this Free Country a Dianoetic Academy, or Seminary for Free-thinkers, provided with retired Chambers, and Galleries, and shady Walks and Groves, where, after seven Years spent in Silence and Meditation, a Man might commence a genuine Free-thinker, and from that time forward, have Licence to think what he pleased, and a Badge to distinguish him from Counterfeits. In good earnest, said *Crito*, I imagine that Thinking is the great *Desideratum* of the present Age; and that the real Cause of whatever is amiss, may justly be reckoned the general Neglect of Education, in those who need it most, the People of Fashion. What can be expected where those who have the most Influence, have the least Sense, and those who are sure to be followed, set the worst Example? Where Youth so uneducated are yet so forward? Where Modesty is esteemed Pusillanimity, and a Deference to Years, Knowledge, Religion, Laws, want of Sense and Spirit? Such untimely Growth of Genius wou'd not have been valued or encouraged by the wise Men of Antiquity; whose Sentiments on this Point are so ill suited to the Genius of our Times, that it is to be feared modern Ears cou'd not bear them. But however ridiculous such Maxims might seem to our *British* Youth, who are so capable and so forward

ward to try Experiments, and mend the Constitution of their Country, I believe it will be admitted by Men of Sense, that if the Governing part of Mankind wou'd in these Days, for Experiment's sake, consider themselves in that old *Homerical* Light as Pastors of the People, whose Duty it was to improve their Flock, they wou'd soon find that this is to be done by an Education very different from the Modern, and othergues's Maxims than those of the Minute Philosophy. If our Youth were really inur'd to Thought and Reflexion, and an Acquaintance with the excellent Writers of Antiquity, we shou'd soon see that licentious Humour, vulgarly called *Free-thinking*, banished from the Presence of Gentlemen, together with Ignorance and ill Taste; which as they are inseparable from Vice, so Men follow Vice for the sake of Pleasure, and fly from Virtue through an abhorrence of Pain. Their Minds therefore betimes shou'd be formed and accustomed to receive Pleasure and Pain from proper Objects, or, which is the same thing, to have their Inclinations and Aversions rightly placed. *καλῶς χαίρειν ἢ μισεῖν.* This according to *Plato* and *Aristotle*, was the *ὀρθὴ παιδεία*, the right Education\*. And those who, in their own Minds, their Health, or their Fortunes, feel the cursed Effects of a wrong one, wou'd do well to consider, they cannot better make amends for what was amiss in themselves, than by preventing the same in their Posterity. While *Crito* was saying this, Company came in, which put an end to our Conversation.

\* *Plato* in *Protag.* & *Aristot.* ethic ad *Nicom.* l. 2. c. 2. & l. 10. c. 9.

AN  
E S S A Y  
TOWARDS A  
NEW THEORY  
OF  
V I S I O N.

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*First Published in the Year, MDCCIX.*


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
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A N  
E S S A Y  
T O W A R D S

*A New Theory of Vision.*

I.  Y Design is to shew the Manner, wherein we perceive by Sight the Distance, Magnitude, and Situation of Objects. Also to consider the Difference there is betwixt the Ideas of Sight and Touch, and whether there be any Idea common to both Senses.

II. It is, I think, agreed by all, that Distance, of it self and immediately, cannot be seen: For Distance being a Line directed end-wisè to the Eye, it projects only one Point in the Fund of the Eye, which Point remains invariably the same, whether the Distance be longer or shorter.

III. I find it also acknowledged, that the Estimate we make of the Distance of Objects considerably remote, is rather an Act of Judgment grounded on Experience, than of Sense. For Example, when I perceive a great Number of intermediate Objects, such as Houses, Fields, Rivers, and the like, which I have experienced to take up a considerable Space, I thence form a Judgment or Conclusion, that the Object I see beyond them is at a great Distance. Again, when an Object appears faint and small, which at a near Distance I have experienced to make a vigorous and large Appearance, I instantly conclude it to be far off: And this, 'tis evident is the result of Experience; without which, from the faintness and littleness I should not have inferred any thing concerning the Distance of Objects.

IV. But when an Object is placed at so near a Distance, as that the Interval between the Eyes bears any sensible Proportion to it, the Opinion of speculative Men is, that the two Optic Axes (the Fancy that we see only with one Eye at once being exploded) concurring at the Object do there make an Angle, by means of which, according as it is greater or lesser, the Object is perceived to be nearer or farther off†.

V. Betwixt which, and the foregoing manner of estimating Distance, there is this remarkable Difference: That, whereas there was no apparent, necessary Connexion between small Distance and a large and strong Appearance, or between great Distance and little and faint Appearance, there appears a very necessary Connexion between an ob-

† See what Descartes and others have written on this Subject.



tuse Angle and near Distance, and an acute Angle and farther Distance. It does not in the least depend upon Experience, but may be evidently known by any one before he had experienced it, that the nearer the Concurrence of the Optic Axes, the greater the Angle, and the remoter their Concurrence is, the lesser will be the Angle comprehended by them.

VI. There is another way mentioned by Optic Writers, whereby they will have us judge of those Distances, in respect of which the Breadth of the Pupil hath any sensible bigness: And that is the greater or lesser Divergency of the Rays, which issuing from the visible Point, do fall on the Pupil: That Point being judged nearest, which is seen by most diverging Rays; and that remoter, which is seen by less diverging Rays: And so on, the apparent Distance still increasing, as the Divergency of the Rays decreases, till at length it becomes infinite, when the Rays that fall on the Pupil are to Sense Parallel. And after this manner it is said we perceive Distance when we look only with one Eye.

VII. In this Case also, 'tis plain we are not beholding to Experience: It being a certain, necessary Truth, that the nearer the direct Rays falling on the Eye approach to Parallelism, the farther off is the Point of their Intersection, or the visible Point from whence they flow.

VIII. Now though the Accounts here given of perceiving near Distance by Sight are receiv'd for true, and accordingly made use of in determining the apparent places of Objects, they do nevertheless

less seem very 'unsatisfactory: And that for these following Reasons.

IX. It is evident that when the Mind perceives any Idea, not immediately and of it self, it must be by the means of some other Idea: Thus, for Instance, the Passions which are in the Mind of another, are of themselves to me invisible. I may nevertheless perceive them by Sight, though not immediately, yet by means of the Colours they produce in the Countenance. We often see Shame or Fear in the Looks of a Man, by perceiving the Changes of his Countenance to Red or Pale.

X. Moreover it is evident that no Idea, which is not it self perceived, can be the means of perceiving any other Idea. If I do not perceive the Redness or Paleness of a Man's Face themselves, it is impossible I should perceive by them the Passions which are in his Mind.

XI. Now from SECT. II. it is plain that Distance is in its own nature imperceptible, and yet it is perceived by Sight. It remains, therefore, that it be brought into view by means of some other Idea, that is it self immediately perceived in the Act of Vision.

XII. But those Lines and Angles, by means whereof some Men pretend to explain the Perception of Distance, are themselves not at all perceived, nor are they in truth ever thought of by those unskilful in Optics. I appeal to any one's Experience, whether upon Sight of an Object, he computes its Distance by the bigness of the Angle, made by the meeting of the two Optic Axes? Or whether he ever thinks of the greater or lesser Divergency

gency of the Rays, which arrive from any Point to his Pupil? Every one is himself the best judge of what he perceives, and what not. In vain shall any Man tell me, that I perceive certain Lines and Angles which introduce into my Mind the various Ideas of Distance, so long as I my self am conscious of no such thing.

XIII. Since therefore those Angles and Lines are not themselves perceived by Sight, it follows from SECT. X. that the Mind does not by them judge of the Distance of Objects.

XIV. The Truth of this Assertion will be, yet, farther evident to any one that considers those Lines and Angles have no real Existence in Nature, being only an Hypothesis fram'd by the Mathematicians, and by them introduced into Optics, that they might treat of that Science in a Geometrical way.

XV. The last Reason I shall give for rejecting that Doctrine, is, that tho' we should grant the real Existence of those Optic Angles, &c. and that it was possible for the Mind to perceive them; yet these Principles wou'd not be found sufficient to explain the *Phænomena* of Distance, as shall be shewn hereafter.

XVI. Now, it being already shewn that Distance is suggested to the Mind, by the Mediation of some other Idea which is it self perceived in the Act of Seeing, it remains that we inquire what Ideas, or Sensations there be that attend Vision, unto which we may suppose the Ideas of Distance are connected, and by which they are introduced into the Mind. And *First*, It is certain by Experience,

rience, that when we look at a near Object with both Eyes, according as it approaches, or recedes from us, we alter the Disposition of our Eyes, by lessening or widening the Interval between the Pupils. This Disposition or Turn of the Eyes is attended with a Sensation, which seems to me to be that which in this Case brings the Idea of greater or lesser Distance into the Mind.

XVII. Not that there is any natural or necessary Connexion between the Sensation we perceive by the Turn of the Eyes, and greater or lesser Distance; but because the Mind has by constant Experience found the different Sensations corresponding to the different Dispositions of the Eyes, to be attended each with a different Degree of Distance in the Object; There has grown an Habitual or Customary Connexion between those two sorts of Ideas, so that the Mind no sooner perceives the Sensation arising from the different Turn it gives the Eyes, in order to bring the Pupils nearer, or farther asunder, but it withal perceives the different Idea of Distance which was wont to be connected with that Sensation: Just as upon hearing a certain Sound, the Idea is immediately suggested to the Understanding, which Custom had united with it.

XVIII. Nor do I see, how I can easily be mistaken in this Matter. I know evidently that Distance is not perceived of it self. That by consequence, it must be perceived by means of some other Idea which is immediately perceived, and varies with the different Degrees of Distance. I know also that the Sensation arising from the Turn of the Eyes is of it self immediately perceived, and various Degrees thereof are connected with different

different Distances, which never fail to accompany them into my Mind, when I view an Object distinctly with both Eyes, whose Distance is so small that in respect of it the Interval between the Eyes has any considerable Magnitude.

XIX. I know it is a received Opinion, that by altering the Disposition of the Eyes, the Mind perceives whether the Angle of the Optic Axes, or the lateral Angles comprehended between the Interval of the Eyes and the Optic Axes, are made greater or lesser; and that accordingly by a kind of Natural Geometry, it judges the Point of their Intersection to be nearer, or farther off. But that this is not true, I am convinced by my own Experience, since I am not conscious, that I make any such use of the Perception I have by the Turn of my Eyes. And for me to make those Judgments, and draw those Conclusions from it, without knowing that I do so, seems altogether incomprehensible.

XX. From all which it follows, that the Judgment we make of the Distance of an Object, viewed with both Eyes, is entirely the Result of Experience. If we had not constantly found certain Sensations arising from the various Disposition of the Eyes, attended with certain Degrees of Distance, we shou'd never make those sudden Judgments from them, concerning the Distance of Objects; no more than we wou'd pretend to judge of a Man's Thoughts by his pronouncing Words we had never heard before.

XXI. *Secondly*, An Object placed at a certain Distance from the Eye, to which the breadth of the Pupil bears a considerable Proportion, being made

to approach, is seen more confusedly: And the nearer it is brought, the more confused Appearance it makes. And this being found constantly to be so, there ariseth in the Mind an Habitual Connexion between the several Degrees of Confusion and Distance; the greater Confusion still imploying the lesser Distance, and the lesser Confusion, the greater Distance of the Object.

XXII. This confused Appearance of the Object doth therefore seem to be the Medium, whereby the Mind judgeth of Distance in those Cases, wherein the most approved Writers of Optics will have it judge by the different Divergency, with which the Rays flowing from the Radiating Point fall on the Pupil. No Man, I believe, will pretend to see or feel those imaginary Angles, that the Rays are supposed to form according to their various Inclinations on his Eye. But he cannot choose Seeing whether the Object appear more or less confused. It is therefore a manifest Consequence from what has been demonstrated, that instead of the greater, or lesser Divergency of the Rays, the Mind makes use of the greater or lesser Confusedness of the Appearance, thereby to determine the apparent Place of an Object.

XXIII. Nor doth it avail to say, there is not any necessary Connexion between confused Vision, and Distance, great or small. For I ask any Man, what necessary Connexion he sees between the Redness of a Blush and Shame? And yet no sooner shall he behold that Colour to arise in the Face of another, but it brings into his Mind the Idea of that Passion which hath been observed to accompany it,

XXIV.

XXIV. What seems to have misled the Writers of Optics in this Matter is, that they imagine Men judge of Distance, as they do of a Conclusion in Mathematics; betwixt which and the Premises it is indeed absolutely requisite there be an apparent, necessary Connexion: But it is far otherwise, in the sudden Judgments Men make of Distance. We are not to think, that Brutes and Children, or even grown reasonable Men, whenever they perceive an Object to approach, or depart from them, do it by virtue of Geometry and Demonstration.

XXV. That one Idea may suggest another to the Mind, it will suffice that they have been observed to go together, without any Demonstration of the Necessity of their Coexistence, or without so much as knowing what it is that makes them so to coexist. Of this there are innumerable Instances, of which no one can be ignorant.

XXVI. Thus, greater Confusion having been constantly attended with nearer Distance, no sooner is the former Idea perceived, but it suggests the latter to our Thoughts. And if it had been the ordinary Course of Nature, that the farther off an Object were placed, the more confused it shou'd appear, it is certain, the very same Perception, that now makes us think an Object approaches, would then have made us to imagine it went farther off. That Perception, abstracting from Custom and Experience, being equally fitted to produce the Idea of great Distance, or small Distance, or no Distance at all.

XXVII. *Thirdly*, An Object being placed at the Distance above specified, and brought nearer to the Eye, we may nevertheless prevent, at least for some time, the Appearance's growing more  
confused

confused, by straining the Eye. In which Case, that Sensation supplies the place of confused Vision, in aiding the Mind to judge of the Distance of the Object; it being esteemed so much the nearer, by how much the Effort or Straining of the Eye in order to distinct Vision is greater.

XXVIII. I have here set down those Sensations or Ideas, that seem to be the constant and general Occasions of introducing into the Mind the different Ideas of near Distance. It is true in most Cases, that divers other Circumstances contribute to frame our Idea of Distance, to wit, the particular Number, Size, Kind, &c. of the things seen. Concerning which, as well as all other the forementioned Occasions which suggest Distance, I shall only observe, they have none of them, in their own Nature, any Relation or Connexion with it: Nor is it possible, they shou'd ever signify the various Degrees thereof, otherwise than as by Experience they have been found to be connected with them.

XXIX. I shall proceed upon these Principles to account for a Phænomenon, which has hitherto strangely puzzled the Writers of Optics, and is so far from being accounted for by any of their Theories of Vision, that it is, by their own Confession, plainly repugnant to them: And of Consequence, if nothing else cou'd be objected, were alone sufficient to bring their Credit in Question. The whole Difficulty I shall lay before you in the Words of the Learned Dr. Barrow, with which he concludes his Optic Lectures.


*Hæc sunt, quæ circa partem Opticæ præcipue Mathematicam dicenda mihi suggestit meditatio. Circa reliquas, (quæ quatuordecim sunt, adeoque sæpiusculæ pro certis principiis plausibiles conjecturas*



ras venditare necessum habent) nihil fere quicquam admodum verisimile succurrit, a pervulgatis (ab iis, inquam, quæ Keplerus, Scheinerus, Cartesius, & post illos alii tradiderunt) alienum aut diversum. Atqui tacere malo, quam toties oblatam cramben reponere. Proinde receptui cano; nec ita tamen ut prorsus discedam antequam improbam quandam difficultatem (pro sinceritate quam & vobis & veritati debeo minime dissimulandam) in medium protulero, quæ doctrinæ nostræ, hætenus inculcatæ, se objicit adversam, ab ea saltem nullam admittit solutionem.

Illæ, breviter, talis est: Lenti vel Speculocavo

EBF exponatur punctum visibile A, ita Distans ut Radii ex A manantes ex inflexione versus axem AB cogantur. Sitque radiationis Limes (seu puncti A imago, qualem supra passim statuimus) punctum Z. Inter hoc autem & inflectentis verticem B uspiam positus concipiatur Oculus. Quæri jam potest ubi loci debeat punctum A apparere? Retrorsum ad punctum Z videri non fert Natura (cum omnis impressio sensum asficiens proveniat a partibus A) ac experientia reclamat. Nostris autem e placitis consequi videtur, ipsum ad partes anticas apparens ab intervallo longissime diffito, (quod & maxi-



imum sensibile quodvis Intervallum quodammodo exsuperet) apparere. Cum enim quo Radiis minus divergentibus attingitur Objectum, eo (seclusis utique prænotionibus & præjudiciis) longius abesse sentiatur; et quod Parallelos ad Oculum  
Radios

*Radios projicit, remotissime positum æstimetur. Exigere Ratio videtur ut quod convergentibus radiis apprehenditur, adhuc magis, si fieri posset, quoad apparentiam elongetur. Quin & circa Casum hunc generatim inquiri possit, quidnam omnino sit, quod apparentem puncti A locum determinet, faciatque quod constanti ratione nunc propius, nunc remotius appareat? Cui itidem dubio, nihil quicquam ex hætenus dictorum Analogia, responderi posse videtur, nisi debere punctum A perpetuo longissime semotum videri. Verum experientia secus attestatur, illud pro diversa Oculi inter puncta B, Z, positione varie distans; nunquam fere (si unquam) longinquius ipso A libere spectato, subinde vero multo propinquius adparere; quinimo, quo oculum appellentes radii magis convergunt eo speciem Objecti propius accedere. Nempe, si puncto B admoveatur Oculus, suo (ad lentem) fere nativo in loco conspicitur punctum A (vel æque distans, ad Speculum;) ad O reductus oculus ejusce speciem appropinquantem cernit; ad P adhuc vicinius ipsum existimat; ac ita sensim, donec alicubi tandem, velut ad Q, constituto oculo objectum summe proquinquum apparens, in meram confusionem incipiat evanescere. Quæ sane cuncta rationibus atque decretis nostris repugnare videntur, aut cum iis saltem parum amice conspirant. Neque nostram tantum sententiam pulsant hoc experimentum; at ex æquo cæteras quas norim omnes, veterem imprimis ac vulgatam nostræ præ reliquis affinem ita convellere videtur, ut ejus vi coactus doctissimus A. Tacquetus isti principio (cui pene soli totam inædificaverat Catoptricam suam) ceu infido ac inconstanti renunciavit, adeoque suam ipse doctrinam labefecerit; id tamen, opinor, minime facturus, si rem totam inspexisset penitus, atque*


*atque difficultatis fundum attigisset. Apud me vero non ita pollet hæc, nec eousque præpollebit ulla difficultas, ut ab iis, quæ manifeste rationi consentanea video, discedam; præsertim quum ut hic accidit, ejusmodi difficultas in singularis cuiuspiam casus disparitate fundetur. Nimirum in præsentè casu peculiare quiddam, naturæ subtilitati involutum, delitescit, ægre fortassis, nisi perfectius explorato videndi modo, detegendum. Circa quod nil, fateor, hætenus excogitare potui, quod adblandiretur animo meo, nedum plane satisfaceret. Vobis itaque nodum hunc, utinam feliciore conatu, resolvendum committo.*

*In English as follows.*

‘ I have here delivered what my Thoughts have suggested to me, concerning that part of Optics which is more properly Mathematical. As for the other Parts of that Science (which being rather Physical, do consequently abound with plausible Conjectures instead of certain Principles) there has in them scarce any thing occur’d to my Observation, different from what has been already said by *Kepler*, *Scheinerus*, *Descartes*, and others. And methinks I had better say nothing at all, than repeat that which has been so often said by others. I Think it therefore high time to take my leave of this Subject: But before I quit it for good and all, the fair and ingenuous Dealing that I owe both to You and to Truth, obligeth me to acquaint you with a certain untoward Difficulty, which seems directly opposite to the Doctrine I have been hitherto inculcating, at least, admits of no Solution from it. In short it is this. Before the double Convex Glass or Concave Speculum

‘ EBF,

' E B F, let the Point A be placed, at such a Distance that the Rays proceeding from A, after Refraction or Reflection, be brought to Unite somewhere in the Ax A B. And suppose the Point of Union (*i. e.* the Image of the Point A, as hath been already set forth) to be Z; between which and B, the Vertex of the Glas or Speculum, conceive the Eye to be any where placed. The Question now is, where the Point A ought to appear? Experience shews that it doth not appear behind at the Point Z, and it were contrary to Nature that it shou'd; since all the Impression which affects the Sense comes from towards A. But from our Tenets it shou'd seem to follow that it wou'd appear before the Eye at a vast Distance off, so great as shou'd in some Sort surpass all sensible Distance. For Since if we exclude all Anticipations and Prejudices, every Object appears by so much the farther off, by how much the Rays it sends to the Eye are less Diverging. And that Object is thought to be most remote, from which Parallel Rays proceed unto the Eye. Reason wou'd make one think, that Object shou'd appear, at yet a greater Distance, which is seen by converging Rays. Moreover it may in general be asked concerning this Case, what it is that determines the apparent Place of the Point A, and maketh it to appear after a constant manner, sometimes nearer, at other times farther off? To which Doubt, I see nothing that can be answer'd



‘ agree-

agreeable to the Principles we have laid down, except only that the Point A ought always to appear extremely remote. But on the contrary, we are assur'd by Experience that the Point A appears variously distant, according to the different Situations of the Eye between the Points B and Z. And that it doth almost never (if at all) seem farther off, than it wou'd if it were beheld by the naked Eye, but on the contrary, it doth sometimes appear much nearer. Nay, it is even certain, that by how much the Rays falling on the Eye do more converge, by so much the nearer does the Object seem to approach. For the Eye being placed close to the Point B, the Object A appears nearly in its own natural Place, if the Point B is taken in the Glass, or at the same Distance, if in the Speculum. The Eye being brought back to O, the Object seems to draw near: And being come to P it beholds it still nearer. And so on by little and little, till at length the Eye being placed somewhere, suppose at Q, the Object appearing extremely near, begins to vanish into meer Confusion. All which doth seem repugnant to our Principles, at least, not rightly to agree with them. Nor is our Tenet alone struck at by this Experiment, but likewise all others that ever came to my Knowledge are, every whit as much, endanger'd by it. The ancient one especially (which is most commonly received, and comes nearest to mine) seems to be so effectually overthrown thereby, that the most learned *Tacquet* has been forced to reject that Principle, as false and uncertain, on which alone he had built almost his whole Catoptrics, and consequently by taking away the Foundation, hath himself pulled down the Superstructure he had raised on it. Which, nevertheless, I do not believe he wou'd have done, had he but consider'd

' der'd the whole matter more thoroughly, and ex-  
 ' amined the Difficulty to the bottom. But as for  
 ' me, neither this, nor any other Difficulty shall  
 ' have so great an Influence on me, as to make me  
 ' renounce that which I know to be manifestly a-  
 ' greeable to Reason: Especially when, as it here  
 ' falls out, the Difficulty is founded in the peculi-  
 ' ar Nature of a certain odd and particular Case.  
 ' For in the present Case something peculiar lies  
 ' hid, which being involved in the Subtilty of Na-  
 ' ture will, perhaps, hardly be discovered till such  
 ' Time, as the manner of Vision is more perfectly  
 ' made known. Concerning which, I must own,  
 ' I have hitherto been able to find out nothing  
 ' that has the least shew of Probability, not to  
 ' mention Certainty. I shall, therefore, leave this  
 ' Knot to be untied by you, wishing you may have  
 ' better Success in it than I have had.

XXX. The ancient and receiv'd Principle,  
 which Dr. Barrow here mentions as the main  
 Foundation of *Tacquet's* Catoptrics, is that *every*  
*visible Point seen by Reflection from a Speculum, shall*  
*appear placed at the Intersection of the reflected Ray,*  
*and the Perpendicular of Incidence.* Which Inter-  
 section in the present Case, happening to be behind  
 the Eye, it greatly shakes the Authority of that  
 Principle, where on the aforementioned Author  
 proceeds throughout his whole Catoptrics, in de-  
 termining the apparent Place of Objects seen by  
 Reflexion from any kind of Speculum.

XXXI. Let us now see how this Phænomenon  
 agrees with our Tenets. The Eye the nearer it  
 is placed to the Point B in the foregoing Figures,  
 the more distinct is the Appearance of the Object;  
 but as it recedes to O, the Appearance grows more  
 Confused; and at P it sees the Object yet more  
 Confused;

Confused; and so on till the Eye being brought back to Z sees the Object in the greatest Confusion of all. Wherefore by SECT. XXI. the Object shou'd seem to approach the Eye gradually, as it recedes from the Point B, that is at O it shou'd (in Consequence of the Principle I have laid down in the aforesaid Section) seem nearer than it did at B, and at P nearer than at O, and at Q nearer than at P; and so on, till it quite vanishes at Z. Which is the very matter of Fact, as any one that pleases may easily satisfy himself by Experiment.


XXXII. This Case is much the same, as if we shou'd suppose an *Englishman* to meet a Foreigner, who used the same Words with the *English*, but in a direct contrary Signification. The *Englishman* wou'd not fail to make a wrong Judgment of the Ideas annexed to those Sounds, in the Mind of him that used them. Just so, in the present Case the Object speaks (if I may so say) with Words that the Eye is well acquainted with, that is, Confusions of Appearance; but whereas heretofore the greater Confusions were always wont to signify nearer Distances, they have in this Case a direct, contrary Signification, being connected with the greater Distances. Whence it follows, that the Eye must unavoidably be mistaken, since it will take the Confusions in the Sense it has been used to, which is directly opposed to the True.

XXXIII. This Phænomenon as it entirely subverts the Opinion of those, who will have us judge of Distance by Lines and Angles, on which Supposition it is altogether inexplicable, so it seems to me no small Confirmation of the Truth of that Principle whereby it is explain'd. But in order to a more full Explication of this Point, and to shew how far the Hypothesis of the Mind's judg-

ing by the various Divergency of Rays, may be of use in determining the apparent Place of an Object, it will be necessary to premise some few Things, which are already well known to those who have any Skill in Dioptrics.

XXXIV. *First*, Any radiating Point is then distinctly seen when the Rays proceeding from it are, by the refractive Power of the Crystalline, accurately reunited in the Retina or Fund of the Eye: But if they are reunited, either before they arrive at the Retina, or after they have past it, then there is confused Vision.

XXXV. *Secondly*, Suppose in the adjacent Figures NP represent an Eye duly framed, and re-





taining its natural Figure. In Fig. 1. the Rays falling nearly Parallel on the Eye, are by the Crystalline AB refracted, so as their Focus or Point of Union F falls exactly on the Retina: But if the Rays fall sensibly diverging on the Eye, as in Fig. 2. then their Focus falls beyond the Retina: Or if the Rays are made to converge by the Lens QS, before they come at the Eye, as in Fig. 3. their Focus F will fall before the Retina. In which two last Cases, it is evident from the foregoing Section, that the Appearance of the Point Z is confused. And by how much the greater is the Convergency, or Divergency of the Rays falling on the Pupil, by so much the farther will the Point of their Reunion be from the Retina, either before or behind it, and consequently the Point Z will appear, by so much the more confused. And this by the bye, may shew us the Difference between confused, and faint Vision. Confused Vision is, when the Rays proceeding from each distinct Point of the Object are not accurately recollected in one corresponding Point on the Retina, but take up some Space thereon: So that Rays from different Points become mixed, and confused together. This is opposed to a distinct Vision, and attends near Objects. Faint Vision is, when by reason of the Distance of the Object or Grossness of the interjacent Medium few Rays arrive from the Object to the Eye. This is opposed to vigorous or clear Vision, and attends remote Objects. But to return.

XXXVI. The Eye, or (to speak truly) the Mind perceiving only the Confusion it self, without ever considering the Cause from which it proceeds, doth constantly annex the same Degree of Distance to the same Degree of Confusion,

Whether that Confusion be occasioned by converging, or by diverging Rays, it matters not. Whence it follows, that the Eye viewing the Object Z through the Glass QS (which by Refraction causeth the Rays ZQ, ZS, &c. to converge) shou'd judge it to be at such a Nearness, at which if it were placed, it wou'd radiate on the Eye with Rays diverging to that Degree, as wou'd produce the same Confusion, which is now produced by Converging Rays, *i. e.* wou'd cover a Portion of the Retina equal to DC. *vid. Fig. 3. supra.* But then this must be understood (to use Dr. Barrow's Phrase) *seclusis prænotionibus & præjudiciis*, in case we abstract from all other Circumstances of Vision, such as the Figure, Size, Faintness, &c. of the visible Objects; all which do ordinarily concur to form our Idea of Distance, the Mind having by frequent Experience observed their several Sorts or Degrees, to be connected with various Distances.

XXXVII. It plainly follows from what hath been said, that a Person perfectly Purbblind (*i. e.* that cou'd not see an Object distinctly, but when placed close to his Eye) wou'd not make the same wrong Judgment that others do, in the forementioned Case. For, to him, greater Confusions constantly suggesting greater Distances, he must, as he recedes from the Glass, and the Object grows more Confused, judge it to be at a farther Distance contrary to what they do, who have had the Perception of the Objects growing more confused, connected with the Idea of Approach.

XXXVIII. Hence also it doth appear, there may be good use of Computation by Lines and Angles in Optics; not that the Mind judgeth of Distance immediately by them, but because it judgeth  
eth

eth by somewhat which is connected with them, and to the Determination whereof they may be subservient. Thus the Mind judging of the Distance of an Object, by the Confusedness of its Appearance, and this Confusedness being greater or lesser to the naked Eye, according as the Object is seen by Rays more or less diverging, it follows, that a Man may make use of the Divergency of the Rays in computing the apparent Distance, though not for its own sake, yet on account of the Confusion with which it is connected. But, so it is, the Confusion it self is intirely neglected by Mathematicians, as having no necessary Relation with Distance, such as the greater or lesser Angles of Divergency are conceived to have. And these (especially for that they fall under Mathematical Computation) are alone regarded, in determining the apparent Places of Objects, as though they were the sole and immediate Cause of the Judgments the Mind makes of Distance. Whereas, in Truth, they shou'd not at all be regarded in themselves, or any otherwise, than as they are supposed to be the Cause of Confused Vision.

XXXIX. The not considering of this has been a fundamental and perplexing Oversight. For Proof whereof, we need go no farther than the Case before us. It having been observed, that the most diverging Rays brought into the Mind the Idea of nearest Distance, and that still, as the Divergency decreased, the Distance increased: and it being thought, the Connexion between the various Degrees of Divergency and Distance, was immediate, this naturally leads one to conclude, from an ill grounded Analogy, that converging Rays shall make an Object appear at an immense Distance: And that, as the Convergency increases, the Distance (if it were possible) shou'd do so likewise.

That this was the Cause of Dr. *Barrow's* Mistake, is evident from his own Words which we have quoted. Whereas had the learned Doctor observ'd, that diverging and converging Rays, how opposite soever they may seem, do nevertheless agree in producing the same Effect, to wit, Confusedness of Vision, greater Degrees whereof are produced indifferently, either as the Divergency or Convergency of the Rays increaseth. And that it is by this Effect, which is the same in both, that either the Divergency or Convergency is perceived by the Eye; I say had he but consider'd this, it is certain he would have made a quite contrary Judgment, and rightly concluded, that those Rays which fall on the Eye with greater Degrees of Convergency shou'd make the Object from whence they proceed, appear by so much the nearer. But it is plain, it was impossible for any Man to attain to a right Notion of this Matter, so long as he had regard only to Lines and Angles, and did not apprehend the true Nature of Vision, and how far it was of Mathematical Consideration.

XL. Before we dismiss this Subject, it is fit we take notice of a Query relating thereto, proposed by the ingenious Mr. *Molyneux*, in his Treatise of Dioptrics\*, where speaking of this Difficulty, he has these Words: 'And so he (*i. e.* Dr. *Barrow*) leaves this Difficulty to the Solution of others, which I (after so great an Example) shall do likewise; but with the Resolution of the same admirable Author of not quitting the evident Doctrine which we have before laid down, for determining the *Locus Objecti*, on account of being press'd by one Difficulty, which seems inexplicable till a more intimate Knowledge of the Vi-

\* par. I. prop. 31. Sect. 9.

‘ five Faculty be obtained by Mortals. In the  
 ‘ mean time, I propose it to the Consideration of  
 ‘ the Ingenious, Whether the *Locus Apparens* of an  
 ‘ Object placed as in this 9th Section, be not as  
 ‘ much before the Eye, as the distinct Base is be-  
 ‘ hind the Eye ? To which Query we may ven-  
 ture to answer in the Negative. For in the pre-  
 sent Case, the Rule for determining the Distance of  
 the distinct Base, or respective Focus from the  
 Glass is this: *As the Difference between the Distance*  
*of the Object and Focus is to the Focus or Focal Length,*  
*so the Distance of the Object from the Glass is to the*  
*Distance of the respective Focus or distinct Base from*  
*the Glass* \*. Let us now suppose the Object to be  
 placed at the Distance of the Focal Length, and  
 one half of the Focal Length from the Glass, and  
 the Eye close to the Glass, hence it will follow  
 by the Rule, that the Distance of the distinct Base  
 behind the Eye is double the true Distance of the  
 Object before the Eye. If therefore Mr. *Molyneux’s*  
 Conjecture held good, it wou’d follow that the  
 Eye shou’d see the Object, twice as far off as it  
 really is ; and in other Cases at three or four times  
 its due Distance, or more. But this manifestly  
 contradicts Experience, the Object never appear-  
 ing, at farthest, beyond its due Distance. What  
 ever therefore is built on this Supposition (*vid.*  
*Corol. 1. Prop. 57. ibid.*) comes to the Ground along  
 with it.

XLI. From what hath been premis’d, it is a  
 manifest Consequence, that a Man born blind, be-  
 ing made to see, wou’d, at first, have no Idea of  
 Distance by Sight ; The Sun and Stars, the remo-  
 test Objects as well as the nearer wou’d all seem to  
 be in his Eye, or rather in his Mind. The Ob-

\* Molyneux Dioptr. par. I. prop. 5.

jects intronitted by Sight, wou'd seem to him (as in truth they are) no other than a new Set of Thoughts or Sensations, each whereof is as near to him, as the Perceptions of Pain or Pleasure, or the most inward Passions of his Soul. For our judging Objects perceiv'd by Sight to be at any Distance, or without the Mind, is (*vid.* SECT. XXVIII.) intirely the Effect of Experience, which one in those Circumstances cou'd not yet have attained to,

XLII. It is indeed otherwise upon the common Supposition, that Men judge of Distance by the Angle of the Optic Axes, just as one in the Dark, or a Blind-man by the Angle comprehended by two Sticks, one whereof he held in each Hand. For if this were true, it wou'd follow that one blind from his Birth being made to see, shou'd stand in need of no new Experience, in order to perceive Distance by Sight. But that this is false, has, I think, been sufficiently demonstrated.

XLIII. And perhaps upon a strict Inquiry, we shall not find that even those, who from their Birth have grown up in a continu'd Habit of Seeing, are irrecoverably prejudiced on the other side, to wit, in thinking what they see to be at a Distance from them. For at this time it seems agreed on all hands, by those who have had any Thoughts of that Matter, that Colours, which are the proper and immediate Object of Sight, are not without the Mind. But then it will be said, by Sight we have also the Ideas of Extension, and Figure, and Motion; all which may well be thought without, and at some Distance from the Mind, though Colour shou'd not. In answer to this, I appeal to any Man's Experience, whether the visible Extension of any Object doth not appear as near to him, as the

the Colour of that Object; Nay, whether they do not both seem to be in the very same Place. Is not the Extension we see Coloured, and is it possible for us, so much as in Thought, to separate and abstract Colour from Extension? Now, where the Extension is, there surely is the Figure, and there the Motion too. I speak of those which are perceived by Sight.

XLIV. But for a fuller Explication of this Point, and to shew that the immediate Objects of Sight are not so much as the Ideas or Resemblances of things placed at a Distance, it is requisite that we look nearer into the Matter, and carefully observe what is meant in common Discourse, when one says, that which he sees is at a Distance from him. Suppose, for Example, that looking at the Moon I shou'd say it were fifty or sixty Semidiameters of the Earth distant from me. Let us see what Moon this is spoken of: It is plain it cannot be the visible Moon, or any thing like the visible Moon, or that which I see, which is only a round, luminous Plain, of about thirty visible Points in Diameter. For in case I am carried from the place where I stand directly towards the Moon, it is manifest the Object varies, still as I go on; and by the time that I am advanced fifty or sixty Semidiameters of the Earth, I shall be so far from being near a small, round, luminous Flat, that I shall perceive nothing like it; this Object having long since disappeared, and if I wou'd recover it, it must be by going back to the Earth from whence I set out. Again, suppose I perceive by Sight the faint and obscure Idea of something, which I doubt whether it be a Man, or a Tree, or a Tower, but judge it to be at the Distance of about a Mile. 'Tis plain I cannot mean, that what I see is a Mile off, or that it is the Image or Likeness of any thing which is a Mile off, since  
that

that every Step I take towards it, the Appearance alters, and from being obscure, small, and faint, grows clear, large and vigorous. And when I come to the Mile's end, that which I saw first is quite lost, neither do I find any thing in the likeness of it.

XLV. In these and the like Instances, the truth of the Matter stands thus: Having of a long time experienced certain Ideas, perceivable by Touch, as Distance, tangible Figure, and Solidity, to have been connected with certain Ideas of Sight, I do upon perceiving these Ideas of Sight, forthwith conclude what Tangible Ideas are, by the wonted ordinary course of Nature, like to follow. Looking at an Object I perceive a certain visible Figure and Colour, with some degree of Faintness and other Circumstances, which from what I have formerly observed, determine me to think, that if I advance forward so many Paces or Miles, I shall be affected with such and such Ideas of Touch: So that in truth and strictness of Speech, I neither see Distance it self, nor any thing that I take to be at a Distance. I say, neither Distance, nor things placed at a Distance are themselves, or their Ideas, truly perceived by Sight. This I am persuaded of, as to what concerns my self; and I believe whoever will look narrowly into his own Thoughts, and examine what he means by saying, he sees this or that thing at a Distance, will agree with me, that what he sees only suggests to his Understanding, that after having passed a certain Distance, to be measured by the Motion of his Body, which is perceivable by Touch, he shall come to perceive such and such tangible Ideas which have been usually connected with such and such visible Ideas. But that one might be deceived by these suggestions of Sense, and that there is no necessary Connection



nexion between visible and tangible Ideas suggested by them, we need go no farther than the next Looking-glass or Picture to be convinced. Note, that when I speak of Tangible Ideas, I take the word Idea for any the immediate Object of Sense, or Understanding, in which large Signification it is commonly used by the Moderns.

XLVI. From what we have shewn it is a manifest Consequence, that the Ideas of Space, Outness, and Things placed at a Distance, are not, strictly speaking, the Object of Sight; they are not otherwise perceived by the Eye than by the Ear. Sitting in my Study I hear a Coach drive along the Street; I look through the Casement and see it; I walk out and enter into it; thus, common Speech wou'd incline one to think, I heard, saw, and touch'd the same thing, to wit, the Coach. It is nevertheless certain, the Ideas intromitted by each Sense are widely different, and distinct from each other; but having been observed constantly to go together, they are spoken of as one and the same thing. By the variation of the Noise I perceive the different Distances of the Coach, and know that it approaches before I look out. Thus by the Ear I perceive Distance, just after the same manner as I do by the Eye.

XLVII. I do not nevertheless say, I hear Distance in like manner as I say that I see it, the Ideas perceived by Hearing not being so apt to be confounded with the Ideas of Touch, as those of Sight are; so likewise a Man is easily convinced that Bodies and external Things are not properly the Object of Hearing, but only Sounds, by the Mediation whereof the Idea of this or that Body, or Distance is suggested to his Thoughts. But then one is with more difficulty brought to discern  
the

the Difference there is betwixt the Ideas of Sight and Touch : Though it be certain, a Man no more sees or feels the same thing, than he hears and feels the same thing.

XLVIII. One Reason of which seems to be this. It is thought a great Absurdity to imagine, that one and the same thing shou'd have any more than one Extension, and one Figure. But the Extension and Figure of a Body, being let into the Mind two ways, and that indifferently, either by Sight or Touch, it seems to follow that we see the same Extension, and the same Figure which we feel.

XLIX. But if we take a close and accurate View of Things, it must be acknowledged that we never see and feel one and the same Object. That which is seen is one thing, and that which is felt is another ; if the visible Figure and Extension be not the same with the tangible Figure and Extension, we are not to infer that one and the same thing has divers Extensions. The true Consequence is, that the Objects of Sight and Touch are two distinct things. It may perhaps require some Thought rightly to conceive this Distinction. And the Difficulty seems not a little increased, because the Combination of Visible Ideas hath constantly the same Name, as the Combination of Tangible Ideas wherewith it is connected : Which doth of necessity arise from the use and end of Language.

L. In order therefore to treat accurately and unconfusedly of Vision, we must bear in mind that there are two sorts of Objects apprehended by the Eye, the one primarily and immediately, the other secondarily and by Intervention of the former. Those

Those of the first sort neither are, nor appear to be without the Mind, or at any Distance off; they may indeed grow greater, or smaller, more confused, or more clear, or more faint, but they do not, cannot approach or recede from us. Whenever we say an Object is at a Distance, whenever we say it draws near, or goes farther off, we must always mean it of the latter sort, which properly belong to the Touch, and are not so truly perceived, as suggested by the Eye in like manner as Thoughts by the Ear.

LI. No sooner do we hear the Words of a familiar Language pronounced in our Ears, but the Ideas corresponding thereto present themselves to our Minds; in the very same instant the Sound and the Meaning enter the Understanding: So closely are they united, that it is not in our Power to keep out the one, except we exclude the other also. We even act in all respects as if we heard the very Thoughts themselves. So likewise the secondary Objects, or those which are only suggested by Sight, do often more strongly affect us, and are more regarded than the proper Objects of that Sense; along with which they enter into the Mind, and with which they have a far more strict Connexion, than Ideas have with Words. Hence it is, we find it so difficult to discriminate between the immediate and mediate Objects of Sight, and are so prone to attribute to the former, what belongs only to the latter. They are, as it were, most closely twisted, blended, and incorporated together. And the Prejudice is confirmed and riveted in our Thoughts by a long tract of Time, by the use of Language, and want of Reflexion. However, I believe any one that shall attentively consider what we have already said, and shall say upon this Subject before we have done, (especially if

if he pursue it in his own Thoughts) may be able to deliver himself from that Prejudice. Sure I am 'tis worth some Attention, to whoever wou'd understand the true nature of Vision.

LII. I have now done with Distance, and proceed to shew how it is, that we perceive by Sight the Magnitude of Objects. It is the Opinion of some that we do it by Angles, or by Angles in conjunction with Distance; but neither Angles, nor Distance being perceivable by Sight, and the things we see being in truth at no Distance from us, it follows, that as we have shewn Lines and Angles not to be the Medium, the Mind makes use of in apprehending the Apparent Place, so neither are they the Medium whereby it apprehends the Apparent Magnitude of Objects.

LIII. It is well known that the same Extension at a near Distance shall subtend a greater Angle, and at a farther Distance, a lesser Angle. And by this Principle (we are told) the Mind estimates the Magnitude of an Object comparing the Angle under which it is seen with its Distance, and thence inferring the Magnitude thereof. What inclines Men to this Mistake (beside the Humour of making one see by Geometry is, that the same Perceptions or Ideas which suggest Distance, do also suggest Magnitude. But if we examine it, we shall find they suggest the latter, as immediately as the former. I say, they do not first suggest Distance, and then leave it to the Judgment to use that as a Medium, whereby to collect the Magnitude; but they have as close, and immediate a Connexion with the Magnitude, as with the Distance; and suggest Magnitude as independently of Distance, as they do Distance independently of Magnitude. All  
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which will be evident to whoever considers what hath been already said, and what follows.

LIV. It hath been shewn, there are two sorts of Objects apprehended by Sight; each whereof hath its distinct Magnitude, or Extension. The one, properly Tangible, *i. e.* to be perceived and measured by Touch, and not immediately falling under the Sense of seeing: The other, properly and immediately Visible, by Mediation of which the former is brought in View. Each of these Magnitudes are greater or lesser, according as they contain in them more or fewer Points, they being made up of Points or Minimums. For, whatever may be said of Extension in Abstract, it is certain sensible Extension is not infinitely Divisible. There is a *Minimum Tangibile*, and a *Minimum Visibile*, beyond which Sense cannot perceive. This every one's Experience will inform him.

LV. The Magnitude of the Object which exists without the Mind, and is at a Distance, continues always invariably the same: But the Visible Object still changing as you approach to, or recede from the Tangible Object, it hath no fixed and determinate Greatness. Whenever therefore, we speak of the Magnitude of any thing, for Instance a Tree or a House, we must mean the Tangible Magnitude, otherwise there can be nothing steady and free from Ambiguity spoken of it. But though the Tangible and Visible Magnitude in truth belong to two distinct Objects: I shall nevertheless (especially since those Objects are called by the same Name, and are observed to coexist) to avoid tediousness and singularity of Speech, sometimes speak of them, as belonging to one and the same thing.

LVI. Now in order to discover by what means, the Magnitude of Tangible Objects is perceived by Sight; I need only reflect on what passes in my own Mind, and observe what those things be, which introduce the Ideas of greater or lesser into my Thoughts, when I look on any Object. And these I find to be, First, the Magnitude or Extension of the Visible Object, which being immediately perceived by sight, is connected with that other which is Tangible, and placed at a Distance. Secondly, The Confusion or Distinctness. And Thirdly, the Vigorousness or Faintness of the aforesaid Visible Appearance. *Ceteris paribus*, by how much the greater or lesser, the Visible Object is, by so much the greater or lesser, do I conclude the Tangible Object to be. But, be the Idea immediately perceived by Sight never so large, yet if it be withal Confused, I judge the Magnitude of the thing to be but small. If it be Distinct and Clear, I judge it greater. And if it be Faint, I apprehend it to be yet greater. What is here meant, by Confusion and Faintness, hath been explained in SECT. XXXV.

LVII. Moreover the Judgments we make of Greatness do, in like manner as those of Distance, depend on the Disposition of the Eye, also on the Figure, Number and Situation of Objects and other Circumstances that have been observ'd to attend great, or small Tangible Magnitudes. Thus, for Instance, the very same Quantity of Visible Extension, which in the Figure of a Tower, doth suggest the Idea of great Magnitude, shall, in the Figure of a Man suggest the Idea of much smaller Magnitude. That this is owing to the Experience we have had of the usual Bigness of a Tower and a Man, no one, I suppose, need be told.

LVIII. It is also evident, that Confusion or Faintness, have no more a necessary Connexion with  
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with little or great Magnitude, than they have with little or great Distance. As they suggest the latter, so they suggest the former to our Minds. And by Consequence, if it were not for Experience, we shou'd no more judge a faint or confused Appearance to be connected with great or little Magnitude, than we shou'd that it was connected with great or little Distance.

LIX. Nor will it be found, that great or small Visible Magnitude hath any necessary Relation to great or small Tangible Magnitude: So that the one may certainly be infer'd from the other. But, before we come to the Proof of this, it is fit we consider the Difference there is betwixt the Extension and Figure which is the proper Object of Touch, and that other which is termed Visible; and how the former is principally, though not immediately taken notice of, when we look at any Object. This has been before mentioned, but we shall here inquire into the Cause thereof. We regard the Objects that environ us, in proportion as they are adapted to benefit or injure our own Bodies, and thereby produce in our Minds the Sensations of Pleasure or Pain. Now Bodies operating on our Organs, by an immediate Application, and the Hurt or Advantage arising therefrom, depending altogether on the Tangible, and not at all on the Visible, Qualities of any Object: This is a plain Reason, why those shou'd be regarded by us much more than these; and for this End, the Visive Sense seems to have been bestowed on Animals, to wit, that by the Perception of Visible Ideas (which in themselves are not capable of affecting, or any wise altering the Frame of their Bodies) they may be able to foresee (from the Experience they have had, what Tangible Ideas are connected with such, and such Visible Ideas)

the Damage or Benefit which is like to ensue, upon the Application of their own Bodies to this or that Body which is at a Distance. Which Foresight, how necessary it is to the preservation of an Animal, every one's Experience can inform him. Hence it is, that when we look at an Object, the Tangible Figure and Extension thereof are principally attended to; whilst there is small heed taken of the Visible Figure and Magnitude, which, though more immediately perceived, do less concern us, and are not fitted to produce any Alteration in our Bodies.

LX. That the Matter of Fact is true, will be evident to any one, who considers that a Man placed at Ten Foot Distance, is thought as great, as if he were placed at the Distance only of Five Foot; which is true, not with Relation to the Visible, but Tangible Greatness of the Object. The Visible Magnitude being far greater, at one Station, than it is at the other.

LXI. Inches, Feet, &c. are settled, stated Lengths, whereby we measure Objects, and estimate their Magnitude, we say, for Example, an Object appears to be six Inches, or Six Foot long. Now, that this cannot be meant of Visible Inches, &c. is evident, because a Visible Inch is it self no constant, determinate Magnitude, and cannot therefore serve to mark out, and determine the Magnitude of any other thing. Take an Inch mark'd upon a Ruler; view it, successively, at the distance of half a Foot, a Foot, a Foot and a Half, &c. from the Eye: At each of which, and at all the intermediate Distances, the Inch shall have a different Visible Extension, *i. e.* there shall be more or fewer Points discerned in it. Now I ask which of all these various Extensions, is that stated, determinate



minate one, that is agreed on, for a common Measure of other Magnitudes? No Reason can be assigned, why we shou'd pitch on one, more than another: And except there be some invariable, determinate Extension fixed on to be marked by the Word Inch, it is plain, it can be used to little Purpose; and to say, a Thing contains this or that Number of Inches, shall imply no more than that it is extended, without bringing any particular Idea of that Extension into the Mind. Farther, an Inch and a Foot, from different Distances, shall both exhibit the same Visible Magnitude, and yet at the same time, you shall say, that one seems several times greater than the other. From all which it is manifest, that the Judgments we make of the Magnitude of Objects by Sight, are altogether in reference to their Tangible Extension. Whenever we say an Object is Great, or Small, of this or that determinate Measure, I say, it must be meant of the Tangible, and not the Visible Extension, which, though immediately perceived, is nevertheless little taken notice of

LXII. Now, that there is no necessary Connexion, between these two Distinct Extensions is evident from hence: Because our Eyes might have been framed in such a manner, as to be able to see nothing but what were less than the *Minimum Tangibile*. In which Case, it is not impossible we might have perceived all the immediate Objects of Sight, the very same that we do now: But unto those Visible Appearances, there wou'd not be connected those different Tangible Magnitudes, that are now. Which shews, the Judgments we make of the Magnitude of Things placed at a distance, from the various Greatness of the Immediate Objects of Sight, do not arise from any Essential or Necessary, but only

a Customary Tye, which has been observ'd between them.

LXIII. Moreover, it is not only certain, that any Idea of Sight might not have been connected with this or that Idea of Touch, which we now observe to accompany it: But also, that the greater Visible Magnitudes might have been connected with, and introduced into our Minds lesser Tangible Magnitudes, and the lesser Visible Magnitudes greater Tangible Magnitudes. Nay, that it actually is so, we have daily Experience; that Object which makes a strong and large Appearance, not seeming near so great as another, the Visible Magnitude whereof is much less, but more faint, and the Appearance upper, or which is the same thing painted lower on the *Retina*, which Faintness and Situation suggest both greater Magnitude and greater Distance.

LXIV. From which, and from SECT. LVII. and LVIII. it is manifest, that as we do not perceive the Magnitudes of Objects immediately by Sight, so neither do we perceive them, by the Mediation of any thing which has a necessary Connexion with them. Those Ideas that now suggest unto us the various Magnitudes of External Objects, before we touch them, might possibly have suggested no such thing: Or they might have signified them, in a direct contrary manner, so that the very same Ideas, on the Perception whereof we judge an Object to be Small, might as well have serv'd to make us conclude it Great. Those Ideas being in their own Nature equally fitted to bring into our Minds the Idea of Small or Great, or no Size at all of outward Objects; just as the Words of any Language are in their own Nature indifferent to signify this or that thing, or nothing at all.

LXV.

LXV. As we see Distance, so we see Magnitude. And we see both, in the same way that we see Shame or Anger in Looks of a Man. Those Passions are themselves Invisible, they are nevertheless let in by the Eye along with Colours and Alterations of Countenance, which are the immediate Object of Vision: And which signify them for no other Reason, than barely because they have been observed to accompany them. Without which Experience, we shou'd no more have taken Blushing for a Sign of Shame, than of Gladness

LXVI. We are nevertheless exceeding prone to imagine those things, which are perceived only by the Mediation of others, to be themselves the immediate Objects of Sight; or, at least, to have in their own Nature a Fitness to be suggested by them, before ever they had been experienced to coexist with them. From which Prejudice every one, perhaps, will not find it easy to emancipate himself, by any the clearest Convictions of Reason. And there are some Grounds to think, that if there was one only invariable and universal Language in the World, and that Men were born with the Faculty of speaking it, it wou'd be the Opinion of many, that the Ideas in other Mens Minds were properly perceived by the Ear, or had at least a necessary and inseparable Tye with the Sounds that were affixed to them. All which seems to arise from want of a due Application of our discerning Faculty, thereby to discriminate between the Ideas that are in our Understandings, and consider them apart from each other; which wou'd preserve us from confounding those that are different, and make us see what Ideas do, and what do not include or imply this or that other Idea.

LXVII. There is a Celebrated Phænomenon, the Solution whereof I shall attempt to give, by the Principles that have been laid down, in reference to the manner wherein we apprehend by Sight the Magnitude of Objects. The apparent Magnitude of the Moon when placed in the Horizon, is much greater than when it is in the Meridian. Though the Angle under which the Diameter of the Moon is seen, be not observed greater in the former Case, than in the latter: And the Horizontal Moon doth not constantly appear of the same Bigness, but at some times seemeth far greater than at others.

LXVIII. Now in order to explain the Reason of the Moon's appearing greater than ordinary in the Horizon, it must be observed, that the Particles which compose our Atmosphere intercept the Rays of Light proceeding from any Object to the Eye; and by how much the greater is the Portion of Atmosphere, interjacent between the Object and the Eye, by so much the more are the Rays intercepted; and by consequence, the Appearance of the Object rendered more Faint, every Object appearing more Vigorous or more Faint, in Proportion as it sendeth more or fewer Rays. into the Eye Now, between the Eye and the Moon, when situated in the Horizon, there lies a far greater Quantity of Atmosphere, than there does when the Moon is in the Meridian. Whence it comes to pass, that the Appearance of the Horizontal Moon is fainter, and therefore by S E C T. LVI. it shou'd be thought bigger in that Situation, than in the Meridian, or in any other Elevation above the Horizon.

LXIX. Farther, the Air being variously impregnated, sometimes more and sometimes less  
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with Vapours and Exhalations fitted to retund and intercept the Rays of Light, it follows, that the Appearance of the Horizontal Moon hath not always an equal Faintness, and by Consequence, that Luminary, tho' in the very same Situation, is at one time judged greater than at another.

LXX. That we have here given the true Account of the Phænomena of the Horizontal Moon, will, I suppose, be farther evident to any one from the following Considerations. *First*, It is plain, that which in this Case suggests the Idea of greater Magnitude, must be something which is it self perceived; for, that which is unperceived cannot suggest to our Perception any other thing. *Secondly*, It must be something that does not constantly remain the same, but is subject to some Change or Variation, since the Appearance of the Horizontal Moon varies, being at one time greater than at another. And yet, *Thirdly*, It cannot be the visible Figure or Magnitude, since that remains the same, or is rather lesser, by how much the Moon is nearer to the Horizon. It remains therefore, that the true Cause is that Affection or Alteration of the Visible Appearance, which proceeds from the greater Paucity of Rays arriving at the Eye, and which I term Faintness: Since this answers all the forementioned Conditions, and I am not conscious of any other Perception that doth.

LXXI. Add to this, that in misty Weather it is a common Observation, that the Appearance of the Horizontal Moon is far larger than usual, which greatly conspires with, and strengthens our Opinion. Neither wou'd it prove, in the least, Irreconcilable with what we have said, if the Horizontal Moon shou'd chance sometimes to seem enlarged beyond its usual Extent, even in more

Serene Weather. For we must not only have regard to the Mist, which happens to be in the place where we stand; we ought also to take into our Thoughts, the whole Sum of Vapours and Exhalations, which lie betwixt the Eye and the Moon: All which cooperating to render the Appearance of the Moon more Faint, and thereby increase its Magnitude, it may chance to appear greater than it usually does, even in the Horizontal Position, at a time when, though there be no extraordinary Fog or Hazeiness, just in the place where we stand; yet, the Air between the Eye and the Moon, taken altogether, may be loaded with a greater quantity of interpersed Vapours and Exhalations, than at other times.

LXXII. It may be objected, that in Consequence of our Principles, the Interposition of a Body in some degree Opaque, which may intercept a great Part of the Rays of Light, shou'd render the Appearance of the Moon in the Meridian as large, as when it is viewed in the Horizon. To which I answer, it is not Faintness any how applied, that suggests greater Magnitude, there being no necessary, but only an experimental Connexion between those two things: It follows, that the Faintness, which enlarges the Appearance, must be applied in such Sort, and with such Circumstances, as have been observed to attend the Vision of great Magnitudes. When from a Distance we behold great Objects, the Particles of the intermediate Air and Vapours, which are themselves unperceivable, do interrupt the Rays of Light, and thereby render the Appearance less strong and vivid; now, Faintness of Appearance caused in this Sort, hath been experienced to coexist with great Magnitude. But when it is caused by the Interposition of an opaque sensible Body, this Circumstance

cumstance alters the Case, so that a faint Appearance this way caused, doth not suggest greater Magnitude, because it hath not been experienced to coexist with it.

LXXIII. Faintness, as well as all other Ideas or Perceptions which suggest Magnitude or Distance, doth it in the same way that Words suggest the Notions to which they are annexed. Now it is known, a Word pronounced with certain Circumstances, or in a certain Context with other Words, hath not always the same Import and Signification that it hath when pronounced in some other Circumstances, or different Context of Words. The very same visible Appearance as to Faintness and all other respects, if placed on high, shall not suggest the same Magnitude that it would if it were seen at an equal Distance, on a level with the Eye. The Reason whereof is, that we are rarely accustomed to view Objects at a great Height; our Concerns lie among things situated rather before than above us; and accordingly our Eyes are not placed on the top of our Heads, but in such a Position, as is most convenient for us to see distant Objects standing in our way, and this Situation of them being a Circumstance, which usually attends the Vision of distant Objects, we may from hence account for ( what is commonly observed ) an Object's appearing of different Magnitude, even with respect to its Horizontal Extension, on the top of a Steeple, for example, an hundred Feet high to one standing below, from what it would if placed at an hundred Feet distance on a level with his Eye. For it hath been shewn, that the Judgment we make on the Magnitude of a thing, depends not on the visible Appearance alone, but also on divers other Circumstances, any one of which being omitted or varied may suffice to make some alteration in  
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our Judgment. Hence, the Circumstance of viewing a distant object in such a Situation as is usual, and suits with the ordinary Posture of the Head and Eyes being omitted, and instead thereof a different Situation of the Object, which requires a different Posture of the Head taking place, it is not to be wondered at, if the Magnitude be judged different; but it will be demanded, why an high Object shou'd constantly appear less than an equidistant low Object of the same Dimensions, for so it is observed to be; it may indeed be granted that the variation of some Circumstances may vary the Judgment, made on the Magnitude of High Objects, which we are less used to look at: But it does not hence appear, why they shou'd be judged less rather than greater? I answer, that in case the Magnitude of distant Objects was suggested by the Extent of their visible Appearance alone, and thought Proportional thereto, it is certain they wou'd then be judged much less than now they seem to be, *Vide* SECT. LXXIX. But several Circumstances concurring to form the Judgment we make on the Magnitude of distant Objects, by means of which they appear far larger than others, whose visible Appearance hath an equal or even greater Extension; it follows, that upon the Change or Omission of any of those Circumstances, which are wont to attend the Vision of distant Objects, and so come to influence the Judgments made on their Magnitude, they shall proportionably appear less than otherwise they would. For any of those things that caused an Object to be thought greater, than in proportion to its visible Extension, being either omitted or applied without the usual Circumstances, the Judgment depends more intirely on the visible Extension, and consequently the Object must be judged less. Thus in the present Case, the Situation of the thing seen being different



ferent from what it usually is in those Objects we have occasion to view, and whose Magnitude we observe, it follows, that the very same Object, being an hundred Feet high, shou'd seem less than if it was an hundred Feet off on (or nearly on) a level with the Eye. What has been here set forth, seems to me to have no small share in contributing to magnify the Appearance of the horizontal Moon, and deserves not to be passed over in the Explication of it.

LXXIV. If we attentively consider the Phænomenon before us, we shall find the not discerning between the mediate and immediate Objects of Sight, to be the chief Cause of the Difficulty that occurs in the Explication of it. The Magnitude of the visible Moon, or that which is the proper and immediate Object of Vision, is no greater when the Moon is in the Horizon, than when it is in the Meridian. How comes it therefore, to seem greater in one Situation than the other? What is it can put this Cheat on the Understanding? It has no other Perception of the Moon, than what it gets by Sight: And that which is seen, is of the same Extent, I say, the visible Appearance hath the same, or rather a less Magnitude when the Moon is viewed in the Horizontal, than when in the Meridional Position: And yet it is esteemed greater in the former than in the latter. Herein consists the difficulty, which doth vanish and admit of a most easy Solution, if we consider that as the visible Moon is not greater in the Horizon than in the Meridian, so neither is it thought to be so. It hath been already shewn, that in any act of Vision, the visible Object absolutely, or in it self, is little taken notice of, the Mind still carrying its View from that to some tangible Ideas, which have been observed to be connected with it, and by that means come  
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to be suggested by it. So that when a thing is said to appear great or small, or whatever Estimate be made of the Magnitude of any thing, this is meant not of the visible, but of the tangible Object. This duly considered, it will be no hard matter to reconcile the seeming Contradiction there is, that the Moon shou'd appear of a different Bigness, the visible Magnitude thereof remaining still the same. For by SECT. I.VI. the very same visible Extension, with a different Faintness, shall suggest a different tangible Extension. When therefore the Horizontal Moon is said to appear greater than the Meridional Moon, this must be understood not of a greater visible Extension, but of a greater tangible or real Extension, which by reason of the more than ordinary Faintness of the visible Appearance, is suggested to the Mind along with it.

LXXV. Many Attempts have been made by Learned Men, to account for this Appearance. *Gassendus*, *Descartes*, *Hobbes*, and several others, have employed their Thoughts on that Subject; but how fruitless and unsatisfactory their Endeavours have been, is sufficiently shewn in *The Philosophical Transactions*\*, where you may see their several Opinions at large set forth and confuted, not without some Surprise at the gross Blunders that ingenious Men have been forced into, by endeavouring to reconcile this Appearance with the ordinary Principles of Optics. Since the Writing of which, there hath been published in the Transactions† another Paper relating to the same Affair, by the celebrated Dr. *Wallis*, wherein he attempts to account for that Phenomenon, which, though it seems not to contain any thing new, or different from

\* Phil. Transf. Num. 187. p. 314.

† Num. 187. p. 323.

what had been said before by others, I shall nevertheless consider in this place.

LXXVI. His Opinion, in short, is this; We judge not of the Magnitude of an Object by the visual Angle alone, but by the visual Angle in conjunction with the Distance. Hence, though the Angle remain the same, or even become less, yet if withal the Distance seem to have been increased, the Object shall appear greater. Now, one way whereby we estimate the Distance of any thing, is by the Number and Extent of the intermediate Objects: When therefore the Moon is seen in the Horizon, the Variety of Fields, Houses, &c. together with the large Prospect of the wide extended Land or Sea, that lies between the Eye and the utmost Limb of the Horizon, suggest unto the Mind the Idea of greater Distance, and consequently magnify the Appearance. And this, according to Dr. Wallis, is the true Account of the extraordinary Largeness attributed by the Mind to the Horizontal Moon, at a time when the Angle subtended by its Diameter, is not one jot greater than it used to be.

LXXVII. With reference to this Opinion, not to repeat what hath been already said concerning Distance, I shall only observe, *First*, That if the Prospect of interjacent Objects be that which suggests the Idea of farther Distance, and this Idea of farther Distance be the Cause that brings into the Mind the Idea of greater Magnitude, it shou'd hence follow, that if one looked at the Horizontal Moon from behind a Wall, it would appear no bigger than ordinary. For in that Case, the Wall interposing cuts off all that Prospect of Sea and Land, &c. which might otherwise increase the apparent Distance, and thereby the apparent Magnitude

tude of the Moon. Nor will it suffice to say, the Memory doth even then suggest all that Extent of Land, &c. which lies within the Horizon; which Suggestion occasions a sudden Judgment of Sense, that the Moon is farther off and larger than usual. For ask any Man, who from such a Station beholding the Horizontal Moon, shall think her greater than usual, whether he hath at that time in his Mind any Idea of the intermediate Objects, or long Tract of Land that lies between his Eye and the extreme Edge of the Horizon? And whether it be that Idea which is the Cause of his making the aforementioned Judgment? He will, I suppose, reply in the Negative, and declare the Horizontal Moon shall appear greater than the Meridional, though he never thinks of all or any of those things that lie between him and it. *Secondly*, It seems impossible by this Hypothesis, to account for the Moon's appearing in the very same Situation, at one time greater than at another; which nevertheless has been shewn to be very agreeable to the Principles we have laid down, and receives a most easy and natural Explication from them. For the further clearing up of this Point, it is to be observed that what we immediately and properly see are only Lights and Colours in sundry Situations and Shades, and Degrees of Faintness and Clearness, Confusion and Distinctness. All which visible Objects are only in the Mind; nor do they suggest ought external, whether Distance or Magnitude, otherwise than by habitual Connexion as Words do Things. We are also to remark, that, beside the Straining of the Eyes, and beside the vivid and faint, the distinct and confused Appearances (which bearing some Proportion to Lines and Angles, have been substituted instead of them, in the foregoing Part of this Treatise) there are other means which suggest both Distance and Magnitude;

nitude; particularly, the Situation of visible Points, or Objects, as upper or lower; the former suggesting a farther Distance and greater Magnitude, the latter a nearer Distance and lesser Magnitude: All which is an Effect only of Custom and Experience; there being really nothing intermediate in the Line of Distance, between the Uppermost and Lowermost, which are both *Æquidistant*, or rather at no Distance from the Eye, as there is also nothing in Upper or Lower, which by necessary Connexion shou'd suggest greater or lesser Magnitude. Now, as these customary, experimental means of suggesting Distance, do likewise suggest Magnitude, so they suggest the one as immediately as the other. I say, they do not (*Vide* SECT. LIII.) first suggest Distance, and then leave the Mind from thence to infer or compute Magnitude, but suggest Magnitude as immediately and directly as they suggest Distance.

LXXVIII. This Phænomenon of the Horizontal Moon is a clear Instance of the insufficiency of Lines and Angles, for explaining the way wherein the Mind perceives, and estimates the Magnitude of outward Objects. There is nevertheless a use of Computation by them, in order to determine the apparent Magnitude of things, so far as they have a Connexion with, and are proportional to those other Ideas, or Perceptions which are the true and immediate Occasions that suggest to the Mind the apparent Magnitude of Things. But this in general may, I think, be observed concerning Mathematical Computation in Optics: That it can never be very precise and exact, since the Judgments we make of the Magnitude of External Things do often depend on several Circumstances, which are not proportionable to, or capable of being defined by Lines and Angles.

LXXIX.

LXXIX. From what has been said, we may safely deduce this Consequence, to wit, that a Man born blind, and made to see, wou'd, at first opening of his Eyes make a very different Judgment of the Magnitude of Objects intromitted by them, from what others do. He wou'd not consider the Ideas of Sight, with reference to, or as having any Connexion with the Ideas of Touch: His View of them being intirely terminated within themselves, he can no otherwise judge them Great or Small, than as they contain a greater or lesser Number of visible Points. Now, it being certain that any visible Point can cover or exclude from View, only one other visible Point, it follows, that whatever Object intercepts the View of another, hath an equal Number of visible Points with it; and consequently they shall both be thought by him to have the same Magnitude. Hence it is evident, one in those Circumstances would judge his Thumb, with which he might hide a Tower, or hinder its being seen, equal to that Tower, or his Hand, the Interposition whereof might conceal the Firmament from his View, equal to the Firmament: How great an Inequality soever there may, in our Apprehensions, seem to be betwixt those two things, because of the customary and close Connexion that has grown up in our Minds between the Objects of Sight and Touch, whereby the very different and distinct Ideas of those two Senses, are so blended and confounded together, as to be mistaken for one and the same thing; out of which Prejudice we cannot easily extricate our selves.

LXXX. For the better explaining the Nature of Vision, and setting the manner wherein we perceive Magnitudes in a due Light, I shall proceed  
to

to make some Observations concerning Matters relating thereto, whereof the want of Reflexion, and duly separating between tangible and visible Ideas, is apt to create in us mistaken and confused Notions. And *First*, I shall observe that the *Minimum Visibile* is exactly equal in all Beings whatsoever, that are endowed with the visive Faculty. No exquisite Formation of the Eye, no peculiar Sharpness of Sight can make it less in one Creature than in another; for it not being distinguishable into Parts, nor in any wise consisting of them, it must necessarily be the same to all. For suppose it otherwise, and that the *Minimum Visibile* of a Mite, for Instance, be less than the *Minimum Visibile* of a Man; the latter therefore may by Deduction of some part be made equal to the former: It doth therefore consist of Parts, which is inconsistent with the Notion of a *Minimum Visibile*, or Point.

LXXXI. It will perhaps be objected that the *Minimum Visibile* of a Man doth really, and in it self contain Parts whereby it surpasses that of a Mite, though they are not perceivable by the Man. To which I answer, the *Minimum Visibile* having (in like manner as all other the proper and immediate Objects of Sight) been shewn not to have any Existence without the Mind of him who sees it, it follows there cannot be any part of it that is not actually perceived, and therefore visible. Now for any Object to contain several distinct visible Parts, and at the same time to be a *Minimum Visibile*, is a manifest Contradiction.

LXXXII. Of these visible Points we see at all times an equal Number. It is every whit as great when our View is contracted and bounded by near Objects, as when it is extended to larger and remote.

moter. For it being impossible that one *Minimum Visibile* should obscure, or keep out of Sight more than one other, it is a plain Consequence, that when my View is on all sides bounded by the Walls of my Study, I see just as many visible points as I cou'd, in case that by the removal of the Study-walls, and all other Obstructions, I had a full Prospect of the circumjacent Fields, Mountains, Sea, and open Firmament ; for so long as I am shut up within the Walls, by their Interposition, every Point of the external Objects is covered from my View : But each Point that is seen being able to cover or exclude from Sight, one only other corresponding Point, it follows, that whilst my Sight is confined to those narrow Walls, I see as many Points, or *Minima Visibilia*, as I should were those Walls away, by looking on all the external Objects, whose Prospect is intercepted by them. Whenever therefore we are said to have a greater Prospect at one time than another, this must be understood with relation not to the proper and immediate, but the secondary and mediate Objects of Vision, which, as hath been shewn, properly belong to the Touch.

LXXXIII. The visive Faculty considered, with reference to its immediate Objects, may be found to labour of two Defects, *First*, In respect of the Extent or Number of visible Points that are at once perceivable by it, which is narrow and limited to a certain Degree. It can take in at one View but a certain determinate Number of *Minima Visibilia*, beyond which it cannot extend its Prospect. *Secondly*, Our Sight is defective in that its View is not only narrow, but also for the most part confused ; of those things that we take in at one Prospect, we can see but a few at once clearly and unconfusedly ; and the more we fix our Sight  
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on any one Object, by so much the Darker and more Indistinct shall the rest appear.

LXXXIV. Corresponding to these two Defects of Sight, we may imagine as many Perfections, to wit, *1<sup>st</sup>*. That of comprehending in one View a greater Number of visible Points. *2<sup>dly</sup>*. Of being able to view them all equally and at once, with the utmost Clearness and Distinction. That those Perfections are not actually in some Intelligences of a different Order and Capacity from ours, it is impossible for us to know.

LXXXV. In neither of those two Ways do Microscopes contribute to the improvement of Sight ; for when we look through a Microscope, we neither see more visible Points, nor are the collateral Points more distinct than when we look with the naked Eye, at Objects placed in a due Distance. A Microscope brings us as it were into a new World : It presents us with a new Scene of visible Objects, quite different from what we behold with the naked Eye. But herein consists the most remarkable Difference, to wit, that whereas the Objects perceived by the Eye alone, have a certain Connexion with tangible Objects, whereby we are taught to foresee what will ensue upon the Approach or Application of distant Objects to the Parts of our own Body, which much conduceth to its Preservation ; there is not the like Connexion between things tangible and those visible Objects, that are perceived by help of a fine Microscope.

LXXXVI. Hence it is evident, that were our Eyes turned into the Nature of Microscopes, we shou'd not be much benefited by the Change ; we shou'd be deprived of the forementioned Advan-


tage we at present receive by the visive Faculty; and have left us only the empty Amusement of Seeing, without any other benefit arising from it. But in that Case, it will perhaps be said, our Sight wou'd be endued with a far greater Sharpness and Penetration than it now hath. But I wou'd fain know wherein consists that Sharpness, which is esteemed so great an Excellency of Sight. It is certain from what we have already shewn, that the *Minimum Visibile* is never greater or lesser, but in all Cases constantly the same: And in the Case of Microscopical Eyes, I see only this Difference, to wit, that upon the ceasing of a certain observable Connexion betwixt the divers Perceptions of Sight and Touch, which before enabled us to regulate our Actions by the Eye, it wou'd now be rendered utterly unserviceable to that Purpose.

LXXXVII. Upon the whole, it seems that if we consider the Use and End of Sight, together with the present State and Circumstances of our Being, we shall not find any great Cause to complain of any Defect or Imperfection in it, or easily conceive how it cou'd be mended. With such admirable Wisdom is that Faculty contrived, both for the Pleasure and Convenience of Life.

LXXXVIII. Having finished what I intended to say, concerning the Distance and Magnitude of Objects, I come now to treat of the Manner, wherein the Mind perceives by Sight their Situation. Among the Discoveries of the last Age, it is reputed none of the least, that the Manner of Vision hath been more clearly explained, than ever it had been before. There is, at this Day, no one Ignorant, that the Pictures of external Objects are painted on the *Retina*, or Fund of the Eye. That we can see nothing which is not so painted: And that,

that, according as the Picture is more Distinct or Confused, so also is the Perception we have of the Object: But then in this Explication of Vision, there occurs one mighty Difficulty. The Objects are painted in an inverted Order on the Bottom of the Eye: The upper part of any Object being painted on the lower part of the Eye, and the lower part of the Object on the upper part of the Eye: And so also as to Right and Left. Since therefore the Pictures are thus inverted, it is demanded how it comes to pass, that we see the Objects erect and in their natural Posture?

LXXXIX. In answer to this Difficulty, we are told, that the Mind perceiving an Impulse of a Ray of Light, on the upper part of the Eye, considers this Ray as coming in a direct Line, from the lower part of the Object; and in like manner tracing the Ray that strikes on the lower part of the Eye, it is directed to the upper part of the Object. Thus in the adjacent Figure C the lower Point of the Object A B C is projected on *c* the upper part of the Eye. So likewise, the highest



Point A is projected on *a* the lowest part of the Eye, which makes the Representation *c b a* inverted: But the Mind considering the Stroke that is made on *c* as coming in the straight Line Cc from the lower end of the Object; and the Stroke or Impulse on *a*, as coming in the Line

A $\alpha$  from the upper End of the Object, is directed to make a right Judgment of the Situation of the Object ABC, notwithstanding the Picture of it is inverted. This is illustrated by conceiving a blind Man, who holding in his Hands two Sticks that cross each other, doth with them touch the extremities of an Object, placed in a perpendicular Situation. It is certain, this Man will judge that to be the upper part of the Object, which he touches with the Stick held in the undermost Hand, and that to be the lower part of the Object, which he touches with the Stick in his uppermost Hand. This is the common Explication of the erect Appearance of Objects, which is generally received and acquiesced in, being (as Mr. *Molyneux* tells us\*) *allowed by all Men as Satisfactory.*

XC. But this account to me does not seem in any degree True. Did I perceive those Impulses, Decussations, and Directions of the Rays of Light, in like manner as hath been set forth, then, indeed, it wou'd not at first view be altogether void of Probability. And there might be some Pretence for the Comparison of the Blind-Man and his cross Sticks. But the Case is far otherwise. I know very well that I perceive no such thing. And of Consequence, I cannot thereby make an Estimate of the Situation of Objects. I appeal to any one's Experience, whether he be conscious to himself, that he thinks on the Intersection made by the Radious Pencils, or pursues the Impulses they give in right Lines, whenever he perceives by Sight the Position of any Object? To me it seems evident, that Crossing and Tracing of the Rays, is never thought on by Children, Idiots, or in truth by any other, save only those who have applied

\* Diopt. par. 2. c. 7. p. 289.

themselves to the Study of Optics. And for the Mind to judge of the Situation of Objects by those things, without perceiving them, or to perceive them without knowing it, is equally beyond my Comprehension. Add to this, that the explaining the manner of Vision by the Example of cross Sticks, and hunting for the Object along the Axes of the Radious Pencils, doth suppose the proper Objects of Sight to be perceived at a Distance from us, contrary to what hath been demonstrated.

XCI. It remains, therefore, that we look for some other Explication of this Difficulty: And I believe it not impossible to find one, provided we examine it to the Bottom, and carefully distinguish between the Ideas of Sight and Touch; which cannot be too oft inculcated in treating of Vision: But more especially throughout the consideration of this Affair, we ought to carry that Distinction in our Thoughts: For that from want of a right Understanding thereof, the Difficulty of explaining Erect Vision seems chiefly to arise.

XCII. In order to disentangle our Minds, from whatever Prejudices we may entertain with relation to the Subject in hand, nothing seems more apposite, than the taking into our Thoughts the Case of one born Blind, and afterwards, when grown up, made to see. And though perhaps, it may not be an easy Task to divest our-selves intirely of the Experience received from Sight, so as to be able to put our Thoughts exactly in the Posture of such a one's; we must, nevertheless as far as possible, endeavour to frame true Conceptions, of what might reasonably be supposed to pass in his Mind.

XCIII. It is certain, that a Man actually Blind, and who had continued so from his Birth, wou'd by the Sense of Feeling attain to have Ideas of Upper and Lower. By the Motion of his Hand he might discern the Situation of any Tangible Object placed within his Reach. That part on which he felt himself supported, or towards which he perceived his Body to gravitate, he wou'd term Lower, and the contrary to this Upper; and accordingly denominate whatsoever Objects he touched.

XCIV. But then, whatever Judgments he makes concerning the Situation of Objects, are confined to those only that are perceivable by Touch. All those things that are Intangible, and of a spiritual Nature, his Thoughts and Desires, his Passions; and in general all the Modifications of his Soul, to these he wou'd never apply the Terms Upper and Lower, except only in a Metaphorical Sense. He may, perhaps, by way of Allusion, speak of high or low Thoughts: But those Terms in their proper Signification, wou'd never be applyed to any thing, that was not conceived to exist without the Mind. For a Man born Blind, and remaining in the same State, could mean nothing else by the Words Higher and Lower, than a greater or lesser Distance from the Earth: Which Distance he wou'd measure by the Motion or Application of his Hand, or some other part of his Body. It is, therefore, evident, that all those things which, in respect of each other, wou'd by him be thought Higher or Lower, must be such as were conceived to exist without his Mind, in the ambient Space.

XCV. Whence it plainly follows, that such a one, if we suppose him made to see, wou'd not at  
first

first Sight think, that any thing he saw was High or Low, Erect or Inverted; for it hath been already demonstrated in SECT. XLI. that he wou'd not think the Things he perceived by Sight to be at any Distance from him, or without his Mind. The Objects to which he had hitherto been used to apply the Terms Up and Down, High and Low, were such only as affected, or were some way perceived by his Touch: But the proper Objects of Vision make a new Set of Ideas, perfectly distinct and different from the former, and which can in no sort make themselves perceived by Touch. There is, therefore, nothing at all that cou'd induce him to think those Terms applicable to them: Nor wou'd he ever think it, till such time as he had observed their Connexion with Tangible Objects, and the same Prejudices began to insinuate it self into his Understanding, which from their Infancy had grown up in the Understandings of other Men.

XCVI. To set this Matter in a clearer Light, I shall make use of an Example. Suppose the above-mentioned blind Person, by his Touch, perceives a Man to stand Erect. Let us inquire into the manner of this. By the application of his Hand to the several Parts of a Humane Body, he had perceived different Tangible Ideas, which being collected into sundry complex ones have distinct Names annexed to them. Thus one Combination of a certain Tangible Figure, Bulk, and Consistency of Parts is called the Head, another the Hand, a Third the Foot, and so of the rest: All which Complex Ideas cou'd, in his Understanding, be made up only of Ideas perceivable by Touch. He had also by his Touch obtained an Idea of Earth or Ground, towards which he perceives the Parts of his Body to have a natural Tendency. Now, by Erect nothing more being meant, than  
that

that perpendicular Position of a Man, wherein his Feet are nearest to the Earth: If the blind Person by moving his Hand, over the Parts of the Man who stands before him, perceives the tangible Ideas that compose the Head, to be farthest from, and those that compose the Feet to be nearest to, that other Combination of Tangible Ideas which he calls Earth: He will denominate that Man Erect. But if we suppose him on a sudden to receive his Sight, and that he behold a Man standing before him, it is evident, in that Case, he wou'd neither judge the Man he sees to be Erect nor Inverted; for he never having known those Terms applied to any other, save Tangible Things, or which existed in the Space without him, and what he sees neither being Tangible, nor perceived as existing without, he cou'd not know that in propriety of Language they were applicable to it.

XCVII. Afterwards, when upon turning his Head or Eyes up and down to the right and left, he shall observe the visible Objects to change, and shall also attain to know, that they are called by the same Names, and connected with the Objects perceived by Touch; then, indeed, he will come to speak of them and their Situation, in the same Terms that he has been used to apply to Tangible Things: And those that he perceives by turning up his Eyes, he will call Upper, and those that by turning down his Eyes, he will call Lower.

XCVIII. And this seems to me the true Reason why he shou'd think those Objects uppermost that are painted on the Lower part of his Eye: For, by turning the Eye up they shall be distinctly seen; as likewise those that are painted on the highest part of the Eye shall be distinctly seen, by turning the Eye down, and are for that Reason esteemed



esteemed lowest: For we have shewn that to the immediate Objects of Sight, considered in themselves, he wou'd not attribute the Terms High and Low. It must therefore be on account of some Circumstances, which are observed to attend them: And these, it is plain, are the Actions of turning the Eye up and down, which suggest a very obvious Reason, why the Mind shou'd denominate the Objects of Sight accordingly High or Low. And without this Motion of the Eye, this turning it up and down in order to discern different Objects, doubtless Erect, Inverse, and other the like Terms relating to the Position of Tangible Objects, wou'd never have been transferred, or in any degree apprehended to belong to the Ideas of Sight: The meer Act of Seeing including nothing in it to that Purpose; whereas the different Situations of the Eye naturally direct the Mind to make a suitable Judgment of the Situation of Objects intromitted by it.

XCIX. Farther, when he has by Experience learned the Connexion there is between the several Ideas of Sight and Touch, he will be able, by the Perception he has of the Situation of Visible Things in respect of one another, to make a sudden and true Estimate of the Situation of Outward, Tangible Things corresponding to them. And thus it is, he shall perceive by Sight the Situation of External Objects, which do not properly fall under that Sense.

C. I know we are very prone to think, that if just made to see, we shou'd judge of the Situation of Visible Things as we do now: But, we are also as prone to think, that at first Sight, we shou'd in the same way apprehend the Distance and Magnitude of Objects, as we do now; Which hath been shewn

to be a false and groundless Persuasion. And for the like Reasons, the same Censure may be past on the positive Assurance, that most Men, before they have thought sufficiently of the Matter, might have of their being able to determine by the Eye at first view, whether Objects were Erect or Inverse.

CI. It will, perhaps be objected to our Opinion, that a Man, for Instance, being thought Erect when his Feet are next the Earth, and Inverted when his Head is next the Earth, it doth hence follow, that by the meer act of Vision, without any Experience or altering the Situation of the Eye, we shou'd have determined whether he were Erect or Inverted: For both the Earth it self, and the Limbs of the Man who stands thereon, being equally perceived by Sight, one cannot choose seeing, what part of the Man is nearest the Earth, and what part farthest from it, *i. e.* whether he be Erect or Inverted.

CII. To which I answer, the Ideas which constitute the Tangible Earth and Man, are intirely different from those which constitute the Visible Earth and Man. Nor was it possible, by virtue of the Visive Faculty alone, without superadding any Experience of Touch, or altering the Position of the Eye, ever to have known, or so much as suspected, there had been any Relation or Connexion between them: Hence, a Man at first view wou'd not denominate any thing he saw Earth, or Head, or Foot; and consequently, he cou'd not tell by the meer act of Vision, whether the Head or Feet were nearest the Earth: Nor, indeed, wou'd we have thereby any thought of Earth or Man, Erect or Inverse, at all: Which will be made yet more evident, if we nicely observe, and  
make

make a particular Comparifon between the Ideas of both Senfes.

CIII. That which I fee is only variety of Light and Colours. That which I feel is Hard or Soft, Hot or Cold, Rough or Smooth. What Similitude, what Connexion have thofe Ideas with thefe? Or how is it poffible, that any one fhould fee Reafon, to give one and the fame Name to Combinations of Ideas fo very different, before he had experienced their Coexiftence? We do not find there is any neceffary Connexion betwixt this or that Tangible Quality, and any Colour whatfoever. And we may fometimes perceive Colours, where there is nothing to be felt. All which doth make it manifeft, that no Man at firft receiving of his Sight, would know there was any Agreement between this or that particular Object of his Sight, and any Object of Touch he had been already acquainted with: The Colours therefore of the Head, would to him no more fuggelt the Idea of Head, than they would the Idea of Foot.

CIV. Farther, we have at large fhewn (vid. SECT. LXIII and LXIV.) there is no dicoverable, neceffary Connexion, between any given Vifible Magnitude, and any one particular Tangible Magnitude; but that it is intirely the refult of Custom and Experience, and depends on foreign and accidental Circumftances, that we can by the Perception of Vifible Extension inform our felves, what may be the Extension of any Tangible Object connected with it. Hence it is certain that neither the Vifible Magnitude of Head or Foot, would bring along with them into the Mind, at firft opening of the Eyes, the refpective Tangible Magnitudes of thofe Parts.

CV. By the foregoing Section, it is plain the Visible Figure of any Part of the Body hath no necessary Connexion with the Tangible Figure thereof, so as at First Sight to suggest it to the Mind: For Figure is the Termination of Magnitude, whence it follows, that no Visible Magnitude, having in its own Nature an aptness to suggest any one particular Tangible Magnitude, so neither can any Visible Figure be inseparably connected with its corresponding Tangible Figure: So as of it self and in a way prior to Experience, it might suggest it to the Understanding. This will be farther evident, if we consider that what seems smooth and round to the Touch, may to Sight, if viewed through a Microscope, seem quite otherwise.

CVI. From all which laid together and duly considered, we may clearly deduce this Inference. In the first act of Vision, no Idea entering by the Eye, wou'd have a perceivable Connexion with the Ideas to which the Names Earth, Man, Head, Foot, &c. were annexed in the Understanding of a Person Blind from his Birth; so as in any sort to introduce them into his Mind, or make themselves be called by the same Names, and reputed the same Things with them, as afterwards they come to be.

CVII. There doth, nevertheless, remain one Difficulty, which perhaps may seem to press hard on our Opinion, and deserve not to be passed over: For though it be granted that neither the Colour, Size, nor Figure of the visible Feet have any necessary Connexion with the Ideas that compose the Tangible Feet, so as to bring them at first sight into my Mind, or make me in danger of confounding them before I had been used to, and for some time experienced their Connexion: Yet thus much seems undeniable

undeniable, namely, that the Number of the visible Feet, being the same with that of the Tangible Feet, I may from hence without any Experience of Sight, reasonably conclude, that they represent or are connected with the Feet rather than the Head. I say, it seems the Idea of two visible Feet will sooner suggest to the Mind, the Idea of two tangible Feet than of one Head; so that the blind Man upon first Reception of the visive Faculty might know, which were the Feet or Two, and which the Head or One.

CVIII. In order to get clear of this seeming Difficulty, we need only observe, that Diversity of visible Objects doth not necessarily infer diversity of tangible Objects corresponding to them. A Picture painted with great variety of Colours affects the Touch in one uniform manner; it is therefore evident, that I do not by any necessary Consecution, independent of Experience, judge of the number of things Tangible, from the Number of things Visible. I shou'd not therefore at first opening my Eyes conclude, that because I see two I shall feel two. How, therefore can I, before Experience teaches me, know that the visible Legs, because two, are connected with the tangible Legs, or the visible Head, because one is connected with the tangible Head? The truth is, the things I see are so very different and heterogeneous from the things I feel, that the Perception of the one wou'd never have suggested the other to my thoughts, or enabled me to pass the least Judgment thereon, until I had experienced their Connexion.

CIX. But for a fuller Illustration of this Matter, it ought to be considered that Number (however some may reckon it amongst the Primary Qualities) is nothing fixed and settled, really existing in things them-

themselves. It is intirely the Creature of the Mind, considering, either an Idea by it self, or any Combination of Ideas to which it gives one Name, and so makes it pass for an Unite. According as the Mind variously combines its Ideas, the Unite varies; and as the Unite, so the Number, which is only a Collection of Unites, doth also vary. We call a Window one, a Chimney one, and yet a House in which there are many Windows, and many Chimneys, hath an equal right to be called one, and many Houses go to the making of one City. In these and the like Instances, it is evident the *Unite* constantly relates to the particular Draughts the Mind makes of its Ideas, to which it affixes Names, and wherein it includes more or less, as best suits its own Ends and Purposes. Whatever therefore the Mind considers as one, that is an Unite. Every Combination of Ideas is considered as one thing by the Mind, and in token thereof is marked by one Name. Now, this Naming and Combining together of Ideas is perfectly arbitrary, and done by the Mind in such sort, as Experience shews it to be most convenient: Without which, our Ideas had never been collected into such fundry distinct Combinations as they now are.

CX. Hence it follows, that a Man born Blind, and afterwards, when grown up, made to see, wou'd not in the first act of Vision, parcel out the Ideas of Sight, into the same distinct Collections that others do, who have experienced which do regularly coexist and are proper to be bundled up together under one Name. He wou'd not, for Example, make into one complex Idea, and thereby esteem, and unite all those particular Ideas, which constitute the visible Head or Foot. For there can be no Reason assigned why he shou'd do so, barely upon his seeing a Man stand upright before him:  
There

There croud into his Mind the Ideas which compose the visible Man, in company with all the other Ideas of Sight perceiv'd at the same time: But all these Ideas offer'd at once to his View, he wou'd not distribute into fundry distinct Combinations, till such time as by observing the Motion of the Parts of the Man and other Experiences, he comes to know, which are to be separated, and which to be collected together.

CXI. From what hath been premised, it is plain the Objects of Sight and Touch make, if I may so say, two Sets of Ideas, which are widely different from each other. To Objects of either kind, we indifferently attribute the Terms high and low, right and left, and such like, denoting the Position or Situation of things: But then we must well observe that the Position of any Object is determined with respect only to Objects of the same Sense. We say any Object of Touch is high or low, according as it is more or less distant from the tangible Earth: And in like manner we denominate any Object of Sight high or low, in Proportion as it is more or less distant from the visible Earth: But to define the Situation of visible Things, with relation to the Distance they bear from any tangible Thing, or *vice versa*, this were absurd and perfectly unintelligible. For all visible things are equally in the Mind, and take up no part of the external Space: And consequently are equidistant from any tangible thing, which exists without the Mind.

CXII. Or rather to speak truly, the proper Objects of Sight are at no Distance, neither near nor far from any tangible Thing. For if we inquire narrowly into the Matter we shall find that those things only are compared together in respect of Distance, which exist after the same manner, or

appertain unto the same Sense. For by the Distance between any two Points, nothing more is meant than the Number of intermediate Points: If the given Points are visible, the Distance between them is marked out by the Number of the interjacent visible Points: If they are tangible, the Distance between them is a Line consisting of tangible Points; but if they are one Tangible, and the other Visible, the Distance between them doth neither consist of Points perceivable by Sight nor by Touch, *i. e.* it is utterly inconceivable. This, perhaps, will not find an easy Admission into all Mens Understanding: However, I should gladly be informed whether it be not true, by any one who will be at the pains to reflect a little, and apply it home to his Thoughts.

CXIII. The not observing what has been delivered in the two last Sections, seems to have occasioned no small part of the Difficulty that occurs in the Business of Erect Appearances. The Head, which is painted nearest the Earth, seems to be farthest from it; and on the other hand, the Feet, which are painted farthest from the Earth, are thought nearest to it. Herein lies the Difficulty, which vanishes if we express the thing more clearly and free from Ambiguity, thus: How comes it that, to the Eye, the visible Head which is nearest the tangible Earth, seems farthest from the Earth, and the visible Feet, which are farthest from the tangible Earth, seem nearest the Earth? The Question being thus proposed, who sees not the Difficulty is founded on a Supposition, that the Eye, or visive Faculty, or rather the Soul by means thereof, shou'd judge of the Situation of visible Objects, with reference to their Distance from the tangible Earth? Whereas it is evident the tangible Earth is not perceived by Sight: And it hath been



been shewn in the two last preceding Sections, that the Location of Visible Objects is determined only by the Distance they bear from one another; and that it is Nonsense to talk of Distance, far or near, between a visible and tangible Thing.

CXIV. If we confine our Thoughts to the proper Objects of Sight, the whole is plain and easy. The Head is painted farthest from, and the Feet nearest to the visible Earth; and so they appear to be. What is there strange or unaccountable in this? Let us suppose the Pictures in the Fund of the Eye, to be the immediate Objects of the Sight. The Consequence is, that things shou'd appear in the same Posture they are painted in; and is it not so? The Head which is seen, seems farthest from the Earth which is seen; and the Feet, which are seen, seem nearest to the Earth which is seen; and just so they are painted.

CXV. But, say you, the Picture of the Man is inverted, and yet the Appearance is Erect: I ask, what mean you by the Picture of the Man, or, which is the same thing, the visible Man's being inverted? You tell me it is inverted, because the Heels are uppermost, and the Head undermost? Explain me this. You say, that by the Head's being undermost, you mean that it is nearest to the Earth; and by the Heels being uppermost, that they are farthest from the Earth. I ask again, what Earth you mean? You cannot mean the Earth that is painted on the Eye, or the visible Earth: For the Picture of the Head is farthest from the Picture of the Earth, and the Picture of the Feet nearest to the Picture of the Earth; and accordingly the visible Head is farthest from the visible Earth, and the visible Feet nearest to it. It remains, therefore, that you mean the tangible Earth, and so determine the Situation of visible things with respect to tangible Things; contrary to what

bath been demonstrated in SECT. CXI. and CXII. The two distinct Provinces of Sight and Touch shou'd be considered apart, and as if their Objects had no Intercourse, no manner of Relation to one another, in point of Distance or Position.

CXVI. Farther, what greatly contributes to make us mistake in this Matter is, that when we think of the Pictures in the Fund of the Eye, we imagine our selves looking on the Fund of another's Eye, or another looking on the Fund of our own Eye, and beholding the Pictures painted thereon. Suppose two Eyes A and B: A from some distance looking on the Pictures in B sees them inverted, and for that reason concludes they are inverted in B: But this is wrong. There are projected in little on the Bottom of A, the Images of the Pictures of, suppose Man, Earth, &c. which are painted on B. And besides these, the Eye B it self, and the Objects which environ it, together with another Earth, are projected in a larger Size on A. Now, by the Eye A, these larger Images are deemed the true Objects, and the lesser only Pictures in miniature. And it is with respect to those greater Images, that it determines the Situation of the smaller Images: So that comparing the little Man with the great Earth, A judges him inverted, or that the Feet are farthest from, and the Head nearest to the great Earth. Whereas, if A compare the little Man with the little Earth, then he will appear Erect, *i. e.* his Head shall seem farthest from, and his Feet nearest to the little Earth. But we must consider that B does not see two Earths as A does: It sees only what is represented by the little Pictures in A, and consequently shall judge the Man Erect: For, in truth, the Man in B is not inverted, for there the Feet are next the Earth; but it is the Representation of it in A which is inverted,  
for

for there the Head of the Representation of the Picture of the Man in B is next the Earth, and the Feet farthest from the Earth, meaning the Earth which is without the Representation of the Pictures in B. For if you take the little Images of the Pictures in B, and consider them by themselves, and with respect only to one another, they are all Erect and in their natural Posture.

CXVII. Farther, there lies a Mistake in our imagining that the Pictures of external Objects are painted on the Bottom of the Eye. It hath been shewn, there is no resemblance between the Ideas of Sight, and things Tangible. It hath likewise been demonstrated, that the proper Objects of Sight do not exist without the Mind. Whence it clearly follows, that the Pictures painted on the Bottom of the Eye, are not the Pictures of external Objects. Let any one consult his own Thoughts, and then say what Affinity, what Likeness there is between that certain Variety and Disposition of Colours, which constitute the visible Man, or Picture of a Man, and that other Combination of far different Ideas, sensible by Touch, which compose the tangible Man. But if this be the Case, how come they to be accounted Pictures or Images, since that supposes them to copy or represent some Originals or other?

CXVIII. To which I answer: In the forementioned Instance, the Eye A takes the little Images, included within the Representation of the other Eye B, to be Pictures or Copies, whereof the Archetypes are not things existing without, but the larger Pictures projected on its own Fund: and which by A are not thought Pictures, but the Originals, or true Things themselves. Though if we suppose a third Eye C, from a due Distance to

behold the Fund of A, then indeed the Things projected thereon, shall, to C, seem Pictures or Images, in the same Sense that those projected on B do to A.

CXIX. Rightly to conceive this Point, we must carefully distinguish between the Ideas of Sight and Touch, between the visible and tangible Eye; for certainly on the tangible Eye, nothing either is or seems to be painted. Again, the visible Eye, as well as all other visible Objects, hath been shewn to exist only in the Mind, which perceiving its own Ideas, and comparing them together, calls some *Pictures* in respect of others. What hath been said, being rightly comprehended and laid together, doth, I think, afford a full and genuine Explication of the erect Appearance of Objects; which Phænomenon, I must confess, I do not see how it can be explained by any Theories of Vision hitherto made publick.

CXX. In treating of these things, the use of Language is apt to occasion some Obscurity and Confusion, and create in us wrong Ideas: For Language being accommodated to the Common Notions and Prejudices of Men, it is scarce possible to deliver the naked and precise Truth, without great Circumlocution, Impropropriety, and (to an unwary Reader) seeming Contradictions; I do, therefore, once for all desire whoever shall think it worth his while to understand what I have written concerning Vision, that he would not stick in this or that Phrase, or manner of Expression, but candidly collect my Meaning from the whole Sum and Tenor of my Discourse, and laying aside the Words as much as possible, consider the bare Notions themselves, and then judge whether they are agreeable to Truth and his own Experience, or no.

CXXI. We have shewn the way wherein the Mind by mediation of visible Ideas doth perceive or apprehend the Distance, Magnitude, and Situation of tangible Objects. I come now to inquire more particularly concerning the Difference between the Ideas of Sight and Touch, which are call'd by the same Names, and see whether there be any Idea common to both Senses. From what we have at large set forth and demonstrated in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, it is plain there is no one self same numerical Extension, perceived both by Sight and Touch; but that the particular Figures and Extensions perceived by Sight, however they may be called by the same Names, and reputed the same Things, with those perceived by Touch, are nevertheless different, and have an Existence distinct and separate from them: So that the Question is not now concerning the same numerical Ideas, but whether there be any one and the same sort or Species of Ideas equally perceivable to both Senses? Or, in other Words, whether Extension, Figure, and Motion perceived by Sight, are not specifically distinct from Extension, Figure and Motion perceived by Touch?

CXXII. But before I come more particularly to discuss this Matter, I find it proper to consider Extension in Abstract: For of this there is much talk, and I apt to think, that when Men speak of Extension, as being an Idea common to Two Senses, it is with a secret Supposition, that we can single out Extension from all other tangible and visible Qualities, and form thereof an Abstract Idea, which Idea they will have common both to Sight and Touch. We are therefore to understand by Extension in Abstract, an Idea of Extension; for instance, a Line or Surface, intirely stript of all o-

ther sensible Qualities and Circumstances that might determine it to any particular Existence; it is neither black nor white, nor red, nor hath it any Colour at all, or any tangible Quality whatsoever, and consequently it is of no finite determinate Magnitude: For that which bounds or distinguishes one Extension from another, is some Quality or Circumstance wherein they disagree.

CXXIII. Now I do not find that I can perceive, imagine, or any wise frame in my Mind such an abstract Idea, as is here spoken of. A Line or Surface, which is neither black, nor white, nor blue, nor yellow, &c. nor long, nor short, nor rough, nor smooth, nor square, nor round, &c. is perfectly incomprehensible. This I am sure of as to my self; how far the Faculties of other Men may reach, they best can tell.

CXXIV. It is commonly said, that the Object of Geometry is abstract Extension; but Geometry contemplates Figures: Now, Figure is the Termination of Magnitude, but we have shewn that Extension in Abstract hath no finite determinate Magnitude, whence it clearly follows that it can have no Figure, and consequently is not the Object of Geometry. It is indeed a Tenet as well of the modern as of the ancient Philosophers, that all general Truths are concerning universal abstract Ideas; without which, we are told, there cou'd be no Science, no Demonstration of any general Proposition in Geometry. But it were no hard matter, did I think it necessary to my present Purpose, to shew that Propositions and Demonstrations in Geometry might be Universal, though they who make them, never think of abstract general Ideas of Triangles or Circles.

CXXV. After reiterated endeavours to apprehend the general Idea of a Triangle, I have found it altogether incomprehensible. And surely if any one were able to introduce that Idea into my Mind, it must be the Author of the *Essay concerning Humane Understanding*; He, who has so far distinguished himself from the generality of Writers, by the Clearness and Significancy of what he says. Let us therefore see how this celebrated Author describes the general, or abstract Idea of a Triangle. 'It must be (says he) neither Oblique, nor Rectangular, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenum; but all and none of these at once. In effect it is somewhat imperfect that cannot exist; an Idea, wherein some Parts of several different and inconsistent Ideas are put together'. *Essay on Hum. Understanding. B. iv. C. 7. S. 9.* This is the Idea, which he thinks needful, for the Enlargement of Knowledge, which is the Subject of Mathematical Demonstration, and without which we could never come to know any general Proposition concerning Triangles. That Author acknowledges it doth 'require some Pains and Skill to form this general Idea of a Triangle.' *Ibid.* But had he called to mind what he says in another place, to wit, 'That Ideas of mixed Modes wherein any inconsistent Ideas are put together, cannot so much as exist in the Mind, *i. e.* be conceived'. *Vid. B. iii. C. 10. S. 33. Ibid.* I say, had this occurred to his Thoughts, it is not improbable he would have owed it above all the Pains and Skill he was master of, to form the above-mentioned Idea of a Triangle, which is made up of manifest, staring Contradictions. That a Man who thought so much, and laid so great a stress on clear and determinate Ideas, shou'd nevertheless talk at this rate, seems very surprising. But the wonder will lessen

lessen if it be considered, that the Source whence this Opinion flows, is the prolific Womb which has brought forth innumerable Errors and Difficulties, in all parts of Philosophy, and in all the Sciences: But this Matter, taken in its full Extent, were a Subject too vast and comprehensive to be insisted on in this place. And so much for Extension in Abstract.

CXXVI. some, perhaps, may think pure Space, *Vacuum*, or Trine Dimension to be equally the Object of Sight and Touch: But though we have a very great Propension, to think the Ideas of Outness and Space to be the immediate Object of Sight; yet if I mistake not, in the foregoing Parts of this Essay, That hath been clearly demonstrated to be a meer Delusion, arising from the quick and sudden suggestion of Fancy, which so closely connects the Idea of Distance with those of Sight, that we are apt to think it is it self a proper and immediate Object of that Sense, till Reason corrects the Mistake.

CXXVII. It having been shewn, that there are no Abstract Ideas of Figure, and that it is impossible for us, by any Precision of Thought, to frame an Idea of Extension separate from all other Visible and Tangible Qualities, which shall be common both to Sight and Touch: The Question now remaining is, whether the particular Extensions, Figures and Motions perceived by Sight be of the same kind, with the particular Extensions, Figures, and Motions perceived by Touch? In answer to which, I shall venture to lay down the following Proposition: *The Extension, Figures, and Motions, perceived by Sight are specifically distinct from the Ideas of Touch, called by the same Names, nor is there any such thing as one Idea, or kind of Idea common to both*



*both Senses.* This Proposition may, without much Difficulty, be collected from what hath been said in several Places of this Essay. But, because it seems so remote from, and contrary to, the received Notions and settled Opinion of Mankind, I shall attempt to demonstrate it more particularly, and at large, by the following Arguments.

CXXVIII. When upon Perception of an Idea, I range it under this or that sort; it is because it is perceived after the same manner, or because it has a Likeness or Conformity with, or affects me in the same way as the Ideas of the sort I rank it under. In short, it must not be intirely new, but have something in it Old, and already perceived by me: It must, I say, have so much, at least, in common with the Ideas I have before known and named, as to make me give it the same Name with them. But it has been, if I mistake not, clearly made out, that a Man born Blind wou'd not at first reception of his Sight, think the Things he saw were of the same Nature with the Objects of Touch, or had any thing in common with them; but that they were a new Set of Ideas, perceived in a new manner, and intirely different from all he had ever perceived before: So that he wou'd not call them by the same Name, nor repute them to be of the same Sort, with any thing he had hitherto known.

CXXIX. *Secondly*, Light and Colours are allowed by all to constitute a sort or Species intirely different from the Ideas of Touch: Nor will any Man, I presume, say they can make themselves perceived by that Sense: But there is no other immediate Object of Sight, besides Light and Colours. It is therefore a direct Consequence, that there is no Idea common to both Senses.

CXXX.

CXXX. It is a prevailing Opinion, even amongst those who have thought and writ most accurately concerning our Ideas, and the Ways whereby they enter into the Understanding, that something more is perceived by Sight, than barely Light and Colours with their Variations. Mr. *Locke* termeth Sight, ‘The most Comprehensive of all our Senses, conveying to our Minds the Ideas of Light and Colours, which are peculiar only to that Sense; and also the far different Ideas of Space, Figure and Motion.’ *Essay on Human Understand.* B. ii. C. 9. S. 9. Space or Distance, we have shewn is no otherwise the Object of Sight than of Hearing. *vid.* S E C T. XLVI. And as for Figure and Extension, I leave it to any one, that shall calmly attend to his own clear and distinct Ideas, to decide whether he has any Idea introduced immediately and properly by Sight, save only Light and Colours: Or whether it be possible for him, to frame in his Mind a distinct Abstract Idea of Visible Extension, or Figure, exclusive of all Colour; and on the other hand, whether he can conceive Colour without Visible Extension? For my own part, I must confess, I am not able to attain so great a nicety of Abstraction; in a strict Sense, I see nothing but Light and Colours, with their several Shades and Variations. He who beside these doth also perceive by Sight Ideas far different and distinct from them, hath that Faculty in a degree more perfect and comprehensive than I can pretend to. It must be owned, that by the mediation of Light and Colours, other far different Ideas are suggested to my Mind: but so they are by Hearing, which beside Sounds which are peculiar to that Sense, doth by their mediation suggest not only Space, Figure and Motion, but also all other Ideas whatsoever that can be signified by Words.

CXXXI. *Thirdly*, It is, I think, an Axiom universally received, that Quantities of the same kind may be added together, and make one intire Sum. Mathematicians add Lines together; but they do not add a Line to a Solid, or conceive it as making one Sum with a Surface: These three kinds of Quantity being thought incapable of any such mutual Addition, and consequently of being compared together, in the several ways of Proportion, are by them esteemed intirely Disparate and Heterogeneous. Now let any one try in his Thoughts to add a Visible Line or Surface to a Tangible Line or Surface, so as to conceive them making one continued Sum or Whole. He that can do this, may think them Homogeneous; but he that cannot must, by the foregoing Axiom, think them Heterogeneous: A Blue, and a Red Line I can conceive added together into one Sum, and making one continued Line; but to make, in my Thoughts, one continued Line of a Visible and Tangible Line added together is, I find, a Task far more difficult, and even insurmountable; and I leave it to the Reflexion and Experience of every particular Person to determine for himself.

CXXXII. A farther Confirmation of our Tenet may be drawn from the Solution of Mr. *Molyneux's* Problem, published by Mr. *Locke* in his Essay: Which I shall set down as it there lies, together with Mr. *Locke's* Opinion of it, *'Suppose a Man  
'born Blind, and now Adult, and taught by his  
'Touch to distinguish between a Cube, and a Sphere  
'of the same Metal, and nighly of the same Bigness,  
'so as to tell, when he felt one and t'other, which is  
'the Cube, and which the Sphere. Suppose then the  
'Cube and Sphere placed on a Table, and the blind  
'Man to be made to See: Quære, Whether by his  
'Sight,*

' Sight, before he touch'd them, he could now distin-  
 ' guish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube.  
 ' To which the acute and judicious Proposer an-  
 ' swers: Not. For though he has obtained the Ex-  
 ' perience of, how a Globe, how a Cube affects his  
 ' Touch; yet he has not yet attained the Experience,  
 ' that what affects his Touch so or so, must affect his  
 ' Sight so or so: Or that a protuberant Angle in the  
 ' Cube, that pressed his Hand unequally, shall appear  
 ' to his Eye, as it doth in the Cube. I agree with  
 ' this thinking Gentleman, whom I am proud to  
 ' call my Friend, in his Answer to this his Prob-  
 ' lem; and am of opinion, that the blind Man, at  
 ' first Sight would not be able with certainty to  
 ' say, which was the Globe, which the Cube,  
 ' whilst he only saw them.' *Essay on Human Under-*  
*standing.* B. ii. C. 9. S. 8.

CXXXIII. Now, if a Square Surface perceived  
 by Touch be of the same sort with a Square Sur-  
 face perceived by Sight; it is certain the blind  
 Man here mentioned might know a Square Sur-  
 face, as soon as he saw it: It is no more but in-  
 troduced into his Mind, by a new Inlet, an Idea  
 he has been already well acquainted with. Since  
 therefore he is supposed to have known by his  
 Touch, that a Cube is a Body terminated by  
 Square Surfaces; and that a Sphere is not termi-  
 nated by Square Surfaces: upon the supposition  
 that a Visible and Tangible Square differ only in  
*numero*, it follows, that he might know, by the  
 unerring mark of the Square Surfaces, which was  
 the Cube, and which not, while he only saw them.  
 We must therefore allow, either that Visible Ex-  
 tension and Figures are specifically distinct from  
 Tangible Extension and Figures, or else, that the  
 Solution of this Problem, given by those two  
 thoughtful and ingenious Men, is wrong.

CXXXIV.

CXXXIV. Much more might be laid together in Proof of the Proposition I have advanced: But what has been said is, if I mistake not, sufficient to convince any one that shall yield a reasonable Attention: And, as for those that will not be at the pains of a little Thought, no Multiplication of Words will ever suffice to make them understand the Truth, or rightly conceive my Meaning.

CXXXV. I cannot let go the above-mentioned Problem without some Reflexion on it. It hath been made evident, that a Man blind from his Birth wou'd not, at first Sight, denominate any thing he saw, by the Names he had been used to appropriate to Ideas of Touch, *vid.* SECT. CVI. Cube, Sphere, Table, are Words he has known applied to Things perceivable by Touch, but to Things perfectly Intangible he never knew them applied. Those Words in their wonted application, always marked out to his Mind Bodies, or solid Things which were perceived by the Resistance they gave: But there is no Solidity, no Resistance or Protrusion perceived by Sight. In short, the Ideas of Sight are all new Perceptions, to which there be no Names annexed in his Mind; he cannot therefore understand what is said to him concerning them: And to ask of the two Bodies he saw placed on the Table, which was the Sphere, which the Cube, were, to him, a Question downright bantering and unintelligible; nothing he sees being able to suggest to his Thoughts, the Idea of Body, Distance, or in general, of any thing he had already known.

CXXXVI. It is a mistake, to think the same thing affects both Sight and Touch. If the same Angle or Square, which is the Object of Touch, be also the Object of Vision, what shou'd hinder  
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the blind Man, at first Sight, from knowing it? For though the Manner wherein it affects the Sight, be different from that wherein it affected his Touch; yet, there being, beside this Manner or Circumstance, which is new and unknown, the Angle or Figure, which is old and known, he cannot choose but discern it.

CXXXVII. Visible Figure and Extension having been demonstrated to be of a nature, intirely different and heterogeneous from tangible Figure and Extension, it remains that we inquire concerning Motion. Now that visible Motion is not of the same sort with tangible Motion, seems to need no farther Proof, it being an evident Corollary from what we have shewn concerning the Difference there is between visible and tangible Extension: But for a more full and exprefs Proof hereof, we need only observe, that one who had not yet experienced Vision, wou'd not at first sight know Motion. Whence it clearly follows, that Motion perceivable by Sight is of a sort distinct from Motion perceivable by Touch. The Antecedent I prove thus: By Touch he cou'd not perceive any Motion, but what was up or down, to the right or left, nearer or farther from him; besides these, and their several Varieties or Complications, it is impossible he shou'd have any Idea of Motion. He wou'd not therefore think any thing to be Motion, or give the name Motion to any Idea, which he cou'd not range under some or other of those particular kinds thereof. But from SECT. XCV, it is plain that by the meer act of Vision, he cou'd not know Motion upwards or downwards, to the right or left, or in any other possible Direction. From which I conclude, he wou'd not know Motion at all at first sight. As for the Idea of Motion in Abstract, I shall not waste Paper about it, but  
leave

leave it to my Reader, to make the best he can on't. To me it is perfectly Unintelligible.

CXXXVIII. The Consideration of Motion may furnish a new Field for Inquiry : But since the Manner wherein the Mind apprehends by Sight, the Motion of Tangible Objects, with the various Degrees thereof, may be easily collected, from what hath been said concerning the Manner, wherein that Sense doth suggest their various Distances, Magnitudes and Situations, I shall not enlarge any farther on this Subject, but proceed to inquire what may be alledged with greatest appearance of Reason, against the Proposition we have shewn to be true : For where there is so much Prejudice to be encountered, a bare and naked Demonstration of the Truth will scarce suffice. We must also satisfy the Scruples that Men may raise in favour of their preconceived Notions, shew whence the mistake arises, how it came to spread, and carefully disclose and root out those false Persuasions, that an early Prejudice might have implanted in the Mind.

CXXXIX. *First*, Therefore, it will be demanded, how visible Extension and Figures come to be called by the same Name, with tangible Extension and Figures, if they are not of the same kind with them ? It must be something more than Humour or Accident, that cou'd occasion a Custom so constant and universal as this, which has obtained in all Ages and Nations of the World, and amongst all Ranks of Men, the Learned as well as the Illiterate.

CXL. To which I answer, we can no more argue a visible and tangible Square to be of the same Species, from their being called by the same Name,

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than we can, that a tangible Square and the Monosyllable consisting of Six Letters, whereby it is marked, are of the same Species because they are both called by the same Name. It is customary to call written Words, and the Things they signify, by the same Name : For Words not being regarded in their own Nature, or otherwise than as they are Marks of Things, it had been superfluous, and beside the design of Language, to have given them Names distinct from those of the Things marked by them. The same Reason holds here also. Visible Figures are the Marks of tangible Figures, and from SECT. LIX. it is plain, that in themselves they are little regarded, or upon any other Score than for their Connexion with tangible Figures, which by Nature they are ordained to signify. And because this Language of Nature does not vary in different Ages or Nations, hence it is, that in all Times and Places, visible Figures are called by the same Names, as the respective tangible Figures suggested by them, and not because they are alike, or of the same sort with them.

CXLI. But, say you, surely a tangible Square is liker to a visible Square, than to a visible Circle : It has four Angles, and as many Sides ; so also has the visible Square, but the visible Circle has no such thing, being bounded by one uniform Curve, without right Lines or Angles, which makes it unfit to represent the tangible Square, but very fit to represent the tangible Circle. Whence it clearly follows, that visible Figures are Patrons of, or of the same Species with the respective tangible Figures represented by them ; that they are like unto them, and of their own Nature fitted to represent them, as being of the same sort ; and that they are in no respect arbitrary Signs, as Words.

CXLII.



CXLII. I answer, it must be acknowledged, the visible Square is fitter than the visible Circle, to represent the tangible Square, but then it is not because it is liker, or more of a Species with it ; but because the visible Square contains in it several distinct Parts, whereby to mark the several distinct, corresponding Parts of a tangible Square, whereas the visible Circle doth not. The Square perceived by Touch, hath four distinct, equal Sides, so also hath it four distinct equal Angles. It is therefore necessary, that the visible Figures which shall be most proper to mark it, contain four distinct equal Parts corresponding to the four Sides of the tangible Square ; as likewise four other distinct and equal Parts, whereby to denote the four equal Angles of the tangible Square. And accordingly we see the visible Figures contain in them distinct visible Parts, answering to the distinct tangible Parts of the Figures signified, or suggested by them.

CXLIII. But it will not hence follow, that any visible Figure is like unto, or of the same Species with its corresponding tangible Figure, unless it be also shewen, that not only the Number, but also the Kind of the Parts be the same in both. To illustrate this, I observe that visible Figures represent tangible Figures, much after the same manner that written Words do Sounds. Now, in this respect, Words are not arbitrary, it not being indifferent, what written Word stands for any Sound : But it is requisite, that each Word contain in it so many distinct Characters, as there are Variations in the Sound it stands for. Thus the single Letter *a* is proper to mark one simple uniform Sound ; and the word *Adultery* is accommodated to represent the Sound annexed to it, in

the Formation whereof, there being eight different Collisions, or Modifications of the Air by the Organs of Speech, each of which produces a difference of Sound, it was fit, the Word representing it shou'd consist of as many distinct Characters, thereby to mark each particular Difference or Part of the whole Sound : And yet no Body, I presume will say, the single Letter *a*, or the word *Adultery* are like unto, or of the same Species with the respective Sounds by them represented. It is indeed arbitrary that, in general, Letters of any Language represent Sounds at all ; but when that is once agreed, it is not arbitrary what Combination of Letters shall represent this or that particular Sound. I leave this with the Reader to pursue, and apply it in his own Thoughts.

CXLIV. It must be confess'd that we are not so apt to confound other Signs with the Things signified, or to think them of the same Species, as we are visible and tangible Ideas. But a little Consideration will shew us how this may be, without our supposing them of a like Nature. These Signs are constant and universal, their Connexion with tangible Ideas has been learnt at our first Entrance into the World ; and ever since, almost every Moment of our Lives, it has been occurring to our Thoughts, and fastening and striking deeper on our Minds. When we observe that Signs are variable, and of Humane Institution ; when we remember, there was a time they were not connected in our Minds, with those things they now so readily suggest ; but that their Signification was learned by the slow Steps of Experience : This preserves us from confounding them. But when we find the same Signs suggest the same Things all over the World ; when we know they are not of Humane  
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Institution, and cannot remember that we ever learned their Signification, but think that at first Sight they would have suggested to us the same Things they do now : All this persuades us they are of the same Species as the Things respectively represented by them, and that it is by a natural Resemblance they suggest them to our Minds.

CXLV. Add to this, that whenever we make a nice Survey of any Object, successively directing the Optic Axis to each Point thereof; there are certain Lines and Figures described by the Motion of the Head or Eye, which being in truth perceived by Feeling, do nevertheless to mix themselves as it were, with the Ideas of Sight, that we can scarce think but they appertain to that Sense. Again, the Ideas of Sight enter into the Mind, several at once more distinct and unmingled, than is usual in the other Senses beside the Touch. Sounds, for example, perceived at the same Instant, are apt to coalesce, if I may so say, into one Sound : But we can perceive at the same time great variety of visible Objects, very separate and distinct from each other. Now tangible Extension being made up of several Distinct coexistent parts, we may hence gather another Reason, that may dispose us to imagine a Likeness or Analogy between the immediate Objects of Sight and Touch. But nothing, certainly, doth more contribute to blend and confound them together, than the strict and close Connexion they have with each other. We cannot open our Eyes, but the Ideas of Distance, Bodies, and tangible Figures are suggested by them. So swift and sudden, and unperceiv'd is the Transition from visible to tangible Ideas, that we can scarce forbear thinking them equally the immediate Object of Vision.

CXLVI. The Prejudice, which is grounded on these, and whatever other Causes may be assigned thereof, sticks so fast, that it is impossible without obstinate Striving, and Labour of the Mind, to get intirely clear of it. But then the Reluctancy we find, in rejecting any Opinion, can be no Argument of its Truth, to whoever considers what has been already shewn, with regard to the Prejudices we entertain concerning the Distance, Magnitude, and Situation of Objects; Prejudices so familiar to our Minds, so confirmed and inveterate, as they will hardly give way to the clearest Demonstration.

CXLVII. Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude, that the proper Objects of Vision constitute an Universal Language of the Author of Nature, whereby we are instructed how to regulate our Actions, in order to attain those things, that are necessary to the Preservation and Well-being of our Bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them. It is by their Information that we are principally guided in all the Transactions and Concerns of Life. And the manner wherein they signify, and mark unto us the Objects which are at a Distance, is the same with that of Languages and Signs of Humane Appointment, which do not suggest the things signified, by any likeness or Indentity of Nature, but only by an habitual Connexion, that Experience has made us to observe between them.

CXLVIII. Suppose one who had always continued Blind, be told by his Guide, that after he has advanced so many Steps, he shall come to the Brink of a Precipice, or be stopt by a Wall; must not this

this to him seem very admirable and surprizing? He cannot conceive how it is possible for Mortals to frame such Predictions as these, which to him would seem as strange and unaccountable, as Prophecy doth to others. Even they who are blessed with the visive Faculty, may (though familiarity make it less observed) find therein sufficient Cause of Admiration. The wonderful Art and Contrivance wherewith it is adjusted to those Ends and Purposes for which it was apparently designed, the vast Extent, Number, and Variety of Objects that are at once with so much ease, and quickness, and pleasure suggested by it: All these afford Subject for much and pleasing Speculation, and may, if any thing, give us some glimmering, analogous Prænotion of Things, which are placed beyond the certain Discovery and Comprehension of our present State.

CXLIX. I do not design to trouble my self with drawing Corollaries, from the Doctrine I have hitherto laid down. If it bears the Test, others may, so far as they shall think convenient, employ their Thoughts in extending it farther, and applying it to whatever Purposes it may be subservient to: Only, I cannot forbear making some Inquiry concerning the Object of Geometry, which the Subject we have been upon doth naturally lead one to. We have shewn there is no such Idea as that of Extension in Abstract, and that there are two kinds of sensible Extension and Figures, which are intirely distinct and heterogeneous from each other. Now, it is natural to inquire which of these is the Object of Geometry.

CL. Some things there are, which at first sight incline one to think Geometry conversant about

Visible Extension. The constant use of the Eyes, both in the practical and speculative Parts of that Science doth very much induce us thereto. It would, without doubt, seem odd to a Mathematician to go about to convince him, the Diagrams he saw upon Paper were not the Figures, or even the Likeness of the Figures, which make the Subject of the Demonstration. The contrary being held an unquestionable Truth, not only by Mathematicians, but also by those who apply themselves more particularly to the Study of Logick; I mean, who consider the Nature of Science, Certainty and Demonstration: It being by them assigned as one Reason, of the extraordinary Clearness and Evidence of Geometry, that in this Science the Reasonings are free from those Inconveniencies, which attend the use of arbitrary Signs, the very Ideas themselves being copied out, and exposed to view upon Paper. But, by the bye, how well this agrees with what they likewise assert of abstract Ideas, being the Object of Geometrical Demonstration, I leave to be considered.

CLI. To come to a Resolution in this Point, we need only observe what hath been said in SECT. LIX. LX. LXI. where it is shewn that visible Extensions in themselves are little regarded, and have no settled determinate Greatness, and that Men measure altogether, by the Application of Tangible Extension to Tangible Extension. All which makes it evident, that Visible Extension and Figures are not the Object of Geometry.

CLII. It is therefore plain that Visible Figures are of the same Use in Geometry, that Words are: And the one may as well be accounted the Object of that Science, as the other; neither of them being

ing any otherwise concerned therein, than as they represent or suggest to the Mind the particular Tangible Figures connected with them. There is indeed this Difference between the Signification of Tangible Figures by Visible Figures, and of Ideas by Words: That whereas the Latter is variable and uncertain, depending altogether on the Arbitrary Appointment of Men, the former is fixed, and immutably the same in all Times and Places. A Visible Square, for Instance, suggests to the Mind the same Tangible Figure in *Europe*, that it doth in *America*. Hence it is that the Voice of the Author of Nature, which speaks to our Eyes, is not liable to that Misinterpretation and Ambiguity, that Languages of Humane Contrivance are unavoidably subject to.

CLIII. Though what has been said may suffice to shew what ought to be determined, with relation to the Object of Geometry; I shall nevertheless, for the fuller illustration thereof, consider the Case of an Intelligence, or unbodied Spirit, which is supposed to see perfectly well, *i. e.* to have a clear Perception of the proper and immediate Objects of Sight, but to have no Sense of Touch. Whether there be any such Being in Nature or no, is beside my purpose to inquire. It sufficeth, that the Supposition contains no Contradiction in it. Let us now examine, what Proficiency such a one may be able to make in Geometry. Which Speculation will lead us more clearly to see, whether the Ideas of Sight can possibly be the Object of that Science,

CLIV. *First*, then it is certain, the aforesaid Intelligence could have no Idea of a Solid, or Quantity of three Dimensions, which followeth from

from its not having any Idea of Distance. We indeed are prone to think, that we have by Sight the Ideas of Space and Solids, which ariseth from our imagining that we do, strictly speaking, see Distance, and some parts of an Object at a greater distance than others; which hath been demonstrated to be the Effect of the Experience we have had, what Ideas of Touch are connected with such and such Ideas attending Vision: But the Intelligence here spoken of is supposed to have no Experience of Touch. He wou'd not, therefore judge as we do, nor have any Idea of Distance, Outness, or Profundity, nor consequently of Space or Body, either immediately or by Suggestion. Whence it is plain, he can have no Notion of those Parts of Geometry, which relate to the Mensuration of Solids, and their Convex or Concave Surfaces, and contemplate the Properties of Lines generated by the Section of a Solid. The conceiving of any part whereof, is beyond the reach of his Faculties.

CLV. Farther, he cannot comprehend the Manner wherein Geometers describe a right Line or Circle; the Rule and Compass with their use, being things of which it is impossible he should have any Notion: Nor is it an easier matter for him to conceive the placing of one Plain or Angle on another, in order to prove their Equality: Since that supposeth some Idea of Distance, or External Space. All which makes it evident, our pure Intelligence could never attain to know so much as the first Elements of plain Geometry. And perhaps, upon a nice Inquiry, it will be found, he cannot even have an Idea of plain Figures any more than he can of Solids; since some Idea of Distance is necessary, to form the Idea of  
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a Geometrical Plain, as will appear to whoever shall reflect a little on it.

CLVI. All that is properly perceived by the visive Faculty, amounts to no more than Colours with their Variations, and different Proportions of Light and Shade: But, the perpetual Mutability, and Fleetingness of those immediate Objects of Sight, render them incapable of being managed after the manner of Geometrical Figures; nor is it in any Degree useful that they should. It is true, there are divers of them perceived at once; and more of some, and less of others: But accurately to compute their Magnitude, and assign precise determinate Proportions, between Things so variable and inconstant, if we suppose it possible to be done, must yet be a very trifling and insignificant Labour,

CLVII. I must confess, it seems to be the Opinion of some ingenious Men, that flat or plain Figures are immediate Objects of Sight, though they acknowledge Solids are not. And this Opinion of theirs is grounded on what is observed in Painting, wherein (say they) the Ideas immediately imprinted on the Mind, are only of Plains variously coloured, which by a sudden Act of the Judgment are changed into Solids: But, with a little Attention we shall find the Plains here mentioned, as the immediate Objects of Sight, are not Visible but Tangible Plains. For when we say that Pictures are Plains: we mean thereby, that they appear to the Touch smooth and uniform. But then this Smoothness and Uniformity, or, in other Words, this Plainness of the Picture, is not perceived immediately by Vision: For it appeareth to the Eye various and multiform.

CLVIII.

CLVIII. From all which we may conclude, that Plains are no more the immediate Object of Sight than Solids. What we strictly see are not Solids, nor yet Plains variously coloured; they are only diversity of Colours. And some of these suggest to the Mind Solids, and others plain Figures; just as they have been experienced to be connected with the one, or the other: So that we see Plains, in the same way that we see Solids; both being equally suggested by the immediate Objects of Sight, which accordingly are themselves denominated Plains and Solids: But though they are called by the same Names, with the Things marked by them, they are nevertheless of a Nature intirely different, as hath been demonstrated.


CLIX. What hath been said is, if I mistake not, sufficient to decide the Question we propose to examine, concerning the Ability of a pure Spirit, such as we have described, to know *Geometry*: It is, indeed, no easy matter for us to enter precisely into the Thoughts of such an Intelligence; because we cannot, without great Pains, cleverly separate and disentangle in our Thoughts the proper Objects of Sight from those of Touch which are connected with them. This, indeed, in a compleat Degree, seems scarce possible to be performed: Which will not seem strange to us, if we consider how hard it is, for any one to hear the Words of his Native Language pronounced in his Ears without understanding them. Though he endeavour to disunite the meaning from the Sound, it will nevertheless intrude into his Thoughts, and he shall find it extreme difficult, if not impossible, to put himself exactly in the Posture of a Foreigner, that never learned the Language, so  
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as to be affected barely with the Sounds themselves, and not perceive the Signification annexed to them By this time, I suppose, it is clear that neither Abstract, nor Visible Extension makes the Object of Geometry; the not discerning of which may perhaps, have created some Difficulty and useless Labour in Mathematics.


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